Julian's Gods

Religion and philosophy in the thought and action of Julian the Apostate

ROWLAND SMITH

ROUTLEDGE

JULIAN'S GODS

Julian's brief reign (AD 361–3) saw the last attempt ever made by a Roman Emperor to counter the spread of Christianity. His personal repudiation of the faith and his efforts to reinvigorate pagan cult across the Empire made a profound impression on contemporaries, and gave him enduring notoriety as 'the Apostate' in later Christian tradition. But Julian was also long revered by nostalgic pagans as a lost champion of classical culture, and their vision of him rested on his own self-image: the last pagan Emperor saw himself as a philosopher as well as a king and military commander, and wrote prolifically on philosophic and theological themes. Most of these writings survive, but the bearing of Julian's speculative theology on his motivation and aims as a pagan is highly problematic, and the problem impinges on a broader debate about the feasibility of his religious policy at a time of accelerating Christian advance in antique society.

Julian's Gods examines the intellectual and religious allegiances voiced in Julian's writings and explores their impact on his religious politics. Julian was a Neoplatonist of sorts, but this book takes issue with recent accounts which view his philosophic monism as the fundamental shaping influence on his plan for a pagan restoration; it aims to show that a long-established pattern of polytheist piety remained central to the religion of both the public and the private man. Julian's intellectual interests ranged widely, however, and the discussion in *Julian's Gods* extends beyond his devotional practice and theology to review the cultural mentality and political ideals of an ambitious ruler who was also a learned man of letters and a gifted author in his own right.

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Prayers without sacrifice are only words, prayers with sacrifice are animated words.

Sallustius, *On the gods and the universe*

He did not feast some and ignore others, but made libation to all the gods whom the poets have passed down – ancestral parents and their offspring, gods and goddesses, ruling and ruled – and filled the altars of all of them with sheep and oxen.

Libanius, *Oration XVII*

How much more individual still was the character they assumed from being designated by names, names that were for themselves alone, proper names such as people have.

Proust, *Du côté de chez Swann*, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff

To Pandora

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ABBREVIATIONS

(Titles of periodicals are abbreviated according to the conventions of *L'Année philologique*.)

ANRW	*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, I.1–, ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase, Berlin/New York 1972–
Billerbeck, *EVK*	M. Billerbeck, *Epictet Vom Kynismus*, Philosophia Antiqua XXXIV, Leiden, 1978
CCCA	*Corpus Cultus Cybelae Attidisque*, ed. M.J. Vermaseren, Leiden 1977–89 [=*EPROER* 50]
CIMRM	*Corpus Inscriptionum et Monumentorum Religionis Mithriacae*, ed. M.J. Vermaseren, The Hague 1958
CSEL	*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*
ELF	*Iuliani Epistulae Leges Poematia Fragmenta Varia*, ed. J. Bidez and F. Cumont, Paris 1922
EPROER	*Études préliminaires aux réligions orientales dans l'empire romain*
Eunap. *VS*	Eunapius, *Vitae Sophistarum*, ed. J.F. Boissonade, Paris 1878, rev. W.C. Wright, *Philostratus and Eunapius, Lives of the Sophists* (Loeb Series), London, 1921: cited in the pagination of both Boissonade and Wright (=W), e.g. Eunap. *VS* 453/342W
Journ. Mithr. Stud.	*Journal of Mithraic Studies*
Mith. Stud.	*Mithraic Studies*, I–II, ed. J. Hinnells, Manchester 1975.

OC	*Oracles Chaldaïques*, ed. E. des Places, Paris 1971
PG	*Patrologia Graeca*
PGM	*Papyri graecae magicae*, ed. K. Preisendanz, Leipzig, 1929–41
PLRE	A.H.M. Jones, J. Martindale and J. Morris, *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, I–II, Cambridge 1971–80
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*
TMMM	F. Cumont, *Textes et monuments relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra*, I–II, Brussels 1896–7

NOTE ON CITATIONS FROM JULIAN'S WORKS

Source-references in the text and notes to Julian's writings are cited by title of work only, omitting the author: eg. *Or.* 4.131a, *Caes* 306a.

The modern editions of Julian in the Loeb and Budé series use different systems to denote individual works. Citations here follow the Loeb in retaining the conventional numbering of the *Orations*:

Or. 1 = *Panegyric in Honour of Constantius*
Or. 2 = *Panegyric on the Deeds of Constantius*, or *On Kingship*
Or. 3 = *Panegyric in Honour of the Empress Eusebia*
Or. 4 = *To King Helios*
Or. 5 = *To the Mother of the Gods*
Or. 6 = *Against the Uneducated Cynics*
Or. 7 = *Against Heraclius the Cynic*
Or. 8 = *Consolation to Himself on the Departure of Sallustius*

The *Ceasars* (= *Caes.*), *Misopogon*, *Letter to the Athenians* (= *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.*), *Letter to Themistius* (= *Ep. ad Them.*), *Letter to a Priest* and the fragments of the *Contra Galilaeos* (= *CG*) are cited by title.

Citations of the above works normally follow Loeb text of W.C. Wright, with occasional departures signalled in the notes. For consistency and brevity, source-references in the main text to *Letters* of Julian are cited by a Loeb letter-number only, but J. Bidez's differently numbered edition of the letters (Vol. I.ii in the Budé) is here preferred as textually superior, and references in the notes add the Budé letter-number also, in brackets: eg. *Ep.* 1 (13 Bidez).

PREFACE

The reign of the Emperor Julian was brief, and it ended in débâcle. When he died in the summer of AD 363 he had ruled undisputed barely a year and a half, and the projected invasion of Persia in the course of which he met his death was to issue in a signally humiliating reverse for Rome in the East. Julian's Persian campaign had been grandly conceived and prepared, but it was patently failing even before he was killed, and in the judgement of many the same was true of the best known of all his designs – his attempt, fifty years after Constantine's conversion to Christianity, at a pagan restoration in the cities of the Empire. On a common view, what Julian tried to do in this connection was unrealizable from the outset; on any view, the restoration and his other public purposes came to nothing.

None the less, very few antique figures have matched Julian's enduring fascination in later eyes, and the case has not appealed solely as a study in imperial failure: Julian's own personality and cultural mentality have held a powerful intrinsic attraction. In his lifetime, a large part of his reputation had rested on his fame as a daring and successful commander. On that score, it could not but suffer for the way the reign ended. But from the first there were other aspects to the man that made him an imperial rarity and attracted the interest of contemporaries. This Emperor was highly educated – a learned man of discriminating literary taste, an avid student of Greek philosophy, and a writer of respectable talent in his own right. These were personal interests, but they were reflected too in the Emperor's public style. Julian wore a philosopher's beard, and responded to the Antiochenes' ridicule of it with polished satire composed for public circulation; the civic inscriptions and oratory of politer subjects celebrated the rule of a lover of wisdom and letters. More than that: in Julian's case, the cultured interests were closely bound up with a

fervent religious sensibility which plainly impinged on central features of his public action. And the evolution of that sensibility had involved the repudiation of a Christian upbringing. Rome's last pagan Emperor was also antiquity's most notable pagan convert, a nephew of Constantine educated as a Christian prince under the supervision of leading bishops of the day: Julian was to be remembered chiefly as 'the Apostate'.

Julian's pagan allegiances and aims markedly coloured the attitudes taken towards him by writers of his day, and ensured that afterwards he was never the subject of scholarly interest only; his posthumous vagaries in popular legend and literature make an intriguing story which runs from the Syriac poetry of a fourth century monk to Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique* and the drama of Ibsen. For historians of antiquity, however, Julian's case holds a special interest on two basic grounds.

In the first place, the profusion and quality of the available evidence allows the case to be explored in rare detail and from a rare perspective. Far more writings survive from Julian's own hand than from any other Roman Emperor's, and they can be read in the light of extensive testimonies from a number of contemporaries, pagan and Christian, who had personal contact with him. They offer Roman historians an almost unparalleled chance to catch the cultural milieu of an individual Emperor, the texture of his personal attitudes and interests and contacts, and their impact on central aspects of his public action.

But second, even if the individual texture were quite lost to us, the reign of Julian would retain a broader significance for its bearing on a fundamental issue in fourth-century history. The attempt of a Roman Emperor in the 360s to promote a pagan restoration, and the fact of its failure, are features of a larger process: they plainly touch on the issue of the scale and pace of Christianization in the wake of the promotion of the Church by Constantine and his sons, and on the question whether it was any longer in the power of the imperial authority to check its advance. The Christianization of the Empire is currently a major focus of interest in Roman history and the debate has contributed to a renewed interest in Julian. Recent contributions have included several biographical studies, monographs and collaborative collections on particular political and cultural aspects of his case, new editions of some of his own writings, and new work on the representation of Julian in the accounts of his contemporaries (notably Ammianus' account in his *Res Gestae*). But much about the

case remains controversial. The modern biographies have differed markedly in their emphases and judgements: Bowersock's *Julian the Apostate*, for instance, achieved its elegant conciseness partly from its dismissive view of Julian's Neoplatonism as important only for the study of his emotional life; by contrast, it was a central claim of Athanassiadi-Fowden's *Julian and Hellenism* that Julian constructed an innovative politico-religious ideology on Neoplatonist principles.

So, too, the significance of his pagan activism in the broader context of the Christianizing process remains problematic, not least because the scale and pace of Christianization itself over the century preceding it is still disputed. One strand of opinion sees the reign of Constantine as more a symptom than a cause in the process. On this view, Christianity had strengthened by the later third century to a point that virtually ensured it a powerful subsequent advance anyway, and certainly made resistance to it after Constantine's conversion of the early fourth century a sideshow. On another view, nothing guaranteed a decisive advance before Constantine and nothing contributed more to the Church's success in the fourth century than his promotion of it – and perhaps too, nothing in principle entailed the utter failure of a counter-programme of pagan activism in Julian's day.

The focus of attention in this book is the cultural mentality of an individual Emperor, not the controversy over Christianization. On the broader issue it does not presuppose or argue for a definite answer. But to insist on discussing the individual case wholly in isolation from the broader issue would perversely underplay its interest, and though I have preferred for the most part to leave my view of the broader debate implicit, it is not neutral. Disagreement over the pace of Christianization continues partly because of a basic imbalance in the amount and types of evidence surviving from the third century as against the fourth: as the evidence stands, the debate is likelier to refine probabilities than to commend a conclusive answer. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that recent work has signally advanced and shifted the terms of the debate. We have been forcefully reminded that pagan practices, beliefs, and attitudes remained lively and resilient through the third century – and in important respects, well beyond it; after Lane Fox's *Pagans and Christians* and Bowersock's *Hellenism in Late Antiquity*, any general notion that the religious culture on which Christianity intruded was moribund looks distinctly unpersuasive. Against this background, the potential impact of an Emperor's pagan activism on the fortunes of pagan cult

in the mid-fourth century may in turn look an issue over which there is still room to differ. Even if there are signs that the restoration Julian worked for was faltering in his lifetime, it need not follow that it was hopeless for him to wish to promote the cause of pagans; explanations of the failure of his restoration will do better to focus on the specifics of the programme he initiated, and what they imply about the impulses and purposes behind it. Was the programme well conceived and well directed to win broad and active support from pagan subjects and to exploit weaknesses in the Church's position? Or did Julian somehow botch the job? Was there something irremediably eccentric in his own conception and practice of pagan cult – a monotheistic core to be linked to his Neoplatonist commitment in philosophy, or a residue, perhaps, from his Christian upbringing? – that impinged on the public programme in ways that fatally restricted its potential appeal and political effectiveness?

In this connection, at least, the recent writings on Julian have tended to concur. They are largely agreed that Julian's measures to promote paganism did reflect in the public sphere a personal notion of pagan piety that stood at odds with the assumptions and practices of mainstream Graeco-Roman polytheism, and that the programme's power to appeal to the majority of pagans was indeed diminished as a consequence. The consensus on this point in works that often disagree on other counts is suggestive, and the view they share at least seeks to explain why Julian's restoration failed in terms which allow for the possibility that a differently nuanced attempt might have fared better. None the less, it may still mislead. A monist element in Julian's theological and philosophic discourse as a Neoplatonist is plain to see. But whether he is aptly described as a pagan monotheist or henotheist is another question; and whether any such conviction decisively shaped his plans for a pagan restoration is another still. For one thing, quite what is the description intended to connote? As a historical phenomenon, monotheism is less unitary than the word may suggest and can exhibit significant variation; why else, after all (to speak only of its Christian version), the long disputes of the early Fathers over the conception of God as a Trinity? For another, there is no shortage in Julian's writings of ostensibly polytheist utterances; they are not obviously dissembling, and his public actions and prescriptions relate to a variety of cults and do not on the face of things commend exclusive allegiance to a single god. In short, there is a tension in the evidence that invites interpretation, and to describe Julian as essentially a monotheist whose utterances and actions at

times disguise the fact offers a means to explain the tension. But it is an interpretation whose playing down of an apparently substantial polytheist strand in the evidence could seem disquieting, and it is not the only possible interpretation.

There is no attempt in *Julian's Gods* to deny a monotheist or at least a henotheist strand in Julian's religious discourse: it is patent. Nor is it easy to suppose that a Christian education of the kind he received would leave no trace. But it is implicit in the book's title that I doubt if either offers the master-key to our understanding of Julian's religion, private or public. In my view his writings and actions disclose a mentality that remains in important respects an irreducibly polytheist mentality; and while there is no question that in some of its features his public activism borrows from Christianity, the claim that it was principally shaped by the wish to create a pagan Church on the base of a rival Neoplatonic monism is arguably a distortion. Here nuance is everything, and A.D. Nock's sentence is still worth quoting after fifty years: 'The religious policy was directed to the restoration of Greek traditional practice coupled with borrowed elements of ethical order, philanthropy, and organization, as effective weapons of Christianity' [*CAH*[1] XII, 447]. The phrasing is suggestive, both for what it chooses to put first and in its implication that the borrowings had a subsidiary place and purpose in Julian's design. Recent judgements have tended to shift the emphasis, but in my view the careful wording of Nock's verdict remains instructive, and in that sense I will argue a revisionist case in *Julian's Gods*.

There is a risk, admittedly, that the notion of 'Greek traditional practice' against which Nock measured Julian's restoration could itself mislead: the phenomenon it describes was not homogeneous, nor was it immune to change over time. But it has been well said that where basic Graeco-Roman attitudes to the gods are at issue, time passed very slowly, and that before Julian is convicted of wishing to 'put the clock back' to some vanished age of Antonine piety, we must be very clear that the hands of the clock had moved appreciably. In this connection I take 'traditional practice' to refer to acts of cult worship performed in a range of civic and private settings on certain basic assumptions: that a plurality of gods exists, however systematically or vaguely their relationship to one another and to humans is envisaged; that they are powerful forces in the world and must be honoured appropriately with prayer and sacrifice; and that in return they can be expected to help and favour those who worship them, showing themselves through oracles, dreams and omens.

To suppose that the issue of Julian's 'monotheism' can be settled beyond dispute would be naive: the argument yields interpetations, not proofs – and it could easily become an argument about terms. It would be unfortunate if it were to deflect attention too much from other, less intractable aspects of an intrinsically interesting case, and in this book it is a part of the argument, not the whole. My broad purpose is rather to clarify the texture, background and relationship of the religious and philosophic interests and attitudes disclosed in Julian's writings, and to consider their bearing on central aspects of his public action as Emperor – most evidently, on the blend of anti-Christian measures and pagan activism promoting what Julian called 'Hellenism'. The range of Julian's cultural knowledge and interests was not narrow, and my title could be construed in an extended sense: the reader could take 'Julian's gods' to refer not only to a set of deities, but to a cultural pantheon in which the guiding lights and heroes of Julian's Hellenism also found a place: ideals of human achievement, conduct and knowledge that he commends in his writings; the myths and texts that enshrine or explain them in his eyes; the humans he calls 'godlike' for what they had written or done. The focus of *Julian's Gods*, at any rate, is on the texture of Julian's cultural mentality in this extended sense, and its chapters are rooted in discussion of Julian's writings.

In my first chapter I introduce Julian as a writer, expand on the substance and relationship of the main issues to be addressed, and outline the content and order of discussion in the succeeding chapters. To some readers the figure of Julian may be relatively unfamiliar, and I have opened this introductory chapter with a summary and (I hope) uncontroversial account of the life and reign; but my book is not a biography, and they will look elsewhere for a fuller account of the political and military aspects. Some of the best treatments are not recent. As a rounded portrait, Bidez's biography remains in my view unsurpassed after sixty years, and a classic account in English is much older; Gibbon's chapters on Julian, once read, are unforgettable. Of the recent biographies, Bowersock's is the most astute on the political career, and its sharp account of Julian's personality cuts deep. It is notably curt, however, in treating of Julian's philosophic and theological interests. Athanassiadi-Fowden's stimulating and open-hearted 'intellectual biography' has justifiably given these aspects more emphasis and more sympathetic attention, but its view of their colour and significance is not one that I share: it will be plain to readers that I disagree on fundamentals in

my arguments and presuppositions, and that *Julian's Gods* points to a markedly different picture.

An earlier version of this book was written as a D.Phil. thesis at Oxford, and there are debts to be acknowledged. Worcester College and Oriel College provided congenial environments in which to work: I am especially grateful to the Fellows of Oriel and to the Gordon Milburn Research Fellowship Committee for electing me to a Research Fellowship. My initial interest in Late Roman history was first encouraged by the late Martin Frederiksen, then by John Matthews, who gave me shrewd advice as the supervisor of my research in its earliest stage and kind help later. I owe a special debt to Robin Lane Fox, an inspiring teacher of Homer to a first year undergraduate, and afterwards a research supervisor on whom I could count for acute advice and tactful encouragement. The examiners of the submitted thesis, David Hunt and Sam Lieu, made helpful criticisms and suggestions. I also wish to thank several friends and colleagues for helpful comments and stimulating conversations at various times on aspects of my subject: in particular, David Potter, Chris Pelling, Robert Parker, Nick Stylianou, John Moles, Tony Spawforth and Jerry Paterson. I also wish to thank my patient editors at Routledge, Richard Stoneman and Angie Doran, and to record my thanks to Nigel Hope for his astute and painstaking copy-editing. At the University of Newcastle, I am grateful to Donald Hill, the Head of the Department of Classics, for his helpfulness in practical matters.

There are more personal debts. The book is dedicated to my wife, a little for a lot.

1

INTRODUCTION

The Emperor and the writer

THE LIFE AND REIGN OF EMPEROR JULIAN[1]

Flavius Claudius Julianus, later the Emperor Julian, was born at Constantinople late in the reign of Constantine the Great, probably in AD 331. On his father's side, the family had already produced Emperors. Julian's grandfather, Constantius Chlorus, had risen from obscure origins in the Balkans to end his days as an Augustus in the Tetrarchy, to be succeeded by the son of his first marriage, Constantine. By a later marriage there had been other sons, half-brothers to Constantine, among them Julius Constantius, the father of Julian. Julian was thus a nephew of Rome's first Christian Emperor, born into an emergent Christian dynasty about twenty years after his uncle's momentous conversion of 312, and in a city that had been inaugurated the year before his birth as a Christian capital for the Empire.[2]

In his plans for the dynastic succession, Constantine in his last years envisaged a role for the offspring of his surviving half-brothers as well as for his own three surviving sons. He looks to have wished to resolve earlier tensions between these two sides of the family, and to establish a pattern of rule by a college of joint Emperors similar to the Tetrarchic arrangement which Diocletian had favoured in the late third century. But the rivalries within the house re-surfaced with drastic results after the death of Constantine in May 337: in September of that year, Julian's father and seven other male members of his family were murdered in what amounted to a coup. One of Constantine's sons, Constantius II, was very likely the instigator; certainly, Julian himself always held his cousin responsible, and the murders worked to Constantius' advantage. The sons of Constantine now ruled alone, and Constantius was allotted the eastern portion of the Empire as his own.[3]

As a child of six, Julian himself was spared along with an 11-year-old half-brother, Gallus – perhaps through the influence of Bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia, a relative of Julian's mother Basilina. Basilina had died in his infancy, and her family now took charge of the orphan. It was in their household at Nicomedia that Julian encountered Mardonius, a Scythian eunuch in the family's service whom he was later to remember fondly as a formative influence in his childhood: Mardonius had once been Basilina's tutor, and now inspired in Julian an early and lasting love of the Greek poets. Julian's overall education, however, had been entrusted to Bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia, and when Eusebius was translated to the see of Constantinople around 339, Julian seems to have moved back there too. Mardonius may have accompanied him, but within a few years there was another, more disruptive, move. Constantius came to worry over the presence at Constantinople of a child of Julius Constantius, and decided that he had better be removed far away from the capital: in 342, Julian and Gallus were dispatched to Macellum, a secluded imperial estate in central Turkey, where they lived as virtual exiles for the next six years.

In his later writings, Julian looked back bitterly on this interlude as a time of mental suffering during which he lacked all intimate social contacts and endured oppressive surveillance by the spies of Constantius; he believed that it was only the passion for study previously instilled in him by Mardonius that had preserved his sanity at Macellum.[4] Books and tutors, at least, were provided for him there by an Arian cleric, George of Cappadocia, and he impressed his Christian instructors as a highly gifted and pious student. In private, though, his reading of the Greek classics was apparently already kindling an adolescent interest in the pagan gods. But throughout this period, a more basic issue must have continued to prey on Julian's mind: the possibility could never be discounted that Constantius would have him put to death.

In the event, Constantius evidently thought it safe by 348 to allow Julian and Gallus to return to the capital,[5] and Julian spent the following three years in rhetorical studies there and at Nicomedia, where he apparently followed through an intermediary lectures given by the pagan rhetor Libanius, in later years an acquaintance of Julian's and a fervent singer of his praises. In 351, his prospects improved further. By then, Constantius was the only surviving son of Constantine, and he looked to his cousins to strengthen the dynasty: Gallus was appointed Caesar (junior colleague to the ruling

Augustus) and dispatched to the East, and Julian was allowed freedom of travel to complete his education with philosophic studies at Pergamum and Ephesus. The decision had important consequences. Julian quickly became familiar with a circle of pagan Neoplatonists headed by a former student of the 'godlike' Iamblichus, and underwent a theurgic initiation at the hands of one of them, Maximus of Ephesus. Though he kept the matter secret for a decade, he came to regard 351 as the year of his 'conversion' to paganism and his awakening to Iamblichan Neoplatonism and theurgy: these commitments were never to waver, and from then on he revered Maximus as an intimate friend and mentor.

Julian continued to study for several years in Asia Minor until his leisure was dramatically interrupted late in 354, when Constantius had Gallus executed on suspicion of treason. Several of Gallus' friends were arrested and tried as conspirators, and Julian was summoned to the imperial court at Milan. It was a summons that gave good cause for worry, but Julian found an influential supporter in the Empress Eusebia and was finally cleared of complicity in the business. In the summer of 355 he was allowed to resume his studies, this time at Athens. It proved a short stay, and the end of student days. Late that year, he was recalled to Milan; there, on 6 November, Constantius appointed him Caesar and gave him his sister Helena in marriage.[6]

Constantius' appointment of his cousin as a junior colleague arose from political and military necessity; an attempted usurpation in the West that year had only recently been seen off, and an imperial figurehead from the dynasty was now badly needed there. In December 355 Julian was sent to Gaul with instructions to counter barbarian incursions from across the Rhine. He quickly proved his worth as a talented and adventurous general with a series of successful campaigning seasons against the Franks and Alamanni between 356 and 359, and won a major victory near Strasbourg in 357. The earliest extant writings of Julian belong to the same period: besides letters, they include three panegyrics, two honouring Constantius, the third the Empress Eusebia. These were speeches written to be delivered at the court, and in them Julian was careful to profess his total loyalty to Constantius; in private, though, he was nursing a deep hatred and resentment of the man he held responsible for the destruction of his family. For his part, Constantius in the late 350s was becoming increasingly suspicious of Julian's ambitions, perhaps not without cause. In any event, developments in the East in 359 gave

him reason or pretext to order Julian to give up a large portion of his army for service in Rome's long-running war against Shapur II of Persia. When the order reached Julian in his winter quarters at Paris early in 360, it precipitated a clear break between the two Emperors: Julian's troops mutinied and acclaimed him Augustus. According to Julian, the acclamation was a spontaneous and unexpected gesture to which he acceded extremely reluctantly, but the signs are that he had tacitly encouraged it, and he made no offer to disown the title in the negotiations with Constantius that followed.[7] Constantius from now on viewed him as a usurper and by 361 was preparing to move against him. Julian responded by marching his army eastwards into Italy and the Balkans, and late in the year sought to justify his move in public letters in which he denounced Constantius for crimes against his family, and disclosed his own paganism. In the event, his preparations were needless: Constantius fortuitously fell ill and died in November 361, and by mid-December Julian had entered Constantinople unopposed as sole Emperor.

Julian immediately looked to strengthen his political base. Some old enemies who had formerly been prominent advisers and administrative officials of Constantius were quickly tried and condemned. Others from the old regime, especially some of the military men, were judged acceptable and useful and were won over to Julian's service, and pagan friends and supporters, among them Maximus of Ephesus, were invited to join him at the imperial court.[8] At the same time, a structural reform of the court was begun: its complex hierarchy and elaborate ceremonial procedures were simplified, and the number of palace officials and staff greatly reduced. The motive was partly economic, but the changes also reflected the ethical outlook of a ruler of somewhat austere temperament: Julian wished to work for a change in imperial style as one aspect of reform across a broad front. Over the year and a half of his reign, he was to show remarkable energy in pursuit of strikingly ambitious public aims.

The significance of Julian's paganism in this connection is not in doubt. One of his first acts as Augustus was to proclaim religious toleration throughout the Empire: pagan cult sacrifice, forbidden by a law of Constantius since 341, could now once again be legally performed.[9] A less obvious purpose of the proclamation, but an intended one, was the exacerbation of existing tensions and schisms within the Church. Throughout the reign of Constantius, the Arian controversy had been the cause of constant disputes. Constantius' own sympathies and his desire for a united Church had led him

finally to give forceful support to the Arian cause:[10] Julian's measure allowed opponents of the Arians who had been denounced and exiled as schismatics or heretics to return to fight their corner once again. So too, the pagan activist measures of 362 which followed the proclamation of toleration were to be directed not just to the restoration of the temples and finances of pagan cults and the appointment of priests to administer them, but also to the removal of the financial subsidies and privileges that the Church had gained under Constantine.

From another perspective, these financial measures can also be viewed as part of a broader reform initiated early in the reign. In the cities of the Empire, a long-established pattern of autonomous local government had patently come under increased strain in the fourth century in the wake of Diocletian's centralizing reform of imperial administration and Constantine's founding of a new capital in the East.[11] Political realities and fiscal necessities gave Julian very limited room for manœuvre in the matter, but he made efforts to reinvigorate the traditional pattern by selective remission of taxes and other measures aimed at the repair of the cities' revenues, and by enlarging the numbers of men eligible for membership of their councils.[12] Even here, though, his hope for a pagan restoration is likely to have impinged. Civic cult had been the heart of pagan worship; if the gods were to flourish, the cities must prosper.

Although Julian made no move to forbid Christian worship or to outlaw the clergy, his actions and utterances in the course of 362 made it plain that he aimed actively to undermine – given time, perhaps, to eliminate – the Church's capacity to exert any significant social and cultural influence in the Empire. If he was to have any chance of achieving that, it was essential that the Christianization of the upper reaches of society be checked and reversed, and in June 362, shortly before Julian moved his court from Constantinople to Antioch, he issued a notorious edict clearly devised to help to marginalize the impact of Christian ideology at this social level in the longer term:[13] Christian professors were now forbidden to teach classical literature and philosophy in the schools on the ground that by doing so they perverted the spirit and content of pagan texts; if they still wished to teach, Julian remarked, they should expound the Gospels in their churches.

The degree of attention Julian gave to the promotion of paganism cannot have failed to strike contemporaries, but his activities in another sphere were no less central to his public aims, and hardly less

ambitious. Military success had been the basis of his early reputation, and its continuance was in the eyes of many subjects the fundamental test of his worth as Emperor: it is notable that in Ammianus' account of the reign in the *Res Gestae*, far more emphasis is given to the story of Julian's Persian expedition than to the measures for pagan restoration.[14] As Augustus, Julian always intended to add to his previous successes in the West, and the war in the East against Shapur which he had inherited from Constantius offered him an obvious theatre. When he transferred his headquarters to the Syrian metropolis of Antioch in July 362, it was principally with that in mind: for the next eight months, the city was to be his base for the planning and preparation of the Persian campaign. As such, Antioch served its purpose, but from the writings of two well-disposed natives of the place – Libanius, by now returned to his home-city as its leading rhetor, and the historian Ammianus Marcellinus[15] – it is all too plain that in other respects Julian's stay there was not happy. The hedonism of Antioch was famous, and by this date its population was predominantly Christian: Julian's personal reputation as an austere associate of Neoplatonists made an unfortunate impression, and his efforts to restore the city's cults not only provoked a hostile response from its Christian majority, but apparently met with indifference among many Antiochene pagans too. It did not help matters that he arrived there at a time of local food shortages and economic difficulties, and that his concern to show proper regard for the autonomy of the city council rendered his interventions to alleviate the problem largely ineffective. As the months passed he was to become deeply unpopular in the city, and a target of popular ridicule.

The degree to which Julian's problems with the Antiochenes were emblematic of a wider failure to win support for his projected pagan restoration is disputable, but he was certainly dismayed by their response, and in the later months of 362 his efforts to promote the restoration grew more insistent. Announcing that 'Hellenism' did not yet prosper as he wished, he overtly discriminated in favour of pagan individuals and communities in his appointments and judgements, and urged imperial officials to do the same. Letters were sent to newly appointed priests advising them on proper modes of priestly conduct and ritual practice; on one view, what Julian had in mind was a kind of centralized pagan church modelled in large part on Christian ecclesiastical structures. Further efforts were made too to repair prominent cult and oracular centres across the cities of the

East, and to focus anti-Christian measures on sensitive points: the letters to priests, for instance, encouraged charitable expenditure at the temples as a means of countering the Church's proven appeal in that particular. It is against this background that one of the reign's most startling episodes – the order issued at Antioch that the Jewish Temple at Jerusalem, destroyed three centuries previously by Titus, should be rebuilt – is best appraised.[16] Had that project ever been accomplished, Jesus' emphatic prophecy in the Gospels that the Temple must fall into perpetual ruin would have been falsified, and the Jews would have become able once again to honour their 'high god' with ritual sacrifice.

In some cities at least, Julian's initiatives of 362 inflamed suppressed passions and resentments among pagans to produce a mood of anger and menace: in several attested cases, riots turned into pogroms in which local Christians were murdered by the crowds. These were developments which went beyond what Julian envisaged. He responded by expressly declaring himself opposed to violent attacks on Christians, and there is no evidence that he intended an institutionalized and general persecution of the kind that Decius or Diocletian had initiated. But the signs are that Julian's stated disapproval of local pogroms was not matched by effective action to ensure that the perpetrators were punished when such outrages occurred, and his decision not to outlaw Christianity outright arguably points principally to his readiness to extract a lesson from the failure of those earlier programmes; under the Tetrarchs, widespread support among the pagan masses for overt persecution had evidently been lacking, and the 'sacrifice test' had produced what might be better avoided, martyrs as a focus for Christian unity. It was the judgement of Gibbon, at any rate, that in the end 'Julian proposed to obtain the effects, without incurring the guilt or reproach, of persecution'.[17]

In a hostile reminiscence of Julian in his days at Athens, Gregory Nazianzen, a Christian fellow-student there, sketched him as an unsettling, hyperactive figure whose eyes constantly darted to and fro as he talked in rapid and unstoppable bursts, or broke into sudden hoots of laughter.[18] The effect is not flattering (it was not meant to be), but the impression it conveys of an exceptional personal energy is well documented in other sources. It is a testimony to it that throughout 362 and early 363 Julian continued to pursue his cherished cultural interests and to write extensively: most of his extant works, indeed, belong to this time. At Constantinople, he composed

at the least two polemical discourses against philosophic opponents termed 'false Cynics' and a theological prose-hymn to Cybele; at Antioch, a comparable hymn to Helios, two satirical works – the *Misopogon*, a reply to his Antiochene critics, and the *Caesars*, in which Roman Emperors from Augustus to Constantine take to the stage – and a long anti-Christian polemic in three books of which only fragments survive, *Against the Galilaeans*. As evidence for the actions and purposes of the public man these texts need delicate handling, but it is implicit in their subjects and time of composition that they are revealing of far more than Julian's personal literary tastes and aspirations.[19]

Julian wrote the last of these works early in 363, as he was completing his preparations at Antioch for the Persian campaign. He had planned the expedition painstakingly and on a massive scale; a force of at least 65,000 men was gathered to march out. It was certainly intended as a decisive move in the war against Shapur – his offer of negotiations in the winter of 362/3 was summarily rejected – but quite what strategic and diplomatic objectives Julian had in mind, and whether they were plausible, remains debatable.[20] What is plain is that even before the expedition set out there were highly placed military staff who doubted its wisdom. Some such worries may have been at the root of an abortive plot at Antioch to assassinate Julian, though it is notable that the officers executed in the wake of it were Christians. Ammianus, who served in the Persian campaign, took care to stress that it set out in disregard of repeated advice from a source to which Julian of all men could have been expected to attend closely; the gods had warned him through successive omens and auspices not to proceed with it – and once it was underway, to turn back. In Ammianus' view, he was encouraged to ignore these clear signs by a coterie of Neoplatonist intimates (among them Maximus of Ephesus) who accompanied him on the expedition and perversely misinterpreted their true significance.

The expedition set out from Antioch in March 363 and in its early stages met with some success. After crossing the Euphrates, Julian divided his army. A substantial force was sent eastward under orders to advance into Media and then turn southward to rejoin the main army in Mesopotamia. The main force, under Julian's command, advanced along the line of the Euphrates, storming several fortified cities on the way, then turned east to march on the great citadel of Ctesiphon on the Tigris. It reached the city late in May; but there the invasion stalled. In circumstances that are not entirely clear –

Shapur's main army, held back until then, was perhaps approaching – the siege of Ctesiphon was hastily abandoned, and Julian's force began a retreat along the Tigris as Shapur closed in. Persian troops now constantly harried the Romans, and on 26 June Julian was fatally wounded as he rode into a mêlée. He was carried to his tent for treatment, but died that night; in Ammianus' version (which has not gone unchallenged) he spent his last hours philosophically, accepting his death as a gift from the gods, and conversing with friends on the nature of the soul.[21] The identity of his killer was disputed from an early stage: some pagans suspected a nameless Christian in the Roman ranks, and later Christians were happy to credit the story, but on the best evidence he was killed by an Arab cavalryman fighting on the Persian side.

Julian died without sons – Helena had died childless early in 360, and he had not remarried – and probably without nominating a successor (a claim to the contrary by a kinsman who tried to usurp power in 365 was very likely false). The morning after his death, his generals and officers met to appoint a new Emperor. The first choice was the Praetorian Prefect in the East, Salutius Secundus, a pagan Neoplatonist and a long-time intimate of Julian. He refused, pleading age, and finally an undistinguished Christian officer, Jovian, was elected in his place. In this moment of crisis, religious considerations were a secondary issue; the pressing need was to extricate the expeditionary force from still greater military catastrophe. This Jovian accomplished, but only at the cost of a peace treaty by which he ceded all of eastern Mesopotamia to Shapur. After a grim retreat, the defeated army returned to Antioch. There Jovian made a new declaration of religious toleration and annulled his predecessor's edicts against the Christians. The body of Julian had been carried back to Roman territory by his army; on Jovian's instructions, it was transported to Tarsus and buried there with due ceremony.

JULIAN IN HIS WRITINGS AND THE ENQUIRY OF *JULIAN'S GODS*

Julian's commitment to Neoplatonism and his devotion to the ancestral gods made for a memorable reign, but he was not the first Emperor in whom informed philosophic interests went hand in hand with a markedly religious temperament: in that, he had an evident predecessor in his personal exemplar of imperial virtue, Marcus Aurelius. Perhaps, too, we should grant that his hated uncle

Constantine was not entirely unaware of philosophic issues.[22] But Julian's case has an exceptional historical interest for the amount of evidence that survives from his own hand. That he wrote as much as he did – the greater part of it, moreover, in a brief and very busy reign, and often (we are told) at the expense of sleep[23] – is itself indicative of the energy of the man. But the special fascination of his writings lies in their range, not their mere quantity. Marcus left only a private diary of self-analysis, and items of correspondence with a rhetor which 'offer virtually no addition to our understanding of [his] philosophic life';[24] Constantine left only some encyclical letters and a theological oration belittling philosophy.[25] Julian left panegyrics, polemics, prose hymns, satires and letters, public and private, to a wide variety of persons – and this does not exhaust the list.

In this book I shall focus particularly on what these writings reveal about Julian's religious and philosophic attitudes and practice. All the more important, then, to be clear that much more could have been said about other aspects of his cultured interests. At the outset, I wish at least to convey something of their variety, and the facility with which he himself conveyed their colour to his readers. The survival of his works, after all, was not mere accident: they were transcribed by Christian copyists who could not help discerning in the Apostate a fluent writer of considerable learning and literary skill. It is tempting, too, to think that they sensed the stamp of a far from unattractive private personality. Here I take issue with a modern biographer's presentation of Julian as a pathological figure, uneasy in his personal relationships and essentially humourless, and prone to use the written word as a substitute for genuine social contact.[26] There are features in his works that tell strongly against this judgement: they speak rather of a man of refined taste for whom philosophy and literature were obvious modes of discourse between educated persons, not a makeshift for the genuine article. In his private letters, he communicated easily and elegantly with a circle of friends by no means restricted to his theurgic mentors. One is especially delightful. It records the gift to the rhetor Evagrius of an estate inherited by Julian. The writer fondly evokes the beauty of its setting, and the youthful days he had spent there with companions, then ends: 'Now I give it to you as a present, my dear – a small one, but precious for coming from a friend to a friend, "from home, towards home", as the learned Pindar says.'[27] In another, he delicately consoles a friend grieving for a dead wife: 'I could not help crying as I read your letter,' he begins, and proceeds to tell an anecdote about

Darius, gently reminding the addressee that a measure of sorrow must fall to everyone, and that a man of culture will try to find solace within his own heart.[28] So too, when Julian wishes to compliment an elderly priestess for her piety, he has recourse to literature. His courteous letter starts with a Sophoclean tag, and proceeds to compare the lady advantageously – and not a little playfully – with Penelope.[29] Homeric allusions, indeed, were second nature to him, adduced with ease to fit the subject and enhanced by a discerning eye: even on the march out East, he could send Libanius a letter which moved from praise of the rhetor's *Monody* on the temple of Daphne by means of a Homeric tag to a description of a beautiful garden encountered *en route*; it was inferior to Alcinous' Phaeacian garden, we read, but its cypress-groves, vegetable beds and fruit-trees compared well with those which Odysseus' aged father had tended on Ithaca.[30]

These are the artful products of one with a talent for friendship and a sure aesthetic sense: it does not surprise us to find him funding a school of music.[31] And the same capacity to make a point deftly by apt allusion is discernible in his public writings. Julian was a master of the civic compliment – and when he wished, of the civic insult. In autumn 361 he dispatched a letter to the Athenians to win their support for his claim to the purple. The very wish is telling of his cultural attitudes – militarily, the support of Athens was insignificant – but the tone he struck in the opening pages is especially revealing. They compliment the virtues of the city by touching obliquely on episodes from her glorious past – the Persian Wars, the foundation of the Delian League at Sparta's expense, the repudiation of a base proposal by Themistocles.[32] In details of this sort, an adroit handling of the ploys of civic oratory recommended in the antique handbooks is plain to see.[33]

When the need arose, the same technique was turned to a different end. To the Alexandrians Julian declares himself ashamed that the city of so great a founder should request the recall of Athanasius. Had they forgotten the sacred traditions of Egypt, the triumph of Ptolemy over the Jews, the favour shown them by Octavian for their reverence of Sarapis and the excellence of their philosophic ancestor Areius?[34] Still defter is his twitting of the Antiochenes: he cannot be angry with them, he avows; their flippancy is inherited from Antiochus himself. To make his point, Julian culls a tale from Plutarch of Antiochus' crazy infatuation with his father's wife. It is only to be expected that his descendants will emulate his conduct: that being so,

'I do not reproach you when I call you "liars and dancers, well skilled to dance in chorus": rather, it is in place of panegyric that I ascribe to you emulation of your ancestors.'[35] And when Julian recounts the discourtesy shown long ago by the Antiochenes to Cato, his wide reading allows him to give the story an extra twist: speaking of the part played in it by a wealthy freedman, he remarks that since the size of the man's fortune is doubtless more interesting to the Antiochenes than the story itself, they may discover it in a book of tales by Damophilus.[36]

These modes of discourse belong to a man who could justly speak of his favourite books of philosophy, rhetoric, poetry and history as 'personal ornaments or amulets ... always tied fast to me'.[37] But while Julian deployed his learning with considerable dexterity, he was able too to put himself at one remove from ploys of rhetoric and to view his subject matter critically. His allusions to Alexander are an interesting case in point. Admiring contemporaries did not hesitate to speak of him in the same breath as Alexander, and later Christians were to go further, ascribing to him the wish to become a 'new Alexander', even the belief that he was a reincarnation of the man.[38] A similar notion has persisted in one strain of modern scholarship, and on one recent view Julian indeed ended up an alienated figure driven largely by an emulation of Alexander which led him to look to the Persian campaign as a refuge from his difficulties at Antioch.[39] That notion is flawed. Julian inherited the Persian problem from Constantius (who had in his turn been implicitly likened to Alexander in this connection) and it was to prepare his campaign that he went to Antioch in the first place.[40] Further, the campaign itself was planned with care, and was probably intended to last a single season.[41] These particulars do not smack of a megalomaniac attempt to rival Alexander. Nor do Julian's own remarks about the man. Alexander's glamour was indisputable, and Julian certainly admired him greatly, but he was well aware of his limitations and failings. In the *Letter to Themistius*, he cited him as an ideal of courage, but he significantly added that it was Marcus Aurelius who epitomized 'perfect virtue'; later passages in the letter speak of a strain of harshness and insolence in Alexander, and declare that the precedent he set may have made many men unwarrantedly arrogant.[42] Quite when Julian wrote this letter is debatable,[43] but there are clear signs that even at Antioch his regard for Alexander remained qualified. In the *Caesars*, Alexander is made to feel remorse for some cruel deeds;[44] more strikingly, in the letter to Nilus Julian

remarks on specific murderous crimes committed by him, and forbears to speak 'of his other follies, lest I should seem to speak ill of a man who by no means maintained an ideal rectitude, but none the less excelled as a general in affairs of war'.[45]

Julian's willingness to fault even a figure to whom he was much attracted, and to do so by citing a series of particular episodes, suggests that he was capable of critical historical judgement in some measure. Admittedly, too much is easily claimed for him on this score. Philosophy and literature were his principal cultural interests: his reading in history proper was evidently limited. He can be judged to have known some books at least of Herodotus and Thucydides,[46] but for his knowledge of Roman history he owed a heavy debt to Plutarch, directly or indirectly, and to summarizing handbooks.[47] And while there is no cause to deny that he knew Latin, his cultural bent was overwhelmingly Greek. He seems to have known Caesar's *Gallic Wars* (read to prepare for his command in Gaul), and perhaps Aurelius Victor's *De Caesaribus*, but if we are to judge by his extant writings, Latin historical writers – and likewise Latin poets – seem hardly to impinge.[48] Julian's restricted reading in the field does not entail, however, that he lacked a sense of the value of history. In his panegyric to Eusebia, he commends the study of it as conducive to understanding of practical affairs and to nobility of character;[49] and a letter to Prohairesius explicitly contrasts historiography with rhetoric for its dependence on accurate factual data.[50]

Implicit in that distinction is a firm sense of the generic proprieties which must be given its due weight in any assessment of the historical knowledge and attitudes to be discerned in a work such as the *Caesars*. On one view, the treatment of earlier Emperors in the *Caesars* reveals not only a deficient grasp of facts, but an author at odds with the judgements of contemporaries: allegedly, he manipulates history to an earnest propagandist end in the wish to publicize himself as a Marcus-cum-Alexander, at once a *civilis princeps* and a warrior king.[51]

To ascribe such fixity of purpose to the piece is perhaps to distort it. Julian's historical interests found a natural focus in his predecessors, and it is no cause for surprise that he identified with his hero Marcus and made Constantine a villain, or that Alexander had a high profile in a work composed in the lead-up to a Persian war. But the *Caesars* was also a polished satire written to divert. If there are passing jibes at a Pius or an Alexander Severus,[52] that hardly suffices to disclose an intellectually isolated author; it may simply

show one willing to twit the great and the good to amuse the reader. By the same token, Augustus is a chameleon, Trajan a *macho* with an eye for a pretty boy, Plotinus' patron Gallienus a mincing transvestite, Alexander the Great a tearful drunk who seeks to exculpate himself when criticized by dextrous 'tricks of logic'.[53]

Plainly, these are jokes and do not pretend to be balanced judgements. They are also, it seems to me, far from wooden, despite the disclaimer to comic talent which opens the work, and they are nicely cast in a concise dramatic style: as to the claim that the author of the *Caesars* was 'essentially humourless',[54] I can only disagree. The truth is perhaps rather that he felt that humour and literary diversion had a time and place. In the *Letter to a Priest*, he could declare that pagan priests ought not to read lampoons, Old Comedy and 'tales whose theme is love';[55] but there he was prescribing a pious ideal for a restricted group, and a broader distinction needs to be observed too between the select group of 'canonical' Greek authors idealized in his *œuvre* (or conversely, those castigated as pernicious reading) and the range of texts with which Julian himself was demonstrably familiar as a reader and put to frequent use in his own writings. Easily leading the field on both counts are Homer and Plato, whose works are by far those most often commended, quoted and echoed; but in other cases, there is a certain discrepancy between the 'ideal library' and the real one. After Homer and Plato, for instance, Aristotle has more favourable mentions in the *œuvre* than any other writer, but Julian's Aristotle looks to be more likely a commended name and a range of excerpts encountered in handbooks than a set of Aristotelian works extensively read.[56]

So too, Julian's idealized list of 'canonical' literary authors is plainly a conventional list; it is virtually identical with the one we find prescribed for study in Libanius. On the one hand, it may tempt us to overestimate the range of his actual reading in the cases of some of those named; there is very little, for instance, that clearly alludes to Isocrates and Lysias in his surviving writings. On the other, there are writers excluded from the list, or even relegated to 'anti-canonical' status, whose works were patently well known to him in his own reading: Aristophanes is a case in point.[57] Julian was quite familiar with lighter works of the sort that he urged his priests to avoid, and quite prepared to toy with them in his own compositions. He notes Archilochus' *penchant* for fable, quotes Old Comedy, cites a volume of gossipy tales.[58] His slighting reference to the Greek novel is in fact the only plain testimony in a classical text to a cultured

writer's awareness of the genre, and his possible echo of Heliodorus in a description of a siege has been taken to furnish a probable *terminus ante quem* for the *Aethiopica*.[59] In the *Caesars* he is plainly indebted, directly or indirectly, to a Lucianic model, both in the literary form and in such details as the doggerel anapaests by which the competitors are summoned.[60] As for the *Misopogon*, to hear in it the 'unsettling laughter' of a thwarted spirit vainly seeking to conceal deep wrath may be to set too little store by the vigour of antique polemic and diatribe.[61] Julian modulated – he did not disguise – his displeasure at the Antiochenes. Better an Emperor who vented his feeling that way than 'a man full of harshness and eager to punish';[62] better still one who took pleasure in displaying a civilized ingenuity in his insults. Julian could keep a straight face as he first observed that he differed from Cicero in lacking a wart on his nose, then sarcastically produced a tag from Cratinus to bemoan his lack of 'that youth, that wit and wisdom' evoked by the name 'Constantius'.[63] Again, it was by playful poetic allusions that he chose to deflect the charge that he '[did] not know how to mix with people', teasingly casting himself as a Misanthrope out of Menander and bewailing his failure to change his colour according to his company after the fashion of Theognis' polypus.[64] The adroitness of the man is plain, and it puts in doubt the view that his faith in the protecting angels[65] of Helios made for an alienated fanatic. If Julian was not a great writer, he was certainly not an indifferent one, and he can often be read with fondness: there is a peculiar blend of vivacity and eloquent learning to be found in much of what he wrote, and a good deal that is charming and touching.

Julian's literary interests plainly went deep, and more will need to be said of their broader implications later. For now, though, I set them aside and enlarge upon my main focus of attention: his religious and philosophic attitudes, and their relationship.

Just as he had a philosophic predecessor of a kind in Marcus, so Julian was not the first Emperor to combine determined anti-Christian measures with active promotion of the ancestral cults as a central feature of his policy: Decius and several of the Tetrarchs had anticipated him in that.[66] But here too, Julian presents a special case. It is largely a question of upbringing. Unlike other Emperors who acted against the Christians, Julian did so from the perspective of one born into a Christian dynasty and brought up in the care of bishops. Further, peculiar circumstances in his youth gave him the chance to devote himself to liberal studies for many years before he entered

public life; and in the process, he espoused a form of Neoplatonism which set great store by the performance of religious ritual, and disposed him to sense an intimate connection between his pursuit of philosophy and his worship of the gods. And these factors conspired to give his politics a special colour: although he hated Christianity, he was not himself in any brutal sense a persecutor: his attack on Christians was not to centre on the familiar demand that they sacrifice on pain of death,[67] but rather on a determination to counter what he saw as a Christian perversion of the staples of classical culture.

Julian's writings leave the reader in no doubt about the energy with which he pursued his devotional and philosophic interests. They make it plain, too, that he saw them as interdependent, and central to his work as Emperor. Reflecting on his youth in the *Against Heraclius*, he declared it his good fortune to have studied with a 'most perfect philosopher' who taught him 'to practise virtue above all else, and to look to the gods as guides to all that is good'.[68] As to whether the pupil had proved worth the candle, he professed ignorance: 'The ruling gods must judge.' But really, he was in little doubt about the verdict: the gods had preserved him and raised him to the purple.[69] Elsewhere in his writings he did not hesitate to call himself a philosopher and theologian,[70] and he took care to cultivate an appropriate style in his appearance and behaviour.

This claim is manifestly informative of the general terms in which Julian viewed himself and wished to be viewed by his subjects. It quickly found an echo in dedications which complimented him as 'the most god-loving renewer of the . . . ancestral cults' who 'rules on the basis of philosophy',[71] and it would prompt an admiring acquaintance to remember him as a king who 'believed learning and the worship of the gods to be intimate kin' and saw it as his task to rescue both from a state of neglect.[72] But it was a claim easily made, and easily repeated by well-disposed pagans: an accurate judgement of its basis in fact and its effects on Julian's thinking as Emperor must rest on a detailed critical appraisal of his pertinent writings and policies. The subsequent chapters of this book are directed principally to that purpose. Here, I wish to expand on the main questions it addresses, and to outline its method and scope.

Three related issues, I think, can be recognized as central to the enquiry. First, what substance was there to Julian's claim to be a philosopher? Due weight must be given here to what he himself meant to imply in awarding himself the title. To Themistius he

declared that he was no expert at philosophy, but 'only a lover of it', and an ineffectual one at that, for pressure of public affairs.[73] His disavowal is doubtless exaggerated, but it should not be judged wholly empty.

Certainly, for the present purpose it is irrelevant that he made no lasting contribution to Neoplatonist theory proper: he made no claim on that score, and no secret of the extent of his dependence on other writers.[74] So far as his theoretical expertise is concerned, the issue turns more modestly on the question of his competence as a self-professed exponent of Iamblichan doctrine. But it must be kept in mind, too, that the term 'philosopher' had an extended meaning when applied to an Emperor, in the sense that it could reflect not only upon his learning but also upon his public style, the display he made of particular 'virtues' in his behaviour towards his subjects:[75] Ammianus, for instance, while not neglecting elsewhere to commend Julian's pursuit of 'the sublime knowledge of first principles', gave pride of place in his obituary of the Emperor to his excellence as an embodiment of the standard philosophic virtues of self-control, wisdom, justice and courage.[76] Accordingly, Julian's philosophic status must be appraised with an eye to the image that he cultivated in his everyday dealings as well as to his more rarified intellectual interests.

Second, what relations held between Julian's 'theology' – his speculative Neoplatonist interests in religious questions – and his devotional impulses and practices? That they were closely bound up with each other is undeniable: but in what ways, and how coherently? Julian himself was naturally keen to imply that his concerns in these fields were entirely complementary and inseparable. It was self-evident, he declared, that 'whoever is god-loving delights to look upon the images of the gods'; and he spoke summarily of the final goal of philosophy as being 'to become like god'.[77] But that was a conventional Platonist formulation, and once again an assertion easily made for being so generalized. We should not be too quick to assume that the correspondence was so neat in practice. Julian clearly set great store by cult worship, public and private, and there was a potential for tension between his activities in that connection and his philosophic monism. Formally, of course, these concerns were compatible, in the sense that Neoplatonic theory – particularly in the Iamblichan version to which Julian subscribed – could offer an explanation and justification of cult practice;[78] Iamblichans, indeed, had their own privileged system of ritual in theurgy. Julian was

himself a practising theurgist, and in his writings he readily alluded to theurgic theory.[79] But his cultic allegiances covered a broad range, and it is another question whether he can aptly be reckoned a Neoplatonist henotheist, content at heart to look upon his own devotions in the reductive light of philosophic theory. The nature of his Mithraism – an allegiance often supposed to have had cardinal importance in his eyes – will require special attention on this score, since it is arguable that the ideology of Mithraism was in some respects peculiarly resistant to Platonist systematizing.[80]

More generally, the issue will turn on the strength that is granted to Julian's basic polytheist sensibilities. This is in its nature an elusive matter, but it must be addressed. It bears not only on the personal 'credo' of Julian, but also on a third broad issue: the impact of his philosophic affiliations on his attempted pagan restoration. Was there a consistent Neoplatonic basis to his measures against Christians and his promotion of pagan cult? And to what degree did the more recondite Iamblichan and theurgic interests of the private man impinge on his public action? Did they make for a religious programme of a markedly unusual ideological colour, even by the standards prevailing among educated pagans? Strong claims have been advanced on this score. Bidez, for instance, in his biography of Julian, saw in his religious programme 'une innovation sans précédent' – an attempt to set up a pagan church centrally organized on Christian lines, but served by a priesthood whose functions were determined by Julian's theurgic and Neoplatonist ideals.[81] A more recent biographer develops a variant on this notion, suggesting that Julian wished to establish a 'monotheistic universal faith' as the state cult by means of a pagan church, and that the hierarchical organization of the cults is indicative of his interest in the 'latest theoretical innovations' of Iamblichan Neoplatonism.[82]

It will emerge that I doubt if Julian can rightly be thought to have had so strange a hybrid in mind; general characterizations of his programme as a kind of theurgic evangelism are in my view out of place. That is not to deny that his personal philosophic and devotional enthusiasms impinged on some aspects of his politics and public behaviour in a way that prompted misgivings even among contemporary pagans. The attitude of Ammianus is obviously revealing on this score. Although he cast Julian as the central figure in his history, 'a man to be counted among the heroic spirits',[83] he had notable reservations about certain relevant features of his policy and behaviour. He deplored the edict by which Christians were forbid-

den to teach the classics;[84] and while he himself clearly set some store by sacrifice and divination, he judged Julian's appetite for them excessive, the mark of one who was 'superstitious rather than properly observant of the rites of religion'.[85] Here, he may well have had in mind not just the strength of Julian's enthusiasm for these practices, but the particular manner of it: as it relates to divination, at least, his judgement seems to inform his narrative of the Persian expedition, in the course of which he chose to dwell on disputes between Etruscan soothsayers and the Emperor's philosophic entourage over the interpretation of omens.[86] The terms in which he described these episodes make it plain that Ammianus believed Julian mistaken in rejecting the advice of the former, and it is tempting to read into this a more general reservation about the effects of the Emperor's fondness for the company of theurgists.[87] His mentor Maximus is not named in this connection as the leading figure in the group, but it is instructive to compare Ammianus' and Libanius' accounts of an earlier episode in which he was involved. Early in 362, Julian had interrupted a meeting of the Senate of Constantinople to greet Maximus on his arrival in the city: Libanius saw in this an admirable example of Julian's regard for philosophy; Ammianus saw in it undignified attention-seeking that ill became an Emperor.[88]

These criticisms – most of all, perhaps, the criticism of the education edict, which touches the ideological core of Julian's anti-Christian policy – are the more telling for the fact that Ammianus had observed Julian at first hand and was predisposed to judge him favourably. Clearly, they imply deep misgivings about certain aspects of his rule.[89] It was partly on the strength of them that Bidez was prompted to discern an increasingly theocratic complexion to Julian's thinking which made, he thought, for 'un fanatisme étranger à l'ésprit hellénique dont il se croyait penétré'.[90] Another biographer has conjectured that Julian's plans for paganism 'probably perplexed rather than inspired the majority of pagans', and that many of them will have heard of his death with relief.[91] But the appraisal of Ammianus' testimony in its broader implications is a delicate matter. Even when the much debated question of his sources is set apart,[92] we must remember that he was writing thirty years after the events described: his doubts may have come to strike him more forcefully with hindsight. He was writing, too, in the belief that his chosen genre demanded a conscious attempt to be impartial, and for a readership in an Empire increasingly Christianized.[93] If his regard for Julian stemmed in no small part from a soldierly admiration for

his military skills, that is no reason to think that his praise of Julian's philosophic aspirations was peripheral or insincere. His reservations about Julian's theurgy are focused on its practice in the specific context of a military campaign, and need not betoken outright hostility or perplexity; Ammianus' own discussion of divination, after all, betrays a familiarity with Neoplatonist doctrine on the matter.[94] So too, his criticism of the education edict does not mean that he was out of sympathy with the general attempt to defend pagan cult. It is less than clear that Ammianus' testimony entitles us to assume that the general rationale behind Julian's religious programme was hopelessly at odds with mainstream educated pagan opinion: I shall suggest that the question of the bearing of Julian's theurgic Neoplatonism on the programme is more finely balanced than is often supposed.

The question of the ideological core to Julian's pagan activism does not bear only on the reactions of pagan contemporaries; there is a broader interest to it. If moderns are often tempted to view Graeco-Roman paganism as conducive to a cultural ideology that was ideally pluralist and tolerant, and to draw a contrast with the Christianized Roman Empire, they do so largely on the strength and implications of its polytheist content. But Julian's status as a representative of a pagan 'tolerance' as against a Christian 'exclusivity' comes sharply into question, if it is indeed the case that a philosophically nurtured monism contributed signally to his thinking and aims as Emperor. Recent scholarship on the broader question of the role of monotheism in the ideology of the Roman universal state has attended to this aspect of Julian's case, and on one view at least, the ideological thrust of his pagan restoration was less pluralist than universalist.[95]

I turn from the three broad issues on which the book will concentrate to my method of approach. Here, critical analysis and interpretation of Julian's writings naturally have pride of place. For my purposes, some of these have more to tell than others. Until his break with Constantius, Julian felt constrained to be reticent about his paganism, and the works he wrote before the break reflect that fact. In the three panegyrics of the 350s – two to Constantius, one to the Empress Eusebia – he took care to keep clear of the subject. They stand witness to his ability to manipulate the familiar themes of the genre, among them the complimenting of the addressee's display of standard 'philosophic virtues', but they tell little of substance about the writer's own philosophic and religious attitudes. A self-consolatory piece written to his friend Sallust (Salutius) in

winter 358/9 and a handful of letters from around the same period are rather more revealing on this score. Perhaps, too, the *Letter to Themistius*, at any rate the larger part of it, should be placed in the mid-350s.[96] But by and large we must direct our attention to the works and letters that Julian wrote after his accession.

That is not a severe restriction, in so far as these texts constitute the greater part of his extant writings, but it does impose an important limitation on the enquiry in another sense. It was the aim of one modern biography 'to trace the various phases of the emotional, intellectual and spiritual itinerary' of Julian.[97] In my view, the state of the evidence makes that impossible. In the first place, we cannot reconstruct with any confidence the mental processes at play in the decades preceding and following the 'conversion' of 351: any attempt to do so will be overwhelmingly dependent on retrospective remarks in later Julianic writings, and can only be conjectural. Second, there is the brute fact of the brevity of Julian's reign. The works he composed while Emperor were written in the space of a year, and it is quite unclear that his basic philosophic and religious attitudes changed or developed substantially during that limited time. For these reasons, I have preferred a thematic to a strictly chronological exposition. I begin (Chapter Two) with an account of Julian's literary and philosophic education and of his subsequent philosophic 'ideal', his notion of what should constitute a 'philosophic' life, private and public; I wish to measure Julian's view against the cultural assumptions and ideals of a broader range of educated pagan contemporaries. Next (Chapter Three) I discuss his own 'philosophic' practice as it presents itself in his two treatises directed against persons he represented as philosophic opponents, 'false' Cynics: here I shall aim to show that the disjunction between the prescribed ideal and the discourse which Julian actually practised in these works is such that we must look warily on any notion that they formulate or rest upon a coherent Neoplatonist theory of culture (*paideia*). Chapter Four enlarges upon a dense and very problematic element in his philosophic ideal, and its bearing on his ritual practice: his interest in theurgy, and the place of the *Chaldaean Oracles* in the Iamblichan theology to which Julian professed a fundamental debt. It provides the base for an extended account of contentious but central questions raised by the prose-hymns *To King Helios* and *To the Mother of the Gods* about Julian's theology and pagan piety, private and public (Chapters Five and Six); here I discuss his heliolatry, his devotional involvements and speculative interests

in the Mithraic and Metroac Mystery cults, and their possible political significance in the setting of the pagan restoration that Julian wished to promote. The arguments in Chapters Two to Six converge in their main lines, and their convergence colours the view I take of Julian's anti-Christian ideology and politics and of the conception of pagan piety on which they rested; I have therefore left my discussion of these issues till last (Chapter Seven). In the summary introductory and concluding remarks to the individual chapters I comment more particularly on the questions addressed in their main sections, and I briefly restate their themes in a closing *envoi*.

2

JULIAN'S EDUCATION AND PHILOSOPHIC IDEAL

In his days as Caesar in Gaul, Julian confided in a letter to his friend and fellow-Neoplatonist Priscus that his first wish in life was to be of some use to 'true philosophers'.[1] His continuing regard for philosophy after he became Emperor prompted considerable interest during his reign and in some quarters it could still inspire strong feelings much later: more than a century after contemporaries had extolled the philosopher king in speeches and on stone,[2] Neoplatonists at Athens were using the year of his accession as the basis of a private chronology.[3] The practice most likely derived from a theme in late classicizing historiography; the notion that Julian's reign provided a standard of judgement for times preceding and following had already influenced the shaping of Eunapius' *Universal History*, and was to figure again afterwards in the *New History* of Zosimus.[4] But the roots of this idealization by later pagans seem to lie more in their appreciation of the stand Julian took on behalf of their kind than in any close study of his own writings, which they very seldom quote. It is upon these that any adequate description of Julian's philosophic ideal must concentrate. He has much to say both about the nature of philosophy – its aims, the studies appropriate to those who aspire to it and the standards of conduct required of those who profess it – and about the teachers and friends who influenced his views on the subject.

AN EDUCATION IN GREEK CULTURE

The information about Julian's education has a special importance for our understanding of his remarks about philosophy: however he chose to see himself, his orations – and with them, many of his letters – reveal a cultured writer with a keen sense of the literary proprieties.

At times, the requirements of form seem to lead to self-contradiction. In one context he is prepared to echo the familiar Platonic criticism of the Homeric account of the gods as false and unacceptable; in another he readily declares that the gods revealed all their wisdom to the same poet.[5] Again, he seemingly sneers at rhetoric as a discipline unworthy of a philosopher's attention, yet elsewhere praises to the skies a new speech by Libanius.[6] Such inconsistencies reflect a wider issue neatly summarized by H.-I. Marrou: 'la marge est faible qui sépare désormais le rhéteur à prétentions philosophiques de ces philosophes abâtardis: dans quelle catégorie placerons-nous un Apulée, un Julien?'[7] The implication for our picture of Julian's ideal of philosophy is evident: what he himself has to say about the matter needs to be read with careful regard to the influences exercised by his education and by the circle which later formed around him. It will be best to review these before Julian's own pronouncements on philosophy are discussed.

The form of Julian's education was perhaps less affected by the unsettling circumstances of his youth than some have supposed.[8] In fact, his education followed a conventional enough pattern in many respects. Its earliest stages were the responsibility of Eusebius of Nicomedia,[9] and it was doubtless with the bishop's approval that the 7-year-old Julian began studies under a eunuch who had earlier tutored his mother.[10] Mardonius' role as *grammatistês* was humble enough; but Julian was a precocious child,[11] and later remarks in his works record both his fond attachment to his first teacher and his belief that he owed his love of literature and the rudiments of his ethical training to the grounding in Homer he received at the time. 'Even then,' he recalled, 'my tutor would annoy me, teaching me how to tread the right path . . . fashioning and, as it were, engraving in my soul that which I had no wish for at the time'; he was to learn early that 'there are many plants in Homer that are more lovely to hear of than those we see with the eye.'[12]

A passage in the *Against Heraclius* implies that Mardonius was present at Julian's court in 363:[13] in it, Julian does not scruple to call him a philosopher. The description, of course, is no more than a metaphor – though one which hints at the special emotional bond which may be supposed to have held between Mardonius and his orphaned pupil. Even so, Julian's recollections of him have their place in an account of his mature attitude to philosophy. For one thing, they presage his tendency to idealize his later philosophic teachers: the pattern established with Mardonius would recur with Aedesius

and with Maximus. For another, they give an early hint that in Julian's philosophic ideal, formal Neoplatonist studies and mystifying theurgic texts were never everything, however emphatically he might commend them at times. Ideals of beauty and notions of religion and of ethics that were far from abstruse had been derived from the Homeric poems for centuries by their antique readers, and with Julian too they were always to count for a lot; the point will only be sharpened if we credit a recent study's claim that, as a philosophically minded reader of Homer, Julian shows a curiously limited interest in the allegorical strategies of interpretation to be found in other Neoplatonists.[14]

Mardonius is likely to have taught Julian until 342, when Constantius dispatched his cousin to Macellum in Cappadocia. Julian was now probably 11 – as it happened, around the age at which one commonly began one's secondary education. When he recalled this period in his *Letter to the Athenians*, he painted it in the darkest colours: he spoke of being 'dragged from the schools, shut off from all liberal study (*mathêmaê spoudaion*) and all free intercourse', and he attributed the brutalization of his half-brother Gallus to precisely these conditions over a span of six years.[15] An intriguing comment followed that verdict: 'In my own case, the gods kept me pure by means of philosophy.' The picture is overdrawn. However lonely his time there, Julian was not deprived of an education at Macellum; nor was it so unusual for a person of his status to be taught privately – as indeed he largely had been up till this point – rather than be sent to a *didaskaleion*.[16] The evidence is confused, but two of his own letters give some indication of his studies at Macellum. They show a considerable familiarity with the library of George of Cappadocia (who, it may be inferred, had succeeded Eusebius as the supervisor of Julian's upbringing): 'I know', wrote Julian in 362, 'what books George had, many of them, if not all; for he lent me some to copy when I was in Cappadocia.' According to a second letter, the library contained many and varied volumes of philosophy, rhetoric, Christian theology and history (again predominantly Christian).[17] It may be suspected that the fiercely Arian George would have had a special care for his charge's spiritual welfare, and if a flattering anecdote in Eunapius is to be believed, Julian's Christian tutors were embarrassed in debate by their pupil's close knowledge of Scripture.[18]

Julian's claim to have been 'kept pure through philosophy' needs to be interpreted in the light of these details. His interest, it is clear, was stimulated by the works in George's library – to a degree. Quick

student though Julian was, we need not credit him with any extensive reading in Plato at this time. Many of the 'books of philosophy' will have been doxographies and anthologies: certainly, a passage in the *Against Heraclius* suggests that Julian's early philosophic education followed a conventional textbook pattern.[19] In it, he categorizes his subject into its three standard parts – practical, natural and logical – then subdivides each into a further three: the process is clearly mnemonic. Nor is there much reason to think of Julian as becoming secretly devoted to pagan philosophy under the noses of his Christian teachers: the pertinent passage in Eunapius (itself biased) by no means makes it clear that his precocity was confined to Christian texts. And as to the more arcane studies espoused in some Neoplatonic circles at the time, we have Julian's own testimony at the start of the *To King Helios* that as an adolescent he 'did not even know what the science [of astrology] was' (4.131a). No doubt most of his time was spent on the Greek poets, on higher grammar and on the preliminaries of rhetoric.[20] In theory, the *enkyklios paideia* required some training in other than literary subjects, but the ideal was often neglected. There is a hint (despite a reference to the 'quadrivium' at *CG* 178b) that this was so in Julian's case: it is at least significant, given his later devotion to a thinker with a passion for numerological and hierarchical classification, that Julian's writings give no hint of expertise, or even interest, in mathematics. Of course, the fact that Iamblichus wrote introductions to this subject for his adult students confirms that Julian's ignorance of it was not atypical. But the point is clear: Julian's claim to have been saved by philosophy at Macellum seems to imply little more than a basic awareness, derived from very limited reading, of philosophy as a subject of higher study.

In 348 Constantius allowed Julian to return to Constantinople to study rhetoric under Nicocles and Hecebolius.[21] At 17, he was around the age at which one's higher education commonly began. The fact that Nicocles was a pagan while Hecebolius was a Christian (though a willing apostate in 363) has been interpreted as a significant factor in Julian's philosophic development: Nicocles is seen as an influential instructor in the allegorization of Homer, Hecebolius as a shallow incompetent, and later the butt of criticisms of orators levelled by Julian.[22] This view, however, depends on a very dubious source: Libanius had been the victim of a professional feud pursued by Hecebolius, and so had a motive to belittle his talent and influence on Julian, and to glamorize the part Nicocles played. But Julian's

own writings make no mention of Nicocles, whereas a letter to Hecebolius is at least attributed to him.[23] Nor is it self-evident that his later critical remarks about rhetors, even if they could be shown to refer to Hecebolius, reflect the attitude he held in 348. In short, inferences seeking to differentiate the philosophic and rhetorical influences of the two teachers are unsound. If a philosophic influence is sought, a more obvious candidate lies to hand: in the letter he wrote later to the pagan rhetor and Aristotelian commentator Themistius, Julian speaks of having studied Plato's *Laws* under his instruction.[24] Themistius held a chair in philosophy in the capital in 348/9, so it seems clear that Julian attended lectures by him at this time.

How strong an impression Themistius made on Julian at that point we cannot say with certainty, but their subsequent relationship has provoked considerable interest, and some puzzlement. Julian's extant *Letter to Themistius* is respectfully cast as the response of a mere 'lover of philosophy' to a (now lost) communication sent by a philosopher proper at a major turning-point in Julian's public career.[25] In it, the writer declares himself doubtful of his ability to live up to the high philosophic ideal which Themistius urges upon him. But the letter does not read overall as the work of one who looked to Themistius as a philosophic superior: it confidently disputes his exegesis of a passage of Aristotle,[26] and it seeks to refute him on particular points of political theory. Notions which figure positively and prominently in Themistius' speeches – that an Emperor's nature is specifically divine in its origin, and that the Emperor himself is the embodiment of law – are rejected in the letter.[27] Themistius was insistent, too, that philosophers could and should engage in the public arena (he himself pursued a public career at Constantinople from his adlection to its Senate in 354 to his appointment as Urban Prefect in 384); the letter, however, commends the contemplative life as markedly superior to the life of practical action.[28]

The letter is commonly dated to late 361, shortly after Julian had become sole Emperor,[29] and on one view a deeper dispute underlies its polite disagreement over points of monarchic theory and philosophic engagement. Some find in Themistius' speeches from the 350s onwards a constant and deeply-felt concern to promote a political and cultural climate that would make for harmony between pagans and Christians.[30] To be sure, in a speech delivered in honour of Jovian on 1 January 364, Themistius was to praise the Emperor's recent edict of religious toleration 'by which we shall be set free from faction'.[31]

That could plainly be taken to imply an earlier adverse judgement on Julian's policy in the field, or at least disquiet at its consequences, and Themistius has been credited with taking a principled stand in Julian's reign in refusing an offer of appointment as Prefect of Constantinople.[32] Should we infer a growing coolness in the personal relations of the two men as a background? On one view, Julian's letter was not quite what it seemed: beneath its apparently friendly and respectful surface disagreements lay a sharper rejection of Themistius' broader notion of *paideia*, and a somewhat sarcastic dismissal of a former tutor's offer to serve as a philosophic collaborator. The new Emperor, we are to assume, had little time for an equivocal pagan ideologist who had linked himself readily and closely to the regime of Constantius.[33]

The implied scenario of ideological reaction against a formerly influential philosophic tutor is dubious, however, and on a very basic ground. Plainly, the letter was written in response to a philosophic exhortation sent at a crucial juncture in Julian's imperial career; but the dating of it to 361 is not beyond challenge. It was long ago suggested that the exhortation and the reply to it could belong to the time of Julian's appointment as Caesar in November 355, and the case for the earlier date has been argued again recently.[34] On this view, the bulk of the letter was first drafted early in 356 but left unsent, to be dispatched some years later with a postscript in the wake of the acclamation at Paris, and not without a political motive: a letter which had originally voiced the new Caesar's ambivalence at his removal from 'the shades of philosophy' to the 'open air' of politics[35] was now used to convey a picture of the Emperor in the West as a modest but talented figure who had reluctantly shouldered the burden of Empire.

A hypothetical element in this reconstruction is plain, but it should probably be accepted. It certainly allows a number of passages in the bulk of the letter to read more naturally, and it accounts for the puzzling change of tone in the final two paragraphs.[36] And if the earlier date is granted, the notion that Julian chose at the start of his reign to reject overtures made by his ex-tutor, perhaps initiating a personal estrangement in the process, will be redundant. In all probability, their personal relations had never been close. It can be inferred that after the fall of Gallus in 354, Julian sought Themistius' good offices;[37] but by then, Themistius enjoyed Constantius' favour, and it was only sensible for an ex-pupil to appeal to him in such circumstances. In Themistius' own writings and known actions

during Julian's reign there is no decisive evidence either of a close prior intimacy or of a later estrangement. That Themistius refused the Prefecture of the capital under Julian is a possibility only: it is by no means certain that Julian ever offered it.[38] And the orator who praised Jovians' religious 'toleration' in 364 was willing to compose a panegyric in Julian's honour in 363, by which time the colour of Julian's pagan activism was plain to see;[39] if he felt qualms on that score, then, it seems he did not make an issue of them. On a harsh view – it has an antique precedent – Themistius was a Byzantine Vicar of Bray, a master trimmer who passed through every change of system with comparative calm.[40] That is perhaps to pay too little heed to the subtlety of late antique panegyric: a fine modern study has stressed its function as a medium for a 'fluid' theoretical expression of the imperial ideal in a constantly changing present.[41] But either way, if the *Letter to Themistius* and the philosophic view of kingship it commends indeed belong in the mid-350s, we can suspect that Themistius' importance as an intellectual influence on Julian was marginal from an early stage.

The lectures of Themistius notwithstanding, the most telling influence on Julian at Constantinople in the late 340s perhaps lay less with philosophy than with his growing awareness of the insecurity of his position: he would allude later to the terrors of that time.[42] After a year, he was removed to Nicomedia; there he continued to study rhetoric, and for a short time followed Libanius' lectures through an intermediary. But while there, he heard reports, perhaps through a circle of theurgists,[43] of a famous disciple of Iamblichus, Aedesius. In 351, with imperial permission, he went to Pergamum and became his devoted pupil. It was a turning-point; after studies under Chrysanthius and Eusebius of Myndus, he proceeded to Ephesus, where he was initiated into the theurgic Mysteries by Maximus, a former pupil of Aedesius. The historical assessment and even the conceptual analysis of an individual's claim to have been 'converted' are highly problematic,[44] but Julian certainly presented these events as a type of conversion. In a letter of 363 he wrote: 'You shall not wander from the straight path [of truth] if you take the advice of one who till his twentieth year walked that road of yours' – the context puts it beyond all doubt that the reference is to Christianity – 'but who now has been walking on the [right] path for twelve years, with the help of the gods' (*Ep.* 47.434d). I will amplify on the background to this episode in Chapter Seven (pp. 180–9): here, it suffices to say that while Julian felt it prudent not to present himself

to the public eye as an apostate from Christianity for a further ten years,[45] he was henceforth committed to Iamblichan Neoplatonism as a system and to Maximus of Ephesus as a master and confidant.[46] All the more important, then, to stress that Julian's 'conversion' did not entail a rejection of his earlier cultural interests. In the eyes of contemporaries, Maximus was a polymath and teacher no less than a mystagogue,[47] and in any case Julian apparently later returned to Nicomedia and became the focus of a circle of philosophers, poets and rhetors, Latin-speaking as well as Greek.[48]

After an enforced stay in Milan in winter 354/5, Julian went to Athens to study and remained there until he was appointed Caesar. It needs to be stressed that rhetoric remained a subject of study – Julian himself would say he had been allowed to go to Athens because the Empress knew that he 'delighted in literature' (*Or.* 3.118c). He attended the lectures of Prohaeresius, and became fond enough of the Christian professor to offer him exemption later from the terms of the education edict of 362. At this time, too, he became an initiate at Eleusis. It was a step which Maximus had urged upon him, but hardly an idiosyncratic one; interest in the Mysteries was in any case well established in philosophic circles by now, presaging a tendency to see philosophy as a sort of priestly craft. In the early fourth century the post of daduch at Eleusis had been held by the Platonist Nicagoras;[49] the same combination of interests was shared by his son-in-law Himerius (who now became a friend of Julian) and by the Neoplatonist Iamblichus II, who was initiated in 362/3.[50] The hierophant who initiated Julian and later visited him in Gaul was both something of a philosopher himself and the father (or grandfather) of the Neoplatonist Plutarch.[51]

Just as the very importance of Julian's conversion may tempt us to underplay his continuing interest in rhetoric, so it can cast his subsequent philosophic studies in a misleading perspective. Eunapius certainly implies that he studied with the hierophant at the time, but less arcane studies continued as well: in Gaul, Julian would compose small studies on Aristotelian themes.[52] Less arcane, but not by much, some will think. For their recipient was Priscus, a pupil of Aedesius who had settled in Athens and who was to become one of Julian's close intimates as a result of a friendship struck there: and Priscus seemed even to Eunapius to be excessively reserved, secretive and recondite.[53] Such was the man who – so Julian's own correspondence implies – would exercise a lasting influence upon him. On one view, the key to Julian's relations with a Priscus or a Maximus was social

inadequacy. A man of 'complex nervous temperament', he had 'few friends'; loneliness and extreme impressionability made him 'ripe for conversion', and his subsequent 'insatiable appetite' for theurgy ended by making him, and the philosophic ideal he espoused, seem freakish even to most of the cultured pagans among his subjects.[54] It is a view that does less than justice to the range of Julian's activities at Athens. Priscus' school, no doubt, resembled that of Aedesius in its rarified and quasi-hieratic atmosphere. But Julian was not entirely absorbed into this closed society. Several points deserve to be stressed.

First, Priscus was from the start a friend rather than a teacher in the strict sense: in a letter from Gaul, Julian wrote that after reading a book by him on Aristotle, he styled himself his pupil, though he was not really such.[55] And if Julian's letters to him seem exuberantly friendly, it is partly a matter of form: we shall see soon that letters to a range of acquaintances show a similar exuberance. Besides, Priscus was not the only friend to be made at Athens. We have noted already Julian's lasting fondness for the Christian Prohaeresius, and the tenor of his student days is further illuminated by a glance at what two contemporaries had to say about their own. Gregory Nazianzen and Basil of Caesarea both made Julian's acquaintance in the lecture-rooms at Athens, and Basil was to receive a cordial invitation to Constantinople after Julian's accession.[56] These contacts suggest that Julian was not rigorously isolated from the bustle of student life at Athens, nor restricted in his social relations to the company of Priscus and his circle. To judge from Gregory's account, both he and Basil had taken care to keep their distance from Priscus,[57] for the very reason Julian had befriended him: the man was 'excessively given over to idolatry'.[58] It is worth noting, too, that reminiscences by Julian which have prompted some moderns to describe him as a priggish and unsociable student find an echo in Gregory's memories of his own and Basil's days in Athens. They and a 'noble band' of friends, he says, knew only two roads, one to the church and one to the lecture-hall; Julian, for his part, remembered Mardonius' injunction to keep his eyes firmly on the ground as he walked to school.[59] The influence of a *topos* may perhaps be discerned.

Too much can be made in any case of the notion that Priscus and his friends were a race apart: the competitiveness of the schools at Athens, famously attested by Libanius, need not be supposed to have passed them by entirely. It is true that the general picture of fourth-century Athens which emerges from Eunapius' *Lives of the Phil-*

osophers is of a centre of rhetoric, not philosophy. But this reflects the bias of the author, who had studied rhetoric at Athens, but had then returned to Sardis for his philosophic studies.[60] Even when we set aside a claim by Julian that Athens was a philosophic centre in the 350s,[61] it is clear from a speech by Himerius that courses in Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean philosophy were available there at that time.[62] But precisely what this signifies is debatable. At one time the great Schools of Athens – Academy and Lyceum, Stoa and Garden – had produced 'Successions' (*Diadochai*), lists recording the heads of the School from the founder onwards. By now, though, any such lines of succession had in all probability long since collapsed.[63] It is well known that under Marcus Aurelius four imperial chairs were established – one for each of the great sects. But it is by no means certain either that the holders of these – styled *diadochoi* – were identical with the heads of whatever 'schools' existed in the High Empire, or that the chairs were still funded in the fourth century. There is no evidence, in fact, that there were any organized Stoic, Epicurean or Peripatetic schools at Athens by then (Himerius only speaks of studying the doctrines of these sects).[64]

The issue of the Academy is more complicated, but clearly to our purpose. For if it survived in the 350s, it is all the easier to imagine Priscus' school as only appealing to an extreme minority. It was long thought that the Academy did still exist, or at least a version of it reformulated under the Antonines. But more recent work suggests that this is to misunderstand the connotations of the term *Platonikos diadochos* in imperial times: it need not refer at all to heads of the original Academy (whose very survival is questioned); nor does it exclusively denote the holder of an imperial chair.[65] But in any case, no Platonist *diadochos* is attested at Athens between the mid-third century and the fifth.[66] The issue is further confused by the presence there in the 350s of two opposed groups of Neoplatonists, represented by Priscus and the followers of Theodorus of Asine respectively. One ingenious proposal is that the absence of attested *diadochoi* in the fourth century merely reflects a *damnatio memoriae* suffered by the school of Theodorus after it lost a struggle for control of the Academy.[67] But the struggle could equally well be explained as a dispute between two rival private schools. Priscus' school, in fact, may have differed less radically in teaching practice or appeal from others at Athens at the time than one might suppose. The civic professor of rhetoric, after all, taught at home in preference to the lecture-hall.[68] Priscus and his circle were perhaps less of a closed

society, and keener to attract students, than Eunapius may suggest: Priscus was acting conventionally enough in compiling a handbook on Aristotle,[69] and Julian's own slighting reference to the followers of Theodorus (*Ep.* 2) hints that his school was not so self-absorbed as to abstain from the vituperative feuds so characteristic of ancient sects.

Julian's formal education ended late in 355, when he was appointed Caesar and sent to Gaul. To one who had not wanted (so he said) to leave Athens,[70] the cultural life of Gaul seemed a desert and a matter for joking: 'The place has made such a barbarian of me that it is a wonder that I still speak Greek.'[71] The uncongenial surroundings did not stop Julian indulging his interests. The Empress had given him a comprehensive library, and after a season's campaigning there was time to study in winter.[72] Nor was agreeably philosophic company lacking, even when the visits of Priscus and the hierophant are set aside.[73] Oribasius, the doctor who accompanied Julian to Gaul, was a pagan and a close friend from days at Athens, and something of a polymath to boot.[74] For those who seek a philosophically influential presence at this time, however, a newer friendship holds more interest. Saturninus Secundus Salutius was already an experienced administrator when he was assigned to the new Caesar as an adviser; he may reasonably be identified with the dedicatee of Julian's *To King Helios* and with the Sallustius to whom the manuscript tradition ascribes authorship of the Neoplatonist manual *On the Gods and the Universe*.[75] But if his philosophic interests are indisputable, his status as a mentor is not. The *Consolation to Himself* that Julian composed after Salutius' forced departure from Gaul testifies to a close friendship, but hardly more. At one point, it is true, Julian likens his distress at the departure to his feelings when he was separated from Mardonius as a child:[76] but when the grounds of the comparison are given, the equipoise of the relationship – its *isorrhopia* – gets particular emphasis. As a Gaul and an official of long standing, Salutius was certainly in a position to offer good practical advice, for which Julian was suitably grateful.[77] But Julian's faith was not blind. He praises Salutius above all for his tested loyalty and his *parrhêsia*, his openness in conversation:[78] a keynote in the *Consolation* is the communality of thought (*koinônia tês phronêseôs*), stemming from the shared experiences of like-minded men,[79] and its tone reveals a writer confident in his own ability to sustain the partnership.[80] As for philosophy, the evidence does not suggest that Salutius exerted a significant influence. He is complimented in the *Consolation* on his

eunomia as a public official on the one hand, and for his rhetorical and philosophic skills on the other;[81] but the attribution of this combination of virtues was standard in praises of fourth-century officials (a point on which I expand shortly), and must not be pressed too hard. Within a few years, at any rate, it was Julian who set the pace; Salutius' manual seems indebted to the fifth and seventh orations of the Emperor in its treatment of myth, and in the details of its demonology it differs from the doctrine favoured by Julian in ways which conceivably imply a lesser degree of familiarity with Iamblichan texts on Salutius' part.[82]

If we are properly to understand the philosophic ideal expressed in Julian's writings, two features of his education to which I have referred in the preceding account need emphasis. First, his theurgic initiation at Ephesus should not obscure the fact that his training in philosophy was both more conventional in form, and less extensive in scope, than one might suppose from a reading of Eunapius. It began in his later teens as part of his higher education: that much was normal.[83] Even after his encounter with the Pergamene Neoplatonists and the 'conversion' of 351, his philosophic studies were not exclusively focused on the privileged Platonic texts and theurgic works of the Iamblichans; study of Aristotle and the Stoics was part of the curriculum too. More precisely – again, this was standard school-procedure – Julian studied samples of Aristotelian and Stoic teachings through excerpt-collections and handbooks: he looks not to have read individual works of Aristotle at first hand, and even the true scope of his reading of Plato could be exaggerated on this count.[84] So too, Julian's attendance at the schools was intermittent – perhaps a year at Pergamum and Ephesus (he himself remarks that the time he spent with Maximus was short), rather less at Athens in the company of Priscus. That does not begin to compare with the long years devoted exclusively to a single philosophic teacher by some celebrated figures: Porphyry spent six years under Plotinus, Gregory the Wonder-worker five under Origen, Plotinus himself eleven years with Ammonius.[85] More to the point, the length of Julian's studies can be contrasted with that of some of his fellow-students: like him, Basil and Gregory pursued their education in several places before they came to Athens; but Basil stayed there for five years, and Gregory for eight or more.[86] For them, lectures in philosophy comprised only a part of a broader rhetorical education: but neither did Julian devote himself to philosophy to the exclusion of other cultured interests in rhetoric and literature.

And this introduces the second point for emphasis. Julian's education made for a learned man with an abiding interest in philosophy and a high regard for philosophers; it did not make for a man with a specialist's philosophic knowledge or expertise. On one test of Julian's *œuvre*, philosophers indeed have an unusual prominence in his personal cultural 'pantheon': of the nine elect figures most often named, eight are philosophers (the exception is Homer). But philosophers' words are much less often cited in the *œuvre* than philosophers' names; in its apparatus of verbal allusion and quotation, it discloses a pattern of cultural reference rooted fundamentally in a knowledge of Greek literature and rhetoric imparted by the *enkyklios paideia*, the familiar model of liberal education.[87] The training in rhetoric, indeed, left a clear mark on the form in which Julian expresses his philosophic ideal. At *Or.* 3.119, for instance, in asserting the pre-eminence of philosophy in Greece, Julian develops a familiar conceit: it is as the Nile is to Egypt, it is a fountain – Peirene itself. This is just the type of practice he seemingly criticizes elsewhere (*Or.* 7.236ab). The inconsistency is superficial and unsurprising. Rhetoric enjoyed so dominant a place in the field of higher education in Julian's time that it necessarily affected his very conception of the philosophic ideal.[88] To his eye, the philosopher was a man of culture, a *pepaideumenos*, and a cultured man had familiarity with the rhetors and the poets as well as with Platonic doctrine. Even if their role is subsidiary, it is nevertheless integral – a fact easily obscured by Julian's emphatic assertion in a letter to Eumenius and Pharianus (former fellow-students at Athens) that the value of everything depends on philosophic study. 'Do not despise the study of mere words, and do not neglect rhetoric and the reading of poetry. But let there be a greater concern for the main lessons, and let your whole effort be aimed at the understanding of Aristotle and Plato. Let this be the task . . . the rest is subsidiary.'[89] If the status granted to literary study here seems excessively humble, there is perhaps an element of posturing in the letter, with the writer keen to stress that he has not gone to seed in Gaul. Elsewhere, Julian is less grudging, and speaks of his own 'initiation' into philosophy in two complementary stages: first, the literary *propaideia* implanted by Mardonius, then Maximus' showing of the 'door to philosophy', the *prothyra tês philosophias*.[90] For one who professed philosophy, occasional digs at rhetors were virtually *de rigueur*; but Julian did not seriously insist that the two disciplines were radically incompatible.[91] The real issue was whether the rhetor had a proper

regard for philosophy: the *dysmathestatos* Cynic Heraclius did not, and is duly contrasted with 'noble rhetors' (*Or.* 7.236b); at *CG* 131cd, the cultural life of Gaul is found wanting on similar grounds. Libanius, on the other hand, is 'the most philosophic and truth-loving of rhetors', Eustathius a *logios* and a *philosophos*; even Prohaeresius is a *sophos*.[92]

Although Julian is sometimes casual to the point of absurdity in distributing praise, the fact that such compliments are exaggerated does not in general mean they are wholly empty. At the start of *Or.* 1, he explicitly proposes a philosophic aesthetic: all actions should aim at beauty, of which virtue is the highest form. But there are many paths to this goal, rhetoric among them: the proviso is that rhetors must take care to see that their words are worthy of judgement by the standards of virtue and philosophy. Ideally, Apollo is the *archêgetês* of rhetoric no less than philosophy (*Or.* 4.132ab). (Julian's denial at the start of *Or.* 1 that he has rhetorical skill or training is a *topos* of the *basilikos logos*: one might compare his disavowal of the title of philosopher at *Or.* 3.120b.) In short, Julian's ideal is philosophic in an extended sense: moderns find a tension between the brand of Neoplatonism to which he subscribed and the conventional notion of *paideia*, but it was not a tension which loomed oppressively in the mind of one who saw verse as the obvious medium for his celebration of the virtues of Priscus,[93] and who waxed lyrical at the recollection of balmy days spent cultivating vines and reading poetry on his grandmother's Bithynian estate (*Ep.* 25).

THE PHILOSOPHIC IDEAL

I pass to Julian's own pronouncements on what philosophy ideally is. Although his views on the ideal studies and proper behaviour of those who aspire to be philosophers are in large part conventional, the way his writings picture philosophy's ultimate aim has an undeniably hieratic tinge. Philosophy is presented as an initiation, figuratively as well as literally: 'Iamblichus initiated me [into philosophy] through his doctrines (*logoi*)'.[94] *Or.* 7 describes it as the conversion of 'the plurality of life into the uniform, indivisible *ousia* of Dionysus' (222a), as becoming 'like a god'.[95] Apollo is its founder, the Delphic 'Know Thyself' its guiding principle;[96] just as we must worship Apollo, so philosophy requires an act of faith; hypotheses may be praised, but dogma must be revered (*Or.* 4.148b). The corollary, of course, is that priests are philosophers: Theodorus, a

fellow-initiate of Maximus and High Priest of Asia under Julian, 'loves philosophy as much as anyone alive' (*Ep.* 16). Whatever it owed to the followers of Iamblichus, this ideal blend of wisdom and ritual purity went back to Porphyry at least.[97] In Julian's encyclical letters, however, the philosophic studies recommended for a priest were conventional enough – as was the 'Likeness unto God' metaphor and the status of Apollo as *archêgos* of philosophy.[98] And simultaneously, Julian can characterize philosophy in secular terms as the science of sciences, *epistêmê tôn epistêmôn*.[99] His letter to Nilus borrows Phaedo's description of philosophy as a cure for all ills, the purifier of our habits and appetites, and praises it as 'a surpassing wonder', since it leads even the wicked 'into the light'.[100] This was a stock figure: the metaphor of the philosopher as healer was a commonplace of the diatribe.[101]

The tendency of fourth-century Neoplatonists to think of philosophy as a kind of priestly craft is familiar, and has been noted earlier.[102] But if the notion had special appeal for the followers of Iamblichus, it was familiar too to the wider Greek intelligentsia; it had been common enough currency for Lactantius to judge it worth attacking.[103] Julian's own interest, however, will have been quickened by particular considerations. On the one hand, as Emperor he was also Pontifex Maximus. More important, he was convinced that he was under the special care of the gods,[104] and his personal piety was closely bound up with his love of philosophy: at the close of his *To the Mother of the Gods* – the work, in his words, of one who was at once a philosopher and a theologian[105] – he prayed to Cybele that he might be granted true knowledge of the doctrines concerning the gods and perfection in theurgy. Of all forms of philosophic expression, he has the highest regard for the myth, composed with proper regard for its noble subject and aimed at making the hidden plain to those who strive to see.[106] But it deserves to be stressed that if theurgy was the highest form of philosophy in his eyes, he certainly recognized that it was the preserve of the happy few.[107] He himself knew the commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles* by Iamblichus (though his reference to it may suggest that he came to it rather later than we might have expected),[108] but he never mentions it when he gives his views on the proper course of study for philosophers: it was to be their final reward after they walked a road which had no short cuts (*Or.* 7.235d). It is to this road that we now turn.

The necessary preconditions for philosophic study, stated in *Ep.* 16, are partly contingent (the student must have leisure) and partly

a matter of disposition (he must also have some natural ability and an innate love of the subject): 'Of the ancients, most who attained to genuine philosophy did so by setting their hearts of these things.'[109] To develop the student's ability and love of the subject was the function of a proper training (*orthê agôgê*), the aim of which is specified at *Or.* 7.235ad as the imparting of a sound knowledge of the Greek language and its literary genres – as Julian remarks elsewhere, 'the Muses teach (*paideusi*) our souls' and predispose us 'to cultivate virtue and regard the gods as our rulers'.[110] In short, a healthy mental disposition and a proper regard for the well-being of the soul were essential.[111] Granted these conditions, the study of philosophy proper can begin. As we would expect of one who had confessed himself an impassioned searcher for the teachings of Plato and Aristotle,[112] Julian stresses their cardinal importance for would-be students: 'Let your whole effort be directed to [their] teachings: let this be the task, the base, the foundation, the building and the roof' (*Ep.* 3.441c).

Of Aristotle no prescriptive account of philosophic studies could fail to take account. Iamblichus had followed standard practice in using excerpts from his works at an early stage in the training of his students: most of what survives of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* is preserved in Iamblichus' book of the same name.[113] His pupil Aedesius continued the practice, as Eunapius makes clear.[114] Indeed, although the Neoplatonists' main contribution to Aristotelian studies came in the fifth and sixth centuries (above all at Alexandria),[115] there seems to have been considerable interest in them at the Pergamene school: Priscus, it seems from a letter of Julian, had composed a work on Aristotle, and Simplicius casts Maximus of Ephesus in an unexpected light by attributing a commentary on the *Categories* to him.[116] This does much to explain the striking emphasis Julian places on the study of Aristotle (though a corrupt passage in a letter could be taken to mean that he had studied Aristotelian logic through the medium of Porphyry rather than Iamblichus).[117] Even so, the place he assigns to Aristotle is noteworthy: in a letter to Oribasius, he judges the Peripatetic teachings are 'no less noble' than those of the Stoics; the only difference between them is that Peripatetics are more confident and less given to deliberation, Stoics keener to stress *phronêsis*.[118] There is, however, a major proviso. Julian is quick to criticize sceptically inclined Peripatetics: 'I hold that the theories of Aristotle are incomplete unless one harmonizes them with those of Plato – and indeed, unless one harmonizes both with the oracles (*prophêteiai*)

granted by the gods' (*Or.* 5.162c). The conception of 'philosophy from oracles' is significant, and I shall return to it in Chapter Four; but the basic notion of harmony between Plato and Aristotle was common philosophic currency by Julian's day and not confined to Neoplatonists: it is a familiar theme, for instance, in the the writings of Themistius.

A passage in the *Letter to a Priest* adds a little to the picture of the course Julian approves: as well as Plato and Aristotle, Pythagoras (Julian probably has Iamblichus' *Pythagorean Life* in mind) and the Stoics are essential reading; by contrast, Epicurus and the Sceptics are to be entirely ignored.[119] Epicurus in particular is anathema: Julian warns that his doctrines need to be vigilantly guarded against 'lest they escape our awareness and slip into our discourse' (*Or.* 5.162a).

It is clear that Julian envisaged a fairly wide-ranging study of philosophic texts. But he surely took for granted the use of doxographies. He certainly used them himself: in a letter written *en route* to Antioch (*Ep.* 29), he remarks that he does not have with him so much as a single manual on philosophy, rhetoric or grammar. This is a fair indication that they were usually to hand. The use of doxographies and handbooks, like the assimilation of basic Stoic dogma about the divine nature of the universe and the possibility of knowledge of it, was a characteristic of Middle Platonism.[120] So was the willingness to see all the ancient sects (Sceptics and Epicureans excluded)[121] as being in fundamental agreement with one another: Julian's conviction that all philosophy is a unity was the corner-stone of *Or.* 6: 'Let nobody make plurality out of what is one' (6.185c). A parallel development was the tendency to elevate famous philosophers of the past to the status of quasi-divine sages: Julian notably presents Diogenes, Pythagoras and Socrates in just this way.[122]

But there is also a more recent figure who gets very similar treatment in this 'idolatry of holiness'.[123] Iamblichus is 'godlike' (*theios*), 'akin to the *daimones*', 'famed hierophant', Plato's peer.[124] His teachings are perfect and cannot conceivably be improved on (*Or.* 4.158a); they constitute the 'end-point of human wisdom' (*Or.* 4.157d). Such high praise was perhaps only to be expected from a pupil of Iamblichus' disciple Aedesius, but too much could be made of the form it took: if Iamblichus is idolized, the honorific epithet *theios* has the ring of an 'in-house' cliché.[125] And although Julian spoke of Iamblichus' books as 'initiating' him into philosophy – a remark which speaks above all of their importance in his theurgic

studies – it is clear from other remarks considered earlier that Iamblichus did not hold a philosophic monopoly in his eyes. Further, Julian's understanding of his thought may be supposed to have been less than perfect. He quite likely met with works such as the *Protrepticus* and the *Pythagorean Life* at an early stage in his studies, and remarks in his writings look to allude to the *On the Gods* and the commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles*.[126] But the structure of Iamblichus' metaphysics, with its proliferation of Hypostases and its devotion to numerical and hierarchical classes, is highly complicated and reflects his interest in mathematics and geometry;[127] and of his writings on these subjects Julian has nothing to say. His works were perhaps easily thought of as an inspiration to be assimilated as well as one could rather than as suitable for formal study in one's training. Plainly, though, of the major Neoplatonist philosophers, he is the writer who matters for Julian. There is little to suggest that Julian was familiar at all with Plotinus' *Enneads*;[128] as for Porphyry, it is quite likely that Julian knew the *Against the Christians*, and perhaps also the *De abstinentia*,[129] but it is suggestive that at *Or.* 5.161c he admits to ignorance of a Porphyrian allegorical work – *On the Cave of the Nymphs*, perhaps – of relevance to his subject.

Just as Julian's recommended reading speaks of an ideal of philosophy which takes account of others besides the 'blessed theurgists' (*Or.* 5.173a), so does the importance he attached to the personal and civic virtues of a philosopher: for an Emperor with a keen sense of his public responsibilities, it could not be otherwise. And his views on this matter must not be summarily dismissed as odd or irrelevant in the eyes of educated, upper-class subjects in general: Greek philosophy had played an important part in the stimulation of their notion of the 'imperial virtues'.[130]

Julian's ideal of friendship tells us much about the personal qualities he expected of a philosopher: Aristotle, after all, had deemed friendship 'a virtue or a mark of virtue',[131] and it will soon become clear that Julian's ideal is derived in its essentials from the treatment of the subject in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Like Aristotle, Julian saw the key to the issue in a proverb: 'Friends have things in common' (*koina ta philôn*);[132] and friendship is a partnership (*koinônia*) of intelligence and thought between parties who are like-minded, particularly in their regard for virtue.[133] Behind this formulation lies the Aristotelian description of friendship as a likeness, 'and especially a likeness of those who are like in virtue' (*E.N.* 1159b3–4). Further, it will be recalled that Julian stressed as a feature of his relationship

with Salutius a sense of balance (*isorrhopia*) between the two parties; the same term is used by Aristotle of philosophic friendship in particular.[134] In Julian's eyes, an important constituent of this balance was frankness in conversation (*parrhêsia*), a refusal to allow differences in social status to prevent one from speaking one's mind. It is not hard to see why this had special interest for Julian: the formalities of imperial protocol will not have been conducive to easy intimacy. The point is nicely made in a letter from Julian to the sophist Philip:

> One's speech cannot always be made to harmonize with one's true feelings ... and letters from the Emperor to private persons can easily be displayed for the purpose of bragging and for making false pretences if they end up in the hands of men who lack a sense of propriety.[135]

Having thus dismissed the sort who manipulate the goodwill of the Emperor to their own advantage, Julian goes on to speak of 'true friendship'. This, he says, is based on likeness of disposition: a humane, temperate nature will be attractive to a humane observer of it, even if he is of higher status or more intelligent. Again, the passage derives from Aristotle, who had distinguished a 'perfect' form of friendship from inferior kinds.[136]

The failure of language to express one's true feelings which Julian remarks upon in the letter to Philip is in part a self-criticism: he feels that his letter is conceited and does not properly convey the warmth of his feelings for Philip. Implicit in these lines is the ideal we have already met in the *Consolation* sent to Salutius:[137] *parrhêsia* among like-minded men of culture – and even among not so like-minded men: invitations to make use of imperial transport and come to visit are sent to Christians such as Basil and Aetius as well as to pagans.[138] Much of Julian's correspondence with philosophers and rhetors is written in the same enthusiastic and playfully apologetic tone as the letter to Philip, often with an effusively friendly flourish at the close: 'Farewell, brother, most dear and most beloved!' runs the phrase which closes each of two letters to Libanius.[139] We need not question the genuine fondness of the writer for his friends if we discern a fondness too for the florid touch in expressions of this sort. The fact that Julian can deprecate his own letters as conceited and prolix[140] makes it all the more important to stress that they remain by design the efforts of a *pepaideumenos*; the *parrhêsia* upon which Julian placed so high a premium must not ignore the proprieties of letter-

writing. At times this can lead to a certain oddity in tone. A letter to the rhetor Evagrius, besides witnessing the importance Julian attached to generosity as a mark of friendship, contains a highly-wrought (and charming) description of a Bithynian estate which he now made over as a gift. Yet it ends with an ingenuous disclaimer: 'If I have made any mistakes, do not criticize them severely, or as one rhetor would another' (*Ep.* 25). There is a self-consciously literary tone in Julian's correspondence with sophists and philosophers: it is nicely conveyed by the postscript in a letter to Libanius, which seems to echo a letter of Marcus to Fronto.[141]

An echo of Marcus would be suggestive. Julian's high regard for him is well known from the *Letter to Themistius* and the *Caesars*, and has prompted some fanciful psychological speculations.[142] Ammianus (16.1.4) describes the young Julian as seeking to model his own actions and character on those of Marcus – a judgement which the opening of the *Letter to Themistius* seems to bear out. On the other hand, it is hard to assess Marcus' philosophic influence on Julian with any confidence or precision: it is a surprising fact that there is not a single clear reference to the *Meditations* in Julian's works. The omission must be acknowledged as puzzling,[143] but it does not prove that Julian did not know the work; there are hints that he may have done.[144] If he did, Marcus' picture of Antoninus Pius as a gentle philosopher-king – dutiful, affable, impatient of flattery and pomp, and deeply traditional in attitude[145] – could hardly have failed to strike a chord with him. (In this connection, it is of some interest that a paraphrase by Iamblichus of Marcus' famous passage on the temptations of the purple was widely enough known to be anthologized in the fifth century.)[146] At the very least, Marcus' picture of Antoninus could be said to find a parallel in Julian's philosophic ideal: it has notable features in common with Ammianus' *elogium* on the virtues of Julian's reign – and not only with regard to the 'private' virtues.[147] Antoninus, we also read, took special care to see that his subjects were treated justly, checked public adulation and financed public works; for Julian, likewise, the private virtues of mildness, friendliness, generosity and *parrhêsia* found their public counterparts in the ideals of mercy, *philanthrôpia* and *civilitas* that philosophy demanded of an Emperor.[148]

Philanthrôpia was a topic much discussed in fourth century political philosophy. For Themistius, it was a cardinal virtue of the philosopher-king.[149] Julian too set great store by the *philanthrôpia* of the Emperor – and also that of his governors and priests. He

outlines his notion of it in the *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez). A priest, he says, must practise this virtue before all others, for it results in other blessings, and above all secures the goodwill of the gods (289a–b). Its scope, however, is not merely theological: 'There are many kinds of philanthropy' (289b). Its political application stems from the fact that man is by nature a social animal (*koinônikon zôon*) and should therefore show kindness to his fellows – or even, indeed, to the wicked (292d; 290d). (The last requirement in practice meant that one exercised a certain forbearance in the face of provocation: Julian would even claim that he had acted 'philanthropically' towards the Christians in that he had not instigated a persecution.)[150] The stress on philanthropy as the signal priestly virtue was certainly influenced by Julian's recognition of the goodwill Christians gained through their practice of it: 'It is disgraceful that impious Galilaeans support not only their poor, but ours too' (*Ep.* 22.430d).

The remark should not be assumed to refer only to the charitable actions of simple men. For Christian intellectuals, as for Julian, the notion – Platonic at root – that a philosopher must play a part in civic affairs for the public good held no small appeal. Eusebius, writing in praise of Anatolius, a bishop of the mid-third century, took care to stress both his philosophic erudition (he is described as Aristotelian *diadochos* at Alexandria)[151] and his sense of civic duty: at a time when the city was under siege, he accepted a high magistracy and succeeded in saving the population from starvation.[152] But the notion emphatically did not belong to the Christians only, and there was no need for Julian to borrow from them in this matter. In the political sphere, the basic characteristics of *philanthrôpia* were straightforward enough: a care for the proper processes of law, and generous public expenditure. In the eyes of the local aristocracies, the former was a crucial issue in the wake of the Diocletianic separation of civic and military administration: it was a prominent theme in many epigrams written to celebrate the virtues of fourth-century governors.[153] From Ammianus (22.10.6) we know that Julian liked to claim – perhaps partly to refute the Christian use of Virgil's Fourth Eclogue[154] – that the goddess Justice had returned to earth during his reign, and several of his letters show the importance he attached to the qualities of temperance and humaneness in his governors. One, to his uncle Julian, the Count of the East, stresses the need for 'great-heartedness' (*megalopsychia*) in a public official, even in the face of insolent provocation; another congratulates Alypius, the governor of Britain, for the way he has combined mercifulness and moderation

(*praotês*, *sôphrosynê*) with courage and strength (*andreia*, *rhômê*); a third condemns as tyrannical the high-handed actions of an unnamed governor.[155]

As for public expenditure, Mamertinus' panegyric of 362 in honour of Julian speaks (in somewhat exaggerated terms) of his restoration of buildings, aqueducts and civic games throughout Macedonia, Illyricum and the Peloponnese.[156] The duty of the Emperor to spend generously for the good of his subjects is duly acknowledged in Julian's own panegyric to Constantius, whose building programme at Antioch is picked out for praise (*Or.* 1.41a). And in *Ep.* 31 Julian decrees that, 'by our *philanthrôpia*', physicians are to be exempted from the financial burdens of senators. When Ammianus reviewed Julian's reign, he emphasized (as Mamertinus earlier had) his *liberalitas* in the imposition of light taxes, and his remission of the *aurum coronarium*.[157]

Ammianus also spoke of Julian as *civilitate admodum studens*, 'greatly inclined to courtesy' (25.4.7): so greatly inclined to it, indeed, that in Ammianus' view he once or twice forgot to maintain the dignified pose his imperial role demanded; his rushing out of the Senate-house in the middle of a meeting in order to welcome Maximus to Constantinople was picked out for censure by the historian (22.7.3). The anecdote reminds us that *civilitas* was the public face of Julian's *parrhêsia* among his friends: above all, it implied that one did not stand unnecessarily on ceremony. Fundamentally, Ammianus' emphasis on *civilitas* as a feature of Julian's public comportment is intended to be highly complimentary: he has in mind a contrast with Constantius, whose habit of referring to himself in letters as *Aeternitas Mea* and *Orbis Totius Dominus* Ammianus judged very revealing.[158]

It remains to clarify the relation between these civic virtues and Julian's ideal of *paideia*. The private virtues of *parrhêsia* and *philia* (friendship) were expressed in the context of a circle of *pepaideumenoi* (circles made all the closer in some cases by the development of family cliques around philosophers),[159] and their broader counterparts remained bound up with the notion of culture: the cultural awareness of the Athenians, so Julian declared, made them the 'most philanthropic of the Greeks'.[160] He was by no means unusual in holding to this ideal. A large number of fourth-century epigrams and panegyrics in honour of provincial governors conjoin the themes of the Muses and *sophia* with the virtues of civic justice and public spending. Himerius, in a panegyric dedicated to a governor of

Achaea, praised him both as 'the eye of Justice and Law' and 'the prophet of the Muses and Hermes';[161] an epigram on Praetextatus, whom Julian himself appointed to the same post,[162] honoured him as 'raised by the Muses and fair judgements'.[163] The pattern is repeated in Asia Minor: at Smyrna a couplet records the rebuilding of the city walls by the 'all-wise' (*pansophos*) Anatolius;[164] at Pisidian Antioch, an epigram celebrates the 'wise judge' (*sophos dikastês*) to whom the city owes its new water supply;[165] at Lycian Laodicea, Scylacius, the Vicar of Asia, is honoured for acting justly with his 'hand of wisdom' (*cheiri sophêi*), and thanked for the building work he has undertaken on behalf of the city.[166]

Verses of this sort are the work of cultured amateurs among the local urban élites, and intended for an élite readership – and in the belief and hope that their efforts would be appreciated by their recipients. The evidence suggests that their confidence was not groundless. Around 364, a governor of Galatia, in addition to financing public buildings and fountains, set up a chair in rhetoric.[167] The fact attests either the governor's genuine interest in the subject, or else – which is hardly less significant – his conviction that he ought at least to seem to be interested in it. And the case of Anatolius of Berytus (another whom Himerius honoured with a panegyric) is still more telling. Anatolius was a trained lawyer, a sophist at the dinner-table, and in the words of Eunapius, 'a lover both of reputation and of eloquence'.[168] On his appointment as Prefect of Illyricum, he organized a rhetorical competition on a set theme, and on a later occasion he played a trick on Prohaeresius in order to test his extempore eloquence.[169] His cultural interests and his concern for justice earned him, if Eunapius is believed, a considerable reputation: 'The Greeks marvelled at him, having learned of his wisdom (*phronêma*) and his culture (*paideia*), his uprightness and incorruptibility.'[170]

Sometimes, indeed, governors were themselves rhetors or poets: a Vicar of Macedonia is hailed as a master-sophist,[171] and one Plutarch, governor of the Islands, was inspired by a visit to Crete to sacrifice to Zeus at Mount Ida and to write a poem in honour of Hera.[172] Nor was the association of *paideia* with conventional acts of pagan piety peculiar to Plutarch: far from it. The Prefect Anatolius, for instance, was an enthusiastic pagan,[173] and the Scylacius whose actions so pleased the locals at Lycian Laodicea is probably to be identified with the traveller of the same name who paid his respects to the god Pan at Phyle.[174]

One could hardly ask for more revealing testimony of the importance of *paideia* in the eyes of the Greek-speaking upper classes in the fourth century. For this attitude there were good reasons. The notion of a shared and common culture allowed the urban élites to retain a crucial self-esteem in their dealings with governors, and to enjoy the blessings of government in the most obvious of senses: a gracious poem of thanks for an aqueduct rebuilt might prompt the further gift of a bath-house; a speech of Prohaeresius pleasing to Constans not only won its author the title of *stratopedarchos*: it also secured for Athens financial privileges in the matter of her corn supply.[175] Nor could the imperial authority fail to take account of a notion so central to the élite's self-definition. The centralizing shift in Roman administration marked by the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine is a fundamental fact of Late Roman history, and it is plain that by Julian's day the city élites were struggling to retain anything like the same degree of social and cultural influence they had once enjoyed.[176] They remained, none the less, a highly privileged and influential presence in the cities of the Empire, and the Emperor and his governors still required their support and practical assistance if government was to function and taxes were to flow: 'in the fourth century,' it has been well said, 'courtesy was still necessary.'[177]

The conclusions to which my discussion points should now be clear in their main lines. Julian's philosophic ideal (his own philosophic *practice* in his writings is not at issue for the moment) reflects a broad cluster of interests widely shared by cultured men in the Greek-speaking portion of the Empire. His *paideia* is not to be dismissed as freakish simply because it failed to impress the Antiochenes. Antioch was predominantly a Christian city by Julian's day, and the majority of its inhabitants could hardly be expected to welcome him unreservedly when he arrived there in the summer of 362. Further, it might be argued that the strongly hedonistic tenor of life in the city will have made even its pagan element peculiarly unresponsive. The contrasting conceptions of virtue held by Julian on the one hand and the Antiochenes on the other may be clarified by a glance at the *Antiochikos* of Libanius (*Or.* 11). Delivered before Julian became Emperor, the speech was designed to appeal to an Antiochene audience and hence has something to tell us about the way the inhabitants of the city liked to think of themselves. It has been acutely observed that while Libanius attributed to his audience 'the virtues of Athens', he interpreted these in a way that Julian would have been

unwilling to accept.[178] The stress is firmly on the material rather than the moral,[179] and even the section on the sacred site at Daphne is curiously secular in tone.[180] The speech contrasts sharply with the moralizing tone Libanius was later to adopt in his *Epitaphios*, which contains a highly idealized picture of Julian's behaviour during his stay at Antioch.[181] In that piece, of course, Libanius was bound by the rules of panegyric, and it would be absurd to assume that the sentiments he expressed are indicative of the attitude of cultured pagans in general towards Julian; but similarly, it would be ill-advised to assume that less cosmopolitan cities in the Empire shared the view we may attribute to the Antiochenes on the strength of *Or.* 11.

The most astute of the recent biographies of Julian briskly (and correctly) observed that Julian made no significant intellectual contribution to the development of Neoplatonism, and dismissed the Neoplatonic background as important only in the study of his emotional life – though it ended by implying that Julian's theurgic interests had helped to estrange him from the majority of his pagan subjects.[182] The specific issue of Julian's theurgy is difficult, and for the moment I leave discussion of it aside: but to disdain to attend closely to the broader texture and public implications of the philosophic ideal expressed in Julian's writings is surely to miss something important. It was not an ideal shaped only by the doctrines of Iamblichus, and if theurgy was of interest to a very limited minority, there is reason to think that Julian was well aware of that fact. His fondness for it certainly did not prevent him from pursuing more mainstream literary and philosophic interests. Nor did it stop him subscribing to a broadly-held view about what constituted proper philosophic behaviour in society. On the face of things, it is less than clear that his personal adherence to Iamblichan Neoplatonism was incompatible at root with a public commitment to social ideals that had wide appeal among the urban élites of the day. The public actions of some of Julian's Iamblichan contemporaries are perhaps instructive on this score. Julian's correspondent Eustathius is a case in point. Eustathius was well-known to Julian as a close kinsman of the aged sage Aedesius, at whose Pergamene school Julian had studied in the months preceding his 'conversion' of 351: he was firmly pagan, and married to a lady of the sort that Eunapius found irresistible – a clairvoyant who doubled as a teacher of philosophy. But Eustathius was also a man of tested eloquence outside the lecture-room; in 358, at a moment of crisis for Rome in the East, Constantius had requested him to head an imperial embassy to King Shapur II of Persia, and

Eustathius had accepted the mission readily.[183] So too, another contemporary of Julian – a Neoplatonist from the same stable, and the bearer of a 'godlike' name – proved willing enough to act the part of the *philanthrôpos*: having settled at Athens, he financed the rebuilding of the city walls and was honoured in the customary way by an inscription in verse: 'In his wisdom (*sophia*) Iamblichus adorned Athens and raised up a strong wall for the rugged city.'[184] As Julian put it: 'To be willing and eager to help the city [in which one has spent one's time] is a clear proof of a philosophic mind.'[185]

That remark does not speak of an Emperor whose philosophic ideal in the round put him hopelessly at odds with his subjects. We shall do well to keep its basic purport in mind in reviewing the issue to which I turn next: Julian's own 'philosophic' discourse in practice as it discloses itself in two texts to whose prescriptive declarations I have several times referred in discussing the philosophic ideal – the *Against Heraclius* (*Or.* 7) and the *Against the Uneducated Cynics* (*Or.* 6).

3

PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICE

The invectives against Cynics

In a letter Julian wrote to his uncle in 362, he humorously bemoaned the lack of reading matter presently available to him: 'I swear by the gods that except for Homer and Plato, I have not so much as a handbook of philosophy or rhetoric to hand.'[1] The exception made for Homer and Plato is a fair pointer to their privileged place in Julian's mind: in his writings, the references to each of them by name far outnumber those to any other author, literary or philosophic.[2] Or rather, on a strict interpretation they do: because this result only follows from the disqualification of a third figure, Diogenes of Sinope, the traditional founder of the Cynic philosophy. Diogenes is referred to no fewer than forty times by Julian.[3] He would go down as a key author for him on that count, if there were not an obvious difficulty: it is not clear that Diogenes ever wrote any books; nor is it clear, if he did, that any authentic works survived in Julian's day. What Julian cites in his references to Diogenes are proverbial sayings put in his mouth, or anecdotes about him of the kind preserved in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers*. None the less, the number of times he names Diogenes is striking; and if we add to them the references in Julian's writings to Diogenes' pupil Crates, they name the Cynic sages more often than Homer.

On these statistics, Julian was exceptionally interested in Cynics. But there is a proviso to be made. Julian's references to Diogenes are almost entirely confined to two polemical treatises that Julian wrote close in time in response to a specific stimulus. Both are addressed to Cynics. The earlier of the two, *Against the Cynic Heraclius* (*Or.* 7), was composed at Constantinople in Spring 362 – on Julian's account, over a single night.[4] It seems to have been delivered to an audience at court,[5] and was prompted by a lecture given by Heraclius at which Julian was present and which he found presumptuous and

verging on impiety. Heraclius' lecture had been presented in the form of myth in which the speaker had cast himself as Zeus, and Julian as the god Pan in need of instruction; Julian's professed intention in replying is to show that the discourse, not the myth, is the appropriate form of expression for a Cynic; and to explain how a philosopher, if he needs to compose a myth, should set about it.[6] The second text, *Against the Uneducated [Apaideutoi] Cynics* (*Or.* 6) was apparently also composed rapidly at the capital, in two days around midsummer 362.[7] Here too the occasion was a lecture Julian had attended: in this case, the (unnamed) speaker had mocked Diogenes himself. Julian's reply purports to give advice to would-be Cynics[8] and couples a defence of Diogenes with an attack on the lecturer and his associates (who may well have included Heraclius).

At first sight, then, we have two *ad hominem* pieces that criticise Cynics on particular points. But in fact they both tend to more general criticism of the alleged impiety of the addressees, and in the course of that Julian naturally gives expression to his own philosophic and religious views. In *Or.* 7, for instance, he concludes with a myth of his own composition – the so-called 'Helios' myth. And in *Or.* 6 he asserts at length the essential unity of Greek philosophy and classical paganism. In that connection, one can hardly avoid thinking of his famous rescript of summer 362 banning Christian professors of literature and philosophy from the schools on the basis that they fail to respect that cultural unity, and of his criticisms in what remains of his later critique *Against the Galilaeans*. All the more important, then, to judge the philosophic and emotional level of the attacks on the Cynics. Do they rest on any coherent theoretical argument (and in particular, do the criticisms of Cynics as 'uneducated' (*apaideutoi*) have a consistent philosophic significance), or are they best read as simply expressing Julian's abhorrence of 'impiety'? And what did he expect to achieve in practical terms by writing them?

On one view, Julian formulated in these works something like a theory of education and culture (*paideia*) intended to counter a threat posed by the Cynics that he saw as analogous to that posed by Christianity. They have been coupled with Julian's hymns *To King Helios* and *To the Mother of the Gods*, and taken to constitute with them a complementary series of texts in which the orations against Cynics respectively express mystical and rational aspects of a single process of thought.[9] The close of *Or.* 7, ostensibly a criticism of the improper use of myth, is read as a fragmentary and allusive

assertion that theurgic Neoplatonism was firmly based in the age-old tradition of Greek theology, the 'more rational and theoretical' *Or.* 6 as a demonstration of 'the unity of all methods and principles in the sphere of the spirit'.[10]

That reading credits Julian with the devising of an elaborate theory of *paideia* in which he innovated on the basis of Iamblichan doctrine to produce a coherent, if popularizing, account of an educative ideal – and in some respects, an original one. Others before him had written against Cynics, but 'Julian's systematic invectives . . . [show] . . . a great difference in their argument: for Julian, all the errors [his Cynic opponents] commit and preach have but one source: *apaideusia* '; the 'essentially theoretical' *Or.* 6, in particular, is to be read as a coherent argument which 'demonstrated the deep unity of Hellenic thought by integrating Cynicism into the Greek philosophic tradition'.[11] Further, a serious didactic aim is ascribed to the speeches, and it carries significant political implications. The speeches 'launch a manifesto concerning the unity of theology, philosophy and politics within the Empire': intended to teach his opponents once and for all the principles of Cynicism and why its followers had to respect them, they mark a preliminary stage in Julian's assault on the Christian *paideia* in which he dealt with 'more insidious underminers of his thought-world' – a group of fifth columnists, as it were, within the culture of Hellenism.[12]

These are large claims and they require close scrutiny. It is true that *Or.* 7 and the hymn *To the Mother of the Gods* share a concern with myth, and that the assertion in *Or.* 6 that philosophy and religion are a unity presages in a general way the syncretic account of divinity in the *To King Helios.* But however the hymns are to be interpreted – an issue I discuss in a later chapter – these points of contact do nothing to show that the polemics are themselves a theoretically coherent pair of texts written to an earnest didactic purpose. On that score, the issue must rest on appraisal of the polemics in their own right.

In my view, the reading I have outlined markedly exaggerates both the intellectual level of the speeches and Julian's likely purposes in writing them, and in what follows I offer a different reading. My argument falls into three stages. In the first, I highlight several prominent features common to both of the speeches at issue: I wish to show that the criticisms Julian makes, once seen in their broader cultural setting, follow a well-established pattern in their general lines. In the second, I develop this claim through analysis of the detail

of the 'more theoretical' *Or.* 6; I will argue that its arguments are similarly derivative in their particulars, and hardly coherent in their overall exposition. In the third I discuss the idea that a serious didactic purpose underlies the polemics: here I will argue that Julian did not compose them in the belief that the Cynics he attacked presented any significant threat to the health of *paideia* in the Empire, and that the force of any analogy drawn in them between Cynics and Christians must be judged accordingly.

THE CULTURAL SETTING OF THE POLEMICS

Diogenes idealized

A basic assumption made by Julian about his opponents in *Orr.* 6 and 7 is easily stated: they are not true Cynics. In both speeches he repeatedly points to their failure to live and teach in accordance with the example set by Diogenes himself. 'In our own day, the imitators of Diogenes have chosen only what is easiest and emptiest and have not recognized what is nobler' (6.202a). They propound a false and disrespectful account of Diogenes' views: *Or.* 7 culminates with a rebuttal of the notion (attributed by Julian to Heraclius) that he was impious (7.238b); *Or.* 6 aims to counter disrespectful ridicule of him as a conceited and foolish man (6.181a).

In setting up the argument on these terms, Julian echoed and took sides in a dispute that had begun in Hellenistic times. A glance at the earlier history of Cynicism will show how it arose.

In philosophic jargon, the aim of Cynicism was a life lived 'according to nature', a life inducing utter self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) and a concomitant impassivity (*apatheia*). But from an early stage, Cynicism was a philosophic will-o'-the-wisp. Some claimed Diogenes had left written works; others denied it, and reckoned his philosophy a 'way of life' rather than a body of doctrine.[13] In popular opinion, certainly, Cynicism was above all else a matter of appearance and social behaviour. From the third century BC on, would-be emulators of Diogenes had wandered as beggars in the Greek-speaking world, to be identified by their emblematic staffs, coarse cloaks, leather pouches and unkempt beards. The type was common enough to become traditional in Hellenistic literature, and remained a popular stereotype of the philosopher up to Julian's time and beyond.[14] Their behaviour was similarly subject to conventional description: Diogenes was remembered first and foremost as the man

who had lived like a dog and spoken to Alexander as an equal; consequently, 'shamelessness' (*anaideia*) and speech which paid no heed to social status (*parrhêsia*) became the accepted hallmarks of Cynicism.

At this level, no clear line marked off self-styled Cynics from common vagabonds: the discontented artisans and runaway slaves turned Cynics in Lucian's satires hint at the attractions this way of life was alleged to hold for those upon whom ancient society laid its harshest claims. That was a social factor which inevitably coloured the cultured attitude to them. All the same, in the philosophic schools a more refined image of the Cynic developed that was to have lasting appeal in cultured circles, and which has great importance for our appraisal of Julian's view of the issue.

The refinement was largely the work of the Stoics, and in part a consequence of a dispute about the philosophic status of Cynicism which is traceable to the early third century BC. As it was seen then, the problem was whether or not Cynicism could be called a *hairesis* – a term of commendation at that stage.[15] Those who denied this were refusing Cynicism the status of a coherently articulated doctrine founded on reasoned principles. By contrast, Stoics keen to lay a claim to the ethical tradition of Socrates devised a succession from him to their founder via Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates. The pedigree was ratified in the *Diadochai of the Philosophers* and was well established by the first century AD.[16] It remained so in the fourth, when it found a clear expression in Themistius[17] and in Julian's own talk of the three figures as 'the headmen' of Cynicism, of 'the Socratic Antisthenes', and of Crates as the pupil of Diogenes and teacher of Zeno.[18]

Diogenes was assimilated by this process as an exemplar of Stoic virtue. But outside Stoic circles, a less refined Cynicism survived. Self-sufficiency and freedom from passion, it was said, were only to be gained through an ethical and physical training (*askêsis*) which took its cue from the manner of Diogenes' life. Insofar as this emphasized his extreme austerity as a proof that happiness (*eudaimonia*) was not dependent on externals, it was quite acceptable to Stoics, but other aspects of it were less palatable. The story went that Apollo had ordered Diogenes to 'falsify the coinage'.[19] This was interpreted in some quarters to entail a radical social critique which did not spare the Schools.[20] Works such as Menippus' *Against the Grammarians* rested on the notion that Cynicism provided a 'short cut to virtue' which rendered conventional

education redundant.[21] Stoics responded by extolling the need for a formal round of study (*enkyklia mathêmata*)[22] – a fact which gives us a preliminary hint that Julian's criticism of his opponents as lacking culture and learning (*apaideutoi*) broke little new ground.

The conception of Cynicism as a 'short cut' to the goal of philosophy was reflected in the manner in which it was popularly taught. Cynic ethics found expression in quasi-literary forms. The diatribe made its appeal through the use of the commonplace and the striking metaphor: worldly goods were useless, man was sick in his spirit; the Cynic was a doctor of souls, a scout for mankind, and so on. A particular feature of diatribe – its use of the *chreia*, a form of anecdote – ensured that stories about Diogenes' peculiar habits and activities were of wide and lasting appeal.[23] Another literary form, the pseudepigraphic epistle attributed to a philosopher, was important too, although not exclusive to Cynicism. Spurious letters of Diogenes, Crates, Heraclitus and Hippocrates are datable in the main to the first century,[24] and whether or not they stem from rhetorical circles they indicate sympathetic interest in radical Cynicism at that time. One such letter will be shown later to have special interest when set alongside comments Julian makes in the polemics.

In cultivated circles the response to this popular Cynicism will have been ambivalent. While its ethical appeal as a 'way of life' (*enstasis biou*) had to be acknowledged, its impatience with the orthodox *paideia* was hardly endearing. But the appeal of the diatribe was very wide, and to a degree it dictated the terms of debate. Julian's own discourse about Cynicism falls easily into the conventional tone at times: the rich man 'is never free while the belly and the part beneath it rules' (6.197c); tyrants are to be found 'not among those who eat bread, but among you who eat costly dinners, as Diogenes says' (6.199a); social prominence is 'an empty thing' (6.200c); 'the language of truth ... is simple: only liars and scoundrels use a riddling style' (7.214a). Similarly, anecdotes which cast Diogenes in an unwelcome light – a scorner of the Mysteries (7.238c), a frequenter of brothels (6.201a), a defecator and masturbator in the Agora (6.202c) – were too well known to be ignored, and needed to be mentioned if only to be explained away. Appeal to the idealized Diogenes of Stoic tradition offered a neat solution to the dilemma: by equating the true Cynic with an ascetic figure deprived of radical muscle, it was possible to reject self-professed Cynics of one's own day as degenerate and misguided.

Julian was by no means the first to do that. Epictetus' lecture *On*

Cynicism supplies a striking instance of the tendency. In his view, only those who fail to appreciate the true greatness of Diogenes will confuse him with his contemporary imitators. They repel by their filthiness, whereas he was healthy and attractive even in his practice of austerity: the true Cynic is a messenger sent to mankind by god, a scout who shows us what is good and warns us away from evil.[25] Similarly, Julian contrasted his opponents with a Diogenes whose rigorous training produced the healthy body and the noble soul of a loyal servant of Delphic Apollo (6.195ab; 192d), a tracker who sniffs out the way of truth (6.188c).

Epictetus does not go so far as to claim that there are no true Cynics surviving, but his picture is deeply archaizing. Dio Chrysostom proceeded on the same basis, venerating Diogenes as an ideal model in one speech and reviling contemporary Cynics in another as men 'who do no good but rather the greatest harm' (*Orr.* 4 *passim*; 32.9). So too did Julian. At 7.236b, he doubted whether there were any virtuous Cynics left in his day, and the addressee of *Or.* 6 is said to have 'strayed so far from Diogenes' plan of life as to think him a figure of pity' (6.202a). Statements of this sort make it very plain that Julian's idealized Diogenes derives from a familiar theme in moralizing writings. They also witness a broader tendency in cultured discourse in antiquity to which I shall return when I come to discuss the *Against the Galilaeans* – a readiness to grant the status of sage or prophet to a figure of the past while simultaneously refuting the claims of his contemporary disciples. Even the sceptical Lucian, for instance, was willing to pay due respect to Pythagoras while at the same time deriding Neopythagoreans like Apollonius and Alexander of Abonouteichos.[26] In short, nothing new was good. Julian's own philosophic hero Iamblichus had chosen to prescribe the ideals of a Neoplatonist theurgist by writing a life of Pythagoras and a commentary on a text purporting to contain the doctrines of ancient Chaldaea. When Julian himself echoed Epictetus and Dio in his comparison of contemporary Cynics with their founder, his attack betokened a proposition to look to the past with an uncritically friendly eye. To that extent, it may be provisionally reckoned conventionally derivative rather than properly philosophic.

Philosophic 'conversion' and the Cynic life

At the start of *Or.* 6, Julian gives as his ostensible aim a wish to set out in public the nature of true Cynicism for the benefit of 'all those

who are entering into this way of life' (6.181d). They must be made aware that it does not suffice, if one wants to be a Cynic, to sport the conventional accoutrements of staff, pouch, cloak and unkempt hair: 'reason rather the staff, a way of life rather the pouch – these are the hallmarks of this philosophy' (6.201a). At first sight, that may seem to indicate a serious didactic motive behind the speech. To judge its tone properly, however, we need to recognize that such a statement of aim, just like the idealization of Diogenes, followed a conventional pattern. In its particular claim that real Cynicism is not a matter of appearance, it merely repeats Epictetus. In a broader sense, it rests on a cultural ideal which had no small appeal to persons well enough off to enjoy a higher education: the notion of conversion to philosophy.

The popular image of the Cynic as one who gave up home and possessions for an inner goal presented the process in congenially stark and dramatic terms. The case of Dio Chrysostom is very revealing of the attractiveness of the ideal in this guise – and also of its dubious practical application. Dio presented himself as having converted to philosophy after consulting an Apolline oracle (Or.13.9) and as having subsequently lived as a wandering Cynic for several years after being banished from Rome in the 80s: 'Those who met me judged me a beggar from the way I looked: others took me for a philosopher' (13.1). In all probability, his claim is largely bogus: he had been a student of philosophy long before the purported conversion, and after his return to imperial favour he continued to practise as a rhetor.[27] No doubt he saw in the accident of exile a rare opportunity for retrospective self-dramatization: Dio had a taste for presenting himself in the guise of celebrated figures of the past, Diogenes being one among several.[28] But if the account he gives is suspect, the fact that he gives it at all is revealing. It shows that Cynicism spoke of a way of life that upper-class students of philosophy might at least claim to be minded to follow. Reflection on the audience of Epictetus supports the view. Although his regular pupils were less eminent than some occasional visitors, they came largely from the provincial aristocracies of Asia Minor. His lectures were public and could attract large audiences: he himself gives five hundred, even a thousand, as the sort of number a successful speaker could expect.[29] His lecture *On Cynicism* was prompted, we are told, by one such pupil 'who seemed inclined to become a Cynic' (*Diss.* 3.22.1).

There is something of a conventional role-play to be discerned

here, both in the pupil's professed inclination and in the teacher's warning against a dangerous false path: the debate breathes the leisurely air of the lecture-room. Few, if any, of the young aristocrats in Epictetus' audience will be supposed ever to have given up their wealth to roam as beggars; but whatever pains he took to explain that philosophy was not a matter of appearance, some students were likely enough tempted to grow their hair and wear the *tribôn*, the Cynic's cloak, as a token gesture: in the fourth century, at any rate, Julian recalls his fellow-student Iphicles as doing just that, to the dismay of his teacher and family (*Or.* 6.198a). For an Iphicles, as for Dio, the image of conversion held a forceful and self-dramatizing appeal which guaranteed that upper class interest in the Cynics' 'short cut to virtue' was long-lived – Augustine was to speak of Cynics, Peripatetics and Platonists as the only pagan philosophers surviving in his day[30] – and not easily confined to the doctrinal arguments of professionals. At cultural centres like Athens, or Alexandria – and later, at Constantinople – students of the Schools and those on their fringes who were perplexed or bored by the intricacies of Middle or Neoplatonist logic might easily be tempted to call them sterile and see in Cynicism easy answers to hard questions.[31] Propriety demanded they were reprimanded, but anyone who counts Julian's *Or.* 6 an attempt undertaken in deadly earnest to instruct misguided souls must account for his contemplating with equanimity at the very start the possibility that his words will not win over his listeners: 'No matter, it is all one to Hippocleides: we are not concerned with puppies who behave this way' (6.182b).

There are hints, in any case, that such admonitions were hardly necessary. Among the well-to-do, impatience with the details of study did not entail a rejection of the established 'philosophic' attitudes of educated men: the behaviour of those who professed Cynicism could fall into a conventional enough pattern. A couplet by one 'Ouranios, a Cynic' commemorates his visit to the Theban Cataracts in Egypt – a popular trip among well-to-do intellectuals.[32] From the same place, a fourth- or early fifth-century ostracon presents two sayings of Diogenes written out as a school exercise, one of which neatly parallels Julian's own picture of the sage as a cultivated man: to the question, 'Where do the Muses live?' Diogenes replies, 'In the souls of the educated (*tôn pepaideumenôn*).'[33] Elsewhere, the prosperous owner of a villa at Cologne chose to adorn his house with a mosaic at whose centre stood a Diogenes surrounded by famous poets and philosophers, among them Socrates and

(probably) Plato and Aristotle.[34] For a cultivated person of that sort, the tradition that Plato and Diogenes had repudiated each other[35] counted for nothing; Cynic and Platonist had become confused in the cultivated imagination, and when Julian put Diogenes in Plato's company the association would hardly strike his audience as novel. So too, his claim to be warning would-be Cynics away from a false path may have seemed less an indication of a burning desire to instruct than a variation on the theme familiar to any man who had enjoyed a higher education: the need to be a philosopher in one's soul rather than in mere appearance.

Conventional criticism of 'false philosophers'

A firm judgement on the intellectual coherence of Julian's case in the anti-Cynic polemics will best be postponed until the argument of *Or.* 6 has been discussed in detail. But it can be safely said, at least, that many of the charges he brings against them are no less conventional than his idealization of Diogenes as an exemplar and the assertion that his opponents distort the sage's message in their teaching and habits. Heraclius is an impious blasphemer (*Or.* 7.205a), a slanderer of noble men and a flatterer (7.223a), a mere seeker of reputation and attendants (7.224b), an insane and foolish ignoramus (7.224d), an idle braggart (7.227a), an absurd fraud (7.234d); the ignorant Cynics of *Or.* 6, similarly, are self-indulgent and greedy slaves of the body (6.182c), shameless and impudent as regards everything divine and human (6.199a), abusers of true philosophers who prejudice the general public against true Cynicism (6.197d; 198b).

Impiety, shamelessness, ignorance, fraud: these are the stock charges of ancient polemic, often enough lacking any sound basis in reasoned argument. The complaint of impiety is clearly likely to be central in Julian's case and more will be said of it later: for the moment, I simply note that it was often merely one ingredient in the barrage of insults and calumnies that one group hurled against another in place of coherent philosophic criticism.[36] In Antonine times, Lucian had reviled the Cynic Peregrinus as 'godless', and Aelius Aristides had criticized his general type as 'impious'.[37] The same charge was levelled at Epicureans by men as different in temperament as Plutarch and Alexander of Abonouteichos.[38] It reflects a widespread assumption of pagans that philosophy and piety went hand in hand: a first-century epigram dedicated to a Platonist,

for instance, praises his rejection of 'vain and godless doctrines (*kenai doxai . . . atheoi*) of the hedonist Epicureans'.[39] The same assumption lay behind Epictetus' idealization of the true Cynic as a pious messenger of Zeus (*Diss.* 3.22.23). Criticism of contemporary Cynics as impious was simply the reverse of the coin.

In the case of Cynics, 'impiety' could easily seen to be strikingly emblematic of their general failure to respect their betters. Cynic *parrhêsia* might be paid lip-service in the abstract, but in practice attitudes were less generous. Just as there was true and false Cynicism, so there was proper and improper freedom of speech. Julian himself gave voice to the crucial proviso: the would-be Cynic 'must not have recourse to *parrhêsia* until he has proved his worth' (6.201a). On that basis, shamelessness could easily become a ground of criticism: Cynics were accused on that score by Aelius Aristides and by Julian's own hostile contemporary, Gregory Nazianzen.[40]

At one level, the charge could reflect little more than the contempt of the upper classes for the antics of ragged beggars. But there were cultural implications as well. It was bad enough to insult one's social betters; for a self-professed 'philosopher' to mock a highly cultured man compounded the offence. That was exactly what Heraclius had done in insisting that he be taken to Julian and 'barking' a mischievous fable in which he had presented himself as Zeus giving advice to a Julian cast as Pan (7.224d; 234d). Did he really think, asked Julian, that it was any great achievement to utter calumnies against men of good standing? (7.223c). Lucian had likewise deplored Peregrinus' gall in libelling 'a man outstanding in *paideia* and worthiness'.[41] The person in question, it is clear from the context, was Herodes Atticus. An anecdote told of him in another writer nicely captures the common reaction of the cultured in this connection. Herodes was intrigued by a long-haired beggar Cynic who entered his house and claimed to be a philosopher: 'I see a philosopher's beard and cloak, but not a philosopher,' he said, and then turned to his companions: 'It pains and sickens me that filthy, disgusting creatures of this sort lay claim to a most sacred title.'[42] The root of the objection is the presumption implicit in the claim.

Confronted by such a travesty of accustomed values, almost any man of culture would have agreed. To some, I suggested earlier, the light value some Cynic teaching placed on a detailed study of philosophy will have had a certain appeal; but there were limits to be observed. The issue had a parallel in the conventional debate about the respective merits of philosophy and rhetoric. The simplicity of

Cynic precepts could be praised by persons who affected to see philosophy as contaminated by the clever tricks of rhetoric: Dio, for instance, spoke of the Cynic hero Heracles as 'educated simply (*pepaideumenos haplôs*), with none of the elaborations and superfluous sophistication devised by contemptible men' (*Or.* 1. 61). But Heracles remained a *pepaideumenos*, and the debate never countenanced the utter rejection of oratorical training. When Maximus of Tyre placed Diogenes in a simple golden age, when Apuleius idealized Crates, they did so in literary set pieces.[43] It was similar with Julian: the pages of the speeches at issue are heavy with allusions to Homer, and in the midst of abuse of 'the most worthless Cynics' for their flowery phraseology he takes care to add that '[his] feelings towards honest rhetors are friendly in every way' (7.236b).

Behind the quotations and the qualifications lies a pervasive assumption that discourse about philosophy is the preserve of men of education. We ought not to be misled by Julian's granting at one point that philosophy is a journey with many roads, some shorter than others (6.184d), nor by his citing with approval the Heraclitean tag that 'much learning does not teach understanding' and the associated talk of Cynicism as 'in some sense a universal philosophy' which spares one the need 'to turn the pages of countless books' (6.187d). The corollary of these sentiments is that the task of the true Cynic is to live philosophy, not to theorize about it: a key complaint levelled at Heraclius is that he is untrained in the proper modes of philosophic discourse and had no business to compose a myth in the first place (7.205b; 208c; 235a). So too, Julian's approbation of the Cynics' 'short cut' turns out to be more than a little ambivalent. 'Are you not aware that short cuts tend to involve one in great difficulties?' (7.225c).

> I myself, although hampered by lack of leisure through external circumstances, at least had the benefit of a proper education, and went not by the short cut you spoke of, but rather the long way round . . . and I believe that the road I took was in reality shorter than yours.
>
> [7.234d–235c]

In a word, Heraclius' short cut was a philosophic dead end. Lucian had been equally dismissive of the Cynics' road, sarcastically calling it 'easy and instant for all to share, requiring no *paideia*'.[44]

No less hackneyed is the complaint that one's opponents are self-seeking charlatans who bring true philosophers into disrepute. Dio

had spoken of Cynics who hung about the agora and on street corners as 'doing the worst possible harm, since they accustom the foolish to mock philosophers' (*Or.* 32.9). In Lucian's *Philosophies for Sale*, the Cynic short cut leads to fame (*doxa*), and appeals to any tanner or cobbler willing to act shamelessly and abuse passers-by.[45] Other works from his hand develop the theme. In one, the goddess Philosophy complains that slaves and labourers, attracted by the respect accorded to her true companions, have deserted their masters and occupations to dress up as Cynics and abuse the public: every city, she protests, is full of 'vermin' professing the tenets of Diogenes.[46] In another, the author toys with the theme of *parrhêsia*, casting himself as one Parrhesiades on trial before famous philosophers for slander. His defence rests on a claim to have converted to philosophy and on the familiar distinction between true and false philosophers. Only the frauds, he claims, were the victims of his lampoons. Diogenes – often enough a figure of fun elsewhere in Lucian – is here prominent among the true philosophers, conducting the prosecution and later unmasking phonies who fail to measure up to the ideals he set.[47]

It is surely telling that charges which Julian repeatedly brings against Cynics are anticipated not only in Stoicizing writers like Epictetus and Dio but also in Lucian, much of whose work shows scant respect for the gods and the sages of the past. If Lucian wrote as a humorist without a philosophic axe to grind, that only shows the more clearly that the charges at issue were common currency and expressive of a general cultural attitude. His humour could be harsh – the slave turned Cynic in his *Runaways* is finally restored to his master to be covered in pitch and exposed on Mount Haemus – but it was no doubt congenial to his readership. Quite simply, the philosophic pretensions of the uneducated poor were not to be taken seriously.[48]

Very commonly, it is plain, descriptions of Cynics as ignorant served as blanket dismissals of such pretensions, not as part of a coherently argued refutation. Vespasian's adviser Mucianus had long ago spoken curtly of the type who dressed the part 'and immediately announced himself as a sage, even though he did not know the alphabet'.[49] Charges of impiety, shamelessness and fraud did not need to be any more coherent. Usually, they were conventional and overlapping complaints which reflected the cultural and social assumptions of those who voiced them. Philosophy belonged to the educated. Some of them, far from expert at it, might make a virtue

of incompetence by affecting to think its details mere sophistry, but that will only have made them the keener to distance themselves from the Cynics of the market-place. The tendency of their criticism to focus on personal characteristics may owe something to that, but it was almost inevitable in any case; no writings indisputably by Diogenes survived to be refuted or cited against his later imitators, and such Cynic literature as there was dealt with the practical application of ethics in a popular form that militated against theoretical expression of the teachings. Responses of the kind that Plotinus had directed against Sceptical epistemology, therefore, were by the by.[50] But the very fact that there was no real knowing what Diogenes had done or said or written allowed the use of an idealized image of him to discredit opponents. Attacks commonly challenged an individual's claim to practise the asceticism he preached, or, if that was not credible, doubted his motives: Julian spoke of his opponents as 'giving up a little to gain a lot' (7.224b); to Lucian, the suicide of Peregrinus was mere *philodoxia*, a wish for fame. Even in more general criticism, the focus lay on appearance and habits. Seneca and Epictetus chose to describe the true Cynic in terms of what he refrained from doing: he did not beg, or abuse the public, or cultivate a bizarre image for show.[51] In short, no clear line divided social and purportedly philosophic criticism of Cynics; both had their roots in the upper-class cultural milieu.

In the common run there is no coherent philosophic base to such charges. If we are to believe that Julian did more than produce a derivative restatement of them – that he produced, for instance, an outline theory of *paideia* – he must be shown to have subordinated the conventional polemical elements to a general argument offered on rational principles. On one view, he provided such an argument in his *Against the Uneducated Cynics*.[52] The account of the exposition of the speech which follows aims to show that he did nothing of the kind.

THE ARGUMENTS OF *AGAINST THE UNEDUCATED CYNICS*

Against Heraclius had begun with a quotation from comedy: 'All manner of things come to pass in the fullness of time.'[53] *Against the Uneducated Cynics* (*Or.* 6) starts on a similar literary note with a rhetorical paradox: 'The rivers are running backwards: here is a Cynic who calls Diogenes conceited (*kenodoxos*), and claims that he

refused to take cold baths' (180d). Julian regards – or affects to regard – criticism of Diogenes by a self-professed Cynic as a contradiction in terms: the critic is never named, but we learn that he is an Egyptian (193a), and he may have belonged to the fringes of the Alexandrian Schools. Likely enough, he was an associate of Heraclius, and in mocking Diogenes was picking up on Julian's own idealization of him in *Or.* 7 as a pious and moral sage. His charge against the master is immediately specified: the story went that Diogenes had died after eating a raw octopus; that act, his critic claims, was mere stupidity and vanity (*anoia kai kenodoxia*),[54] and death was a just penalty for it (181a). Julian counters this by remarking on the presumption of his opponent in professing to know that death is an evil – an issue that neither Diogenes nor Socrates had felt able to judge. Then, after a short passage of conventional moralizing, the aim of the speech is announced: Julian will tell what he has learned from his teachers about Cynicism so as to give guidance to anyone who intends to follow that way of life (181d). His ideal aim, he says, is to persuade that his is the correct view; but it will be enough if would-be Cynics are disposed towards noble actions without being persuaded of that (182a). Further, he will ignore those 'enslaved by the pleasures of the body'; these he punningly describes as *kynidia*, 'puppy-dogs' (182b), but the expression puts one in mind of Epicureans too, and gives a hint that *Or.* 6 will fall into an established tradition of eclectic polemic. Finally, we are given a statement of the intended method of the speech. It purports to be a philosophically coherent refutation: 'Let me pursue my argument under headings and in due order from the beginning, so that by dealing with each topic properly I may more conveniently achieve what I intend and make it more easy for you to understand' (182c).

This introductory section presages many of the problems of interpretation to be met with later in the speech. Nothing in it hints at any originality on Julian's part. In its particulars, it illustrates several standard features of polemic that I have already discussed. Its withholding of philosophic status from a claimant to it follows a common practice. The assumption that an idealized Diogenes must provide the measure by which contemporary Cynics are judged and the professed intention to advise aspirants to the Cynic life repeat Dio and Epictetus. The coupling of Diogenes with Socrates hints at what *Or.* 6.202a will later confirm – that Julian took for granted the orthodox Stoic *diadochê* which connected the two through Antisthenes – and indicates his assumption that Cynicism is entirely

consistent with Platonism. It remains to be seen, however, whether this marriage of sages rests on coherent argument rather than simply on uncontroversial commonplaces of 'eclectic' philosophy: the Christian Eusebius, after all, had readily bracketed Pythagoras, Socrates and Diogenes together in his anti-pagan polemic *Against Hierocles* as a standard by which true philosophy could be judged.[55] It remains to be seen, too, whether Julian effectively argues that a lack of *paideia* is the root cause of his opponents' errors, or whether the term *apaideutos* serves largely as conventional denigration. Although the title of the speech hints that what excludes his opponents from the company of the wise is their cultural unawareness (*apaideusia*), an explicit claim to that effect is oddly absent in the opening section: criticism seems rather to turn on the improper shamelessness involved in abusing and putting oneself on a par with Diogenes. Finally, a certain tension of tone may be discerned in the section: the humour of the opening stands in some contrast to the ostensibly serious aim of the author.

By tracing the exposition of the argument, we can consider these issues as they arise. At the close of the introduction, Julian remarks that, since Cynicism is 'a form of philosophy', he must discuss philosophy in general before he proceeds to consider it. The section which follows (182c–186b) will claim to show that philosophy is one and indivisible: while its exponents may travel by different roads, they share a common aim. It opens with a Platonic echo: thanks to Prometheus' gift of *nous* and *logos*, all nature has a share of incorporeal reason (*asômatos logos*). The shares enjoyed respectively by lifeless bodies, plants and animals are listed, then man: as the highest product of nature, he has a reasoning soul (*psychê logikê*) that predisposes him to philosophize. This much is staple Platonist fare. Julian then proposes three descriptions of philosophy which he treats as closely related: it is 'the Art of Arts and the Science of Sciences'; it is an attempt at 'Likeness unto God' (*homoiôsis tôi theôi*); its nature is encapsulated in the Delphic injunction, 'Know Thyself'.[56] The first description is dealt with briefly at 184a, where it is simply subsumed under the third. The other two will occur repeatedly, and one basic feature of them is obvious: they define philosophy in religious terms. Julian will be able to claim that those who reject his view of philosophy are not only in error, but impious to boot.

Professing piety to Apollo, the writer chooses to concentrate on the notion of philosophy as self-knowledge. By it, he says, we gain knowledge of both soul and the body. More than that, it allows us

to investigate 'something in us that is better and more divine than the soul [*nous*, intelligence] which all men believe in without being taught and consider somehow divine' (183b). 'Something better and more divine than the soul' clearly alludes to a central Neoplatonic doctrine which had also been mentioned in *Against Heraclius* in its talk of 'a portion of the One and the Good, a *plêrôma* of the soul' (7.217d). But it is significant that in the same breath Julian brings forward the 'eclectic' commonplace that man, even without being taught, has a natural knowledge of God.[57] He proceeds to identify knowledge with 'Likeness unto God' (184b): the gods surpass men in virtue of their knowledge, and even for them self-knowledge holds pride of place; hence to gain such knowledge is to become like a god. A conclusion immediately follows: 'Let no one divide or cut philosophy into many things: or rather let no one make many out of what is one' (184c). It is allowed that individual philosophers have taken different roads, but the destination was the same for each; if one considers the most famous members of the various sects, one will find total agreement. In support of which, Julian adduces the remarks of famous philosophers: Pythagoras, Theophrastus and Aristotle all bid us become like God; Heraclitus, the Stoics and Plato all agree that philosophy is self-knowledge.[58]

This passage is crucial. On the most conventional of grounds, Julian implicitly rules out as inconceivable any challenge to the view that philosophy investigates that which is 'more divine than the soul'. Anyone who disagrees is not a philosopher at all. Further, there is no distinction made between philosophy and religious belief in this matter: to question the unity of philosophy is to abuse the Delphic precept 'Know Thyself', and a cardinal impiety. It would be excessively generous, though, to credit Julian with having argued this philosophically. So far as logical exposition goes, the passage is markedly deficient: it is not an argument at all, but a statement of belief which had already been more concisely expressed at *Or.* 7.225d: 'In philosophy the beginning and end is one: to know oneself and to become like the gods.' The claim rests on two conventional metaphors by no means confined to strictly philosophic writings. 'Likeness unto God', for instance, has a long history. Plato, speaking of philosophy as an escape from evil, had pictured it as 'likeness unto God as far as possible' (*kata to dynaton*). Through the later Stoa, the figure gained wide currency in second-century 'eclecticism':[59] Epictetus (*Diss.* 2.14.12) could speak of 'the need to strive as far as possible to become like the gods', Marcus Aurelius of the wish of the

gods that 'all reasoning beings should become like them' (*Medit.* 10.8). In ascribing the phrase to Pythagoras, Julian reflects a popular belief that he was the originator of it.[60] Nor was his idea that it was the aim of the true Cynic original: Diogenes Laertius (6.51) had credited Diogenes with the remark, 'Good men are images of the gods.' Plotinus and other Neoplatonists predictably made much of the theme, tending to omit the qualification *kata to dynaton*, and no doubt Julian had met it in Iamblichus.[61] But however intricate a treatment it may have received in the sage's works, there is nothing to suggest that Julian's use of it in *Or.* 6 rests on a complex framework. Rather, he cites a standard metaphor as an expression of a Neoplatonist's faith in philosophy.

Whatever the origin of the phrase 'Know Thyself', its use to describe the aim of the philosopher was a similarly hackneyed *topos*, derived from Plato's *First Alcibiades*.[62] The dialogue was a staple of Neoplatonist teaching, and Julian's familiarity with the relevant passage is unsurprising. But in any case, from Cicero onwards, the phrase came readily to the lips of an educated man, and by the fourth century had become an easy cliché.[63] Julian uses it both to characterize philosophy and to support his claim that Apollo is the true founder of Cynicism, and Diogenes his obedient servant (188ab). In each case, he follows a popular convention. Under Cynic influence, the precept became a commonplace in diatribe, where it was particularly associated with Diogenes: 'Have you heard', Dio has him say, 'of the inscription at Delphi, Know Thyself?' – 'I have' – 'Is it not clear that the god gives this command to all, believing that they do not know themselves?'[64] In his own 'Cynic' phase, Dio had proposed 'Know Thyself' as the source of wisdom (*Or.* 10.28). Epictetus too attached the greatest importance to the phrase: Apollo was the 'source of truth', 'Know Thyself' his means of leading civilized men to truth (*Diss.* 3.1.18–24). Given the popularity of the *topos*, its occurrence in Neoplatonic texts is unremarkable, and Julian's use of it does not rest exclusively on any specific Neoplatonic doctrine; although he cites as Iamblichan the view that Apollo was the true founder of Cynicism (*Or.* 6.188b), the association was clearly traditional. Epictetus had pictured the Cynic as acting in accordance with the god's advice: he should know himself, and attempt nothing without Apollo's help (*Diss.* 3.22.53).

To read *Or.* 6.182c–186b as an innovative or coherent argument rooted in study of Iamblichus is unwarranted. Reduced to its constituent parts, the passage can be seen to rest entirely on 'eclectic'

commonplaces. It contains no attempt to reconcile the doctrines of opposed Schools: instead, Julian simply characterizes philosophy in conventional metaphors with which no one would disagree. The same techniques had been used at *Or.* 7. 236a–238b: in challenging Heraclius' claim that Diogenes was himself 'impious', Julian asserted a consensus among prominent figures – Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle – as proof that philosophers revere the gods, and then placed Diogenes among them in virtue of his obedience to the command of Apollo. That was a familiar ploy: I have referred already to a mosaic which portrays Diogenes in just such company,[65] and there is a literary precedent in Lucian's *Piscator*, in which just this quartet of sages is prominent among the 'true' philosophers.

Given Diogenes' close association with Apollo, mockery of him comes near to blasphemy. That Julian had this very much in mind in *Or.* 6 is implicit in the dismissive reference at 185a to 'certain philosophers . . . who have been taken captive by Circe and the Lotus-Eaters, by *hêdonê* or *doxa*'. The remark recalls an allusion at the opening of the speech to 'men enslaved to pleasure' (182a); from a later passage (198bc) it is plain that Julian meant to allude there to his Cynic opponents: but the reference was not to them alone. It was quickly followed by the passage asserting the harmony of famous philosophers to support the claim that philosophy is a unity. Notably absent there are the Epicureans. Elsewhere, Julian would forbid the pagan priesthood to read Epicurean or Pyrrhonian works,[66] and he is very likely thinking of Epicureans as well as Cynics at 185a. His vocabulary echoes the standard cultured attack on them I have noted earlier: we can think of the epigram to the memory of a pious Platonist who lived by 'the wise theories of Socrates and Plato and not by the godless, hedonistic theories of Epicurus', or of Themistius' warning against the unworthy sect.[67] The passage in *Or.* 6 thus gives another hint that Julian's attack is to be read in the light of traditional polemic: false Cynics are casually dismissed along with Epicureans as quite beyond the pale. The same technique is to be found in Lucian: his Alexander of Abonouteichos berated his Epicurean critics as blaspheming atheists, drew the parallel with Christians, and called upon Pythagoras, Plato and the Stoics as his natural allies.[68] It is suggestive, too, that there was a precedent for the use of the 'Know Thyself' theme in polemic of this sort. As both a Platonist and a priest of Apollo at Delphi, Plutarch had good reason to reflect upon the proverb. In his *Against Colotes*, he attacked as outrageous the claim of that (long-dead) Epicurean that the oracle of Apollo was bogus,

and that to praise 'Know Thyself' as 'the most divine of the writings at Delphi' was absurd.[69] Julian may or may not have known the essay, but he plainly set up his opponents on a well-known line.

It is notable that nowhere in the section on the unity of philosophy is there a reference to the *apaideusia* of Julian's opponents, much less any claim that it is their cardinal failing. The writer is prescribing, not arguing. Still, Apollo was leader of the Muses as well as the founder of philosophy, and Julian's identification of knowledge with a godlike state certainly expresses his belief – alluded to at *Or.* 7.236a, and central to his rescript on Christian teachers – that religion and Greek culture are inseparable. But this hardly entails a picture of him as innovatively devising a coherent ideology of *paideia* as the cornerstone of a religious and political system. In fact, the identification rests on another standard *topos*. Funerary inscriptions witness a widespread belief that one could be heroized by culture and live for ever among the gods.[70] Applied to philosophers, these notions went back to the early Pythagoreans. Later, Platonists and even Epicureans could all look back to the founders of their sects as divinized by learning. Ofellius Laetus, for instance, a Platonist and an acquaintance of Plutarch, composed a poem on a philosophic theme and was raised to singularly elevated company on the strength of it; if the theory of metempsychosis held true, it was declared, then Plato surely lived again in Ofellius.[71] In the fourth century, one Asclepiades 'set up an altar to the son of Leto and the Muses' and found himself in the company of Zeus,[72] but as early as the first century, the notion that the learned are saved had a non-philosophic application: even laymen could expect this happy fate on the strength of their 'wisdom' (*sophia*) in the service of the Muses. These beliefs were enduring: a fifth-century epitaph of a pagan youth readily conjoined piety and culture, and proposed immortality as their reward: '*occubat in terris sapiens, sed vivit in astris./nunc, docte puer, studiis et iure perite,/in virenti loco comitatur turba piorum.*'[73]

Julian's association of religion and culture, then, had a background in a long-established mode of thinking. Moreover, there are clear precedents to be found for his specific association of true Cynicism with *paideia*. We have noted already a fourth-century *chreia* which attributes to Diogenes the remark that 'the Muses live in the souls of the educated'.[74] Stobaeus preserves several similar sayings put into his mouth,[75] and iconographic evidence can provide a supplement. A second-century sarcophagus relief from Palermo represents a philosopher with a wallet in the company of a Muse, and to their left

another with wallet and staff.[76] A similar relief at Rome has a bearded figure with a staff beneath two Muses.[77] Although the interpretation of sarcophagi is problematic, the characteristic appendages suggest that Cynics are portrayed.

It is revealing, too, that Cynics themselves could equate piety and *paideia* in a polemical context. The fourth 'Epistle of Heraclitus', a Cynic (or Cynicizing) product of the early first-century, had refuted the conventional criticism of Cynics as impious and ignorant, proposing a natural theology which turned on its head the claim that lack of respect for altars and divine images was the mark of an uncultured man. Accused of defacing an altar, Heraclitus not only dismisses his critics as *apaideutoi*, but goes on to say: 'On account of *paideia* I shall never be silenced. . . . Am I not pious, who alone knows God?'[78]

On the evidence so far, the purportedly theoretical basis of Julian's attack in *Or.* 6 amounts to little more than a hotch-potch of Platonic clichés, well-worn *topoi* and pietistic commonplaces. I pick up his argument at 186b, where the focus of attention shifts from philosophy in general to Cynicism itself. Does this section deserve to be interpreted any differently?

Julian begins by stating that the earlier, true Cynics did not write serious discourses, so his opponents have no recourse to the usual procedure in a philosophic debate: they cannot criticize his views by reference to a body of canonical writings. If he means to deny that Diogenes wrote anything, that was nothing new: Sosicrates Rhodius had asserted as much in the second-century BC.[79] Next, he asks who the true founder of Cynicism was (187b): he cites approvingly the remark of Oenomaus that 'Cynicism is not Antisthenism or Diogenism' (187c), then politely rejects the claim of Heracles, the paradigmatic Cynic hero in virtue of his labours and his *philanthrôpia*. Even before Heracles, he says, there were men who followed the Cynic life, barbarians as well as Greeks (here he combines the 'barbarian wisdom' *topos* with 'Know Thyself', rather as Philostratus had done in his *Life of Apollonius* (2.27)). He proceeds to describe Cynicism as the most natural of all philosophies, and one which requires no reading of books (187d). Apollo is the true founder of Cynicism, and all a Cynic needs to do is obey the Delphic precepts 'Know Thyself' and 'Falsify the Coinage'. 'Falsify the Coinage' was the oracle that Apollo was said to have uttered to Diogenes after his exile from Sinope.[80] Julian interprets it here, as he had in *Or.* 7 (211c), as ordering Diogenes to follow the principles of truth and to

reject 'vain theories': in his eyes, Diogenes is above all a pious servant of Apollo and his oracle (191a, 199b: cf. 7.211d). The interpretation rests on an established theme which made the Cynic a servant of god: Epictetus (*Diss.* 3.22.23) had pictured him as a messenger sent to earth by Zeus.

In accounting for the absence of writings by Diogenes, Julian claims that, unlike Plato, he chose to attain his aim by deeds alone (189b). I have already remarked on the wide disagreement in antiquity about the philosophic status of Cynicism: Diogenes Laertius allowed that it was a minor Socratic school, but others saw it as a 'way of life'.[81] Julian, well aware of the bowdlerization of Cynicism by the Stoics (185c), here follows the latter view. This will allow him to criticise 'the modern imitators of Diogenes' as Cynics in word and appearance only, not in deed (195c; 202d). But it is significant that he does not steer a consistent course through the debate. First, he makes use of the Stoic *diadochê* when it suits his purpose (202d). More important, he speaks of Cynicism elsewhere as if it were a sect. At 187d, he remarks that it does not entail the discipline demanded 'by other sects'; at 190a he assumes that the early Cynics observed the formal division of philosophy into two parts, speculative and practical, and his criticism of Heraclius for writing a myth rests on the supposition that Cynics should philosophize in accordance with the same division (215c–216d).

Above all, there is an obvious tension between Julian's claim that the Cynic way of life requires no reading of books and the criticism of his opponents as *apaideutoi*. For all his protestation of admiration for Diogenes' 'philosophy in action', Julian's own education predisposed him to think of philosophy as essentially a learned affair. At several points in *Or.* 6, he castigates his opponents as unread. Speaking of vegetarianism at 191c, he says, 'If you are willing to take the trouble, there are swarms of books devoted to this subject'; at 200b, he commends to the addressee Plutarch's *Life of Crates* with the words, 'If you had the habit of reading books, as I do . . .' Similar remarks had been pointedly directed at Heraclius in *Or.* 7. His ignorance of Hesiod, we read, is perhaps excusable, 'for you have not been well educated' (7.235a); he is no doubt unfamiliar with the famous sentence set above the entrance of the Academy (7.237a); but no matter – 'I must not detain you on your short cut to wisdom by forcing you to read long, difficult books' (7.227b). We should hesitate to take Julian's words as proof that his addressees were totally uneducated; in fact, some of them had written books (7.224d),

and it was an effective polemical ploy – of which Julian would make full use in his letter to the Roman senator Nilus[82] – to display one's own erudition to the detriment of one's opponent. What the remarks do show is that in Julian's eyes a philosophic dispute naturally centred on books, and that intellectual snobbery played a part in his criticism of his opponents as ignorant. His claim at 7.226d that the speech of Heraclius was unoriginal and merely repeated an earlier myth should be read in this light. Again, the *Against Hierocles* of Eusebius provides a parallel: Eusebius opens with the charge that the arguments of his opponent are simply pilfered from the works of earlier writers, and goes on to cast a slur upon Hierocles by declaring that anyone who wishes to understand his (Eusebius') position in the debate must first read Origen's *Against Celsus*.

At 190c, Julian at last takes up the specific criticism his opponent had levelled at Diogenes – that his eating raw meat was mere vainglory, *kenodoxia*. Julian responds with a lame argument which side-steps the issue: Diogenes' actions did not win him the applause of observers; on the contrary, they were repelled by his practices; applause is the only aim of *kenodoxia*; therefore Diogenes cannot have been a *kenodoxos*. Diogenes' behaviour is interpreted instead as a form of piety towards Apollo; convinced that philosophy was demanded of him by the Delphic oracle, he thought it his duty to test every question by reference to fact, not by the opinions of others. Thus he did not believe that the statements of any man, even a Pythagoras, should be accepted as true until tested (191b).

Julian's reference to Pythagoras is prompted by the latter's vegetarianism. The matter was of some interest to Neoplatonists: among the 'many books' on the subject referred to at 191c, Julian may have had in mind Porphyry's *De abstinentia* and remarks in Iamblichus' *Pythagorean Life* (13; 68). But these have no bearing on the immediate argument: Julian's opponent had criticized Diogenes for eating raw meat, not for meat-eating itself. In the section which follows (191c–193c), two arguments are proposed in defence of Diogenes' practice. The first claims that Diogenes believed that it was permissible to eat meat if one did so in concord with nature (*kata physin*), and that if one can eat it uncooked without suffering harmful effects, one should do so: Diogenes thus ate raw meat in order to test whether it was harmful or not. Julian himself admits that this argument is unconvincing (191d), and proposes a second. He starts by defining the aim of Cynicism: passionlessness (*apatheia*), the condition of the gods (192a). Diogenes, it is then claimed, thought that the nausea

caused by one's eating raw flesh proved only that one was enslaved to 'vain theories' (*kenai doxai*), and was therefore determined to overcome his own aversion to it. Julian praises him for that, asserting that we only cook meat before eating it through force of habit (192b). Surely, he adds, we cannot say meat is impure in its natural state, but pure once it is cooked? He goes on to abuse his opponent as a hypocrite: 'You yourself, I believe, have eaten countless pickled foods, "fish and fowl and whatever comes to hand"; for you are an Egyptian, and omnivorous' (192d). What, then, of the oysters and other shellfish men such as he habitually consume? Is not the salient difference between his own practice and Diogenes' simply this, that he seasons the raw food he eats with salt and spices, thus 'doing violence to nature', whereas Diogenes ate it unseasoned 'according to nature' (193c)? A strained conclusion has emerged: 'It will now be plain to anyone who can follow an argument of any sort that the excellent Diogenes did nothing irregular or contrary to custom' when he ate an uncooked octopus (193b).

Prefaced as it is by the allusion to the 'swarms of books on the subject' (191c), the passage gives another indication of the effect on Julian's argument of his bookish approach to philosophic debate: he writes as if Diogenes were similarly concerned to prove the truth or falsity of theoretical hypotheses. But the arguments Julian proposes are, once more, quite derivative: they appeal partly to the standard philosophic doctrine that virtue consists in actions performed 'according to nature', but above all they reflect common moralizing themes. The ethics of dietetics had been a popular subject since Socrates had classed fine cookery as a kind of fraudulence.[83] Cynics conventionally approved an austere diet: Crates had forbidden gluttons entry into a paradisal city (named Pera, after the leather food-pouch of the Cynic) where the staple diet consisted of thyme, garlic, figs and bread; a diatribe of Teles made Diogenes reject meat as a costly luxury.[84] Hand in hand with such attacks on luxury went another commonplace notion – it can be found in Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre and Philostratus[85] – which saw man's use of fire as the beginning of his softness and love of luxury: in Dio, Diogenes is made to denounce the gift of Prometheus on precisely these grounds (*Or.* 6.25–9). The moral issue had a particular connection with dietetic theory: health, not pleasure, was to be the aim of eating, and the commonplace claim was that those who ate simply were all the healthier for it. Pythagoras was credited with the view that food

which can be eaten directly without being cooked was the best form of nourishment, and the notion had enjoyed a long history.[86]

Again, Cynics were particularly associated with this *topos*. 'I have seen beggars healthy despite their need', says the Diogenes of the apocryphal letters, 'and rich men sick through indulgence of their wretched bellies'; and the same point is made in the (possibly fourth-century) pseudo-Lucianic *Cynic* (9). Epictetus, too, had stressed the robustness of Diogenes, contrasting his asceticism with the mortifying practices of degenerate Cynics.[87] Julian's moralizing attack on the sick who luxuriate in their illness at the start of *Or.* 6 is to be read in this light. Similarly, the arguments used to defend Diogenes against the charge of *kenodoxia* should be seen as echoing familiar claims rather than as expressive of any Neoplatonic dietetic theory. Equally conventional is the jibe that his opponent falls short of his avowed principles in his culinary tastes – Epictetus and Lucian both criticize Cynics on the same grounds.[88] In short, Julian's refutation of the charge of *kenodoxia* constitutes a set of variations on standard themes, and very little more.

The arguments Julian has offered do not impress by their quality, and in combination they could hardly be said to converge in any clearly coherent pattern. He now takes a new tack, and gives us another definition of Cynicism: it is that happiness which consists in living in accordance with nature rather than with common opinions or theories (*doxai*) (193d). The contrast – a staple, of course, of 'eclectic' philosophizing – is developed along standard Stoic lines: man has a rational soul; hence it is in his nature to live by reason. True happiness resides in our minds (194d), and it is absurd to seek it outside oneself (194b). Epictetus had put just this view into the mouth of his Cynic interlocutor (*Diss.* 3.22.38). Julian asserts that Diogenes had professed this belief above all others. All his actions were performed in accordance with reason; the austerities of his *askêsis* were the mark of a man who held the body to be of no account (195b). The claim is clearly inconsistent with the earlier argument that Diogenes had a care for his health in his choice of diet (191d), and a further paradox is implicit in the fact that living *kata physin* appears to involve a training whose effect is to make the body 'stronger than it was by nature' (194c). The writer ignores the difficulties, and simply illustrates his claim by using two hackneyed literary figures. First, there is the metaphor of Diogenes as an athlete. In body, he is more than equal to any competitor at the Games (195a). Dio had made much of this conceit; two of his Diogenes orations

have the Isthmian Games as their setting. A passage in his Eighth Oration clarifies the grounds of Julian's comparison: the labours undertaken by the Cynic are tougher opponents than those any athlete faces (8.13); and Diogenes devotes his life to a battle against the most difficult opponent of all – physical pleasure (8.20). The metaphor enjoyed wide circulation: Epictetus (*Diss.* 3.22.51) likened the conversion to the Cynic life to entering oneself for the Olympics. And Julian's second comparison – Diogenes is happier in soul than the king of Persia (195b) – is equally conventional: Epictetus had drawn the same parallel (*Diss.* 3.22.60), and Dio had given over half of his Sixth Oration to it. Julian, indeed, has a verbal echo of that work: he and Dio both speak of Diogenes enjoying crusts of barley more than gourmands do their delicacies.[89] Once again, the argument rests on commonplaces.

There follows a test of the quality of Diogenes' happiness, purportedly on reasoned principles (195c–197a). In effect, it merely repeats the *logos/doxa* contrast: Diogenes, even when he was enslaved, remained happy. The only thing which truly enslaves us is our acceptance of 'the *doxai* of the many': provided that we reject them, we are fully free (196c). 'However,' Julian is quick to add, 'I do not mean that we should be shameless' (196d): even 'the *doxai* of the many' are to be preferred to that. At this point, the argument has patently become muddled. The writer is criticizing both 'the *doxai* of the many' and shamelessness: yet shamelessness is the very thing that most obviously evinces the Cynic's rejection of general opinion. Julian's only attempt to resolve a dilemma of his own making appeals to the Platonic division of the soul (197a): many Cynics, despite their rejection of *doxa*, have failed to control the irrational part of the soul, and are no better than wild beasts. This signally fails to counter the obvious retort that shamelessness none the less constitutes a means of liberation from *doxa*.

The analogy with wild beasts presages a direct attack on false Cynics. Their activities, it is said, bring true philosophers into disrepute (197d). Julian recalls the sad case of a fellow-student. Iphicles was that rare thing, a virtuous Cynic, and yet the bad reputation of the movement led his own teacher to think him no better than a beggar (198b). Two points may be made about the passage. First, the criticism itself merely repeats the standard polemical objection we have noted already in Dio and Lucian; it may be prompted as much by regard for the literary proprieties as by any sense of outrage we care to ascribe to Julian. Second, although Julian

allows that Iphicles is a true Cynic, he does so in order to make a specific point; his basic attitude to Cynicism remains deeply archaizing. Diogenes is idealized the more readily because he belongs to the distant past: at *Or.* 7.226b Julian had doubted whether there was a single virtuous Cynic in his day. The picture of Diogenes he gives indicates that he shared the predisposition of earlier writers to honour sages of times past while denouncing their present-day disciples.[90]

After a conventional moralizing round against lovers of wealth and bodily pleasure (198bd) which largely repeats remarks made in *Or.* 7,[91] Julian brings his treatise to a close with a combination of criticism of contemporary Cynics and further idealization of Diogenes to point up their inadequacy. The charges brought will by now be very familiar to the reader: shamelessness before men, and above all, impiety towards the gods. In this connection, an explicit criticism made of the second-century Cynic Oenomaus of Gadara[92] deserves a special word. 'Let not the Cynic be shameless or impudent after the fashion of Oenomaus, a scorner of all things divine and human: rather let him be, like Diogenes, reverent towards the divine' (6.199a). This echoes a remark in *Or.* 7, where the same Oenomaus is said to have wished to do away with reverence for the gods, to bring human wisdom into disrepute and to spurn the divine law that prompts men to believe in the gods by an innate faculty of mind (7.209b). There, Julian made it clear that he was responding to particular works of Oenomaus, which he calls the *Autophonia of the Cynic* and the *Against the Oracles*. The first is lost; to judge by its title, it maybe proposed that Cynic self-sufficiency rendered oracles redundant; conceivably, it was dismissive of the link between Diogenes and Delphi in this connection. The second has more to tell. It can be safely identified with the *Imposture of the Tricksters* (*Goêtôn Phôra*) of which Eusebius preserves fragments.[93] In this intriguing work, oracular predictions of future events were dismissed as bogus utterances astutely contrived to fit any eventuality; their advice was either trite or positively injurious.[94] The attack extended to Apollo himself; he was no more than a 'shameless prophet', a 'trickster', a 'sophist'.[95]

Julian's picking out of Oenomaus for particular criticism on the basis of this work is interesting on several counts. First, it is notable that the specific grounds of complaint make no express reference to *apaideusia*; they speak rather of shamelessness, impiety and a denial that knowledge of god is innate in man. Second, the justice of Julian's

implicit ascription to his opponents of a view of the gods as hostile as Oenomaus' is doubtful. Just conceivably, Oenomaus was an atheist proper.[96] Even if he was not, there is a distinction to be made between his position, which shows hostility not only to the institution of oracles but also to a god in his own right, and other Cynicizing criticism, which did not go that far. Dio, in his allegedly Cynic period, was extremely sceptical of the claims of oracles, but none the less kept Apollo as a touchstone of virtue.[97] Pseudo-Heraclitus argued that he showed himself truly pious by rejecting artificial institutions of cult.[98] Claims of that sort made play with a familiar proposition of natural theology which declared that knowledge of the divine was innate in man and evident in the created world for all to gain. That notion – which Oenomaus is charged by Julian with having denied – was by no means exclusive to Cynicism. It may find a Neoplatonic expression in Porphyry's report that Plotinus thought cult practice less than fitting for a philosopher.[99] Certainly, Plutarch stands witness to an established line of argument that regarded the manufacture and worship of cult images as unphilosophic and demeaning: the universe is god's truest temple, the earth the best evidence of his existence.[100] Julian himself had recourse to the theme in *Or.* 7: there he explained Diogenes' refusal to become an Eleusinian initiate as a consequence of his having so great a soul 'that he thought it best to associate himself with the divine substance of all the gods who together govern the whole universe, not with those whose functions are limited to certain portions of it' (7.238c).

Julian himself assumed that Heraclius was not familiar with Oenomaus' writings – a failing adduced by him as one more indication of his opponent's philosophic ignorance[101] – and the context of his remark about Diogenes and the Mysteries hints that Heraclius did not in fact hold to an Oenomaean view of the gods: it defends Diogenes against the claim of Heraclius that he was impious.[102] Unless Heraclius had intended this as a compliment – and there is nothing to suggest as much – Julian's implicit ascription to him of Oenomaean views will be counted a loose polemical charge which distorts rather than refutes his opponent's position. Here again, Lucian provides a loose parallel: there are signs that the suicide by fire of the Cynic Peregrinus, vilified by Lucian as an atheist, was consistent with Neopythagorean beliefs to do with the immortality of the soul.[103]

That both the anti-Cynic polemics fasten on to Oenomaus as a target for attack is perhaps a further indication of Julian's bookish

approach to the debate. His attack may be assumed to have a special edge for the fact that Oenomaus had been turned to good use by a Christian polemicist,[104] but Oenomaus was easily fixed upon as a focus of criticism simply because his views had been expressed in texts which could be cited and refuted. On that score, it deserves to be noted that Oenomaus' attack on Apollo, though vitriolic, was not mere bombast. The surviving fragments of it show a grasp of the philosophic points at issue. They allude to doctrines of Democritus, Chrysippus and Epicurus in the course of an attempt to discredit the theoretical basis of divination, and they allow respectively for theories of pre-will and cosmic predestination.[105] Julian chose not to dwell on Oenomaus' familiarity with the teachings of the Schools, and did not trouble to counter his specific arguments. Instead, he offered a general reprimand.

The last pages of *Or.* 6 echo those of *Or.* 7 in their concern to maintain Diogenes as an exemplar of piety and virtue in the face of popular anecdotes which would suggest the contrary. *Or.* 7 had closed by discussing a remark attributed to Diogenes that implied hostility to the Mysteries of Demeter.[106] Not so, responded Julian: to be initiated at Eleusis, one had to become an Athenian citizen, and that was contrary to Diogenes' cosmopolitan principles (7.238c); besides, the mere undergoing of a ceremony is neither here nor there, since initiation is to be earned through the practice of virtue (7.239c). Similarly, *Or.* 6 accepts as true the story that Diogenes had neglected to visit temples or to worship divine images, but justifies his practice on the ground that he had no means to buy offerings for their altars: it was enough that he worshipped the gods with his whole soul (6.199b).

These contorted defences stand witness to Julian's discomfiture in the face of the tradition of the radical Diogenes. He prefers to pass in silence over embarrassing elements in that tradition: the claims, for instance, that Diogenes thought priests no better than thieves, and commended theft from temples in return; or that he had scrawled graffiti over a statue of Aphrodite at Delphi.[107] And in the closing pages of *Or.* 6, while professedly advising would-be Cynics, he displays considerable ambivalence over where living 'according to nature' stops and reprehensible shamelessness begins. Though he is prepared to defend Diogenes' *penchant* for defecating and masturbating in public, he does so very gingerly and is at pains to establish a didactic motive (202c). As for the stories that Diogenes consorted with prostitutes, he deals with them as best he can: he went with a

hetaira only once, we are told – or perhaps not even once (201b). In short, Julian is distinctly uncomfortable with the tradition of the *anaideia* of the shameless Diogenes, and as far as possible he plays it down.

He is on safer ground with the critical reprise that ends the speech: present-day Cynics mistakenly assume that to be a Cynic it is enough to cultivate a particular appearance (201a). As we have seen, this criticism belonged to a standard repertoire of polemic centuries old: it could turn up equally easily in a *divertissement* by Lucian, or in a Stoic sermon by Epictetus. In judging its force in Julian's writings, we need to bear in mind that in other contexts he was happy to make much friendlier play with the image of the Cynic's visual appearance. In a letter written late in 361, he could recount having mistaken a distantly-seen figure with a Cynic's staff and cloak for his revered mentor Maximus.[108] And writing in a different literary vein, he could readily depict his own appearance in terms strongly reminiscent of the Cynic's: the chider of Heraclius was also the author of the *Misopogon* (*Beard-Hater*). Contrasting himself in that work with the depilated effeminates of Antioch, he lays claim to a long, lice-filled beard, unkempt hair and a chest as hairy as a lion's.[109] Julian happened to be hirsute, and he had made a philosophic beard a feature of his style: in this text, he comically exaggerated his hairiness by evoking an image with a long-familiar background in literature and the diatribe. As a writerly trick, it has a close match in pseudo-Lucian's *Cynic*, whose speaker is made to glory in a leonine beard, a forest of hair on the head, and a skin as rough and hairy as nature could make.[110]

Finally, Julian echoes Epictetus once more: the degenerate imitators of Diogenes fail to recognize his spiritual greatness (202d). The speech closes with a repeat of the association of the sage with Plato, Pythagoras, Socrates and Aristotle, and stock examples of his austerity.

If the account of *Or.* 6 that I have given holds good, the speech will be judged wholly derivative in its arguments, and confused and rambling in its overall exposition. In both its criticisms of contemporary Cynics and its idealization of Diogenes it is the conventional work of a well-read man. Julian himself mentions Plutarch's (now lost) *Life of Crates* and Dio Chrysostom as sources for his knowledge of Cynicism,[111] and the parallels I have cited certainly imply a debt to Dio. Diogenes Laertius is another possibility, though anecdotes are recorded in *Or.* 6 that are not to be found in the *Lives*,

and many of the stories Diogenes Laertius tells could easily have been culled from other texts. Julian may well have derived a good deal of his material from anthologies: Sopater, for instance, a pupil of Iamblichus of whom Julian speaks with respect elsewhere, certainly compiled an anthology that is known to have contained a selection of sayings of Diogenes and excerpts from Plutarch's *Crates* and Diogenes Laertius.[112] Epictetus too, though he is not mentioned, may have been in mind. Whether Julian was directly indebted to his *On Cynicism* or to particular works of Lucian is hard to say, but in the end it does not greatly matter: the mere fact that the criticisms of 'false' philosophers follow such similar lines in both authors indicates the depth of Julian's debt to long-established tricks of literary polemic. His castigation of his opponents as 'ignorant' in the title of *Or.* 6 is a case in point: nowhere in the text is it argued that *apaideusia* is the root cause of their failings: in fact, nowhere in the text is the epithet *apaideutos* applied to them. As in *Or.* 7, the burden of criticism lies primarily with the standard charges of impiety and impudence. Criticism of the ignorance of the opponent, when it occurs, serves as a catch-all and a dismissive insult, and reflects the common assumptions of cultured men. Just so, Julian had spoken earlier of Heraclius and his friends as 'rhetoricians so ignorant that Athena herself could not make them wise' (7.225b). To his way of thinking, no doubt, *paideia* was in the end not mere learning but a disposition of mind nurtured by learning, and a disposition lacking in his opponents. But to the question, Can *Or.* 6 justifiably be called a cogent Neoplatonist argument to that effect? there is a plain answer: it cannot.

CYNICS AND THE PROGRAMME OF HELLENISM

The derivative content of the anti-Cynic polemics, and Julian's failure to present a philosophically coherent argument against his opponents in *Or.* 6, need not entail that they were written to no earnest purpose. I turn now to the question, were they composed with a keen eye to the furtherance of 'Hellenism' in the Empire?

On a recent view, it will be recalled, they were indeed intended to play an important educative role in the promotion of Julian's plans for reform in the public sphere: they sought to check the activities of 'insidious underminers of Julian's thought-world' whom Julian believed to pose a disturbing threat to the fabric of society – a threat analogous, in some respects, to that posed by the Christians.[113]

Julian's own statements of aim in the speeches would allow a more modest reading. According to him, *Or.* 7 was intended to clarify a specific philosophic topic: the context and manner in which myth could be properly put to philosophic use.[114] For its part, *Or.* 7 purported to outline the principles of Cynicism for the benefit of persons intending to practise that form of philosophy[115] – a declaration of aim which requires no overriding didactic impulse, since it came easily to any cultured writer with the conventions of the diatribe and particular literary precedents in mind. Julian's description of his opponents as 'puppies' who may well disregard his advice[116] suggested that he had no great hopes to reform them by a mere speech, and that he viewed them as irritating rather than dangerous. Further, it is plain from his own remarks that there was an *ad hominem* element in both speeches: each was written in reply to a lecture delivered in his presence which had been distasteful and in some degree personally offensive to him.

At first sight, these factors suggest that the polemics were composed by Julian in a private capacity, in answer to particular occasions and to limited purposes. If we are to ascribe a larger purpose to the speeches, it must be shown that, in Julian's eyes at least, the activities of 'false' Cynics posed a significant threat that needed to be countered. Whether or not it was a plausible belief, was it none the less one that Julian held? An analogy drawn by Julian between Cynics and Christians at one point in *Or.* 7 has been taken by some as a clear hint that he did view the activities of Heraclius and his associates in this way. In my view, even that much is unlikely. I shall argue that their Cynicism did not seriously put in jeopardy Julian's plans for political, social or religious reform, either by its ideology or as an expression of subversion or social discontent; and that nothing Julian has to say in the polemics indicates a serious belief that it did.

Although Julian professed surprise at Heraclius' presumption in requesting an imperial audience,[117] he says nothing to suggest that he sensed any serious ideological challenge to his own political authority as Emperor in the lectures of Heraclius and his fellow-Cynics, or that they were ill-disposed towards him on political principle. Rather, he castigates them for their lack of principle: when he speaks of an earlier visit made by Heraclius to the court of Constantius, the implication is that he is a mere *philodoxos* drawn to anyone with wealth and influence.[118] Indeed, the notion Heraclius' lecture had any clear political thrust would hardly merit discussion,

were it not for the fact that some modern accounts ascribe to Cynics in the early Empire an ideologically based hostility to rule by Emperors.

Substantial evidence for this idea is hard to come by. Cynicism has been loosely described as a radical Stoicism; but whatever is made of the notion that Stoicism at one time served as a significant focus of activist political opposition – and too much is easily made of it[119] – there is little reason to think that Cynicism ever gave much cause for worry on that specific score. Rostovtzeff, it is true, interpreted a remark of Dio Chrysostom to imply that Cynics played a considerable part in fomenting political disorders in first-century Alexandria,[120] and that they did so on ideological grounds which left their mark in parts of the *Acts of the Pagan Martyrs*.[121] In my view, he misread the evidence and did not prove his case;[122] but even if it were granted, it would seem to hold good only for one particular time and place. A more recent attempt to place Cynics in the vanguard of political and social unrest in the second century is speculative and unconvincing:[123] in truth, the sources do not suggest that the doctrines and practices of Cynics caused any great concern on this score, either in Julian's day or earlier.

On the contrary, the manner in which Cynicism appealed as a philosophic ideal, in the upper levels of society at least, hints that its doctrine lacked a political edge. Its appeal was overwhelmingly individualist. 'The only proper constitution', ran an apophthegm of Diogenes, 'is the constitution of the universe.'[124] That marked an assumption that all government was contrary to nature and a sham: it counselled not an idealist politics, but rather the withdrawal of the individual from temporal distractions in the civic sphere. Julian was familiar with the view, and had sanctioned it as a pious ideal when he defended Diogenes' unwillingness to become a citizen of Athens as an expression of the sage's wish to preserve his status as a *kosmopolitês*.[125] So too, Epictetus had judged misplaced the charge that Cynics fail to accept the responsibilities of civic life: their true business, he affirmed, was to debate eternal issues before all mankind.[126]

It is in this light that the image of the Cynic as king needs to be interpreted. The metaphor of the philosopher as the sole true king in virtue of his self-knowledge and self-discipline was standard; applied to Cynics, it gave a figurative description of the self-sufficient man. Not even Agamemnon, Epictetus recalled, was happy: uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.[127] The point made was not that

temporal kingship was wicked, but that it did not confer true happiness. Beyond that, Cynicism had no political theory to offer. At most, there were *topoi* which could in principle be used for political ends: kings ordained by Zeus, plain speaking in the company of powerful men and so forth.[128] In practice, those were hackneyed themes and usually implied no radical purpose. Far from it: it seems likely that this disdain for politics will have contributed in no small measure to Cynicism's appeal: it spoke to the individual, not to the citizen.

It might be objected that the lack of any positive political edge to Cynic doctrine is by the by, and that the problem posed by Cynicism lay rather with its appeal to those at a lower level of society – persons with little or no interest in philosophic niceties who were socially discontented and saw in the Cynic life a means of escape, after the fashion of the runaways-turned-Cynics to be met with in Lucian's satires. A remark made in *Or.* 7 might suggest that Julian did believe that Cynics presented a problem of this kind: it describes them as 'men who go about in our midst subverting the common institutions' (*koina nomima*).[129] The context of the remark lends no support to the view, however. The charge occurs at the close of a passage of rhetorical exaggeration in which Cynics are likened to pirates. That is clearly polemical bombast; and the point of the closing charge is to heighten the rhetorical effect. Pirates, it asserts, at least feel some shame, and choose to hide away in lonely places; whereas Cynics are so shameless as to go about their mischief in the very midst of society. Read this way, the passage can carry no great weight. In any case, it may be doubted whether, even in Antonine times, runaway Cynics had even been so numerous as to provoke genuine concern; Lucian, after all, wrote as a humorist prone to exaggeration. As for the fourth century, hard evidence for the phenomenon is wholly lacking. It is tempting to think that the appeal of Cynicism at this level of society was long past its heyday by the time Julian wrote, and that the figure of the Cynic was more often encountered as a philosophic ideal or a *bête noire* in the minds of cultivated men of leisure than as a creature of flesh and blood in the market-place. And whatever its social level of appeal, Cynicism remained individualist in its basic ethos; its practitioners did not form a cohesive social movement working to a common shared purpose.[130] In a word: Cynics like Heraclius were in no position – even if they had so wished – to subvert or reform society.

In Julian's case, however, one has to allow for a particular factor:

a compellingly-felt concern for the fortunes of pagan cult. *Or.* 7, after all, was said by the author to have been prompted by Heraclius' impious myth: what of the possibility that the activities of his Cynic opponents, even if they posed no real challenge to his own authority and no immediate threat to social order, seemed to Julian to be harming his hopes for a pagan restoration, and needed to be checked on that count?

This view of the matter has had currency in modern works on Julian that are often at odds on other counts: it is assumed not only in Athanassiadi-Fowden's account of Julian's *paideia*, but also in remarks of Bowersock. He found the anti-Cynic polemics 'immensely revealing' of the 'puritanical pagan', and read the declaration of *Or.* 6 that philosophy is one and indivisible – in itself, we have seen, something of a platitude – to imply that Julian was genuinely alarmed at the prospect of dissent among the pagan ranks, and determined to see to it that 'there should not be many schools of philosophy, but only the right philosophy.'[131]

This judgement raises a deep question about the practical consequences of Julian's ideological notion of 'Hellenism' as a unity: how aptly can his plans for the Empire be described as totalitarian? I have touched briefly on this question earlier in discussing his philosophic ideal, and I shall return to it when I come to consider his critique of Christianity. For the moment, I merely observe that a declaration of the unity of Hellenism might have different force in different contexts. In so far as Julian made it with Christians in mind, it plainly signified far more than a personal statement of disapproval: it found a counterpart in practical measures. Where Cynics are concerned, its force is not so clear. Complete unity of opinion within paganism was not a practical possibility. Some diversity was inevitable, and within limits could hardly be thought to do sensible damage to pagan cult practice. In religious terms, the dispute about the force and purpose of the anti-Cynic speeches turns on the degree of diversity that Julian was prepared to tolerate: did he truly think that the attitudes of Heraclius and his kind towards the gods marked them out as men who did real harm to pagan values and practice, a group more insidious than Christians, but one which posed a broadly similar threat?

A particular feature of the polemics might seem to lend support to this notion. Several charges levelled at Cynics in them were later to figure in the *Against the Galilaeans*, and at one point in the *Against Heraclius* Julian drew an explicit analogy between Cynics and

Christians (7.224b). To determine the force of the parallels, however, we need to consider the terms of comparison and their intended scope. It deserves to be stressed at the outset that they cannot obscure one major difference. Whereas the *Against the Galilaeans* went hand in hand with political measures devised against Christians and their false *paideia*, the anti-Cynic pieces stand alone. If Julian had felt such pressing worry about Cynics in connection with his plans for pagan restoration, he would not, one suspects, have confined himself to verbal denunciation in polemic.

Verbally, indeed, a comparison of Cynics with Christians was no novelty. Aelius Aristides had long ago castigated Cynics as 'very like those men who live in Palestine, whose impiety is evident from the fact that they do not recognize their superiors.'[132] The parallel was very loosely drawn: Aelius made a casual comparison with a notorious group of 'atheists' to give colour to a conventional polemical charge. Similarly, Alexander of Abonouteichos had forbidden 'atheists, Christians or Epicureans' to witness the mysteries of Glycon.[133] The fact that the Christian parallel had come easily to pagan lips as a polemical slur makes it unsurprising that Julian should have had recourse to it in an *ad hominem* attack. It does not of itself imply that Julian believed Cynics to be substantially akin to Christians, and hardly less obnoxious.

With this in mind, I turn to the detail of the analogy explicitly drawn at 7.224b. There Julian nicknames his opponents 'monks' (*apotaktitai*) – 'a name which the impious Galilaeans apply to certain men'. Undoubtedly, he intends the general charge of impiety to stick to Heraclius – *Or.* 7, after all, was a reply to an impious myth. But that charge is not elaborated when the grounds of the comparison are developed. Rather, the connections adduced echo other conventional charges of polemic: the insolence and lack of integrity of Cynics. Like itinerant monks who survive on charity, they have left their homes to wander the world, and are now making a nuisance of themselves at the imperial court; the much-vaunted asceticism of both groups consists merely in 'small hardships endured for the sake of much, or rather everything, from other sources, in order to secure fame and attendants'.[134] These very charges, it will be recalled, had long since been levelled at 'false' philosophers in the dialogues of Lucian.

The force of the comparison is further restricted by its immediate context. It is made in the course of a passage of flamboyant rhetoric in which Heraclius is abused on a variety of standard grounds, each

of which can be paralleled in Epictetus or Lucian. Heraclius, we read, is unworthy to carry the staff of Diogenes or to indulge in *parrhêsia*;[135] he thinks that to be a philosopher is essentially to dress the part;[136] he reviles his social betters, and brings philosophy into disrepute.[137] The writer follows through with a colourfully exaggerated claim that the unruliness of this Cynic and his friends makes them more feared in the market-place than soldiers,[138] then with the comparison with monks and finally with a barrage of insults: presented before their Emperor, the Cynics 'have behaved most stupidly, ignorantly, flattering and barking at one and the same time'.[139]

Even here, Julian does not compare Cynics with Christians *tout court*, but rather with a minority Christian group. Monks of the kind he speaks of would soon be rampaging as self-appointed 'shock-troops' of Christ, destroying temples and disrupting sacrifices, and were to prompt disquiet even among Christians: the terms in which Julian criticized them are intriguingly echoed in a pronouncement of Valens, and Theodosius, it is well known, was to judge it necessary to legislate against their violence.[140] To any pagan of Julian's day, they will have been emblematic of hatred of the gods at its most fanatical, and as such, they will have had very obvious appeal as a striking object of comparison in a polemical context. But by the same token, the comparison with Heraclius was a wild exaggeration and would be understood as such by Julian's readers: Heraclius' 'impiety' consisted in nothing more than the composition of a mischievous allegory: it was hardly to be put on a par with the atheism of Christian 'shock-troops'.

The comparison Julian made, then, was principally intended as a colourful slur in a derivative attack. Like the analogy drawn between Cynics and pirates at *Or.* 6.210a, it turns on a rhetorical exaggeration: just as Cynics are even more shameless than pirates, even more frightening than soldiers, so they are like monks, and even more objectionable than run-of-the-mill Galilaeans; indeed, they have 'even more affrontery than monks'.[141]

If these analogies and exaggerations point to anything deeper, it is a way of thought, not an explicit programme. The two speeches contain other charges which we can also match in the *Against the Galilaeans*: failure to accept that knowledge of god is innate in man through a predisposition of the soul,[142] and betrayal of tradition – in the case of Cynics, the tradition of true philosophy epitomized by Diogenes, in the case of Christians, the tradition of Moses.[143] These

charges, too, presented themselves to Julian ready-made: they had been levelled at 'false' Cynics by Epictetus, and at Christians by Celsus.[144] Still, they are rooted in a surrounding philosophic and religious ideology in a way that the 'monk' comparison is not, and it is tempting to suppose that they mark genuinely-felt objections on Julian's part, explaining the particular charge of *apaideusia*. Alluding in *Or.* 7 to the benefits of his education, Julian spoke of a training in Greek letters and in the basics of philosophy, and a readiness to think of the gods as guides to a virtuous life.[145] So too, in *Against the Galilaeans*, a man of learning is 'a gift from the gods to men'.[146] On this score, false Cynics and Christians were both ignorant, merely the propagators of childish, mindless fables.[147] But the charge need not carry equal force in the two cases. Although Julian was hardly likely to dwell on the distinction in the cut and thrust of polemic, to count a Cynic ignorant was not necessarily to count him no less perversely misguided than persons who denied outright the ancestral gods in favour of the claims of 'the corpse of a Jew'.[148] At best, the correspondences at issue will show that particular ideological factors contributed to Julian's dislike of both Cynics and Christians: they do not justify the inference that he discerned an especially intimate connection between them. But by the same token, the charge rested – as I have observed already – on a conventional association of learning and piety, not on any abstruse doctrine of Iamblichan Neoplatonism.

On this reading, the comparison with Christians is to be taken in the light of established polemical technique and does not imply that Cynics posed a significant threat to the well-being of pagan cult in Julian's eyes. Significantly, Julian makes no claim that Heraclius and his associates themselves felt any mutual affinity with Christians or were in practice kindly disposed towards them. At one point, in *Or.* 6, he follows up a quotation of a phrase from Genesis with the remark, 'You recognize, I suppose, the sayings of the impious Galilaeans':[149] but that is no more than a sarcastic jibe, on a par with the nickname 'monk'. His silence on this score is borne out by a telling event: three years after Julian's death, Heraclius was to attach himself to the cause of the pagan Procopius, the kinsman of Julian who claimed to have been chosen by him as his successor to the purple.[150] This point deserves emphasis, because a casual reading of a speech by Gregory Nazianzen might be taken to hint at friendly association between Cynics and Christians around this time. The speech in question was a panegyric composed in honour of one

Maximus, whom it describes as a 'Cynic (*kyôn*, "dog"), free in speech but yet not shameless ... the best and most perfect of philosophers.'[151] It was prompted by the arrival at Constantinople of Maximus as the representative of Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, a post he had gained on the strength of a reputation for ascetic virtue after several years spent in the desert. This fulsome praise of a 'Cynic' is spoken by a vehement opponent and one-time acquaintance of Julian: it conjures up a remarkable picture of a Cynic from Egypt – the homeland, we recall, of the addressee of *Or.* 6 – working intimately with prominent officials of the Church, and might seem to suggest a wider context to Julian's own polemics.

The picture dissolves on a closer reading of the speech, however. In Gregory's usage, it turns out, 'Cynic' denotes no more than a Nicene Christian who dresses in a peculiar costume in illustration of virtues that remain the monopoly of Christians: Maximus is 'a philosopher of ours in foreign dress':[152] stress is laid on his sufferings as a supporter of the Nicene creed, and the hope is expressed that he will continue to revile 'gentile superstitions' – a phrase which seems in context to denote Arianism.[153] In this case, we may suspect, *parrhêsia* entailed no more than the vehement promotion of the Nicene cause. Maximus clearly cultivated a reputation for asceticism, but it is equally clear that the rhetoric of Gregory exaggerated the significance of a beard and a cloak. A survey of Maximus' career by Jerome says nothing about his being a Cynic.[154] In any case, it is inconceivable that either Gregory or Peter would have ever supported a person whose Nicene credentials were in any doubt: eccentric or astute, Maximus should be viewed as a picturesque Christian.

Nor should the speech be thought to imply that Gregory himself was more generally well-disposed to Cynicism in practice. His flattery of Maximus seems to have been offered with a personal motive in mind, in the hope that Maximus' patron Peter would support Gregory's bid to be confirmed as Bishop of Constantinople. In the event, this did not happen: on the contrary, Peter apparently contrived to make Maximus bishop, and Gregory's opinion of the latter changed abruptly.[155] In his *De vita sua*, he reviled him in bitter terms, and his remarks about Cynicism in that setting are notably hostile: *kyôn* becomes a word of abuse, and Cynicism is presented as incompatible with faith in Christ.[156] His earlier, kinder words in the panegyric are in fact a witness to the potency of the cultured image of the Cynic as a philosophic ideal that I have discussed

already, and mark the susceptibility of a Christian writer to the same diatribe style whose effects I have observed in connection with Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom and Julian himself. Long established as a medium of instruction, not least in Cynic writings, this style cast a pervasive spell, and predisposed Christian as well as pagan writers to adopt a characteristic tone and metaphorical imagery in popularizing treatments of ethical subjects. As uncompromising an apologist as Tertullian, for instance, found it apt to use the image of the idealized Diogenes to show up the failings of a hateful opponent in his *Against Marcion*.[157] More striking still, his *De pallio* celebrates in high rhetorical style the philosophic cloak conventionally associated with the Cynic, and picks out Diogenes and Crates for special praise as true lovers of wisdom.[158] But this does not for a moment imply that Tertullian was in practice sympathetically disposed towards contemporary Cynics. The point of the *De pallio* becomes clear in its closing lines: the proper place for the *pallium*, symbol of all that is admirable in classical culture and formerly worn by pagans, is now on a Christian shoulder.[159] Similarly, Gregory's panegyric alludes to the image of the true Cynic to emphasize the asceticism of the person praised. Comparable traces of the diatribe's effects can be found in other Christian writings of the late fourth century: the homilies of Asterius of Amasea, for instance, cast Lazarus as a vagrant philosopher, and call upon the conventional metaphors of the philosopher, scout and doctor;[160] and Gregory of Nyssa, when he described Gregory the Wonder-worker, did so in terms that put one in mind of Lucian's account of the Cynic Demonax.[161]

Allusions of this kind, then, need not be thought to mark any fondness for Cynics on the part of Gregory and his like, nor any quickening interest in Cynic teachings. And in any case, however Christians chose to speak of Cynicism, there is no good evidence that Cynics, for their part, were disposed to take any reciprocal interest in Christian doctrine or to associate with Christians. From the second century, it is true, there is the celebrated case of Peregrinus, who lived for a time among Christians as a youthful visitor to Palestine.[162] But his subsequent espousal of Cynicism did lead, in the end, to a parting of the ways.[163] If he provides an instance of a man moving easily from a Christian to a Cynic milieu, that is a subtly different thing: it is revealing of the appeal of both movements at a comparable social level at the time, not of a positive ideological rapport. Besides, his is a lonely case; it needs to be read in the light of other Antonine testimonies which tell a different story. At Rome

in the 160s, Justin challenged to public debate a Cynic named Crescens, who had laid the customary charges of atheism and impiety against the Christians. The episode had a practical upshot: Crescens was apparently prominent among those who demanded Justin's execution.[164] Nor, it seems, was this the only occasion when a Cynic was involved in persecution of Christians.[165]

The conclusions to which the arguments of this chapter point are plainly at odds with the reading of the polemics outlined at its start. On that reading, *Or.* 6 offered a popularizing account of the Neoplatonic theory of *paideia*, and together with *Or.* 7 was seriously intended to check a group seen by Julian as renegades who put his hopes for a pagan Empire in jeopardy. In my view, the speech is a derivative polemic which offers very little in the way of cogent argument, and the persons it and *Or.* 7 attacked were men of straw: they gave Julian no cause for worry so far as his standing as Emperor or his policies were concerned, and the significance of the analogy he drew between them and Christians has been greatly exaggerated.

If *Or.* 6 does not deserve to be treated as a deeply pondered work of Neoplatonist argument, it is hardly a matter for surprise; as Julian himself remarked, it was a rushed product of two days' work. As for *Or.* 7, it was written still more hurriedly, and it is not, despite its title, wholly given over to the issue of Cynicism. Julian used criticism of Heraclius' fable as a pretext to set down a myth of his own devising.[166] It is a story which stands as the true climax of the speech and will need to be discussed further in other contexts: it bears on his hostility to Christians, and on his conception of himself as an Emperor under special divine protection. Our present interest, though, lies with the portion of the work concerned with Cynics, and the criticisms in that portion merely prefigure those of *Or.* 6, and are equally derivative.

We must give due weight, too, to the fact that both the speeches were *ad hominem* invectives. *Or.* 7 was offered as a response to blasphemy, but there was also a personal edge to the exchange. Heraclius in his fable had cast Julian as Pan and himself as Zeus, in which guise he had offered to instruct his Emperor.[167] That had no political significance, but it was an instance of Cynic presumption to which Julian could not forbear to allude, and which plainly irritated him somewhat. Similarly, the criticisms of Diogenes that had prompted him to write *Or.* 6 had mischievously picked up on his own earlier remarks in *Or.* 7. But if Julian personally disliked

Heraclius and the unnamed recipient of *Or.* 6, it does not follow that he believed their activities were dangerous, still less that he imagined two invectives would counter their effects. His purpose in writing the speeches was lighter and more immediate. He was out to defeat two 'puppy-dogs' in a staged debate before an admiring audience of intimates[168] and members of the imperial court, and will have relished the opportunity the occasion offered for an oratorical display of learning and skill in the manipulation of a familiar repertoire of literary invective. In their ready appeal to conventional charges, the speeches plainly share something with the *Against the Galilaeans*; but when we come to discuss the shape and emphasis of the arguments in that work, we shall see that its points of difference are equally plain, and that they reflect a broader difference in level of intent. *Against the Galilaeans*, that is to say, was what the invectives against 'false' Cynics patently were not: a polemic whose specific complaints were acknowledged and addressed in a determined programme of political action.

4

THE *CHALDAEAN ORACLES* AND NEOPLATONIST THEURGY

From Julian's attacks on the Cynics, which show him practising philosophy none too rigorously in a well-established style of cultured discourse, I pass to a more recondite aspect of his philosophic interests on which I touched briefly in my account of his 'philosophic ideal': his Neoplatonist theurgy. At Ephesus in 351, probably in a temple of Hecate, Julian had been initiated by Maximus into 'the entrance of philosophy' – the Mysteries of the theurgists.[1] Although he says little directly about theurgy in his writings, he says enough to indicate that it remained thereafter a matter of special interest to the private man. In a letter written in Gaul around 358/9, he asked Priscus, about to come to visit him, to bring a copy of the commentaries of Iamblichus on the canonical text of Neoplatonist theurgy, the *Chaldaean Oracles*.[2] In 362, he prayed at the close of his hymn *To the Mother of the Gods* that he be granted 'perfection in theurgy', and remarked on the need for pagans to respect a tradition about Zeus 'given to us by the theurgists of ancient times'.[3] Ammianus, moreover, implies that during the Persian campaign, Julian's theurgic convictions came to impinge on his public actions as a general, with unhappy results; the advice of the expedition's Etruscan soothsayers, we are told, was repeatedly disregarded in favour of conflicting readings of the omens offered by the Emperor's theurgist intimates.[4]

If Julian perused the Iamblichan commentaries as eagerly as he requested them, it is a plausible assumption that some substantial traces of theurgic doctrine will be found in his speculative writings. In particular, we look to the hymns, and what they say about the gods and the soul: one, after all, is the occasion for the request for theurgic perfection; the other is explicitly said by Julian to be an abridgement of Iamblichan teachings in these matters.[5] In a sense, the issue is not in doubt: in both hymns, there are occasional

quotations or verbal echoes of phrases from the *Oracles*. Later, when I come to review the doctrine of the hymn *To King Helios* in detail, I will make a stronger claim: I will argue that specific theurgic doctrines can be shown to inform the conceptual framework of the hymn, and that the manner in which they inform it entitles us to discard any interpretation of the hymn as a text deeply imbued with Mithraic doctrine. Before I proceed to argue that, however, I must address a prior question. To appraise Julian's debt to theurgic teachings requires a preliminary judgement about the nature of those teachings: and the doctrinal content of the *Chaldaean Oracles* and the Neoplatonist interpretations of it form a dense and highly problematic subject in their own right. In this chapter, then, I indicate the views I take of the major points at issue. I shall order what I have to say in three stages: first, I discuss the circumstances of composition and intellectual milieu of the *Oracles*; then the main features of the soteriological teachings and ritual practices expounded in them; and finally, the process by which Iamblichus and his followers adapted these to their own ends. On one view, this process had its political repercussions, and discussion on that score will lead us back to the issue of Julian's own theurgy and its bearing on his public actions.

THE COMPOSITION AND INTELLECTUAL MILIEU OF THE *CHALDAEAN ORACLES*

The *Chaldaean Oracles* – hereafter 'the *Oracles*' – were a collection of hexametric verses which purportedly recorded the utterances of gods on questions to do with the creation and ordering of the universe and the places to be assigned to divine principles and the soul within it. As we have them, they exist only in fragments, culled for the most part from the late Neoplatonists Proclus and Damascius, in whose eyes the *Oracles* constituted a most holy 'god-given' text.[6] An entry in the *Suda*, apparently deriving from Proclus,[7] indicates that they were written down by one Julianus the Theurgist, son of one Julianus the Chaldaean, in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The testimonies are not entirely clear on this point, however: one variant puts the author in the time of Trajan,[8] and there are signs that the elder Julianus too was credited with having played some part in the production of the *Oracles*: the Neoplatonists, when they quoted them, commonly attributed them to 'the Theurgists', or 'the Chaldaeans', or 'one of the Theurgists'.[9] One neat explanation of the tradition of dual authorship was offered by E.R. Dodds, who

suggested that the *Oracles* were less likely an outright forgery than the utterances of an entranced medium.[10] On that view, the messages of the gods might be conjectured to have been voiced by one of the Juliani, and then put into verse by the other, in a fashion analogous to the way that the *prophêtês* and the 'thespode' produced oracles at the Apolline oracle at Claros.[11]

The attractiveness of this solution makes it all the more important to stress that the historicity of the entire tradition of the two Juliani is highly dubious. Proclus, it may be suspected, placed Julianus the Theurgist in the reign of Marcus largely on the strength of a story that it was he who had performed a celebrated rain-miracle in the course of the Marcoman campaign of 173. But our earliest account of the miracle, given in Dio,[12] makes no mention of him in this connection: the first known association of (unnamed) 'Chaldaeans' with the episode belongs to the late fourth century;[13] and our earliest reference to 'Julian the Theurgist' by name in any context comes later still, in Sozomen.[14] There, he is spoken of simply as a magician. The first reliable reference to a Julianus as author of the *Oracles* is in fact the letter which Julian wrote to Priscus in the late 350s. There, Julian speaks of 'the writings of Iamblichus on my namesake'. It is safe to infer that he refers to the extensive (and now lost) Iamblichan commentary on the *Oracles*[15] and that in that work, which seems to have been written early in the fourth century, Iamblichus too had credited a Julianus with authorship. It is possible – but not certain – that Porphyry had done likewise a little earlier.[16] Before that, however, we hear nothing of either of the Juliani from any source: even if the historicity of either or both is granted, there is nothing to disprove the idea that they were at best obscure magicians and that the attribution of the *Oracles* to the Theurgist is as fanciful as the retrospective attribution to him of the rain-miracle. And a plausible explanation of the tradition of the dual authorship of the *Oracles* can be offered on this assumption: conceivably, the talk in the Neoplatonists of two Juliani marks an attempt to account for the presence of two distinct elements in the *Oracles*: on the one hand, instructions treating of theurgic rituals; on the other, a revelation of cosmological and soteriological doctrine. There is a hint of something of the sort to be had in a Proclan tradition which tells of the elder Julianus 'conjoining' the soul of his new-born son with the soul of Plato through theurgic magic: the implication here, perhaps, is that the father, through his magical expertise, enabled the son to interrogate

the soul of the philosopher and produce a Platonic revelation in oracular form.[17]

We need to allow, too, for another factor. If the author (or authors) of the *Oracles* wished the work to be thought to contain the teachings of ancient Chaldaeans, he might well have felt disinclined to offer it to readers under his own name. In the case of prophetic or oracular texts, anonymity had a powerful attraction, since it allowed an aura of venerable antiquity to attach itself to the purportedly divine utterances contained in them. The practice is familiar enough from comparable collections of wisdom-texts – most notably, the *Hermetica* and the Zoroastrian pseudepigrapha[18] – and the advantage of anonymity as a literary strategy is very clear from the fact that within twenty years of the eruption of Vesuvius it was widely supposed that the disaster had long since been foretold by the Sibyl.[19] In short, it is easy to suspect that the ascription of the *Oracles* to the Juliani may be more informative of the history of their exegesis than of their actual origin.

If the Juliani are jettisoned, the *Oracles* can only be dated from internal evidence. On the basis of their style and content, the mid- to late second century is usually allowed to stand as the likely time of composition. Certainly, in their concern with the nature and ordering of divinities and their functions, and in their claim to offer a means to put one in direct contact with gods through ritual invocation, they are comparable with various religious and philosophic phenomena of the period: there is the oracular cult of Glycon invented by Alexander of Abonouteichos, for instance, which enjoyed great vogue in Asia Minor around the time;[20] and one can point to the invocations of epiphanies to be found in the magical papyri, some of which at least belong to the second century.[21] It was a time, too, when the great Apolline centres at Didyma and Claros were flourishing: by the early third century, the god was answering questions about his true nature and the fate of the soul in terms which bear striking resemblances to the *Oracles* themselves, and answering them in sufficient quantity for compilations of his responses to be produced for interested readers.[22] In both the Apolline texts and the verses of the *Oracles* there is a syncretic notion that the beings men call gods are merely functionaries of a supreme Being – a philosophic notion particularly characteristic of the Middle Platonism of the second century.[23] Further, two specific doctrines in the *Oracles* – one asserting that the divinity whom men call the First Intellect is in

reality the Second, the other that the Demiurge is a Dyad – find close parallels in the fragments of Numenius of Apamea.[24]

At the very least, these parallels show that the *Oracles* are deeply imbued with the currents of thought of what has been nicely called 'the underworld of Platonism' in this era; but the parallels are closely enough matched in tone and sense to suggest a more direct link.[25] The direction of influence, however, is much disputed. Numenius' writings are generally dated around the middle of the second century, but could conceivably be slightly earlier;[26] so even if he is reckoned to have been a source of the *Oracles*, that does not put it beyond doubt that the *Oracles* belong to the later second century. And it is quite possible that it is Numenius who is indebted to the *Oracles*; he certainly had a keen interest in sacred teachings of exotic provenance. If that were so, the *Oracles* could be placed early in the century. Such a date is not in itself implausible, and we can point to the possibility that writings laying a similar claim to an oriental pedigree – in this case, pseudepigrapha crediting Zoroaster with the foundation of a Mithraic Mystery cult – were circulating in the West by the end of the first century.[27] And if an early second century date for the *Oracles* is entertained, another possible explanation of the two Juliani comes to mind. Conceivably, the variant which dates one of the two to the reign of Trajan (97–117) reflects an attempt to make the ascription of the *Oracles* to an Antonine magician square with vestigial signs that they had existed in some form significantly earlier. A convenient way to do this would be simply to invent a Chaldaean father for the notional author, and to place him in the reign of an earlier Emperor firmly linked in the popular mind with the East: Trajan's expedition into Mesopotamia made him an ideal candidate.

All this, however, is rather to suppose that the *Oracles* were composed at one particular time and place. Even that must be counted doubtful. There is no cause, it must be stressed, to think that authentic Chaldaean material had a significant place in their doctrines; it has been strongly argued that their philosophic content had a single source in contemporary Platonism,[28] and the surviving fragments show no sign of an attempt to convey even a spurious Mesopotamian colour in the incidental details: but it is quite possible that the work took on the shape in which it became known to the Neoplatonists gradually, that it comprised a book of revelations into which new texts were inserted over a considerable period by various hands, and took on its Platonist colour in the process.[29] There are

signs, in any event, that exegetical writings on them were already in existence before the Neoplatonist involvement with them began.[30]

The considerations I have outlined plainly impose drastic restrictions on any account of the origin of the *Oracles*. The idea canvassed by Hans Lewy in an influential study,[31] that they were composed by the son of a Chaldaean emigrant in the time of Marcus, and in a Roman setting, is very flimsy. If the parallels with Numenius of Apamea were thought to hint at personal contact between him and the author(s) of the *Oracles*, they might rather point to a Syrian milieu; for the rest, we must be content to view them as an anonymous text, part sub-Platonic, part 'magical', which was produced (or which evolved) sometime in the second century. The ascription of the *Oracles* to one or both of the Juliani is best explained in the light of the interest they came to have for the Neoplatonists; and Iamblichus stands out as a likely catalyst in the development of the tradition. Porphyry, we shall shortly see, seems to have regarded the doctrines contained in the *Oracles* circumspectly: it was Iamblichus to whom they owed their status as a cardinal text of later Neoplatonism – a text, Proclus declared, which it was 'unlawful to disbelieve'.[32] In order to secure that status, we may suspect, it will have seemed desirable to establish a clear pedigree for the *Oracles* by assigning them to an identified individual. To that end, to invent or to turn to one's purpose a wonder-worker with Eastern connections was an obvious move to make, and one of which Iamblichus, given his presentation of his own *On the Mysteries* as the work of a sage of Egypt, may be judged eminently capable.

DOCTRINES AND RITUALS OF SALVATION IN THE *CHALDAEAN ORACLES*

At the beginning of even a summary description of the doctrinal content and ritual practices expounded in the verses that were to become the canonical text of Neoplatonist theurgy – and I do not mean to offer more than that in this section – we are faced with a major difficulty. The surviving fragments of the *Oracles* comprise about 300 lines of what was evidently a considerably longer text: most of them run to two or three lines only, and many consist simply of disjointed phrases of a few words. Modern editors have reasonably taken the view that there is no basis on which they can be recast into the coherent order that they are generously assumed to have presented in their original state, and have been content to place what

survives in loosely connected thematic groups. Further, the *Oracles* were written in a turgid and obscure poetic diction which makes for a great deal of ambiguity in expression: in many cases, there is no knowing for certain to what entity a given fragment refers, or quite what a given phrase is supposed to connote. And these difficulties are compounded further by the fact that what survives has come down to us almost wholly through the medium of late Neoplatonist commentators. Their testimonies bear the mark of the philosophic concepts and terminology of post-Plotinian metaphysics, and may easily mislead us about the nature of the doctrines that the author of the *Oracles* had in mind. So too, the exalted Proclan conception of theurgy as a *pistis* superior to philosophy[33] clearly rests in some degree upon a Neoplatonist systematization of the information given in the *Oracles* in the matter of ritual practice.

Hans Lewy attempted to reduce our dependence on the later traditions by a radical measure. In his major study of the *Oracles*, he began by arguing that we can add to the existing fragments of the *Oracles* a hundred or so lines of verse which are known to have figured in two other antique compilations of oracles; and he went on to use information gleaned from the added verses to elucidate obscure features in the verses preserved by the Neoplatonists as 'Chaldaean'. This bold attempt to expand the basic data, if it were acceptable, would certainly facilitate an account of the theological doctrines of the *Oracles*. However, it is not acceptable. Various doubts about the validity of the procedure were quickly raised by Dodds,[34] and they were emphatically confirmed later in a striking particular when the text of the most important of the 'new *Chaldaean Oracles*' was shown by Louis Robert to include (perhaps simply to comprise) a genuine response from the oracle of Clarian Apollo – a notion that Lewy had rejected out of hand.[35]

The only safe procedure, then, is to restrict ourselves to the fragments attested by the Neoplatonists, and to do our best to allow for the philosophic bias inherent in the manner of their transmission. Nevertheless, Lewy's mistake is instructive; it points to a feature of the doctrine of the *Oracles* that needs to be emphasized at the outset. What is suggestive in this connection is that an oracular text issued at a major cult centre of Apollo could be mistaken for a fragment of the *Oracles* in the first place. The text in question probably belongs soon after AD 200 and was given in response to a question on an elevated subject: Was Apollo really God, or was God another? It

survives in more than one version, and in its fullest form it may conflate responses given on more than one occasion. In that form it reads as follows:

> There exists a fire (*phlogmos*) which has occupied a vessel above the heavens – a fire infinitely in motion, a boundless eternity. It is not within the grasp of the blessed gods, unless the mighty Father should plan his purposes so that he himself might be looked upon: in that place the ether does not bear the radiant stars; nor is the luminous moon raised up there. No god meets him [the Father, who is fire] on his path, nor am I myself [solar Apollo] spread out so far as to reach him, though I whirl through the ether in company with my light-rays. God is fire, a vast channel moving in a spinning motion with a whirring sound. But if someone touched that ethereal fire, he would not feel fear in his heart, for it has not power to burn. Through an unceasing care that derives from God himself, eternity mingles with eternities. Self-begotten, untaught, without a mother, unshakeable, nameless, many-named, dwelling in fire – that is God; we are messengers (*angeloi*), only a small part of God.[36]

In its lofty phrases, its doctrinal transcendentalism, and its emphasis on heavenly fire and a divine hierarchy, this text has a lot in common with the pronouncements of the *Oracles*. In this case, however, we are not dealing with the quasi-philosophic lucubrations of an occult clique, but with words put into the mouth of Apollo at an influential cult centre. The temple official who produced this response was evidently well informed in the Platonist theology of the day, and the person who consulted Apollo evidently found it entirely appropriate that his prophet should have cast the reply of the god in the fashion he did: not the least remarkable fact about the oracle is that its final lines were subsequently inscribed on the city wall of Oenoanda, together with three additional lines – very likely also from Claros – giving instruction on the proper mode of worship of the god concerned. 'This he said to those who enquired of the nature of God: "God is all-seeing Ether: look and pray to him at dawn, looking to the east."'[37] On one view, indeed, the question which elicited the oracle was put by a representative of the community of Oenoanda at a time when it wished to found a new cult.[38]

That notion is open to doubt, but even if the original consultant was a private individual, the use to which the oracle was subsequently put suggests that the currents of thought expressed in it did not touch only a tiny philosophic minority: in Asia Minor at least, they seem

to have impinged on the thinking and ritual practice of a wider range of pagans.[39] And this in turn can serve to warn us against the assumption that most pagans of the time, if they came upon the *Oracles*, would have found their contents utterly bizarre and foreign to their own religious concerns. The Clarian response – and there are others which could be adduced alongside it[40] – gives us cause to wonder if that was really the case. Rather, it hints that even within the mainstream paganism of the day there was an audience for theological pronouncements whose general tone and content put one in mind of the *Oracles*.

I pass now to the doctrine of the *Oracles* themselves. Our principal interest here lies with the doctrines of the soul and its salvation offered in them, and the ritual practices with which they were associated. But these doctrines presuppose a particular divine order and cosmology, and I will begin with an outline of their likely teaching on that score.

The *Oracles* seem to conceive of a triad of 'noetic' entities as the principal divinity of the universe. One fragment tells of a 'noetic' Father 'who perfected everything, and committed it to the Second Intellect, whom you, o race of men, call the First'; on the strength of which, it can be inferred that the Father is himself the First Intellect and the highest principle in the Chaldaean system.[41] The third member of the triad is a 'Power' (*Dynamis*): 'the *Dynamis*', we read, 'is with [the Father]; the [Second] Intellect proceeds from him'.[42] Whether or not the *Dynamis* was thought to have played any part in the generation of the Second Intellect is unclear: conceivably, it was viewed as a primal female entity, and had some part to play in the process, although it is expressly stated that the Father 'did not enclose his own fire' in it.[43]

This 'noetic' triad was conceived of as subsisting in an immaterial fire, and as responsible for the creation and maintenance of the whole of reality, the sensible world included – a fact which allows us to put aside the notion that the *Oracles* were in any radical sense dependent on an Iranian cosmic dualism.[44] The process of creation in the *Oracles* is far from clear in its details, but it seems safe to describe its basics as follows.

The Father shuns direct involvement in creation;[45] that which he 'committed to the Second Intellect' must be interpreted Platonically, as a body of noetic Forms. The Second Intellect serves as a dyadic Demiurge: on the one hand, it 'comprehends the intelligible' (which is to say, the Forms); on the other it 'introduces sense-perception

into the *kosmoi*, sending a fiery power into the noetic and sensible worlds'.[46] From him, too, it seems, comes 'the generation of manifold matter'.[47]

For its part, the *Dynamis* looks to serve as a channel of some kind for the Demiurge's activities: at a lower level of reality, she doubles as Hecate, the goddess who is the speaker of many of the lines of the *Oracles*, and as the personification of the World Soul.[48] Set at the point in the universe where the 'noetic' world ends and the 'sensible' world begins, she animates the latter with Soul or, as the verses put it, with typical opacity: 'Around the cavity of [her] right hip is poured forth in abundance the plenteous liquid of the primordially generated soul, which entirely ensouls the light, the fire, the aether and the *kosmoi* [the stars and planets].'[49]

This account, it must be said, is radically simplified. It subsumes into the persons of the Demiurge and the *Dynamis* a considerable number of subsidiary intermediaries whose precise functions are uncertain: it is quite possible that these were not entirely clear in the original poem, and that 'in the minds of the author(s) the hypostases of the philosophers and the gods and *daimones* of Graeco-oriental cult were very incompletely fused.'[50] But for our purposes it is sufficient to note some general points about the cosmological system implied. First, it presupposes a basic Platonist division of reality into a 'noetic' world of Ideas and a lower world of sensibles; and it conceives of this reality as triadically structured.[51] Second, it pictures the principal term of the supreme triad – the Father – as utterly inaccessible to human knowledge: he is 'a noetic entity which you must think with the flower of thought: if you inclined your intellect to it, and thought it as if thinking something, you would not think it ... it subsists beyond human intellect'.[52] Third, reality in the *Oracles* takes the form of 'noetic fire' (light),[53] rays of which emanate from the Father through the Second Intellect, and thence down into the lower Hypostases of being: and this implies that in the sensible world, the rays of the Sun are the highest expression of 'noetic' reality. Fourth, Hecate/*Dynamis* is presented as a channel through which these activities take place; it is she who governs the sub-lunar world, and accordingly she will serve as a crucial intermediary between the world of men and the 'noetic' world of the Father. Lastly, it is made clear that the soul, in the course of its descent to earth, has become contaminated in some degree by matter, or at least increasingly beset by it, and has been compelled to put on a protective garment (*ochêma*, *pneuma*) as it descends:[54] 'Do not befoul your

pneuma', enjoins one fragment.[55] And in its lowest, human, form, the soul has become subject to the Fate which operates in the sub-lunar world: 'Do not add', we read, 'to the portion of Fate.'[56]

The soteriology of the *Oracles* is plainly intended to remedy this state of affairs: it seeks to rid the soul of its accretions and return it to its first, noetic, home. 'You must look towards the light and towards the rays of the Father, whence your soul was sent to you, clad in much *nous*'; 'Do not look upon Nature: the name is enmeshed with Fate'; 'Let the immortal depth of the soul be opened up: spread out your eyes strongly and upwards.'[57] For this to be achieved, it was plainly supposed in the *Oracles* that one must establish a channel of communication with the noetic world through the agency of Hecate. Theurgic ritual was apparently the means for establishing contact with the goddess.

The word *theourgos* occurs only once in the extant fragments of the *Oracles*. It was almost certainly a neologism coined by the author(s),[58] and seems to imply that the theurgist 'works upon gods', or 'does the work of gods', or 'makes things divine'. Presumably, too, the term draws an implicit contrast with *theologoi*, who merely talk or think about the gods. So far as we can tell, the ritual techniques used by the theurgists were comparable to those widely utilized in ancient spells and sorcery to achieve more limited and immediate ends. One view has it that there are two basic types of procedure to be discerned in the fragments: one – the so-called 'telestic' – involving the use of sacred symbols and objects (*symbola*, *synthêmata*); the other – this is a modern hypothesis – involving the induction of trance-states in living persons.[59]

To understand the ritual use of symbols in the *Oracles*, we need to recognize their debt to the principle of 'sympathies'. 'The Paternal Intellect', one fragment runs, 'has sown *symbola* throughout the *kosmos*.'[60] According to this conception, there were 'sympathetic' representatives of the divine in the material world which served as *symbola* of the divine causes of animals, plants and minerals. By discovering and manipulating the appropriate *symbola*, one could establish contact with the gods. The fact that Hecate is the speaker in many of the extant fragments of the *Oracles* clearly suggests that she was the deity most often involved by theurgists in this connection. To judge by a late testimony,[61] the *symbola* manipulated by theurgists took various forms. They might be secret symbols or messages written on gems or stones used in the ritual; they might be magical sounds, the secret names of gods; so too, they might be

statues of gods. Comparable texts in the *Hermetica* and the *Magical Papyri* speak of statues 'filled with spirit' and of the manufacture of images containing *symbola* intended to draw spirits into them.[62] As far as the scanty evidence permits us to judge, Julian's own theurgic initiation seems to have involved the invocation of Hecate by this means: our clearest testimony bearing on the detail of the rituals practised by Maximus of Ephesus concerns his animation of a statue of the goddess by theurgic means.[63]

From the manner in which we learn of these activities of Maximus, it is clear that they were looked upon as somewhat eccentric even by some Iamblichan contemporaries.[64] But it is as well to reiterate here that we should be wary of making too much play with the peculiarity of theurgy in this matter. The theurgic animation of statues can be seen from one perspective as a development of a broader strand in pagan thinking and practice. It rested, first, on the general assumption that divinities were prone to manifest themselves in one way or another before their worshippers – an assumption with firm Homeric roots and a long and very lively subsequent history.[65] More specifically, the supposition that the power of a god could be contained within a cult statue and turned to effective use finds clear parallels outside theurgic circles. Second and third century oracular inscriptions found at Syedra and Iconium, for instance, both of which seem to have emanated from Apollo's oracle at Claros, record the manufacture and setting up of statues of Ares whose function was clearly apotropaic: in the case of the Syedran statue, the god was constrained in a most emphatic fashion, being bound in chains.[66] And evidence of similar habits of mind persisting in the fourth century and later in mainstream paganism is not lacking. In the early 420s, silver statues of three figures, dressed in barbarian garb and buried under the ground, came to light in Thrace. The governor of the region was evidently quick to assume that the statues had been put there to ward off barbarian invasion; following the discovery, he sent to the Emperor to ask whether they should be removed or left in place.[67] In the upshot they were removed – giving the pagan historian Olympiodorus occasion to observe pointedly that shortly afterwards a trio of barbarian peoples was to burst through the Roman frontier.

The notion that divinities were also invoked into the bodies of participants at theurgic rituals is not hinted at in any of the securely attested fragments of the *Oracles*, but it is not unlikely in itself: the trance-technique was certainly employed in some broadly comparable magical circles. A spell in the *Magical Papyri* offers a recipe

designed to summon a god into the body of a child, and Porphyry clearly knew of 'theological' oracles – the products of seances rather than temples, it may be supposed – in which gods spoke through the body of a man.[68] Proclus, at least, believed that the earlier theurgists had practised this technique,[69] and there is a strong hint in Eunapius that Iamblichus himself did something similar: he is said on one occasion to have compelled a spirit to admit that it was not, as it claimed, Apollo, but merely the soul of a dead gladiator,[70] which seems to imply a ritual designed to allow for the interrogation of a god through a human medium.

If it is right to attribute the techniques I have outlined to the early theurgists, their discipline must be assumed to have differed from sorcery in the common run in virtue of its aim rather than its methods. One modern definition speaks of it as 'magic applied to a religious purpose and resting on a supposed revelation of a religious character'.[71] 'Magic' itself is a difficult term, but this formulation certainly fits well with Iamblichus' talk of the aim of the theurgists as being to bring about 'an ascent to the noetic fire'.[72] By invoking Hecate, the theurgist was put into contact with the channel by which the soul had descended and could hope to reascend.

The Neoplatonists, Julian included, talk of this process as an 'elevation' (*anagôgê*). Whether this was the term used in the *Oracles* themselves is not clear; nor do the fragments yield much about the structure of the ritual. There seems to have been a purification intended to strengthen the 'subtle vehicle of the soul'; this will refer to the garment which the soul had been clothed in as it descended from the noetic world, and was doubtless intended to ensure the soul's resistance to the 'perishable envelope of bitter matter' which had come to cling to it in the sublunar world.[73] Thereafter, the soul was apparently conceived of as ascending in stages, drawn up by the sympathetic power of rays of light emanating from the noetic entities and through the visible Sun. 'Enquire', one fragment reads,

> after the ray of the soul, from which she descended in a certain order to minister to the body, and how you shall lead her up again to her ordered place, having combined the [ritual] act with the sacred word.[74]

That done, the soul will 'speed to the centre of the sounding light' (the Sun), mingling with solar rays.[75] There, finally, 'the soul of mortals will press god to itself, having nothing mortal left in it,

utterly intoxicated with god'; and thereafter, it seems, 'the theurgists do not fall into the common herd of men subject to Fate'.[76]

The ritual salvation of which these fragments speak can be assumed to have constituted the ultimate aim of theurgy, and the likelihood is that a ritual enactment of the 'elevation' I have outlined formed the core of the theurgic initiation that Julian underwent at Ephesus: Julian himself, at least, speaks of 'an ineffable *mystagôgia* in which the Chaldaean ecstatically celebrated the seven-rayed god through whom he raised up the souls [of men]'.[77]

IAMBLICHAN THEURGY

Our discussion so far has focused on the *Oracles* themselves – their origin, their soteriological doctrines and the associated rituals. But the theurgy Julian knew and practised did not take its shape simply and solely from the *Oracles*: between 'Julian the Theurgist' and Julian the Apostate stands the figure of Iamblichus. It remains to consider the part he played in the transmission and modification of the doctrines and rituals at issue, and its bearing on Julian's own theurgy.

If Plotinus knew anything of the *Oracles*, he gave no sure sign of it in his writings.[78] So far as we can tell, Neoplatonist interest in them began with Porphyry, Plotinus' pupil and the sometime teacher of Iamblichus. At what stage he came to take an interest in the *Oracles* we cannot say for sure; the chronology of his writings in general is a much-debated issue.[79] Here it is enough to say that it is extremely doubtful whether he knew them when he wrote what is often taken to have been his first substantial work, the *Philosophy from Oracles*; the attested remains of that text do not contain any verses subsequently cited as Chaldaean by Neoplatonist commentators. But he was clearly familiar with theurgic doctrine by the time he wrote two other works, the extant *Letter to Anebo* and the *On the Return of the Soul* (of which only fragments in a Latin translation survive, and which was perhaps the work ascribed to him in the *Suda* under a different title, *On the Writings of Julianus the Chaldaean*).[80] The dates of these works too are disputed: on one view, the first was probably written during Plotinus' lifetime (which is to say before 270), the second sometime after his death. Both, however, indicate that Porphyry had strong reservations about the practice of theurgy – at least by philosophers – at the time of writing.

I begin with the *Letter to Anebo*. The piece purports to be a letter

to an Egyptian priest, but the addressee is almost certainly fictional, and the likelihood is that the 'letter' was written in the course of a debate with Iamblichus on the philosophic value of theurgy. Although it does not actually quote the *Oracles*, it contains strongly expressed criticism of the view that theurgy provides an effective means for the attaining of union with the gods. The criticisms are made in the form of a series of conundrums. Porphyry begins by asking how we are supposed to distinguish between the various classes of superhuman beings, divine, angelic or daemonic, and goes on to imply that there is no sure way that we can: the relative situations of such beings in the cosmic order; their passibility or impassibility; their noetic or psychic constitutions; their corporeality or incorporeality – all these criteria for distinguishing between them are considered and rejected.[81]

At first sight, these criticisms seem to imply that in Porphyry's view theurgy has little or no value: they strike at the basic premise that the theurgist can establish contact with specific divinities appropriate to his aims by particular rituals. Probably, though, the tone of the letter owes something to the conventions of polemic; it need not have been Porphyry's intention to reject theurgy outright. In the *On the Return of the Soul*, at any rate, he granted it a limited function. In that work, he was prepared to distinguish theurgy from magic (*goêteia*) and to allow the existence of helpful *daimones* which could be distinguished from gods.[82] But the rituals (*teletai*) of the theurgist, it was implied, were only useful to those who could not philosophize, and their value was restricted even in that setting: theurgy could purify only the lower portion of the soul, and was effective only in virtue of the 'sympathetic' principles in the sensible world.[83] It was powerless to affect the higher soul envisioned in Neoplatonist theory, and hence could not provide the 'universal way of salvation' by which Porphyry set such store.[84]

Iamblichus' response to this view of the matter is crucial for our understanding of Julian's attitude to theurgy. His extensive commentary on the *Oracles* does not survive, but the general drift of his argument is recoverable from his *On the Mysteries*, which he presented as the work of an Egyptian priest, and clearly intended as a refutation of the *Letter to Anebo* of Porphyry. Like that letter, it does not actually quote from the *Oracles* – very likely, that is the result of an attempt made by the writer to preserve the semblance of a local Egyptian colour – but its conceptual debt to theurgic doctrine is not in doubt. Near the start of the work, Iamblichus insists that

there are some questions which only theurgists can hope to answer,[85] and the primacy of their discipline over discursive reason is asserted in a striking passage at the close of Book Two.

> Intellectual understanding (*ennoia*) does not conjoin the theurgists with the gods; for in that case, what would prevent those who practise philosophy theoretically from attaining theurgic union with the gods? . . . It is rather the perfected performance of ineffable actions beyond all understanding (*noêsis*), and the power of unutterable *symbola* understood by the gods alone, which bring about theurgic union. For we do not perform these actions with the mind, since in that case their efficacy would be intellectual (*noera*) and dependent on ourselves. . . . Rather, those *symbola* by themselves perform the task that belongs to them, without our thinking: the ineffable power of the gods to whom the *symbola* raise us recognizes by itself the images proper to it.[86]

The root of the anti-Porphyrian riposte in this passage lies in the denial that theurgy is only effective in the sensible world. The theurgist, it is implied, does not attempt to constrain the gods: the rituals that he performs are effective only through the will of the gods; they serve merely to gain one 'their good will, and the illumination which they impart',[87] enhancing the powers of the *symbola* in which divine vestiges are operative. Rather than drawing the gods down to the theurgist, they situate him in such a way that his soul can be purified and raised up to them. But to situate oneself thus by means of theurgic ritual is only an auxiliary cause of the elevation of the soul: the prior cause lies with the divine itself, with the principles by which it has generated a universe sown with its *symbola*.[88]

The passage in question leaves little room for doubt about the importance of the performance of ritual in Iamblichus' mind; the suggestion[89] that Neoplatonists tended to distinguish firmly between practical and theoretical modes of theurgy, and to focus their attention on the latter, hardly squares with what Iamblichus says here. If any clear distinction was proposed between a higher and a lower form of theurgy, it must be supposed to have rested not on the presence or absence of a ritual component but on the view taken of the particular purpose to which the ritual was directed, the inner disposition of the practitioner.[90] In the sensible world, theurgy provided a means to affect *daimones* in virtue of the 'sympathies'

inherent in material objects; but directed at a higher level, it could lead to the union of the soul with noetic entities, and it was for that above all that Iamblichus will have prized it.

No such distinction is explicitly drawn in *On the Mysteries*, it must be said; but a parallel of a kind is offered by the treatment of divination found in the work. In view of Ammianus' testimony that in the course of the Persian campaign disputes arose between the army's soothsayers and Julian's theurgist friends over the interpretation of omens, what Iamblichus has to say on this score has no small interest. He firmly distinguishes – surely with a passage from the *Oracles* in mind[91] – between forms of divination which depend on the reading of signs in the sensible world (astrology, for instance, or augury) and the *theia mantikê*, a higher art by which the soul can obtain intuitive knowledge of the principles contained within the divine mind.[92] Divination in the common run is counted severely limited in its power, subject to error and of no help at all to those who seek to comprehend the divine principles of the universe; to achieve that – and such is the wish of the theurgist – requires the practice of a *mantikê* founded in the apprehension of noetic entities.

The view of theurgy propounded in *On the Mysteries* prompted E.R. Dodds – one of its most astute readers – to describe it as 'a manifesto of irrationalism'.[93] If we take Iamblichus at his word, however, it is rather an attempt 'to respond as a theurgist to matters to do with theurgy, and to examine as a philosopher matters to do with philosophy'.[94] Certainly, its defence of theurgy is intellectually subtle, and bears on a broader philosophic dispute with Porphyry about the nature of the soul and the manner of its descent. According to Porphyry, the soul as it becomes incarnate leaves behind a portion of itself in the divine world.[95] On this assessment, the soul does not stand in need of theurgy (restricted, of course, to the sensible world by Porphyry): at best, theurgy will provide an inferior means of purifying the lower soul of irrational elements. The higher portion of the soul remains untouched by matter, closely linked to the noetic order and capable of delivering itself through the agency of moral virtue and philosophic contemplation. Implicit in this scheme, too, is the general tendency of Porphyry to blur the edges between the sensible and intelligible hypostases: portions of the soul subsist in both at once.[96]

Iamblichus challenged both the particular account of the soul and the broader tendency, affirming that the human soul was not (as Porphyry implied) consubstantial with the souls of gods, and

denying that it left any portion of itself aloft in the process of embodiment: rather, it descended completely.[97] In consequence, it was not able to bring about its return to the divine by its own efforts, intellectual or otherwise:

> Knowledge (*gnôsis*) is not contact with the divine, for knowledge is separated [from its object] by a kind of otherness. But preceding it there is another, a self-generated, uniform embrace which joins us to the gods. We must not suppose that we have the power to recognize this contact.[98]

It was in virtue of this prior bond, this 'embrace' that linked the worlds of gods and men, that theurgy found its justification: through the practice of its rituals, the gods 'shine out, benevolent and propitious towards the theurgists, calling up their souls ... and accustoming them, while still in the body, to become detached from those bodies and to be drawn around their eternal and intelligible first principle'.[99] What permitted the soul to ascend was not its own purified power, its return to an unfallen portion of itself, but rather the cosmic processes of procession and reversion which derived finally from the One itself, the ultimate source of all Being in Neoplatonist doctrine: 'From their first descent, god sent souls hither in order that they should revert back to him.'[100]

The fact that Iamblichus' exposition of theurgic doctrine was bound up with a more general attempt to resist the Porphyrian account of the soul and the 'telescoping' of Hypostases that went closely with it has some importance for our purposes, since it inevitably coloured Julian's own attitude to the *Oracles*. In pursuit of his broader claims, Iamblichus was led to interpret the doctrines of the *Oracles* so as to make them accord with his basic metaphysical principles. Most importantly, he interpreted them in accordance with a principle of 'logical realism' – a principle which he used in order to preserve a clear distinction between objects of thought ('intelligibles') and thinking entities ('intellectuals') in the second Hypostasis.[101] Consequently, he can be assumed to have insisted upon a place in the cosmology of the *Oracles* for a *noeros* 'intellectual' *kosmos*. Similarly, he built upon the Chaldaean doctrine of triadic reality an exhaustive array of triads of divine entities, interconnecting them in complex arrangements.[102] His exegesis was to have a profound effect on the view later Neoplatonists took of the *Oracles*. It came to be assumed that behind the opaque verses there lay a

perfect account of the divine ordering of the universe and the fate of the soul: the work became a canonical text whose statements were not to be doubted.

While we cannot reconstruct the Iamblichan exegesis in detail – the works in which he elaborated it most fully, the commentary and his *On the Gods*, are lost[103] – its impact on Julian's own theurgy is not in dispute; clear traces of its effects will emerge when I come to discuss the conceptual basis of his hymns to Helios and Cybele. For now, though, I keep the hymns aside, and turn from the issue of the philosophic interpretation of Chaldaean doctrine to a less abstruse question arising from Julian's conversion to Iamblichan theurgy. If we judge by an expert's proposed chronology of Iamblichus' writings, the period of his greatest interest in the *Oracles* came in the first quarter of the fourth century.[104] These were years in which conflict between Christians and pagans found overt political expression in a series of persecutions and subsequently in the accession of the first Christian Emperor, and it is a possibility that Iamblichus' elevation of the *Oracles* to the status of a sacred book is not unconnected with those developments. On one view, it went hand in hand with an anti-Christian activism which gave Iamblichus' school at Apamea political significance of a kind. Arguably, the well-connected philosopher who wrote an anti-Christian tract on the eve of the Great Persecution was one of his pupils;[105] in any event, it seems clear that a decade or so later two such pupils attached themselves to the imperial retinue of Licinius in the run-up to his open conflict with Constantine, and kept their master informed of events in letters sent to Apamea.[106] There is perhaps a hint here that Iamblichus was trying to encourage Licinius to challenge the policies of his Christian colleague. Certainly, one of the pupils in question – Sopater, apparently a favourite of his master – is heard of later in a suggestive connection. Within a few years of Iamblichus' death (*c.* 325), he had secured for himself a position of influence at the court of Constantine. According to Eunapius, he had done so in order 'to dominate and convert by his arguments the purpose and headlong policy' of that Emperor.[107] In the upshot, he fell victim to intriguers who brought against him the charge that he had used magic to cause famine and riot at Constantinople by delaying the arrival of shipments of corn.[108] His execution on this charge seems to have made his fellow-Iamblichans more secretive in their practice of theurgy; we are told that Aedesius, the head of the Pergamene school at which Julian was to study, chose to keep silent at this time about his knowledge of the Master's 'divine

inspiration' (*theiasmos*) through fear of the Christian authorities.[109] When Julian sought theurgic initiation he had to proceed to Maximus, who practised the art less circumspectly – and who in the long term would come to a similar end to Sopater's, being charged under Valens with practising magic for political purposes.[110]

There are hints to be had, then, that the theurgic interests of Iamblichus and his followers may have quickened in concert with a less than quiescent response to the advance of Christianity in the Empire. And this raises a question about the degree to which Julian's own Neoplatonist theurgy was to impinge on his religious policy. One strand in modern scholarship has presented it as a key to the understanding of his attempt to reform the pagan cults and their priesthoods. The main measures undertaken by Julian in this field were set out in a series of encyclical letters sent to his high priests, one of which survives in part.[111] It tells of the imposition of a hierarchically organized provincial priesthood under the control of Julian in his capacity as Pontifex Maximus – a priesthood which in its turn regulated local priesthoods;[112] and it speaks at some length of the moral standards and austere regimen to which the clergy were expected to adhere. They are to read only suitable works of philosophy – Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Pythagoreans; they must pray to the gods twice or three times daily, sacrificing at dawn and dusk and observing the purificatory rituals scrupulously; and in their dealings with the community at large, they are to pay special heed to the performance of a variety of philanthropic activities.[113] Bidez, noting that those appointed to provincial priesthoods were in several cases Iamblichan Neoplatonists,[114] judged that the hierarchic structure and the setting-out of norms of priestly ethics amounted to 'une véritable transformation du paganisme' – a theocratic plan to establish a pagan church centrally organized after a Christian model, but given over to the propagation of 'le dogme nouveau' of theurgic Neoplatonism.[115] Bowersock, too, took it to be plain that Julian 'was trying to create something altogether new and probably impossible, a pagan church',[116] and Athanassiadi-Fowden was still more emphatic on the importance of the Iamblichan background: Julian's plan was to found a 'monotheistic universal faith' by means of a universal pagan church established on principles suggested by the 'latest theoretical innovations' of Iamblichan Neoplatonism.[117]

In my view, these judgements markedly exaggerate the degree to which the theurgic Neoplatonism of the private man impinged on the public religious programme. So far as the organization of the

priesthood was concerned, there was a precedent half a century old in the reforms of the Tetrarch Maximin Daia. Maximin too, as *Pontifex Maximus*, had appointed provincial high priests who were in turn empowered to appoint local priests. In his case, there is nothing to suggest a Neoplatonist motive, and no need to suppose that he had the Christian Church strongly in mind as an organizational model; a recent study stresses that his reform in turn had clear pagan precedents, that its keynote lay in revival, not in innovation.[118] And that serves to warn us not to exaggerate the degree to which Julian's reform was conceived after either a Christian or a theurgic model. In one particular – his provision for systematized works of charity through the temples – he showed himself ready to take a leaf from the Christian book.[119] But even in this connection, it is notable that Maximin for his part had coupled religious reform with a major programme of tax relief for the cities of the East under his control.[120]

The notion that Julian wished to recast the rituals and priestly functions of public cult on theurgic lines is dubious too. That some of the provincial priests appointed were Neoplatonist acquaintances does not suffice to prove as much: an inclination to appoint to these posts persons who shared his philosophic interests and who were personally known to him need not entail any systematic plan to 'theurgize' public worship. And while the traces of Julian's high regard for philosophy are evident from his stipulation that his priests must cultivate high ethical standards of behaviour and from the authors he commended to be read by them, they do not entitle us to infer that the deep impulse behind the reform lay in his theurgy. At one point in the *Letter to a Priest*, where he reflects on the theory of cult worship, Julian arguably has implicit recourse to theurgic doctrine: statues of the gods, he says, are not divine in themselves, but neither are they merely blocks of wood and stone; they are rather 'symbols of the presence of the gods ... through which we may worship [them]'.[121] He says nothing, however, to indicate that he requires the priesthood to study theurgic texts or to participate in theurgic rituals.

The best evidence that theurgy impinged on Julian's public action is perhaps to be found not in these instructions to the priesthood, but in an edict issued at Antioch on 12 February 363.[122] It announces two decisions of the Emperor, the first of which is irrelevant here: Julian simply reaffirms earlier imperial sanctions against the violation of tombs, probably with the Christian practice of interring the

remains of martyrs in pagan sanctuaries strongly in mind. What follows is more curious: daytime funeral processions are to cease. Julian is insistent that he hereby restores 'ancestral custom' (*palaion êthos*), and he justifies the order in archaizing turns of speech: funerals held in the light of day are offensive to 'the Olympians'. But in its generality, the order has no attested precedent in Roman sacral law, and the stress it puts on the avoidance of ritual pollution may well derive from a strict interpretation of Neoplatonist teaching in the matter.[123] It would be easy, however, to make too much of the edict. For one thing, if there was no Roman legal precedent, there was a Greek one of a sort. A law forbidding funeral processions after dawn had long ago been cited as Solonian by Demosthenes, and it had been picked upon by Plato himself: like Solon, the legislator in his *Laws* specifies that funerals shall be held before dawn.[124] If the inspiration behind Julian's edict was indeed chiefly philosophic, then, it need not have been rooted in interpretation of recondite theurgic texts. Perhaps, too, the edict's date is telling: it belongs late in the reign, and was issued only weeks before Julian set out with his army for Persia – at a time, that is to say, when the wish to avoid *miasma* will have been particularly to the fore in the Emperor's mind. In any event, there is a clear sign that when Julian insisted in the *Letter to a Priest* upon the need for priests to avoid ritual pollution, he had well-established practices of pagan cult at least as much in mind as any arcane purifications of theurgy. A priest who ceases to officiate for a time, the letter tells us, must avoid pollution for 'as many days as the law commands: thirty is the number with us at Rome, but elsewhere the number varies.'[125] The explicit mention of Rome is revealing: Julian speaks emphatically as the head of an ancestral pontifical college whose duty it is to ensure the proper working of the *sacra publica*; and no less plainly, he anticipates that the details of the rites he outlines will differ in accordance with established local practice, and acquiesces in the fact.

If too much has been made to hang on Julian's theurgy in some accounts of his religious politics, that is perhaps because the mere fact of it cannot but compel attention; it is the most strikingly fourth-century feature in the devotional and intellectual make-up of the man. Who could conceive of his imperial exemplar Marcus chanting secret names of gods and *daimones* in a subterranean chamber in the expectation that the statue of Hecate before which he stood would smile, then laugh, then draw his soul from the body and send it on

an astral journey?[126] All the more important, then, to keep the matter in perspective. If the theurgists ascribed power to ritual magic and acted on that belief, very many pagans who knew nothing of the verses of 'Julianus the Chaldaean' and his son had long since done the same. Nor did one need to study theurgic texts to believe that the gods could teach theology through their oracles: a century and more before Julian, we have seen, Apollo's prophets at a major centre of his cult were giving responses in just that spirit. As for Julian's own case, Iamblichan theurgy impinged on him deeply, to be sure; but it was a part of his personal credo, not the whole of it. It belonged principally to the philosophic piety of the private man, telling him how the universe cohered and the happy fate that awaited his soul. On his death-bed, attended by his philosophic intimates, Julian would take comfort from an oracle that had foretold his end:

> A fiery chariot whirled among storm-clouds shall carry you to Olympus; loosed from the wretched suffering of men, you shall attain your father's halls of heavenly light, whence you have fallen and come into the body of a mortal man.[127]

We need not think on that account that he wished to transform the ancestral cults of the Empire into an earthly monument to the One God of the philosophers. The interplay between his Neoplatonist monism and his devotional sensibilities and practice is much more subtle than a judgement of that sort would imply – or so I will argue in the chapters that now follow. I will consider the issue first as it bears on his heliolatry and his Mithraic and Metroac interests (Chapters Five and Six); then as it bears on his hostility to Christianity (Chapter Seven).

5

THE MYSTERIES I
Julian as initiate

Julian was remembered by Libanius as one who had 'met with the gods in countless initiations'.[1] In modern Julianic studies, the nature and significance of his interest in the antique Mystery cults have figured as a central and contentious question. Scattered passages in his own writings and a handful of near-contemporary testimonies are usually taken to show that he was an initiate of several such cults. In the *Caesars*, he claims knowledge of the commandments of Mithras; in *To the Mother of the Gods*, he ponders whether he can properly speak in public of Cybele's rituals and doctrines.[2] Other allusions he makes hint at Dionysiac and Eleusinian initiations too.[3] But attention has focused chiefly on his relations with the cults of Mithras and of Cybele, because the hymns to Helios and the Mother seem to indicate a special and quasi-philosophic interest in them on the writer's part.

About the significance of the issue for Julian as Emperor – that is to say, the possibility that his interest in these cults had a peculiar bearing on his public actions – there is less agreement. Here too, Mithraism and Cybele's 'Metroac' cult take pride of place: partly because of his apparently special interest in them, partly because of the earlier history of the cults themselves. The worship of Cybele the Great Mother had long belonged to the *sacra publica* of the Roman state;[4] in particular, Julian could look back to developments in the cult in Antonine times in the wake of which its ceremonies became an important medium for the expression of loyalty to the Emperor.[5] Above all, however, the argument has focused on his Mithraism. On one score, the matter can be seen as firmly settled. In a classic article, A.D. Nock effectively disposed of the notion that Mithraism was so closely analogous to Christianity in development and appeal as to pose any real threat to the early Church:[6] that idea had once enjoyed

wide currency, and Franz Cumont in his seminal study of Mithraism had played up Julian's Mithraism as a positive counterweight to his apostasy.[7] But Cumont also argued that Mithraism was peculiarly congenial to Emperors for a reason of state: 'They found in its doctrines a support for their personal policy and a staunch advocacy of autocratic pretensions.'[8] It has seemed to some – to Bidez, for instance, and more recently to Athanassiadi-Fowden – that Julian's Mithraism is not just an indication of the devotional and philosophic interests of the private man, but a major influence on his imperial ideology and action.[9] Others are more doubtful; in Bowersock's biography, any philosophic interests Julian may have had in the Mysteries in general are viewed as 'important . . . only in the study of his emotional life', and Mithras himself finds no place in its index.[10] More radically, a prominent expert in the specialized field of Mithraic studies has challenged the notion that Julian was ever initiated as a Mithraist at all.[11]

In this chapter and in Chapter Six I wish to review these important issues in the light of recent work on the cults, some of which (particularly on Mithraism) is of exceptional quality and interest.[12] It will become plain that in my view Julian was indeed an initiate of Mithras, and that I think a balanced portrait of him must give his philosophic interests in the Mysteries close attention; but I will argue on different grounds that the depth and significance of Julian's specific interest in Mithraism have indeed been exaggerated – and that on both counts, his Metroac interests offer suggestive contrasts.

To judge the places of Mithras and Cybele in Julian's thought and practice is not easy: much of the evidence is highly problematic. I begin with an outline of my approach to the main questions at issue, and the difficulties they raise.

In this chapter I will first discuss the cultural setting of Julian's interests in the Mysteries, then a contentious but basic factual issue. To give a perspective to Julian's own case, I will start by commenting on the general grounds on which Mystery cults and their teachings might appeal to an educated person in late antiquity (pp. 117–24). Here we will need to distinguish between active participation in the cults by such a person and the speculative interest – philosophic, theological or simply antiquarian – he might take in their doctrines and rituals without himself practising as an initiate of a Mystery cult. A speculative interest of some kind is manifest in Julian's works; the question of his personal involvement with specific cults and its bearing on that interest is more contentious, and when I pass to

Julian's own case it is the question I must address first (pp. 124–38). What evidence indicates that Julian was himself initiated into the Mysteries of Mithras or of Cybele? And if he was, what can be known about the dates and circumstances of his initiations? Here, independent evidence is for the most part vague or wholly lacking: the most important testimony comes in Julian's own writings, and it raises a particular problem in its interpretation. His allusions to his initiations are extremely oblique: they will need to be read with an eye both to their literary contexts and to his wider Neoplatonist interests.

The impact of Julian's Neoplatonism in particular will require close scrutiny. Julian counted himself a philosopher and theologian,[13] and from that perspective specific questions about his initiations are subsidiary to a broader issue to which I turn in Chapter Six: his philosophic attitude to the doctrine and ritual of the cults. To a Neoplatonist, plainly, philosophy and religious interests or allegiances were easily compatible and might well seem complementary. But in practice, what relations obtained between Julian's interest in Mystery doctrines and his interest in philosophy? Supposing that his interest in the doctrines derived from personal involvement in specific cults, had it any marked effect on his philosophic conceptions and practice? In particular, can any such effect be discovered in the theorizing of the hymns to Helios and the Mother of the Gods? Do these works aim to present Mithraic or Metroac doctrines in philosophic terms? And if they do, how successful, and how innovative, is the attempt to graft the teachings of the Mysteries on to a Platonic stock? Here the main problem lies with the hymn to Helios and its bearing on Julian's Mithraism, and I will need to discuss the question at length (Chapter Six, pp. 139–63). Any view of Julian's Mithraism and its effects must hang largely on two things: first, on one's general view of the nature of Mithraic religion, which in recent time has been the subject of intense debate;[14] second, on the weight one attaches to the syncretic 'identifications' of Mithras with other gods allegedly to be found in Julian's works (for the brute fact is that he only ever speaks of Mithras by name twice, and then briefly).

With Julian, there is a further distinction to be made between the personal involvements and interests, and the political significance to be attached to them. In its last part (Chapter Six, pp. 163–76), my discussion will turn to the putative influence of Julian's interest in the Mystery cults on his public actions: is it plausible to think that he was minded to give an especially privileged status to Mithras in

the restoration of pagan cult that he aimed to promote? And how does the cult of Cybele compare in this connection?

MYSTERY CULTS AND THEIR APPEAL

Mystery cults owe their common title to a peculiarity in their rituals, which made provision for a purificatory ceremony of initiation at which the devotee was granted symbolic knowledge of ritual objects, utterances and actions. That knowledge, the etymology of 'mysteries' implies, was deemed secret, in virtue of which the ceremonies of these cults were termed *mystêria* (or otherwise, *teletai*). In the later Empire, the practising of *mystêria* was most typically a feature of several of the so-called 'oriental' cults. Into this very dubious class[15] fall the Mithraic and Metroac cults with which I am mainly concerned.

Modern study of these cults has looked beyond their ritual to emphasize a distinctive doctrinal trait. Among the benefits the cults held out was the prospect of being 'saved' through initiation – salvation in this setting involving a spiritual 'rebirth' of some kind.[16] This is often taken to imply that 'a change of mind through experience of the sacred' – in a word, conversion – was typically (and in a pagan context, unusually) an important feature of an initiate's experience,[17] and remarks in Julian's own works could seem to support this sort of explanation. In the Helios myth, for instance, he presents himself as one 'filled with darkness' whose life is transformed by a revelation in which Helios and other named gods are declared his 'benefactors, friends and saviours'.[18]

But this general view needs to be qualified. The fact that ritual initiation and its associated soteriology find evident counterparts of a kind in Christianity has guaranteed these features of the cults enormous attention, but too much has often been made of the parallels even among the cults themselves. Mystery cults did not comprise a homogeneous group-type, and some of their apparently shared traits turn out to serve rather different purposes from cult to cult. Initiation, for instance, was a *sine qua non* as a mark of self-dedication for a Mithraist, but not for a devotee of Cybele or of Isis: in those cults, the indications are that it was rather an extra benefit available to a minority willing and able to pay for it.[19] Again, Mithraic initiation comprised a series of graded ceremonies which marked the devotee's spiritual progress over an extended period, but there is nothing in other Mystery cults to compare with this: initiation

typically consisted of a preliminary purification followed closely in time by one or two rituals of symbolic or doctrinal instruction.[20] Similarly, *sôtêria* (salvation) is clearly a term with wide potential scope, and different cults seem to have understood the end implied, and the means to it, in different ways. Deliverance might be individual or cosmic, from bodily ills or from the body itself; it might, or might not, imply immortality; it might, or might not, imply an initiate's self-identification with a god in his passions, or triumphs, or death.[21]

There is a deeper objection. To look primarily to their soteriology is to characterize the cults in too narrow a sense.[22] It rather assumes that the explanation of their appeal lies mainly in the solutions they offered to personal problems of identity, that they attracted individuals who found no answer to their private needs and fears in conventional pagan forms of worship. That is a large assumption to make. In fact, the notion that Mystery cults constituted a highly rarified and other-wordly kind of worship, performed in secret by small groups of deeply committed converts, is in many ways misleading. Private Mystery cults existed, certainly; but Mysteries also belonged to the piety of public life. A later second-century inscription from Prusias attests their practice in the setting of a Caesar cult; another records their 'renewal' early in the third-century at the temple of Ephesian Artemis; in the late fourth-century, they still had a place in the annual festival of Aion and Kore at Alexandria.[23] And to judge from the seating facilities at some pertinent cult centres – at Eleusis, and perhaps at some Metroac centres in the Empire – *mystêria* in imperial times could be affairs more communal than secret, with hundreds (sometimes even thousands) participating at once.[24]

As to secrecy, the story went that initiates knew but did not speak. 'I set an ox upon my tongue: we must not speak of things not to be uttered,' said Julian of the Dionysiac Mysteries.[25] But the silence that piety enjoined belonged principally to details of the ritual, not to its main lines or the prospects it held out, and it did not present an insurmountable obstacle to the enquiries of interested non-initiates.[26] If Julian's allusions to his own initiations are oblique, it is partly because he manipulates the theme of 'holy silence' to a literary purpose: the question that opens *Or.* 5, for instance – 'Shall I speak what is not to be spoken, reveal what is not to be revealed?' – toys with a familiar chord to tease the reader.

In many of their traits, indeed, Mystery cults were conventional

enough, 'supplements rather than alternatives to the ancestral piety'.[27] Usually, they assigned a prominent role to sacrifices, votive offerings and processions. Mithraism, which had no use for public processions, furnishes a partial exception in this as in much else: but even so, the Mithras of cult inscriptions is less obviously a philosophic medium of redemption than an energetic god whose assistance in the mundane affairs of day to day was duly repaid by sacrifice and offering.[28]

The fact that Mystery cults kept to convention in practices of this sort gives a perspective to their more unusual features. *Sôtêria* was no doubt of special interest to a philosophically minded man like Julian, but it constitutes but one of a number of possible reasons for initiation: others may be no less important for being less otherworldly. When a man chose to be initiated, he also chose a society of fellows in whose company he would worship and feast. Membership of a Mystery cult, like any other, could serve as a means of expressing social allegiance and status, both within the group and beyond it: it is not coincidental, for instance, that of the attested senatorial Mithraists of the fourth century, almost all held the rank of 'Father'; more generally, Mithraism is well known for its strong appeal to soldiers.[29] We should not be too quick to think that Julian's involvement with Mystery cults owed everything to their soteriology and doctrinal 'secrecy'.

Our interest, though, is not only with Julian's religious practice; it is equally with the view he took of the ritual and doctrines of the cults as a philosopher. In this connection, it is of the first importance to stress that by Julian's day there was already a tendency to think of the cults as in some way complementary parts of a greater whole. A telling instance is supplied by a very hostile witness. In the 340s the senator Firmicus Maternus, converted to Christianity after successive careers as an advocate and an astrologer, wrote a virulent tract *On the Error of Pagan Religions*. In its early chapters, he chose to treat the Isiac, Mithraic and Metroac cults as variant forms of an oriental worship of divine elements.[30] As a Christian polemicist, he had reasons of his own to associate the cults in this way; but his often detailed knowledge of points of ritual, and his assumption of a unifying factor, are also emblematic of the interest the Mysteries held for some Neoplatonist circles. Firmicus' own philosophic education was rudimentary – before his conversion, he preferred to read the stars – but like his casual philosophic interests in general, his concern with the Mysteries owes a debt to Porphyry.[31] Porphyry's allegory *On the Cave of the Nymphs* has several allusions to the cults of

Mithras and Demeter, and he may also have written a treatise, now lost, on the Metroac Mysteries.[32]

The Neoplatonist interest is manifestly important in Julian's case, and its implications require attention. It is evident that a more or less philosophic interest in 'the Mysteries' was quite compatible with actual membership of a Mystery cult, and easy to think that in some cases it positively encouraged initiation. For the fourth century, there are some very well-known instances of cultured pagans undergoing initiation: most notably, Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, governor of Achaea under Julian, who was both a philosophic commentator and an antiquarian of some renown, and a man whose appetite for initiation – Mithraic, Metroac, whatever – was seemingly insatiable.[33] All the more important, then, to stress that a cultured interest in the Mysteries did not need to extend to active participation in a cult. There is no good evidence that Firmicus was ever himself an initiate, and whether or not Porphyry had been (nothing compels us to think so), he certainly relied heavily on other men's books for his knowledge of the subject: in the *On the Cave of the Nymphs*, he explicitly mentions Numenius and Cronius as sources.[34]

Porphyry's interest in the Mysteries, though, was not merely antiquarian; it had a philosophic application of a kind. *On the Cave of the Nymphs* adduces the Mysteries in support of an allegorical interpretation of Homer; like Homer, it is supposed, they will give pointers to philosophic truths when they are interpreted in the light of Neoplatonic theory.[35] But a Neoplatonist would look most readily to such features of Mystery cults as seemed palpably 'philosophic' or 'theological', or whose oddness invited explanation by allegory and analogy; his ideological bent would draw him to seek out the unifying principles he supposed them to contain. Accordingly, the focus of philosophic interest lay primarily not with the cults *per se* – their variety, the practices and beliefs of actual devotees – but rather with specific aspects of ritual and doctrine abstracted from their cultic contexts. The corollary is a subtle shift in the meaning of 'the Mysteries', and a deeper resonance to the term. In Neoplatonist usage, it could designate not so much any particular kind of ritual or cult as an idealized form of spiritual knowledge accessible to those who understood the philosophic meaning of its symbolism.

This tendency is very clearly revealed in Iamblichus. Detail about his treatment of Mystery doctrines is hard to come by directly, because so much work of likely relevance from his hand has been

lost. But there are hints to be had. His approach to theological issues, like his metaphysics, looked strongly for correspondences and unifying principles.[36] In view of the loss of his *On the Gods* – apparently an exercise in radical syncretism, and a major source for Julian's *To King Helios*[37] – we must look to the extant *On the Mysteries of Egypt*. The title is not the author's own, but it serves none the less to make a point. The text pretends to be the work of an Egyptian hierophant, but that claim probably indicates little but the appeal a spurious orientalism could have as an intellectual theme:[38] it is on a par with the attribution of sub-Platonic tracts to Hermes Trismegistus or Julian the Chaldaean, or with the characterization of Plato as a Greek-speaking Moses. Similarly, although there are occasional passing allusions to Isiac and Metroac Mysteries, the ritual and doctrine of Mystery cults – Egyptian or otherwise – are the pretext of the piece, not its subject. As we have noted earlier (see pp. 105–8), it is principally a defence of the theurgic view that the goal of philosophy is attained by appropriate ritual action as much as by mental speculation. A disciple of Iamblichus might conceivably see this as an encouragement to join a Mystery cult: but the ritual commended in the work itself is clearly theurgic. Moreover, Iamblichus' approach in *On the Mysteries* was primarily theoretical: his purpose was to give a philosophic justification of theurgic doctrine. Seen from this perspective, his talk in the book of 'ineffable Mysteries'[39] gives a nice instance of the extended and idealized usage of the word: in the Iamblichan version, particular cults are peripheral to the issue; the Mysteries are assimilated to theurgy, and the term is made to speak of a way of knowledge that is at once occult and theoretically justified. In effect, it serves as a mode of describing philosophy itself as Iamblichus understood it.

It is important to put this usage into its context. The drawing of parallels between the Mysteries and philosophy may have been congenial to Neoplatonists, but it was emphatically not their invention. Figurative descriptions of philosophy as a kind of mystic initiation were no new thing. The metaphor derived from Plato himself, and had long been a commonplace.[40] It was thus an analogy which any Neoplatonist would be predisposed to make in some form, and a usage that could easily descend to the level of cliché: in the Middle Platonists, it seems often no more than a conceit.[41] The significance of the figure in Julian will prove a nice question. He had ready enough recourse to it, but his description of Iamblichus as a 'hierophant' whose works had 'initiated' him into philosophy needs

to be interpreted in light of the fact that he did not scruple to speak of his instruction as a child at the hands of Mardonius in comparable terms.[42] Potentially, none the less, the usage had its implications for Neoplatonic procedure, and it was not always devoid of force or purpose. Aristotle had spoken of the Mysteries as providing not a *mathêma* but a *pathêma* – an experience without intellectual content or meaning – and his dictum was to find an echo in Plutarch.[43] The exegetic method of Porphyry's *On the Cave of the Nymphs* and the theurgic theory underlying Iamblichus' *On the Mysteries* imply a decisive rejection of this approach. The assumption in both is that Mystery doctrines and rituals, once appropriately interpreted, will yield profoundly philosophic lessons.

Clearly, the case of Iamblichus is more important for our purposes: a remark of Julian's may hint that he had heard of *On the Cave of the Nymphs*,[44] but if it does, it also indicates that he had not actually read it. His own Neoplatonism had taken its special colour from the Iamblichan school at Pergamum and from Maximus, and on Julian's own admission his hymn *To King Helios* was in large part a reworking of Iamblichan ideas (*Or.* 4.157d); it was in that very connection that he spoke of his 'initiation' through the works of the Master. Whatever the force of that metaphor, there is no doubt about Julian's familiarity and agreement with the Iamblichan view that the Mysteries contained philosophic lessons. Indeed, he seems to have taken this much as axiomatic: in the *Against Heraclius*, at any rate, he classified theology as a division of natural philosophy, then proceeded to speak of 'that branch of theology which has to do with initiation and the Mysteries', as if this were a matter of course and self-evident to educated readers.[45]

It is notable that this passage occurs in the context of a defence of myth. The need to study myth, Julian said, arose from the fact that 'nature loves to hide her secrets and does not suffer hidden truth about the essence of the gods to be thrown to profane ears in naked words' (*Or.* 7.216c). The clear message is that Mystery doctrines are a kind of myth, and that the most appropriate interpretation of them is an allegorical exegesis of the type accorded to myth. Moreover, he claims Iamblichus as his authority for this view:

> He does not treat all kinds of myth, but rather, those concerning initiation into the Mysteries. . . . For it is the incongruous element in myths that leads us to the truth. The more paradoxical and outrageous a riddle is, the more it seems to tell

> us not to trust in the words themselves, but rather to direct our efforts to the hidden, and not to give up until they are plain, until they initiate, or rather perfect, our intelligence.
>
> (*Or.* 7. 217cd)

These passages leave no doubt about Julian's adherence to the view that the Mysteries constitute a proper subject of philosophic study. In themselves, they need not indicate devotional practice in any Mystery cult on his part: but in principle, clearly, the defence of the Mysteries as a subject of exegesis – strictly speaking, an argument about philosophic procedure – could be extended to give a philosophic justification of membership of a Mystery cult. Julian used it to do just that. Like Iamblichus before him, he adduced Pythagoras, who 'travelled to Egypt and visited Persia, and wherever he went sought to be admitted to the Mysteries of the gods, and to be initiated into all kinds of mystery rites in every place'.[46] And tellingly, he called Iamblichus himself to witness too: a notice above the entrance to his school, so Julian says, warned those who entered 'to be initiated into all the Mysteries, and to take part in the most sacred ceremonies'.[47]

That philosophic considerations stimulated Julian's interest in initiation is not in doubt, then. He was not the sort to be content with theory alone: to the teacher who told him of the magical feats of Maximus he had replied, 'Devote yourself to your books: you have shown me the man I seek.'[48] But his remarks about Pythagoras and the schools of Iamblichus have more than a touch of hyperbole, and they are notably generalized: he refers to 'all kinds of Mysteries', not to specific cults. It is a nice question, whether he has Mithras or Cybele particularly in mind, or 'Mysteries' of a different sort. In this connection, the case of Iamblichus is again instructive. In view of his theoretical interest in ritual, and in view of his punctiliousness in the observance of sacrifice, it is remarkable that Iamblichus himself is nowhere said to have been an initiate of any specific Mystery cult. A possible explanation lies in his theurgy. His interest in the subject was plainly not just theoretical: he enjoyed a posthumous reputation as a model wonder-worker in Neoplatonic circles whose theurgic practices are not in doubt.[49] But theurgic ritual is to be carefully distinguished from the ritual of Mystery cults in general. Theurgic ritual was essentially the practical accompaniment to the sub-Platonic theory which found expression in the *Chaldaean Oracles*. I have discussed the Neoplatonic treatment of this text and Julian's

interest in it in Chapter Four: here it is enough to say that within such circles it was theurgy rather than Mystery cults proper which provided ritual in its most perfect and theoretically justified form. If what Julian sought was simply a dramatic enactment of Neoplatonic theory, we might expect him to look first and foremost to theurgy to supply it – and as it happens, the most securely attested of his initiations is precisely his theurgic initiation at the hands of Maximus.[50] That is not to say that his Neoplatonism and his interest in the cults of Mithras and Cybele belong to easily separable spheres: far from it. But it serves to warn us not to assume that Mithras and Cybele were little more than embodiments of philosophic principles in his eyes. A piety of a different order also played its part.

Julian was plainly well acquainted with both the figurative use of the expression 'the Mysteries' as a metaphorical description of philosophic study, and with a particular Neoplatonic application of the commonplace figure that carried theurgic connotations. In part, it is his ready use of the expression in these extended and generalized senses that complicates the basic but disputed question of fact to which I now turn – the issue of his own status as an initiate proper of specific Mystery cults.

JULIAN AS INITIATE: THE MYSTERIES OF MITHRAS AND CYBELE

Julian's modern biographers have not doubted that he was a Mithraic initiate, and many of them have made a great deal hang on the fact. Shortly after his triumphant entry into Constantinople in 361, declared Bidez, he became 'le grand maître des conventicules mithriaques'; and it is a mark of the importance Bidez attached to the issue that he returned to it at the close of his book.

> Si Julien, devenu César, préféra à toutes les autres sa dévotion au dieu perse, c'est que le mithriacisme était une religion des soldats, admirablement apte à réchauffer et entretenir le patriotisme ... capable de ranimer le dévouement au Génie de l'Empire et la croyance à la divinité des empereurs.[51]

A more recent biography is still more emphatic: Julian, it argues, had probably become a Mithraic initiate as early as 351, and after Constantius' death, 'Helios-Mithra, supreme deity at once of the Neoplatonists and of the Roman state, was ... to inspire [him] in all his doings.'[52] At first sight, the prominence that these judgements

grant to Mithras contrasts oddly with the place assigned to the god in Julian's own writings, where Mithras is only twice referred to by name. An account of Julian's Mithraism should begin with these allusions – and with the recognition that, if Julian was a devoted Mithraist, the paucity of indisputable reference to the god in his works needs explaining. Of course, it may be that Julian was simply discreet in the matter; it is a familiar claim that there are other, less direct traces of his Mithraism to be found in his writings, and that Mithras can be identified with the god whom Julian calls Helios. But it will emerge that that identification is not beyond challenge. Nor, it may be said, was reticence in religious discourse a notably Julianic trait: in general, his love of the gods seems nicely matched by his love of writing about them.

I begin with the two passages that name Mithras, and what they tell. Both are quite brief, but one appears more immediately relevant to Julian's personal beliefs and religious practice. It occurs at the close of his *Caesars*. The author's purposes in writing this work, its date of composition and even its true title have all been much discussed. The occasion of the piece, at least, is clearly stated in its opening lines: it was written to celebrate the Saturnalia, which was held annually in mid-December. We know too that when Julian wrote it he was already Emperor. This yields either late 361 or late 362 as the time of composition. In fact, there are good reasons to prefer the later date, and to number the work among those 'fine compositions' that Libanius credits Julian with having composed during the 'long winter nights' at Antioch 'when others were more interested in the affairs of Aphrodite'.[53] In its form, it recalls the Menippean satire: the *mise-en-scène* is a banquet-cum-contest held half-way between earth and Olympus for deceased Emperors of Rome, who are joined for the occasion by Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. In his preamble, Julian presents the work as a *spoudogeloion*, a fable (*mythos*) that is at once entertaining and serious, and one of his purposes was plainly to give expression to judgements about his imperial predecessors: there is much praise of Marcus Aurelius, and much vilification of Constantine and his sons. But Julian's concerns in the *Caesars* go beyond the straightforwardly political. He grants himself privileged status as a narrator, claiming to have had the tale he tells from Hermes' own mouth;[54] and our special interest lies in the short dramatic postscript that Hermes is made to speak at the very end of the piece:

Then Hermes spoke to me: 'I have granted you knowledge of

> father Mithras. Keep his commandments (*entolai*), thus securing for yourself a cable and a sure anchorage while you live; and when you must depart from the world, you can reckon him with good hope to be your tutelary god (*hêgemona theon*).'[55]

Comprising the last words of the work, the passage has an emphatic position. Dramatically, it is connected with what has preceded by the figure of Hermes: earlier in the text, he had told the imperial contestants to look to their preferred tutelary gods;[56] now he gives Julian the same advice. None the less, the passage might appear to have been tacked on rather arbitrarily: Mithras has not appeared as a participant in the fable, nor has he been mentioned in the course of it. (The Helios mentioned at 314a, it is clear from the context, stands for Aurelian's *Sol Invictus*; as such, his alleged identity with Mithras in Julian's eyes is not self-evident.)[57] Nor, in all probability, is there any covert Mithraic allusion to be found in the fable. It has been argued that Julian's god Cronos stands for a specifically Mithraic god of Infinite Time, but the idea is unlikely on several counts.[58] It is not even clear that Julian intended the figure of Cronos in the *Caesars* to bear any specific symbolic meaning; but if we insist on finding one, he is far better taken to allude to the 'noetic' Cronos whom Iamblichus derived from the Orphic poems and the *Chaldaean Oracles*.[59]

In its structure and content, then, the fable owes nothing to Mithraic doctrine, and nothing in it prepares us for the mention of Mithras in the postscript. But the basic import of Hermes' words seems clear enough: Julian implicitly declares himself a Mithraic devotee. Beyond that, the passage is not informative. A particular item of vocabulary – *entolai*, used to denote the commandments of a god – has been adduced as a specifically Mithraic term, but without good cause: Julian could read the word put to just this use in a range of authors, from Aeschylus to St Paul.[60] So too, while the phrase 'with good hope' may allude to a ritual purification Julian had undergone, there is nothing clearly Mithraic about it: it is known to have featured in the liturgy of the Eleusinian Mysteries, but it had also found an early metaphorical use in Plato's *Phaedo*.[61] It is used elsewhere by Julian in connection with Cybele, Helios, 'the gods' in general and a human being appointed to a priesthood.[62] In short, if Hermes' words suggest that Julian was a Mithraist, they give no indication of the circumstances of any initiation he underwent, nor of his precise initiate status within the hierarchy of the cult. Nor is

there anything in them to imply that Mithras is recommended as a peculiarly appropriate focus of devotion for an Emperor in his public capacity: the passage reads most naturally as an expression of personal and private belief.

Even this much has been doubted. A recent study of Julian's Mithraism by Robert Turcan closes on a dismissive note: 'quant au le mithriacisme personel de Julien, c'est une extrapolation des historiens modernes.'[63] It is not merely that the question of the time of Julian's initiation is deemed unanswerable: there is no good reason to think he was ever a Mithraist at all. This claim rests partly on sceptical interpretation of passages which I shall discuss shortly, partly on arguments from Julian's silence. While these cannot of their nature be conclusive, some of them are telling. For instance, in a letter written to the Alexandrians in the wake of the lynching of George of Cappadocia, George's construction of a church on the site of a *mithraeum* goes unmentioned.[64] The absence, too, of Mithras from Julian's coinage is perhaps significant for the fact that other Eastern deities find a place in it, although the relevance of the coinage to Julian's personal beliefs is certainly open to doubt.[65] But his silence is not total: the postscript to the *Caesars* seems a crucial exception. Turcan attempted to reject it by claiming that it must be read in the light of the insulting of Christ and Constantine which immediately precedes it: the name Mithras is only used in a 'traditional' sense as 'the Persian name of Helios' in order to scandalize the Christians.[66] But the import of the passage seems plain and Turcan's rejection of it has the ring of special pleading. His determination to refute all evidence that Julian was a Mithraist is perhaps to be explained in the light of his wider preoccupations: it forms part of a larger argument about Mithraic doctrine to which I shall return later.

Our uncertainties about the time and setting of Julian's initiation are not much clarified by the only other explicit reference to Mithras to be found in his works. Like the first passage, it occurs in a piece written at Antioch in late 362, the hymn *To King Helios*. On one view, the hymn is a celebration of Mithras by another name and offers the strongest proof we have of Mithras' pre-eminence in Julian's religious thought. I will examine that claim at length when I discuss the theoretical basis of the hymn in Chapter Six: for the moment, I confine myself to the single passage in it where Mithras is actually named. The allusion is made *en passant*, and it cannot be understood except in the light of its immediate context. A page earlier, Julian had declared that Helios was a founder (*archêgos*) of

Rome.[67] He supported the claim by pointing to the civic cult of Apollo on the Palatine established by Augustus: 'Apollo has his house on the Palatine Hill, and so does Helios himself, under this name which is common and known to everyone [i.e. the name of Apollo].' Further proofs are then adduced: the soul of Romulus emanated from and returned to Helios; the Vestal Virgins tend the fire 'begotten of the god'; the Roman calendar is solar rather than lunar.[68] At this point, Julian writes as follows:

> If I were to say that we both revere Mithras and celebrate games in honour of Helios every four years, I should be speaking of rather more recent customs (*neôtera*): but perhaps it is better to adduce a proof from things more distant in the past (*tôn palaioterôn*); . . .
>
> (155b)

and then reverts to the subject of the calendar and to the reforms of King Numa.

Clearly, this passage raises the matter of the monotheistic tendencies long discerned in late antique paganism: the connections drawn at the time between various sun-gods (or gods associated in some fashion with the sun), and the strength of the identifications of one such god with another. I shall return to this question later. But the interpretation of the passage must begin with the recognition that it is introduced in support of a particular contention – namely, that the god Helios is an *archêgos* of Rome. It proposes further arguments in favour of this contention, which are then set aside as unsuited to the writer's purpose in virtue of the comparative modernity of the subject matter. It needs to be stressed, too, that the passage contains not one argument in embryo, but two. The meaning of Julian's words is not that Mithras is honoured by the celebration of games: rather, it is plainly stated, first, that 'we revere Mithras'; second, that 'we hold games for Helios'. But in any case, the second clause cannot refer to Mithraic worship proper: quite simply, there were no games of any kind associated with the cult. In fact, it is clear from a remark Julian makes a little later that the allusion is to the festival of the *Heliaia*, which had been instituted in 274 as part of the civic cult of *Sol Invictus* founded at Rome by Aurelian.[69] Now Mithras' solar connections are very well known, and it is common enough to find him honoured in inscriptions with the title *Sol* or *Sol Invictus*. But this makes it all the more important, when actual religious practice is the issue, to distinguish between Aurelian's *Sol* and the Mithras of

cult worship. The cult established by Aurelian was a new creation. In quite what sense his personal interests or cultic allegiances can be said to lie behind his elevation of a solar deity is far from clear, but there is no indication that he was himself an initiate of Mithras or that Mithraism inspired him in the matter. If personal preferences counted, he was likelier looking to the Sun god of Emesa in Syria; on the only evidence we have, he apparently attributed his military success against Zenobia of Palmyra to the assistance of this god.[70] Whether or not that is true, Aurelian gave his cult at Rome a resolutely public face: a public temple, public games, and officially appointed priests, the *pontifices Solis*. Mithraism presents a very different face: no civic shrines or official priesthoods, no public processions or sacrifices, and no games. For reasons to which I will return later, it never found a place among the *sacra publica* of the Roman state.

The allusion to Mithras in *To King Helios*, then, is introduced as one of several would-be proofs of the status of Helios as founder of Rome. While it touches incidentally on Julian's personal piety, it should be interpreted (like the allusions which precede and follow it) as primarily a more general claim about religious practice in the Empire; otherwise, it would not begin to serve its purpose in the argument. Its meaning can be assumed to be something of this sort: 'Another indication of Helios' status is that among the Romans there is the custom of worshipping Mithras.' The unspoken premise is that Mithras bears a relation to Helios; but as to the nature of that relationship, nothing in the passage compels us to regard Mithras' connection or identification with Helios as any more intimate or privileged in Julian's eyes than that of Apollo or *Sol Invictus*. Certainly, it does not allow us to assume that the Helios of the hymn is *par excellence* Mithras throughout. If the reference to Mithras has anything to tell about Julian's private piety, it lies in the fact that it sits rather oddly amidst the allusions to various civic cult practices: lacking all official status as a cult, Mithraism hardly seems to provide any argument whatsoever for Helios' role as founder of Rome. That Julian nevertheless chose to allude to it at all in this connection is therefore curious, and his doing so can perhaps be best explained as a rather incongruous intrusion of personal sentiment into the argument.

Taken together, then, the two clear references to Mithras in Julian tell less than one might expect. They witness a personal interest in Mithras of a kind that makes it reasonable to think of Julian as an

initiate of the cult at the time of writing. But it is notable that they both occur in works datable to late 362, and give no indication of the time and place of any initiation; they do not suffice to show what is often claimed, that Julian had become a devotee of Mithras considerably earlier than 362, or that before all else it was a Mithraic faith which had sustained him in the years before he became Emperor. Nor (to anticipate the questions on which I shall focus in Chapter Six) do they do anything to show that his Mithraism had a well defined basis in, or effect upon, his Neoplatonism, or that he sought to promote the cult to a political purpose during his reign.

First, what of the notion that Julian had long been a dedicated worshipper of Mithras by the time he wrote the *Caesars* and the hymn to Helios in 362? In the absence of any hint in the two passages where Mithras is named, we must look elsewhere in Julian's writings, to passages which are conceivably allusions of a less direct kind to Mithraic initiation, and to support in the contemporary witnesses. To Bidez, the existence of such passages was not in doubt.[71] But the evidence has been analysed sceptically and at length by Turcan, and it may be stressed that our rejection of his reading of the close of the *Caesars* does not entitle us to reject his critique of other passages, which seems to me to have considerable force. A brief review of the evidence in question will show up the main points in dispute.

A passage in Gregory Nazianzen can be dealt with briefly.[72] It speaks of Julian's entering an underground cave to perform occult rites. Cumont took this cave to be a *mithraeum*,[73] but without good cause: the allusions to Hades and to Maximus of Ephesus to be found in the passage leave little doubt that Gregory is speaking of Julian's participation in the theurgic rites of Hecate by which Maximus – as we know from Eunapius – set such store. The episode can be reasonably dated to 351, the time of Julian's first visit to Maximus; but it gives us no reason to accept a recent attempt to retrieve Cumont's reading and to place Julian's Mithraic initiation in that year.[74]

There is more plausible support to be had from the start of the hymn to Helios for the view that Julian was already a Mithraist by the time of his entry into Constantinople in December 361. The passage in question raises once again the problem of Mithras' identification with Helios.

> I am [says Julian] a follower (*hopados*) of King Helios: of this fact I possess within, personally (*oikoi, par' emautôi*), proofs

> more sure [than I can give]: but this it is permitted for me to say, and will not incur divine wrath – from childhood, there has been a strange longing in me for the rays of the god.[75]

Clearly, the 'surer proofs' (*pisteis akribesterai*) which cannot be uttered could refer to details of a ritual initiation. Is there reason to think it is a specifically Mithraic initiation? Here, the fact that Julian claims to have these proofs *oikoi* – literally, 'at home' – is suggestive, because it can be connected to a passage in Libanius' *Epitaphios*. Libanius, speaking of Julian's days at Constantinople shortly after he had become Emperor, says this:

> Since it was not easy for the Emperor to go from the palace to the temples every day (concourse with the gods being of the greatest importance), a temple was built in the middle of the palace to the god who leads in the day, and he partook of Mysteries, being initiated and in turn initiating, and he set up altars to all the gods separately.[76]

If Libanius' 'god who leads in the day' is identified with Mithras, we have clear testimony of a *mithraeum* in the palace, and Julian's personal allegiance to the god will be beyond doubt. The opening of the hymn to Helios can then be interpreted as a covert allusion to Mithraic worship: *oikoi* will refer to the royal palace, the 'surer proofs' either to Julian's knowledge of the rituals performed in the *mithraeum*, or conceivably to the 'symbols' of an initiation undergone previously and subsequently placed in the shrine by Julian out of piety. And if Libanius' phrase 'being initiated and in turn initiating' is read literally, it implies that Julian was more than a mere neophyte at the time of his residence at Constantinople; rather, he became a Mithraic Father there, and in that capacity presided at the initiations of others. This would in turn allow his first initiation into the cult – his induction as Raven – to be placed further back in time to some point in the 350s. The phrase will hint, too, that Julian was keen to bring others to the worship of Mithras; and in this connection we can adduce a note to the manuscript title of a speech by Himerius, according to which he delivered it as an act of thanks to Julian after he had been 'initiated into the Mithraic Mysteries'.[77]

The convergence of these details is suggestive, but what they add up to is a possibility, not a certainty. Neither Julian nor Libanius actually names the god in question as Mithras. A 'follower of King Helios' – Julian's phrase – is not indisputably a Mithraic initiate, and

Libanius' 'god who leads in the day' might similarly allude to a sun-god other than Mithras. Nor can we press his phrase 'being initiated and in turn initiating': by this time, the metaphorical usage of the language of the Mysteries was a commonplace in pagan and Christian rhetoric, and here it might indicate no more than that Julian officiated at sacrifices at which he received and distributed portions of the victim.[78] So too, it turns out that Himerius is a less decisive witness than he seems. The 'Mithraic Mysteries' in the preamble to his speech is a commentator's gloss, and a dubious one: the text itself speaks much more generally of Julian's enabling 'hands to stretch out to Helios', his introducing into the capital 'divine *teletai*' and 'Mysteries of celestial gods';[79] one looks in vain for allusions to specifically Mithraic rituals or initiate grades.

Turcan remained sceptical on these grounds. There is perhaps some support for his stance in the fact that Sun worship had been associated with the 'Second Flavian' dynasty up to Constantine; it is notorious that even after 312, Constantinian coinage continued to celebrate *Sol Invictus*. Julian, then, could look back to family and dynastic precedent – and more generally to the solar worship of anti-Christian Tetrarchs like Galerius and Maximin Daia,[80] and it remains a possibility that the temple in the palace that Libanius mentions was not a *mithraeum*, but a private shrine to the Sun.

On that reading, Julian's comment that he has 'surer proofs' of his devotion to Helios 'within, personally' (*oikoi, par' emautôi*) will still need to be explained. Turcan took the phrase to refer to a religious vision experienced by Julian as a young man – a vision seemingly recorded in the guise of a myth in the *Against Heraclius*.[81] In that myth, Zeus tells Helios to care for the young Julian, and Helios, recognizing in the boy 'a spark of himself', willingly does so. Later, as a young man, Julian is visited by Hermes, who guides him to a mountain peak where he meets the father of the gods; Zeus grants him a vision of Helios, and Julian is overcome by ecstasy. He wishes to remain with the gods, but Helios orders him to return to earth: 'You are young and not yet initiated. Go back to your own (*par' hymas*), so that you may be initiated and dwell there in safety (*asphalôs*).' Julian then submits himself to the will of Zeus, Helios and Athene, and receives from Helios and Athene advice and assurances of their further protection.[82]

Julian's immediate purpose in composing this tale was to give an example of how a myth should be written.[83] At the same time, it reads naturally as an expression of his personal belief that he was under the

protection of the gods – Helios in particular – and it is reasonable to think that it recalls a religious experience he had in fact had. On that basis, Turcan proposed that the word *oikoi* at the start of the hymn to Helios referred not to a temple in the palace at Constantinople or to rites performed there, but to Julian's vision of Helios and the rites and promises of the god recorded in the myth – *oikoi* being read figuratively and in close conjunction with *par' emautôi* to mean 'within myself, personally'.

A further word about the Helios myth is in order here. Supposing that what is recorded is a vision of some kind, can we plausibly put a date to it? That is plainly very difficult, but if any weight is given to incidental details in the myth, it can be provisionally put at around 350: the Julian of the tale is said to be a young man, as yet without political preferment, and not yet initiated[84] (his theurgic initiation, we have seen, can be placed in 351). And on one view, if we read what Helios says in the myth in the light of Hermes' words at the end of the *Caesars*, the myth supports the case for a comparably early Mithraic initiation.[85] Hermes, we recall, gave Julian knowledge of 'father Mithras', and told him that he could obtain a safe anchorage and look 'with good hope' to the future life provided that he kept the commandments (*entolai*) of the god. The argument is that Hermes here refers to his earlier role as Julian's guide in the myth. Helios too, after all, speaks of an initiate dwelling 'in safety' (*asphalôs*), and bids Julian 'go with good hope';[86] and his instructions to Julian in the myth might be identified with the *entolai* Hermes mentions in the *Caesars*.

The argument is unpersuasive. First – supposing that the Helios myth of the *Against Heraclius* indeed recalls a vision of 350 or thereabouts – it is important to remember that the work itself belongs to 362: one could view any Mithraic features occurring in the myth as superimposed by a writer recalling an experience of a decade past in the wake of a more recent interest in Mithraism. But the very existence of such features is dubious. The specific verbal correspondences in the *Caesars* and in the Helios myth belong to a more general vocabulary of devotional discourse, and it is unsurprising that Julian had recourse to them when he came to describe an epiphany; their presence, then, can be readily explained without appeal to Mithraism. It is similar with the advice given by Helios in the myth. His orders are not called *entolai*, and there is nothing distinctively Mithraic about them. They follow – and in part repeat – the counsels of Athene: she tells Julian not to mistake flattery for

friendship, to be on his guard, and to revere only the gods and those men who resemble them;[87] Helios in his turn advises him to treat his friends honourably, to love his future subjects as the gods love him and to put the worship of the gods before all other goods.[88] These are conventional exhortations to a king-to-be: they recommend no more than the princely virtues of *civilitas*, justice, philanthropy, piety. Subsequently, Julian is warned by Helios not to become a slave to desire, his own or another's: 'Go bearing the armour you brought here.'[89] The words recall an earlier passage where Julian is said to have with him a shield, a sword and a spear,[90] but there is no need to think that Julian here alludes to an initiation as a Mithraic *miles*: the metaphor of the wise man as a soldier was a commonplace of the diatribe and the Stoics.[91]

It is also important to recognize that the Helios myth was probably composed with a specific literary precedent in mind; it has echoes of the *First Oration* of Dio Chrysostom, some of which look very revealing for our purposes. Like Julian, Dio had recourse to a 'sacred and edifying tale told in the guise of a myth'[92] in which Hermes descends to earth, appears before a youth (in this case, Heracles) and guides him through secret ways to a mountain peak, there to grant him a vision of a deity so pure that no evil person could look upon it 'any more than one with weak eyes could look at the orb of the sun'.[93] Julian's literary debt in the matter is surely clear – and with Dio, at any rate, the question of Mithraic allegory simply does not arise at all. It is true that, whereas Dio was content to recount Hermes' appearing to a third party, the *Against Heraclius* treats of a vision which the writer implicitly claims for his own; but there is good reason to think that in a rhetorical setting Hermes was very easily called upon to serve in just this fashion. Menander Rhetor suggests that in speeches of praise,

> you should invent dreams, and pretend to have heard voices and to wish to proclaim them to your audience; for instance, say of your dream that Hermes came by night and stood by you, commanding you ... and that you, obedient to his commands, will repeat what you heard him say.[94]

If this dictum – whose effect is neatly to conjoin Hermes' familiar roles as god of eloquence and divine intermediary – is any reflection of a rhetorical device in general use, it will hardly do to assume a specifically Mithraic significance for Hermes' appearance before Julian in the *Against Heraclius*.

Unless, then, one simply assumes the identity of Helios with Mithras – an identification I shall test in Chapter Six – the notion that the Helios myth constitutes a covert declaration of Mithraic faith finds no support in the context of the myth itself. And there is equally little reason to identify the role of Hermes in the myth as the occasion of his granting 'knowledge of Father Mithras' to Julian. Hermes' role as guide and intermediary between gods and men was nothing if not standard, and there is no peculiar significance in the fact that he appears as such both in the *Caesars* and in the *Against Heraclius*.

This reading of the Helios myth could be thought to add something to the force of Turcan's negative arguments. But in my view, as I have already indicated, the scepticism of his overall conclusion is excessive. It is safe, I think, to accept on the strength of the close of the *Caesars* that Julian was indeed a Mithraic initiate. And if we accept that, we will be more inclined too to credit at least some of the testimonies adduced in favour of Julian's being a Mithraist of some long standing by the time he wrote the *Caesars*. It is true that those testimonies fall short of proof; individually, each of them could be explained without appeal to Mithraism. But the convergence of two items, at least – the opening of *To King Helios*, and Libanius' allusion to a temple in the palace to 'the god who leads in the day' – is striking, even if the temple Libanius refers to is not indisputably Mithraic. If they offer us no precise indication of the time and circumstances of the original initiation at which Julian swore to uphold 'the commandments of Father Mithras', there is still reason to believe the initiation is more than 'une extrapolation des historiens modernes', and still a place for qualified conjecture about the likely background to it.

Two possibilities come immediately to mind in this connection: philosophy and soldiering. Whatever the strength of Turcan's attack on Neoplatonist testimonies as a means of reconstructing Mithraic doctrine, it does not rule out the possibility that, for Julian, participation in Mithraic cult followed easily from his philosophic interests. On his own account, he awoke to philosophy in 351 at the Pergamene school of a pupil of Iamblichus. It was at the same time an awakening to paganism: Julian's philosophy was readily compatible with ritual practice, going hand in hand with a theurgic initiation the same year. He continued to pursue his philosophic and literary interests in Asia Minor until summoned to Milan in 354. After Milan, there was more study at Athens – and another initiation, into the Eleusinian Mysteries. No doubt he was partly prompted by the appeal so venerable

a cult had for one who professed a romantic attachment to Athens,[95] but once again there were philosophic affiliations at play: the hierophant who initiated Julian doubled as a theurgist with a high reputation among the Neoplatonist circles Julian had entered in Asia Minor; a story in Eunapius would have us believe that it was to make contact with this man that Julian went to Athens in the first place.[96] In two cases, then, a link between philosophy and initiation is plain in Julian's case. One might surmise a third, and place his initiation as a Raven of Mithras between 351 and 355, either in Asia Minor, or conceivably at Athens.

The second putative *mise-en-scène* – soldiering – would imply that he was initiated rather later, during his years in Gaul from 356 onwards. The special appeal of Mithraism within the legions is familiar enough. Analysis of inscriptions indicates Mithras' popularity among centurions and the lower ranks, but a significant number of senior officers are also attested as devotees. It is a reasonable conjecture that such men often first came into contact with the cult when they arrived to command their units in frontier provinces.[97] If this is what happened with Julian, his period as Caesar in Gaul gives a likely time and place. The Rhine frontier on which his campaigns were to focus had boasted a marked concentration of Mithraic centres: Cologne for instance, recovered by Julian in 356, or Strasbourg, the scene of his most notable victory. Further west, *mithraea* are attested on the Rhône at Lyon and at Vienne, his military headquarters in 355–6.[98] Many of these long-established sites, it is true, seem to have ceased to function by Julian's day (Mithraism was particularly vulnerable to the legislation of Constantine and his sons against 'secret magic'); but that need not imply an abrupt cessation of the military tradition of Mithraic worship in their vicinities.

Neither of these possible contexts for Julian's initiation rules out the other: an involvement prompted by Neoplatonic interests might have been coloured later by military experience, or vice versa. All the same, one would like to test their relative strengths. A considered view must await our judgement of the claim that the hymn to Helios is imbued with Mithraic doctrine, but we can tentatively make two basic points. As presented, the case for a background in philosophy rests on the analogies with the theurgic and Eleusinian initiations. But this is to assume a comparable predisposition to Mithraism in the Iamblichan clique behind Julian for which there is no hard evidence. There is also a more general factor that might seem to

favour a military background, or at least an initiation in the West: the disposition of Mithraic remains. The Magian cults of Mithras in Anatolia notwithstanding, *mithraea* are scarcely attested in Asia Minor.[99] The contrast with the thickly scattered remains along the Rhine is extreme and cannot be ascribed solely to a putative bias in the archaeological evidence. At first sight, this points to the West as offering Julian the better opportunity to come to know the cult at first hand, whether or not he had a philosophic curiosity about its doctrines before his command in Gaul. If one hankered after an earlier, philosophically motivated initiation into the cult, Athens as much as Asia might offer a setting: Piraeus has yielded a single late dedication to 'Helios-Mithras',[100] and a more suggestive connection would emerge if a building excavated at Eleusis were the *mithraeum* it was once suspected to be. As Cumont saw, however, the inference is quite unsound.[101] Without that prop, the idea that Mithraism at Athens had come by Julian's day to have a connection with the Eleusinian Mysteries – in which case his initiations into the two cults might indeed be closely related – has no good basis.[102] It is far from obvious, then, that Julian's Mithraism need have followed directly or rapidly from his theurgic 'conversion' alone. If circumstance of time and place played any great part in Julian's espousal of Mithraism, his days in the company of soldiers in the West are the likelier setting.

I have needed to discuss the question of Julian's status as a Mithraic initiate closely: the evidence bearing on it is highly problematic, and in modern scholarship a lot has been made to hang on the fact of his Mithraism. His personal involvement in the Metroac Mysteries of Cybele, the Mother of the Gods, is comparatively uncontroversial, and what needs to be said here can be said much more briefly. The basic fact that he was initiated into the Metroac cult is not in doubt. The opening and closing lines of the hymn *To the Mother of the Gods*, composed at Constantinople in March 362,[103] present the writer as an initiate of the goddess who undertakes to instruct the 'common herd';[104] and it will be plain from the discussion of the doctrine of the hymns in Chapter Six that the main body of the work discloses detailed knowledge of Metroac purificatory ritual and a patent interest in the meanings attaching to its symbolism. There are signs too – again, I will enlarge on the point later – that the fortunes of Cybele's cult were particularly close to Julian's heart during his reign.

What is once again lacking is any precise indication of the time and

setting of Julian's initiation into the cult. A passage in Gregory Nazianzen's *First Invective* against Julian implies that he participated at a *taurobolium* (the ritual at which the goddess's initiates were drenched in the blood of a sacrificed bull),[105] but the episode described cannot be dated with any confidence, and in view of the Metroac cult's very wide geographical spread, Asia Minor, Athens and the West would all offer settings.[106] An initiation in Gaul in 356 or thereabouts must be counted a distinct possibility. Metroac cult centres are abundantly attested all along the Rhône valley from its delta to Lyon. Lyon had a proud past as the metropolis of Cybele's cult in Gaul; Vienne, at which Julian was based during the first half of 356, was close by, and itself a major Metroac centre.[107] All the same, with Cybele there is perhaps something more to be said for a relatively early initiation against a philosophic background. She had strong cultic associations with both Asia Minor and Athens[108] – the respective settings of Julian's theurgic and Eleusinian initiations. Given the circumstances of Julian's introduction to theurgy and his subsequent stay at Nicomedia, the prominence of the cult at Ephesus and its ancestral connection with Phrygia are particularly suggestive. At Ephesus the Mother had long been revered under the name of Artemis,[109] and it was there in 351 that Julian became an initiate of the theurgic rites of Hecate.[110] There is good evidence from Asia Minor that the Mother came to be associated in cult practice there with Hecate,[111] as with Artemis – a connection which a theurgist, for whom Hecate was 'the womb which holds all things',[112] had special reason to appreciate. It is tempting to think that Julian's interest in the Metroac cult was closely linked to his discovery of theurgy – in which case he had ample opportunity to become an initiate of the cult during the leisurely years he spent in Asia Minor in his early twenties. By the time he wrote his hymn to the Mother, at any rate, it was Cybele to whom he would pray for 'perfection in theurgy'.[113]

6

THE MYSTERIES II

Doctrine in the hymns and the piety of public cult

THE DOCTRINES OF *TO KING HELIOS* AND *TO THE MOTHER OF THE GODS*

Even if the philosophic motivation behind Julian's Mithraic initiation is disputed, a central question remains: Did Mithraism none the less influence his subsequent writings? Here, interest has centred on the hymn *To King Helios*. 'Dans son hymne,' wrote Bidez, 'Julien célèbre la puissance de Mithra.'[1] A recent study is more emphatic: the hymn is seen as a definitive attempt to crystallize the Roman religion, in which Mithraism is explicitly connected with Plato and 'Helios-Mithras' is raised as the supreme deity of the Roman Empire.[2] Certainly, if Mithraic influence on Julian's philosophizing is to be found anywhere, it will be presumed to have left its traces on a hymn to a Sun god composed around the same time as the *Caesars*.[3] Before we can decide whether it did, however, we face a primary difficulty: What was the speculative doctrine of Mithraism in Julian's day?

Here, the terms of the debate have altered radically in modern scholarship. The most eloquent view was Cumont's. In the face of the extreme paucity of clearly relevant Graeco-Roman documentary evidence, he had recourse to Zoroastrian texts, and interpreted the Western iconographic and epigraphic material in their light. The Cumontian picture of the Western cult assumed the importing of Magian doctrine without significant alteration;[4] Mithraic doctrine was presented as a system rooted in notions of cosmic dualism and eschatology, Mithras himself – whatever his special importance as saviour in the eyes of worshippers – as a mediating deity between higher divine powers of good and evil which were in their turn subordinate to a supreme principle of Infinite Time. Western

equivalents of these higher principles were found respectively in the Jupiter, the Areimanius and the Leontocephaline god of Mithraic statuary and dedications: and taking this hierarchic framework as his touchstone, Cumont proposed further Magian parallels and so built up a detailed account of Mithraism in several of its aspects – its cosmogony and soteriology, its ethics, its rituals, its priesthoods and its symbolism. The advantage of such a procedure, plainly, is that it yields an account both extensive and internally coherent. But the risks are plain too, and Cumont's conclusions have been challenged on various counts. Quiet doubts can be sensed in A.D. Nock's cautious remarks on the diffusion of the Mysteries in the West, the distinction to be made between that process and the literary dissemination of Iranian ideas, and the peculiar features of the Romanized cult.[5] Later, the claim that the Mysteries first evolved their essential structure in Magian circles of Anatolia was questioned by Stig Wikander.[6] The widest-ranging critique, however, is more recent. R.L. Gordon attacked not only several of Cumont's main conclusions, but also the basis of his method – his appeal to Iranian evidence to explain the Western cult – on the ground that it seriously distorted such Western evidence as we do possess.[7] On the basis of that evidence, Gordon argued, there was no indication that a cosmic dualism lay at the heart of Mithraic doctrine: Cumont's arguments for the identification of Mithraic with Magian gods were circular, and finally arbitrary. Mithras himself, to judge by Eubulus, was no intermediary between higher powers but rather 'the father and creator of all'[8] – a testimony which led Gordon to doubt if any deity worshipped by Mithraists was superior to him in honour or power. In short: Cumont made a number of assumptions about the relationship of Magian and Western teachings that had no support in the Western evidence and were at times in clear conflict with it. In Gordon's view, the explanation of these errors lay in a preoccupation with the issue of Mithraic doctrine which caused Cumont to neglect to ask what the Western evidence, taken by itself, had to tell about other aspects of the cult. By contrast, Gordon himself focused first on the particulars of cultic organization and its wider social setting.[9] Developing a suggestion of Nock's,[10] he treated 'the genius of Mithraism' less as a body of ideas slowly transmitted from Persian sources than as a more recent and self-conscious invention of persons who, if they borrowed from those sources, did so selectively and turned what they took from them to their own purposes. On this

explanation is possible, by interpreting the Western evidence in its own right – even if this means admitting that much about Mithraic doctrine is simply beyond sure knowledge. One possible way forward would be to interpret Mithraic symbolism on the hypothesis that it may both evoke and purposely distort a broader body of Graeco-Roman cultural knowledge – 'the encyclopaedia', as Gordon called it – in order to generate a paradoxical system of meaning by association and contrast. Work on these lines has been attempted by Gordon himself, but notably too by Roger Beck, who has argued that a riddling manipulation of received astronomical and astrological knowledge was central to Mithraic teaching.[11]

In Gordon's own research in the field, structuralist and post-structuralist strategies are very much in evidence. But whether or not one is sympathetic to these procedures, his attack on Cumont is cogent in conventional terms, and not to be ignored. It does not explicitly deny that Mithraism in its Western form *could* be a version of Magian doctrine, but it treats the whole notion as unverifiable guesswork.

Robert Turcan's work on Mithraism can be read in part as a response to this critique. While allowing for considerable modification to Cumont's picture, he adhered to the basic claim that a dualism of the Iranian type figured in the Western teachings. His reasoning on this score was linked to another argument. In his view, the evidence of Neoplatonists such as Porphyry is of little help to us in our efforts to understand Mithraic doctrines. It marks, he grants, a sympathetic interest on their part, and a conviction that a 'perennial philosophy' underlay Mystery doctrines and rituals; but it proceeded from preconceptions which in Turcan's view were foreign to Mithraic doctrine, and at root incompatible with it. Most important, it could not accommodate the dualist doctrine of the opposed cosmic principles Oromazdes and Ahriman, because of the standard Neoplatonist tenet that evil had no genuine existence but was rather an absence of being, non-being.[12] Conceivably, this larger claim helps to account for Turcan's highly sceptical account of Julian's particular case. In any event, its general effect is to render the reconstruction of the Western doctrine still more problematic, since even the sparse documentary evidence whose possible value Gordon did not deny is brought into question. It poses a particular difficulty for those who wish to argue on the strength of the testimonies of Porphyry and his like that the core Mithraic teachings derived largely from Platonism in their cosmology, and centred in an account of the destiny of the

soul in the cosmos. Reinhold Merkelbach, to be sure, has since offered just such a picture of Mithraic doctrine in a recent study of the cult, but his failure to confront Turcan's main claim makes his picture look distinctly vulnerable in what it presupposes.[13]

No general consensus has emerged among Mithraic specialists about these issues beyond a readiness to accept that Cumont's idea of a general doctrinal transfer from East to West, at least as he formulated it, is no longer convincing. Our best response to their disagreements is to keep our options open: we should look for specific details in the hymn to Helios that parallel what can be inferred about Mithraic doctrine from other sources on the respective hypotheses of Cumont and Gordon – and, where it differs significantly from them, on the view of Turcan.[14]

On one modern view, the hymn is the pinnacle of Julian's philosophic efforts, and a document that adds significantly to our knowledge of Mithraic teachings; it is to be read as a text whose primary purpose – and whose achievement – was to combine the central doctrines of Platonism and Mithraism, and to construct out of them an innovative and intellectually coherent synoptic theology.[15] At first sight, the claim is not an obvious one to make. As we have seen, the hymn contains only a single fleeting mention of Mithras by name. By contrast, Julian himself was emphatic that the theory he presented in the hymn was drawn entirely from Iamblichan doctrine, 'a little from a lot'.[16] We have no reason to suppose that Iamblichus had practised as a Mithraist himself, and neither in his extant writings, nor in the many passages in later Neoplatonist texts which discuss or quote or borrow from other Iamblichan texts now lost to us, is there any sign that he had written speculatively on the Mysteries of Mithras; and his silence in this connection is arguably the more telling for the fact that some earlier Platonists, Porphyry among them, had done just that. Since our knowledge of most of what Iamblichus wrote comes down to us at second hand, it would not do to press this point hard; but it is safe at least to say that Julian's debt to Iamblichus in the hymn does nothing to support the argument for Mithraic content in it. And the problem does not end there. Even if it were granted that the hymn indeed contained allusions to Mithraic doctrines, what weight would attach to them? It was long ago surmised that Mithraic teaching was peculiarly resistant to Platonist interpretation,[17] and the idea has since become a leading theme in Turcan's work. In his view, the Platonist interpreters of Mithraic doctrine were seeking to force a square peg into a round hole, and

their status as witnesses to Mithraic doctrine proper is correspondingly dubious; what they report as Mithraic doctrine, he thinks, is in large part a Platonizing distortion contrived to fit with their own ideological preconceptions. On this argument, Julian's hymn, supposing it makes 'Mithraic' allusions, would be a notable case in point – and with a paradoxical twist: the distortedness of the allusions would only be increased if the amalgamation of 'Mithraic' and Platonic elements in the hymn were indeed conceptually coherent.

Perhaps, though, the issue of coherence should not take centre stage in Julian's case. I have suggested earlier, in my account of the *Against the Uneducated Cynics*, that a certain scepticism about the intellectual level of Julian's philosophizing would seem to be in order. On one view, it is true, that treatise offered a theoretical demonstration of the unity of Greek philosophy. Here I merely recall my own conclusion that it is barely coherent in philosophic terms; it amounts to little more than a polemical hotch-potch of *topoi* and rhetorical commonplaces whose compatibility no ancient reader familiar with the diatribe and tenets of 'eclectic' Platonism would question. But in any case, Julian's handling of such compliant material does not guarantee a coherent presentation of evidence in the hymn to Helios, where the synthesis of Platonism with a distinct conceptual system that it allegedly contains would require a notable degree of intellectual deftness on his part.

On what, then, does the notion that *To King Helios* is a Mithraic document rest? First, perhaps, on an assumption that Julian, if he was a Mithraist, would hardly forbear to accommodate a Mithraic creed in a speculative treatise on the Sun. It is an easily understandable assumption, but it should not be mistaken for a fact; Cumont himself thought it impossible to establish.[18] In the end, the case turns on whether or not clear allusions to specific Mithraic ideas are found in the hymn, and more generally on the identity we ascribe to the god whom the hymn calls Helios. On these counts, though, the seeds of a judgement along different lines can be readily found in a remark of Nock's. Nock did not doubt Julian's Mithraism: 'but for insights concerning the universe he turned to his philosophic teachers and to the doctrines enshrined in the new synthetic mysteries which were associated with the *Chaldaic Oracles*'.[19]

Broadly stated, the claim that the *Chaldaean Oracles* had a bearing on Julian's Neoplatonism is not in dispute. I wish to argue a stronger case. In the account of *To King Helios* which follows, I will argue that the hymn and the *Oracles* stand in a relationship whose full

significance has not been appreciated. In my view, many of the features of the hymn held to mark Mithraic influence are better explained by appeal to the doctrines of the *Oracles*. And where they are not accounted for by the *Oracles*, I believe that the arguments for significant Mithraic influence can be shown to be redundant on other grounds, or else simply false. In short, I wish to remove the hymn to Helios from the Mithraic debate.

I begin by outlining briefly the plan of the work. After that, I go on to discuss, first the specific points of doctrine in it which might be thought Mithraic, then the general claim that Julian's Helios and Mithras are in fact one and the same god.

The hymn has a reputation for obscurity – and not merely in virtue of its abstruse metaphysical subject-matter. The problem perhaps lies less with Julian's plan of exposition than with his execution of it.[20] Composed, Julian tells us, in celebration of the public festival of *Sol Invictus* held at Rome on 25 December 362, the hymn takes the literary form of a *physikos hymnos*, expounding the 'nature' (*physis*) of Helios. The programme is announced clearly and early: Helios is to be praised through description, successively, of his substance (*ousia*) and origin, his powers and activities, and the boons he grants 'to all the *kosmoi*'.[21] The main body of the work reflects this formal division of the subject: after an account of substance and origin, 142b marks the transition to the second theme; the third, the *beneficia* of Helios, is picked up at 151c.

The hymn does not make for easy reading, none the less. It has its conceptual basis in Iamblichan metaphysics, a system formidably detailed and complex in itself.[22] More than that, Julian draws upon and abbreviates – one may wonder with what skill – a particular Iamblichan work now lost to us.[23] Then again, Julian says he composed the piece rapidly over three nights[24] – not without cost, perhaps, to clarity of expression.

But these difficulties are compounded by the manner in which he presented his material. In my view, a tension between the hymn's conceptual source and its rhetorical form has not been recognized. Although the tripartite ordering of material Julian aimed at is not prescribed by Menander Rhetor in his discussion of the *physikos hymnos*,[25] it certainly respects a literary convention witnessed elsewhere in Menander. Julian's Helios has the title 'King': a glance at the recommended pattern of the *basilikos logos* is revealing. First, says Menander, treat of the birth and nature of the Emperor; then his virtues as they are displayed in various fields of action; and finally,

the benefits his subjects derive from his rule.[26] In the hymn, Julian adapts this pattern to the subject in hand, not without ingenuity. The virtues of an Emperor, for instance, were to be described primarily by reference to his actions in two spheres, war and peace;[27] in the hymn, Helios' powers and activities are displayed in the noeric (intellectual) and visible *kosmoi* of Iamblichan doctrine. Similarly, the Emperor's *beneficia* find a counterpart in the works of Helios in the sublunar region, and his birth and nature in Helios' substance and origin.

Julian's regard for this rhetorical pattern clearly gives a certain order to his material. But we may doubt if a Neoplatonist treatment of a divinity readily accommodates itself to the literary form in question. The structure most obviously suitable for a Neoplatonist metaphysical treatise would correspond primarily to an ascending or descending series of Hypostases: setting aside the One, Iamblichan doctrine assumed three such Hypostases, respectively the noetic (intelligible), noeric (intellectual) and visible *kosmoi*. Against this setting, consideration of Helios' nature and functions *per se* would be subordinated to consideration of his expression of them in the three *kosmoi*: this would produce a systematic account of his substance, powers and activities and their blessings, first, in the noetic *kosmos*, then in their noeric and visible aspects successively. The tripartite order Julian proposes, by contrast, subordinates the three *kosmoi* to the categories in terms of which he describes Helios. This would imply successive accounts of Helios' substance, powers and activities, and *beneficia*, all described with reference to their expression in three *kosmoi*.

Each of these orders is theoretically coherent, but the second proves difficult for Julian to maintain, for a reason which he himself supplies. He notes at 142d that in the case of a god, as opposed to a man, it is misleading to treat substance, power and activity as separate entities: rather, 'all that he wills, he is, and can do, and does.'[28] In practice, Julian's exposition does not consistently follow the order proposed at the start of the hymn: it veers between the two methods of organization. They are not radically incompatible, and the tension need not make the hymn conceptually incoherent, but it does make in places for repetition and confusion in presentation. We can also note a more general implication: to ascribe the 'obscurity' of the hymn to the presence in it of Mithraic doctrines ill-known to us may be premature.

I pass to the content and general argument of the hymn. Its conceptual basis, to judge from the opening of the section on Helios'

substance and origin, lies squarely in Iamblichan cosmology. The universe, it is proposed, coheres through divine providence. Eternal, ungenerated, imperishable, it is watched over ultimately by a King of the Universe 'around whom everything exists' – an entity variously named the 'Supra-Intelligible', the 'Idea of Being', 'the One', 'the Good', the 'Cause of All'. By virtue of his creative substance, this King produced an intellectual (noeric) Helios, whose own centrality is immediately emphasized by Julian: he is 'middle among the middle and intellectual creative causes'. And just as the Good is the cause of blessings in the Intellectual world, so this 'son of the Good' dispenses blessings in the Intellectual world over which he has domain. Finally, in the third rank, there is a visible Helios – the Sun – whose status and functions in the sensible world are analogous to those of his noetic namesake and generative cause.[29]

The passage I have summarized has been spoken of as a 'Platonic seal' to the hymn, which rather suggests that the Neoplatonic vocabulary bulking so large in it in fact conceals a Mithraic content.[30] But all it need imply is that Julian is looking primarily to Iamblichus' tripartite cosmology to supply the conceptual frame on which a description of Helios can be hung. And if that is so, any Mithraic content in the hymn must be strictly delimited. Indeed, there is no need and no reason to think that the hymn is indebted to Mithraism for these underlying concepts. Only if Mithraic doctrine had had a perceptible impact on Iamblichus' own cosmology would such a claim be tenable, and of that there is not the slightest suggestion: Iamblichus' proposal of a tripartite cosmos is explicable in strictly philosophic terms as the consequence of his adhering to a principle of logical realism which led him to distinguish the noetic from the noeric order.[31] For this principle he was ultimately indebted to Plato's *Parmenides*: but if any further impetus were needed, an amenable triadic system lay to hand within the Middle Platonist tradition. The *Second Platonic Epistle* – probably a Neopythagorean text, and valued highly by Numenius[32] – can well be cited here: in terms which seem to foreshadow Julian's own King 'around whom all things exist',[33] it declares that

> all things are related to the King of All, and for his sake they are, and of all things fair he is the cause. And related to the Second are the second things; and related to the Third, the third.

Mithraic doctrine, so far as we know, made no play with a cosmic system of this sort.

The general argument, then, shows no distinctively Mithraic influence. What of the particulars? Does Mithraism none the less guide Julian in his emphasis on specific aspects of Helios? To test this claim, one looks for details in the hymn which at least accord with independent evidence about Mithraic doctrine, and perhaps intentionally evoke it. A number of passages have been adduced on this score. Allegedly, allusions can be found to the tauroctony, to the demiurgic and intermediary functions of Mithras, to Mithraic principles of Necessity and the divinity of the elements, and to the solar deities Cautes and Cautopates. I discuss them in that order, one by one.

A reference to the tauroctony would be decisive if it could be demonstrated. Here, a passage in the hymn in which Helios is associated with 'Dionysus, controller of divided substance' (144c) has prompted comment. On one view, Julian's phrase points to an independently established connection made between two mythological traditions of cosmic individualization, the Mithraic and the Orphic.[34] But it is far from clear that any such connection had been made for Julian to allude to: its very existence is simply a modern conjecture of Cumont's, and no trace of it can be found elsewhere in Julian or in any other ancient text.[35] Besides, there is an oddness in the argument itself: supposing that Julian does allude to the tauroctony, he presents the Helios–Dionysus figure not as Mithras, but rather as the bull he kills. Above all, however, – and crucially – there is an easier explanation of the allusion to hand. It is quite sufficient, and far more plausible, to discern a reference made solely, and very much in passing, to the Orphic myth of the killing of Dionysus. In making that, and no more than that, Julian could look to a Platonist exegesis of the myth which had begun as early as Xenocrates and later found a place in Plutarch and in Origen,[36] neither of whom has anything whatever to say about a Mithraic parallel.

The idea that the hymn makes allusion to Mithras' role as Demiurge can be similarly refuted. A number of parallels can be drawn between what Julian says of Helios and what other Platonist writers say of Mithras. Helios is 'child of the Good' and a Demiurge.[37] In these respects he resembles the Mithras of Numenius (Numenius having effectively identified Mithras with the 'Second God' of his triad).[38] As Demiurge, he creates and continually generates natural life: one thinks of the Mithras of Eubulus, 'Father and creator of all'.[39] But these correspondences do not count for much. Certainly,

they do not indicate that Julian is knowingly alluding to Numenian statements made specifically about Mithras.[40] The debt at issue is much simpler: the description of Helios as a child of the Good is a quotation from the *Republic*, no more and no less.[41] So too, the *Republic* sufficiently explains the passage immediately following this description in the hymn, where Helios is referred to as god of light and its noetic counterpart, truth.[42] As for the identification with the Demiurge, it has a precedent in Plutarch's 'Eclecticism'; notably, he too uses a triadic theology in this connection.[43] There is a basic lesson to be drawn from these facts. If other writers call Mithras child of the good, or god of light and truth, or Demiurge, we need not infer from the parallels with Helios as he is described in the hymn that our author has Mithras at the front of his mind; it may be that in these particulars, he simply Platonizes.

There remain other parallels which seem to give better support to the argument for Mithraic influence. Pre-eminently, there is the peculiar stress Julian lays on the concept of centrality, or 'middleness', in the hymn. He repeatedly ascribes this quality to Helios, in each of his three aspects. At first sight, there looks to be a strikingly close correspondence with Mithras: both Cumont and Gordon ascribe to him an important function as an intermediary, although they disagree about the precise nature of the activities involved.[44] But there are delicate questions at issue: Julian himself felt the need to digress to explain in what sense he meant to use the concept of centrality (*mesotês*). We must do the same.

Julian defines centrality in two ways (138cd). First, in a local or formal sense, it is that which is equally remote from extremes, the median point between (say) hot and cold. But it is also that which conjoins and makes one what is separate. In that case, a thing is median in virtue of its activity or function: for illustration, Julian cites Empedocles' Harmony. Julian's primary interest lies with the second definition, but the first is not wholly neglected, no doubt because it serves to symbolize and lend support to Helios' centrality in the connective sense. In each of the three *kosmoi* in which he figures, Helios is central in relation to the other gods belonging to them.

In each case, centrality involves a connective function. The Good (that is, the noetic Helios) is said to be the cause of beauty, being, perfection and oneness for the noetic gods, 'connecting them and making them shine out by a power which reflects his goodness' (133b). By the same token, the noeric Helios and the Sun cause these blessings for the noeric and visible gods they respectively govern. In

the last case, however, the centrality is also formal. The visible gods are the planets, and Julian explicitly allots the Sun a 'middle place' among them (135c). This seems to carry a double meaning. The first is made clear by the statement that the planets 'dance around' the sun: not an allusion to a heliocentric universe, of course, but rather to the planetary epicycles and 'eccentrics' of Ptolemaic astronomy; the planets move in circles around the Sun, which itself circles the fixed earth.[45] Second, it is assumed that the Sun is 'middle' – that is, fourth – in the planetary order in respect to its distance from earth (146c). This arrangement – the so-called 'Chaldaean' order[46] – was widely known in antiquity through Ptolemy. There is a discrepancy between it and the order found in Plato, but the two can be reconciled in the light of epicyclic theory[47] – and in any case, there are signs that Julian's priorities on this score lay more with symbolic utility than with astronomical nicety.[48]

In the case of the noeric Helios, centrality is expressed in a further way. The noeric Helios is not only 'middle' in relation to other noeric gods, but also in relation to his noetic and visible counterparts. Julian takes care to make this point, and it is not hard to see why: it implies that Helios' centrality is expressed most markedly (because most variously) in his noeric aspect. As Julian has it, he is 'middle among the middle' (132d). More importantly, it does much to explain why the hymn focuses pre-eminently on the noeric Helios. For inasmuch as Helios is an intermediary between the noetic and visible worlds, he can be seen as an intermediary between god and man: from this, it is no great step to invest him with the qualities of a saviour through whom a devotee may hope to escape from the world of 'generation'. And that is precisely what Julian does: the noeric Helios 'frees [our souls] from the body and raises them up to the substances which have kinship with the god' (152b).

The centrality Julian ascribes to Helios, then, is exhibited in various ways. His local centrality among the planets symbolizes higher functions; cosmologically, he connects the three *kosmoi* and mediates within each of them; theologically, souls are freed from the body by his agency. Mithraic content in the hymn has been adduced on each of these scores, with varying degrees of plausibility.

On the first count, the claim derives from Cumont's notion that the Sun in Mithraic doctrine also stood fourth in the planetary order. In support, he appealed to the fact that the Babylonian Shamash, whom he identified with Mithras, held that position. But this claim has been sharply challenged. Gordon not only disputed the

identification with Shamash; more radically, he argued that no evidence implied the existence of the Chaldaean order in Western Mithraism; on the contrary, it is incompatible with what evidence we do have – a fact which has lately been impressively exploited by Beck as the basis of his study of the Mithraic system (or rather systems) of planetary orders.[49] The fact speaks: this alleged parallel between Helios and Mithras cannot stand. Even if it could, it would lack significance: Helios' planetary position is plainly explicable in terms of the mainstream astronomy of the time.

The cosmological parallel is also problematic. It is prompted by a well-known passage in Plutarch's *On Isis and Osiris*. The Persians, Plutarch says, conceive of Mithras as occupying the middle part of the universe between Oromazdes and Ahriman, 'for which reason they call [him] 'the middle one' (*mesitês*); subsequently, the Sun is said to be reckoned equidistant between Oromazdes and the earth.[50] There is certainly a correspondence of a kind here with Helios' median place between the noetic and visible *kosmoi*: but it breaks down in two crucial respects. For one thing, the broad significance of Plutarch's report is far from clear. The beliefs he records are ascribed to Persians; quite possibly, they had no place in the Mithraic cult in the West.[51] More importantly, the dualistic cosmology implied is not congruent with the tripartite system of the hymn. In Plutarch, the portions of the universe between which Mithras stands are good and evil: in the hymn, the visible *kosmos* – for all that it is subject to 'generation', and a place from which the soul wishes to escape – is ultimately created by the Good, which rules over it as the Sun. Accordingly, Plutarch's Mithras cannot possibly mediate in the same sense as the noeric Helios. A very different, oppositional relationship predominates: either Mithras will be a compound of good and evil – which would be outrageous to Julian – or else he will serve not to connect them but to mark their separation.

There remains Julian's use of 'middleness' to symbolize the soteriological function of the noeric Helios. Here there is more substance to the Mithraic parallel, inasmuch as the close of the *Caesars* certainly alludes to Mithras as a mediating saviour god. Julian's Helios 'saved' by raising souls up to the Intelligible world by means of his rays.[52] Cumont and Gordon agreed that Mithras did something similar, and that centrality was symbolic of this activity. They had in mind a passage of Porphyry that makes Mithras median between the celestial hemispheres, then tells of winds associated with his *paredroi* which respectively raise up souls 'to the heat of the

divine' and carry them down to genesis.[53] Even though Julian makes no play with the particular image of centrality Porphyry uses, the two accounts agree in large measure.

But there is a proviso. In Turcan's view, the Porphyrian passage is a tendentious exegesis of Mithraic soteriology, and the true Mithraic doctrine was very different. On the basis of an inscription unknown to Cumont, he proposed that Mithraists believed they were already collectively 'saved' on earth; by performing the tauroctony, Mithras had saved the good creation of Oromazdes the Light (an act of deliverance, Turcan believed, which rendered the Mithraic cult sacrifice unique in its underlying logic, the ritual being enacted not *for* but in some way *by* the god). The notion of an individual and extraterrestrial salvation did not arise: the evidence interpreted by Platonists to imply that Mithraists envisaged a posthumous journey of the soul through the planetary spheres in fact denoted a *temporal* journey of souls through an enormously long sidereal 'week': what Mithras promised his followers was cyclic rebirth.[54]

This is a striking argument, but I distrust it and set it aside. The evidence Turcan cites perhaps implies a belief in earthly *sôtêria* through the tauroctony, but it does not rule out the doctrine of a posthumous extraterrestrial journey as a consequence, and it does not prove a doctrine of cyclic rebirth. Moreover, the claim requires that the whole Porphyrian passage which tells against it is discounted, and I do not think that Turcan has made good his general argument on this score; it is one thing to allow for Platonist contamination in the passage, quite another to reject its basic import outright.

The parallel between the *mesotês* of Helios and Mithras, then, holds good in one respect: their soteriological status. At first sight, this seems to be a good instance of Mithraic influence in the hymn, and to count against my previous arguments. For the most part, these have only shown that it is possible – not that it is right – to explain particular details without appeal to Mithraic doctrine. But if those arguments now seem inconclusive, I believe others are compelling. The true key to the hymn can be shown to lie not with Mithraism, but with the *Chaldaean Oracles*.

The impact of the *Chaldaean Oracles* on Julian's philosophic thinking, in marked contrast to the putative place of Mithraism in it, is beyond any doubt: we know that the doctrine expounded in the hymn to Helios derives from Iamblichus; we know that Julian put a high value on Iamblichus' commentary on the *Oracles*; and we can

point to clear verbal echoes from the *Oracles* in *To King Helios* and *To the Mother of the Gods*.[55] And in the case of the *Oracles*, at least, there is no reason to suspect any significant Mithraic doctrinal influence at all. The intellectual milieu from which they issued some time in the second century belonged to 'the underworld of Platonism' (and if that is a touch vague, we can perhaps be a little more precise: it has been plausibly argued that in several of their defining doctrines they correspond suggestively with Valentinus' Platonizing Gnosticism).[56]

Accordingly, where a doctrine in the *To King Helios* can be shown to derive from the *Oracles* or from Iamblichus' exegesis of them, there will be good reason to treat the hypothesis of substantial Mithraic influence as redundant. And in the case of Helios, his centrality and his soteriological functions, the *Oracles* prove highly revealing. Like the hymn, they assume a totalized reality that consists of three *kosmoi*, hierarchically ordered.[57] The boundaries demarcating these worlds from one another, admittedly, are not identical with those of the hymn. The first – like the first in the hymn – is an Intelligible (noetic) world: in the hymn, though, this world is subdivided into two *kosmoi*, the noetic and the noeric. The second world in the *Oracles* consists of the spheres of the fixed stars and the seven planets; the third, the sublunar regions and the earth. Together, that is to say, the second and third worlds of the *Oracles* are coextensive with the third, visible world of the hymn. The intermediate noeric world of the hymn does not figure in the *Oracles*, but the discrepancy – and with it, the differences in the lines of demarcation in the two systems – is easily explained. Julian is following not the *Oracles* themselves, but Iamblichus' commentary on them, and Iamblichus' philosophic commitment to a noeric order of reality will plainly have led him to interpret the tripartite universe of the *Oracles* in accordance with his own metaphysics. (There is a close analogy to such a procedure to be found in Proclus' treatment of the *Oracles*.)[58]

There are numerous further parallels to notice. Just as each of Julian's *kosmoi* is governed by an aspect of King Helios, so the Chaldaean noetic, material and sub-lunar *kosmoi* are each assigned a 'ruler'. In the first – subdivided in Julian's Iamblichan reading, we recall, into two aspects, the noetic and the noeric – is placed Aion, a 'father-begotten light' emanating from a 'first transcendent fire':[59] the resemblance to Julian's noeric Helios is patent. In the second, the ruler is none other than the Sun; in the third it is probably the Moon.[60] The assignation of the second to Helios is obviously crucial. As in

the hymn, the Chaldaean Sun is called 'middle' in relation to the other two rulers, and holds a middle place in the planetary order.[61] As ruler of the planets, he is called 'seven-rayed' (*heptaktis*): the very word – it is probably a Chaldaean neologism and has no necessary Mithraic connotation – is used by Julian in *To the Mother of the Gods*,[62] where it is explicitly said to denote 'an ineffable mystery teaching [of] the Chaldaean ... familiar to the happy theurgists'. Further, the centrality of the Chaldaean Sun is connective as well as local. His essential quality – fire – has a noetic origin in Aion; channelled through the third ruler, it warms the earth.[63]

The bearing of these conceptions on the doctrine of the hymn is plain enough: and there is perhaps a special interest for us in the relationship of Aion and the Sun. A Neoplatonist tradition ascribed to 'the Chaldaeans' the belief in an extramundane as well as an intramundane sun.[64] The reference, I submit, is likely to be to the Aion of the *Oracles*. There is evidence, at least, to suggest that Julian had this interpretation in mind when he wrote the hymn to Helios. At 148ab, he speaks of a doctrine which places the Sun 'far above the region of the fixed stars', and goes on to observe that it is inconsistent with the notion of his planetary centrality he has expounded earlier in the hymn. On that ground, the passage has been taken to be a statement by Julian of a doctrine he does not himself hold:[65] but that reading does not persuade. What Julian says is this:

> On this theory [Helios] will not be stationed midmost among the planets, but midway between the three worlds: that is, according to the hypothesis of the Mysteries, if indeed one ought to use the word 'hypothesis' and not rather say 'established truths', using the word 'hypothesis' for the heavenly bodies. For the priests of the Mysteries tell us what they have been taught by the gods or by great *daimones*, whereas the astronomers make plausible hypotheses from the harmony they observe in the visible spheres. No doubt it is proper to approve the astronomers as well, but where any man thinks it better to believe the priests of the Mysteries, him I admire and revere.

He speaks of the doctrine as a 'mystic hypothesis', and treats it as belonging to a higher order of knowledge than the propositions of mere astronomy. In my view he is alluding to – and assenting to – the 'Chaldaean' doctrine of the transmundane Sun: as he interprets it, it applies to the noeric Helios, and hence is compatible with the

centrality of the visible Sun.[66] It is in this light that one should read an earlier, punning description of Helios as the son of Hyperion (literally, 'He who goes above') – a name that has been read as an allusion to the Mithraic Cronos and a support for Cumont's view of his theological status.[67]

The emphasis laid in the hymn on the motif of Helios' cosmological centrality and 'connectiveness', then, is easily and economically explained once the extent of Julian's debt to the *Oracles* – or rather, to the Iamblichan interpretation of them – is appreciated. And the same holds true for the motif in its soteriological application. Like the hymn, the *Oracles* give Helios a central role in the raising of souls. Theurgic ritual aimed to effect by an invocation of solar rays an *anagôgia* of the soul that would carry it up to the Father; in that process, the Sun connects souls with his higher counterpart Aion, and Aion in turn connects the Sun with the Father.[68] And once more, there is clear evidence that Julian had the Chaldaean notion of *anagôgia* as his model in the hymn. The *Oracles* taught that the journeying soul was clothed in a protective 'subtle vehicle' (*lepton ochêma*) made up (in part) of solar rays:[69] Julian unmistakably echoes the doctrine and the very phrase at 152b, where he tells of 'the subtleness . . . of [Helios'] divine rays, given as a kind of vehicle for the safe descent of our souls'. (So too, his allusion to the 'seven-rayed god' occurs in a passage explicitly concerned with theurgic *anagôgia*.)[70] These verbal allusions point clearly to the *Oracles* as Julian's textual source here, and they must guide our interpretation of the parallel we have already drawn in this connection between Julian's Helios and Porphyry's Mithras. The centrality (*mesotês*) of the hymn's 'saving' Helios, it is plain, finds a parallel of sorts in the mediating role that Porphyry ascribed to Mithras in his *On the Cave of the Nymphs*. But it is no less plain, in the light of Julian's precise verbal echoes of Chaldaean verses, that the Porphyrian parallel quite fails to establish that Julian's discourse on Helios' centrality as saviour was distinctively Mithraic. Even if we grant that Porphyry was accurately reporting a true Mithraic teaching (and some deny it), we can properly point only to a *correspondence* with the hymn: we cannot legitimately infer substantive Mithraic doctrinal *influence* on it.

Sundry further details in the hymn that have been adduced to prove Mithraic doctrinal content are similarly explicable in the light of the *Oracles*, and I can deal with them more briefly.

In treating rather obscurely of its annual course, Julian speaks of

the Sun as 'the ruler of five heavenly circles'. In these, 'he begets the three graces' (Spring?); 'the others are the scales of great *Ananke*' (146d). But what he says, he adds, 'is perhaps incomprehensible to the Greeks'. Now Cumont – though Gordon has since dissented – allotted a signal place in Mithraism to a goddess of Necessity which he treated as theologically prior to Mithras in cult doctrine,[71] and on one view Julian's remark is a tribute to this Mithraic goddess.[72] In fact, though, it could be reckoned 'incomprehensible to the Greeks' because it is 'Chaldaean', just as the doctrine of *anagôgia* is elsewhere 'unknown to the common herd, but familiar to the blessed theurgists'.[73] The *Oracles* make much play with a principle of Necessity; they tell both of a noetic entity which 'holds the All together according to the order of *Ananke*'[74] and of *Ananke* as a deity in the visible world; as an aspect of Hecate, or *Physis*, she governs the movements of the heavenly bodies.[75] It is surely something akin to the latter role that Julian has in mind. In the immediately preceding sentences – sentences which may recall a specific Chaldaean text[76] – Julian explicitly made Helios the controller of the planetary and celestial movements. By the statement that the Sun rules the scales of *Ananke*, we may understand him to do so by this agency. Julian's remark is thus explicable without recourse to Cumont's hypothesis – which in any case would give *Ananke* a status incompatible with her being ruled by the sun.

A possible objection to this explanation is that the Chaldaean doctrine of *Ananke–Physis* finds a clear analogue in the World Soul of Middle Platonism and would hardly seem strange to a philosophically minded Greek. But what, then, is odd in what Julian says? It cannot be the association of scales with *Ananke*, even if Mithraists made it: *Ananke* was conventionally identified with the mother of the Fates, of whom scales had been a symbolic attribute from Homer onwards. Perhaps the oddity consists in two details: first, the notion of Helios ruling *Ananke*; second, the identification of *Ananke*'s scales with heavenly circles. Quite what Julian means by this identification is not clear; he himself thinks to make it plainer by introducing the Dioscuri into the discussion (147ac). The connection he has in mind is evidently between the equipoised movement of a pair of scales and the myth of the 'alternate-dayed Twins', each living and dying by turn, and the context is astronomical. The Dioscuri passage has been read as a further illustration of the Mithraic doctrine of Necessity.[77] The notion rests on another Cumontian hypothesis, which would have it that in Mithraism the Dioscuri symbolized the

celestial hemispheres.[78] But if Mithraists made this association, it was not peculiar to them; Philo records it as the opinion of 'mythographers' of his day.[79] In any case, Julian notices the identification only to reject it (147b); instead, he tentatively proposes that the Dioscuri – and by extension, it seems, the scales of *Ananke* – are identifiable with the celestial tropical and polar circles (147cd). Since so little is certain about Mithraic astrology, one cannot rule out utterly the possibility that Julian is here borrowing an image from it. But by the same token, we have no positive reason to think so, while we do have Julian's explicit admission that in making the suggestion 'we seem to be innovating' (*kainotomein*). Perhaps we should grant that, in this particular, Julian is making an original suggestion; but if one insists on a source, one may as soon propose Iamblichus as Mithraism. (We hear, for instance, of a 'Chaldaean' prose work which dealt in detail with the creation and ordering of the planets and stars.)[80]

Later in the hymn, Julian refers to 'certain gods who are held together by King Helios ... and guide the fourfold nature of the elements' (151bc). A further (disputed) Cumontian notion – that worship of the elements was central in Mithraic cult practice – has prompted the suggestion that this passage aims to reconcile a Mithraist's belief in the divinity of the elements with Platonic orthodoxy, in which such an idea was unthinkable.[81] Again, the suggestion is unnecessary. What Julian says does not imply that the elements are divine. Rather, it is entirely consonant with a Neoplatonist reading of the *Timaeus*. In that work, the elements are qualities, copies of Forms, which the Demiurge causes to become sensible in space.[82] Appropriately combined (which is to say, guided in their movements), they will constitute the bodies of creatures in the sublunar world.[83] But the Demiurge disdains to act directly as creator in a region of generation and decay; instead, in a celebrated passage,[84] he allots that function to the gods he has already made. Plato spoke in metaphor, but the image clearly anticipates Julian's 'gods held together by Helios'.

For later Platonists with a keen interest in the ordering of divine entities in terms of power and function, the image's appeal was emphatic. For illustration, I cite two relevant cases. The *Chaldaean Oracles* record the creation of the world out of the elements by the agency of Ideas[85] which are described in various aspects: as 'thunderbolts', they emanate from a demiurgic Intellect; as 'principles', they give form to matter; as 'guardians', they regulate its movements.[86]

Similarly, Iamblichus – and following his lead, Julian's associate Salutius – distinguish four activities of gods in the cosmos: demiurgic, vivifying, connective and guarding.[87] A further Iamblichan passage gives the decisive detail with its talk of 'cosmocratic rulers (*archontes*) which administer (*dioikountes*) the sublunar elements'.[88] Here we have a near-exact analogue to the Julianic passage, and a compelling reason to discount the notion that it has Mithraic overtones.

Between Julian and the *Chaldaean Oracles* stands Iamblichus. It is through Iamblichus that we can explain a final allegedly Mithraic feature: a reference to solar *paredroi*. If we are put in mind of Cautes and Cautopates, it needs to be stressed that Julian himself was explicit that he had another connection in mind. In describing Helios' relations with members of the pantheon, he cites 'Phoenician theology', remarks that the people of Emesa, a sacred place of Helios since time beyond memory, set up Monimos and Azizos in company with him, and proceeds to identify these gods as Hermes and Ares, 'the *paredroi* of Helios' (150bd). He emphasizes that he has plucked the information – and the identification – from Iamblichus, and for our purposes this is a revealing admission. Iamblichus, we noted earlier, seems to have been indifferent to Mithraism: certainly, nothing in his surviving writings or in later testimonies suggests an interest in it on his part. Rather, it appears from the Julianic passage that in his exegesis of heliolatry – an exegesis constituting a major source of the hymn – the Syrian philosopher looked to the Emesan cult. And Julian was content to reproduce Iamblichan material without modification, even in a detail which gave him a fine opportunity to introduce a Mithraic allusion if he had wished. His failure to do so is hardly explicable as the reticence of an initiate. It suggests that he was not concerned to draw to the attention of his readers a parallel in Mithraic iconography of which he was presumably very well aware. Read in that light, the passage is singularly poor evidence for the claim that he was aiming in the hymn to graft Mithraic doctrine on to a Neoplatonic stock.

If my account of the supposedly Mithraic passages in the hymn persuades, the idea that it owes any significant debt to Mithraic doctrine proper will be dismissed. Julian's Helios (and for that matter, the Attis of his hymn to Cybele) may share certain features with the Platonizing Mithras of Numenius; but that, we have seen, tells nothing by itself. Other details, more suggestive at first sight, can be shown to derive straightforwardly from Iamblichus' metaphysics and from his exegesis of a sub-Platonic verse-collection. To

this one can add the telling absence from the hymn of even the most oblique reference to several items peculiarly characteristic of Mithraic teaching and worship: no petrogenesis; no allusion to the meaning of the multiple grade system and its associated symbolism; no trace of Ahriman; no tauroctony. If Julian's purpose in the hymn had really been to integrate Mithraic doctrine with Neoplatonist theory, he would surely have felt the need to make some reference to these matters. We find nothing of the sort – nor even an attempt to give a spurious Iranian colour to the work; for his exotic oriental touches, he appeals to Phoenicia and Syria, doubtless after Iamblichus.[89] The case seems plain in all but one particular: the single mention of Mithras in association with Helios in the passage we considered earlier in the context of Julian's own interest in the cult.[90]

The point here is that Mithras is not the *only* god associated with Helios in the hymn. Julian adduced the worship of Mithras by Romans as one of several proofs that Helios is the founder of the imperial city. To appraise his statement properly, we need to keep in mind an important distinction. It has been well said that 'worshippers of particular Sun gods [in our period] formed only a small proportion of the persons who associated the Sun with the Supreme God in some way because philosophy suggested that it should be so associated or even identified.'[91] In Julian's day, the divine Sun was not merely an object of cult worship: its divinity was also a philosophic concept with wide currency and a Platonic pedigree. The hymn is principally concerned to anatomize Helios in this latter sense, whereas the passing reference to Mithras denotes an object of cult worship and need not carry any philosophic connotation. But even if it were read as if it did, it still would not suffice to show that Helios is just the name by which Julian chooses to call Mithras, that in his mind the two gods are one and the same. If that claim is to imply proper identity of status and function, it needs to point to more than a loose syncretic association of the sort so readily entertained in Julian's day. At several points in the hymn, Helios is explicitly identified or closely associated with various gods: Zeus and Apollo are 'in no way different' from him (149bc); he shares with the one 'an equal and single dominion', with the other 'singleness of thoughts and imperishable oneness' (144bc). He is Apollo *Musêgetês* (144b), Oceanus 'father of All' (147a), the Sun of the Emesans (150c); Dionysus and Asclepius, whom he fathered in the world, were 'by his side before its creation' (144b); Hermes and Ares are his *paredroi* (150a), Athena Pronoia his 'perfected intelligence' (149d).

Julian found such associations easy to make, and what he implies is something less than total identity. Helios is not on an equal footing with the other gods: in each of the three worlds, he is their ruler; and unequal entities cannot be identical. The underlying conception is familiar and can be aptly illustrated from an item I discussed in Chapter Four – the oracle giving Apollo's response to the question, Was he God, or was God another? 'We are messengers', he said, 'and a small portion of God.'[92] Strictly, Julian does not identify the various gods at issue with Helios, but with 'parts' of him: a power, or a function, or a portion of his essence. On one occasion, he associates Helios with Mithras in a restricted sense of this kind – just as, in support of the same argument, he associates him with Palatine Apollo and the sacred fire of Vesta.[93] But the Mithraic association is no more intimate or privileged than these or any of the others mentioned: indeed, it is more tentatively proposed than most of them. The connection is casual and loose and has no peculiarly Mithraic connotation: at most, Mithras is presented as on a par with Zeus, Apollo, Athene, one of many gods in whom a higher transcendental deity can find expression. If the allusion – as I have suggested earlier – marks the momentary intrusion into the argument of a personal sentiment, it does nothing to imply that the hymn is indebted to Mithraism in any specific points of doctrine. Still less does it allow us to infer that Julian's conscious purpose in writing it was to integrate Mithraic and Platonic doctrine into a composite philosophic theology.

The conclusion stands. Mithraism gives no key to the meaning or purpose of *To King Helios*, and to view it as a document that can add to our knowledge of the Roman Mithraic Mysteries is a deep mistake. The text is what Julian declared it to be: a product of an Iamblichan Platonist, composed to commemorate the public festival of a god of the Roman state. Whatever the importance of Mithraism to Julian may have been, its doctrines had no discernible impact on the ideology of his hymn to Helios.

To strengthen the claim that Mithraic doctrine was irrelevant to the hymn to King Helios, we can contrast it with a closely analogous case – Julian's hymn *To the Mother of the Gods*. In this case, there is no doubt that the hymn alludes to Mystery doctrines of the deity it addresses, and our discussion can be briefer.

Whatever the setting of Julian's initiation into the Mysteries of Cybele, his philosophic interest in Metroac myth and ritual was plain to see by the time he wrote the *To the Mother of the Gods*. The hymn

is explicitly the enquiry of a 'philosopher and theologian'[94] into the questions, Who is Attis? Who is the Mother of the Gods? And of what kind is the purification at issue?[95] Like the god of the *To King Helios*, Cybele straddles the *kosmoi* in her various aspects: she is 'the source of the noeric and creative gods, who in turn guide the visible gods; mother and spouse of great Zeus, the great goddess who came into being next to and in company with the great creator [and] who receives into herself the causes of all gods, noetic and hypercosmic' (166ab): in short, the noetic principle in its dynamic aspect. Attis is at once a mediating principle between the Mother and the material world – 'a noeric god resembling solar rays' (165c), a *logos* through whose agency souls are enabled to ascend – and a divinity who participates in that world and orders it, as the Sun does in the hymn to Helios (161c). The central Metroac myth is construed in the hymn as a riddling account of the phases of Procession and Reversion in the Neoplatonic process of emanation: the noetic Cybele's 'passionless love' (*erôs apathês*) first elevates Attis 'to dance and leap' in the noeric world. His later desertion of her for the love of a nymph is symbolic of his overstepping this limit and his participation in matter; his castration is 'a checking of the unlimited process' which threatened to dissipate his being; and his subsequent return to Cybele's favour marks the reversion of the soul towards the One.[96] Here, a Neoplatonist's manipulation of the story is especially marked. In the familiar version of the myth – a version, moreover, that seems to have been assumed and symbolically enacted in Metroac cult-practice in earlier imperial times[97] – Attis had ended up not just a eunuch, but a corpse; the cause of Cybele's lamentations was her consort's death, not simply his desertion of her for a nymph in a cave. But to a Platonist the notion that a god could die was unthinkable, and Julian interprets accordingly.

A similarly philosophic account is given of the March festival of Cybele and Attis. It begins on the day of the spring equinox, when a limit is set to the course of the Sun, and so recalls the mutilation of Attis (168a). The felling of the sacred tree, a ritual enactment of Cybele's plucking of Attis from the reeds of the river Gallus, symbolizes the necessity for men to pluck what is fairest – virtue and piety – to prepare for their elevation to the company of the goddess (169a). As for the detail of the purificatory Mysteries associated with the festival, Julian feels bound to speak discreetly (173d): none the less, he alludes to the ritual image of the castrated Attis, divining its deeper meaning as symbolic of 'the cutting away of all that is

excessive and vain in the impulses and movements of the soul' (174c), and he picks out various dietary taboos for comment. Fruits and vegetables that grow downwards into the earth or 'creep along' it, fish that live in the deep – these are inappropriate foods at the time of a rite whose aim is the ascent of the soul;[98] apples are 'sacred and golden, an image of the rewards of the Mysteries, and must be honoured and worshipped for the sake of their archetype'; dates are perennial and sacred to the Sun, and they are not to be used to nourish the body (176b).

How far Julian's manipulation of the Metroac material was philosophically innovative it is hard to say. He presents his identification of Attis with the substance of generative and creative *nous* as an independent perception (161c), disclaiming all knowledge of a treatise which he has been told that Porphyry had written on the theme, but which he insists he has never read. If he means the *On the Cave of the Nymphs* – and he well may – it is a suggestive remark in the present context: several passages in that work are usually viewed by specialists as the best evidence we have of Platonizing interest in aspects of the Mithraic Mysteries, and Julian will be shown to be ignorant of them. The issue is delicate, however, because the remark also implies that Porphyry's treatise was at least the sort of work that Julian *might* have read. On one view, indeed, it is just possible that the hymn to Cybele itself may allude to Mithraic astrological teaching in a riddling detail: the goddess, we read, was told of Attis' infatuation for the nymph by a 'flame-coloured lion' acting on the instructions of Helios (167b). Could that be a reference to the Leo of the Mithraic zodiac in one of his aspects?[99] Perhaps it could, but recent scholarship has taught us that nothing about Mithraism is more puzzling than the logic of the Mithraic zodiac, and Julian's lion can very easily be accounted for without recourse to it. The association of lions and the Sun was emphatically not peculiar to Mithraism, either in astrological terms or in the general 'cultural knowledge' of the time: 'in the lore of antiquity the lion was the sun's animal, sharing his qualities and virtues.'[100] Moreover, the lion also happens to have been Cybele's animal *par excellence*, as both texts and Metroac cult-reliefs make abundantly plain. Julian himself calls the lion her servant, and the servant of her 'forethought' (*promêtheia*): he alludes to the myth of Prometheus' gift of heavenly fire to men. If we cannot quite rule out the possibility of an additional, Mithraic, reference, the possibility is very faint. And either way, my broader argument stands. At most, we would have a

piquant paradox to savour: the best evidence to be had of a Mithraic content in Julian's philosophic theorizing would not be found in the hymn that supposedly blended it with a Platonist theology in praise of 'Helios–Mithras', but in a passing detail of ambiguous significance in the hymn to Cybele.

The overall influence of Iamblichan theory in the hymn to Cybele, in any event, is not in doubt.[101] As in *To King Helios*, theurgic writings were clearly in the writer's mind. The intimate connection proposed between Cybele and the supreme noetic principle has an exact parallel in the association of Hecate and the Paternal Nous in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, and a verbal echo to boot,[102] and there are several other quotations of Chaldaean neologisms and phrases to be found: *skybalon*, for matter (three times);[103] *heptaktis* and *anagôgos*, referring to a doctrine of psychic elevation 'familiar to the theurgists';[104] 'mortal husk of raw matter',[105] of the body. The prayer which closes the hymn begs the goddess to grant the author 'perfection in theurgy'.[106] In fact, a theurgist's exegesis of Metroac myth and ritual lies at the heart of the work: the interest Julian displays in Metroac data is philosophic in the qualified sense that it interprets them as illustrations of the principles of a theurgic Platonism. All the same, the contrast with Mithraism and the hymn to Helios remains. In the *To King Helios*, there was to be no analogous exegesis – nor even passing mention – of Mithraic doctrines or rituals. Assuming that Julian had knowledge of these to bring to bear if he had wished – which I do assume – his silence can be read in different ways.

One solution – an unsatisfactory one – would be that his Mithraic faith was too intensely personal to be comfortably subjected to appraisal of this sort. We must allow the possibility, but very grudgingly: as a psychological judgement, it is impossible to verify or refute, but it is hard to believe that Julian's devotion to theurgy was any less intense, and he was willing enough to refer to theurgic doctrines. It seems better, then, to look for an answer not so much in Julian's personal traits as in a peculiarity in Mithraism itself. The true nature of Mithraic doctrine remains in deep dispute and we can only speculate, but perhaps the very ease with which Metroac material is Platonized by Julian is telling. On one controversial recent view, we have seen, the Mithraic doctrine of salvation was highly distinctive, and markedly less amenable to Platonizing interpretation; on another, much of the imagery in Mithraic iconography which is conventionally supposed to represent scenes from a story

of Mithras' life does not relate to *events* in a mythological narrative at all, but rather points to an astrological theory with a central place in Mithraic doctrine.[107] But the basic notion that Mithraic doctrine ran counter to the common flow is not so new: Nock long ago conjectured that in Mithraism – he contrasted it here with other Mystery religions – there was a peculiar 'core of philosophy' that did not lend itself to any systematic interpretation on the conceptual terms assumed by Greek philosophy. On that view, the appeal of the cult might seem to lie more in the notes of exertion and energy it sounded than in the note of revelation; Julian might look to Mithras as a moral guide, commander and redeemer, yet turn to the doctrines of the theurgic Mysteries when he pondered on the universe and the place of the soul within it.[108]

THE CULTS OF MITHRAS AND CYBELE AND THE GODS OF THE ROMAN STATE

There remains a final major issue to consider: the place accorded by Julian to the Mithraic and Metroac cults in his imperial policy and practice. Here too, I will argue, the cults present contrasting cases. It will be best, however, to treat the question without recourse to what has been said about the relation of Julian's Mithraic and Metroac interests to the ideological basis of the hymns: there, our concern lay with the private man, with his theurgy and his cultured interests as an exegete; here, it lies with a political programme of pagan restoration and the role of the two cults in it.

It is an old idea that the value Mithraism put on energy and exertion in the face of difficulties made a strong appeal to Roman sensibilities. At first sight, that might seem to make it a plausible instrument of imperial policy and publicity. Cumont had no doubts on that score, and allotted the cult a clear political significance in the third and fourth centuries. In his *Mystères de Mithra*, he gave a chapter over to 'Mithra et le pouvoir impérial'. He argued that from the time of Commodus onwards, the Emperors tended to extend protection and special favour to Mithraism – in which connection he picked out in particular the reigns of Aurelian, the Tetrarchs and Julian. And in his view, their 'faveur constante' could not be put down to a passing vogue or to individual preferences: the cult found a place in imperial ideology because it answered to a political need; the Emperors found in its doctrines 'un appui pour leur politique personnelle et un soutien pour les prétensions autocratiques'.[109] Two

doctrines in particular, Cumont believed, played a part in the development of the style of imperial government that Rostovtzeff was to call the 'Oriental Despotism'. First, a concept of a divine grace that legitimated and increased the power of 'true' princes, and brought about the ruin of pretenders and usurpers. This conception – so the argument ran[110] – added resonance and depth to a notion already established in imperial ideology in the guise of the Fortune of the Emperor, and was to be linked with the adoption of such titles as *Felix* and *Invictus*: it affirmed that the ultimate proof of a ruler's worth was his success – above all else, his success in war. And Cumont believed that a second 'Mithraic' doctrine, to do with the pre-existence of souls and the manner of their descent to earth, further emphasized the association of Emperors with gods, enhancing imperial claims to divinity by its implication that the descending soul of a king was invested with power by the sun and so became its earthly representative.[111]

It will be evident from my earlier outline of the direction Mithraic studies have taken since Cumont was writing that these arguments are open to serious doubt.[112] The first takes for granted an untestified transposition into Western Mithraism of a much earlier Mazdean doctrine; the second observes no distinction between imperial involvement with solar cult in general and with Mithraism in particular, as if the former self-evidently implied a specifically Mithraic component in imperial ideology. And a closer examination can only increase one's scepticism. The claim is that Mithraism was promoted as a feature of imperial policy. At first sight, dedications by Mithraists *pro salute imperatoris* may seem suggestive, but dedications of that sort were never unique to Mithraism, nor even particularly prominent in it.[113] The acts of loyal subjects, some of them Mithraists, in any case do nothing to show that Mithraism was ever encouraged from above on political grounds. As for numismatic evidence – however it is to be interpreted in general in relation to imperial 'policy' – the fact is that the Roman imperial coinage from Commodus to Julian has not a single effigy of Mithras (as opposed to *Sol*) to show.[114] For evidence of active promotion of the god, one has to look for allusions to him in public inscriptions, and here one meets an almost total blank. We hear once of a *sacerdos invicti Mithrae domus Augustanae* under the Severans, but in this case we need to allow for the presence in the palace of Julia Domna and her friends: we are surely dealing with a domestic chaplain of some kind, not a figure in any newly created official priesthood.[115] In fact, the

single clear instance of imperial involvement in Mithraic cult in a public setting is Tetrarchic. In 308, Diocletian, Galerius, Maximian and Licinius jointly consecrated a *mithraeum* when they met to confer at Carnuntum on the Danube, and commemorated their action with a dedication to 'Unconquered Mithras, Sun God, Protector of their Empire' (*Deo Soli Invicto Mithrae, fautori imperii sui*).[116]

Much has been made of this episode, but a good case has been made recently for a more modest reading of it.[117] The crucial detail is the locality. Carnuntum was a major cult-centre of Mithraists; the act of the Tetrarchs could well be specifically aimed at maintaining the loyalty of the Danubian legions, in whose ranks an unusual concentration of Mithraists was to be found – an act with political overtones, certainly, but one performed within a local setting. Just so, Julian would take care when he addressed the Alexandrians to appeal to local sentiment; in his letter to them it is 'great Serapis' before all other gods who confers on him 'the right to rule the world'.[118] The very uniqueness of the Carnuntum dedication lends support to a reading of this kind; where the Tetrarchs set up temples in other parts of the Empire, they were to other gods, and the official theology of the regime was emphatically traditional at base, with Jupiter serving as its highest patron deity.

If this view of the episode is correct, the case for a privileged place for Mithras in imperial policy must turn on the role assigned to *Sol Invictus*. It is common knowledge that Mithras was often addressed by this title, but Cumont himself accepted that by no means all inscriptions which mention *Sol Invictus* were Mithraic. I have already alluded to the complexity of ancient heliolatry: even reckoned simply as an object of worship – and as we have seen, over and above that the Sun also served as an intellectual concept in philosophy – *Sol* was a god worshipped by a good many cults, and numerous gods came to be identified as solar associates or manifestations. Syncretizing tendencies in the High and later Empire were clearly at play here (though it is quite another question, whether there is reason to speak of a 'solar monotheism' in the context of pagan cult, or of homogeneous 'native' cults of the Sun).[119] It is not hard, then, to see why he might appeal to Emperors as symbolic of the unity they desired in the state, and why they might encourage his worship.[120] Indeed, imperial promotion of solar cult had a firm precedent in the policy of the first Emperor. Augustus seems to have looked to Apollo as his special protector. By building a great temple on the Palatine,

he made him a powerful supporter of the State: as *Sol*, he was presented as midwife to a second age of gold.[121] To find the practice at its peak, of course, we look to the third century, and to the founding by Aurelian of a state cult of *Sol Invictus* at Rome. The episode is crucial to the Cumontian argument, but it calls for subtle appraisal. I have indicated the difficulties already in another connection:[122] here, I simply note that whether or not Aurelian was at all influenced in his action by his earlier experiences at Emesa in Syria, the cult he founded was certainly not Mithraic. It was organized on very traditional lines, with a huge temple in the Campus Martius,[123] public games and an official college of priests. In pagan discourse, the Sun could symbolize the power of a king: Aurelian's choice of the Sun as the god of his new cult was made with that in mind – and quite likely, too, with an eye to the Sun's established status as a deity worshipped in a range of cultic settings by many of his subjects. Those worshippers included Mithraists, but nothing compels us to think that Aurelian's cult was tailored to Mithraism in particular, or that it was intended to supplant other cults or to bring about a uniformity of worship.[124] His *Sol Invictus* is no more to be identified exclusively with Mithras than with the various other solar deities that were worshipped among the legions and in the cities of the Empire.

Indeed, Cumont's argument can be turned on its head. If it was the purpose of Aurelian to promote worship of the Sun as an expression of imperial power, it might seem telling that he chose to found a cult with a more overtly Roman face than any existing solar religion of his day could show. It is perhaps a mark of his astuteness in the matter that Julian's own Constantinian dynasty would afterwards take care to emphasize its connection with *Sol Invictus*; notoriously, the association continued to appear in the coinage of Constantine himself for several years after his 'conversion'.[125] The continuity of practice illustrates the striking scope of the image's appeal: as a symbol of a supreme god, the Sun was acceptable to many Christians as well as to pagans.[126]

Julian's aim was hardly to pander to Christian sensibilities; none the less, a lesson could be drawn from Aurelian's precedent, and Julian was arguably sensitive to it. The occasion of the hymn to Helios, after all, was precisely the festival of Aurelian's *Sol* – in which connection it is notable that Julian's prayer to Helios as ancestral protector of Rome in the hymn occurs directly after a passage given over to *Sol Invictus* and his *Heliaia*.[127] We can press the point further,

to suggest that in specific respects Mithraism was positively ill-suited to serve as an instrument of statecraft in a pagan restoration. In particular, three interrelated features seem a hindrance: the 'newness' of Mithraism, its exclusivity and its connections, real or imagined, with the East – and specifically with Persia.

Julian looks to have had an inkling of the difficulty. The hedging tone of the reference to Mithras in the hymn to Helios – he is adduced to support a point, then abruptly dropped in order to avoid 'speaking of more recent things'[128] – appears to mark a recognition that Mithras' relatively late arrival on the Roman scene made his status somehow dubious. The problem was perhaps not strictly novelty as such. Aurelian's cult was still more recent; but it had been set up from the first as a public entity. Julian could not do the same with Mithraism. It was not so novel as to have made no general impression – and here the other two features come into play. In popular estimation, the cult seemed exotic and inward-looking, a thing apart.[129] Unlike the Metroac or Isiac cults, it had never been integrated into the network of public worship. There were no public processions or festivals, and women were entirely excluded;[130] even Mithraic sacrifice, we have seen, may have had a significance peculiarly its own, and the Mithraic ideal of priestly authority looks to have been similarly distinctive against the setting of the traditional Graeco-Roman civic model of priesthood.[131] For all its wide dissemination through the Empire, the cult remained – literally – underground: a god whose rites were performed exclusively by male initiates in the seclusion of subterranean chambers lacked a crucial public dimension and was an unlikely candidate for promotion as the supreme divinity and guardian of the Roman world.

On top of this there is the fact that the 'orientalism' of Mithraism had a specifically Persian complexion. On one view, this was the most decisive hindrance of all to its unqualified promotion in imperial ideology.[132] The assimilation of a Cybele or an Isis, the argument runs, was in part an expression of Roman self-confidence: it needs to be seen in the light of the successful incorporation of Asia Minor and Egypt into the Empire. Persia, by contrast, was an alien culture never decisively broken. She remained a long-standing enemy, and an increasingly powerful and aggressive one: for Julian, as for the third-century Emperors, she constituted the major external threat to the Empire.[133]

Unsurprisingly, a strain of anti-Persian feeling persisted in traditionalist ideology. Persia was not just a military threat, but an affront

to solid Roman values, a source of evil. The tone of Diocletian's edict against the Manichees gives the flavour, with its castigation of their attempt, 'by means of the deplorable customs and perverted laws of the Persians, to infect men less offensive in their nature, the virtuous Roman people and our entire peaceful world'.[134] Ammianus' tone is generally cooler, but there is comparable language to be found in places: his digression on the Persian Empire notes both the immensity of its size and resources, and the moral failings of its 'threatening, crafty, haughty, cruel' inhabitants and their 'abominable laws' (23.6.80f). Mithras, it is true, was sufficiently Romanized to escape the sort of odium which attached to Mani: nevertheless, he was compromised by the Persian connection, and no Emperor – least of all one who planned a major Persian campaign – could afford utterly to neglect cultural sensitivities in the matter.

There are signs that Julian recognized that and was perceived to act accordingly. The reports of sympathetic contemporaries ascribe to him the conviction that Persia posed a capital threat to the Roman world. Ammianus puts a Catonian sentiment into his mouth – *abolenda nobis natio molestissima* – and has him characterize Persians as treacherous and cunning; that is a literary set piece, but Libanius tells how a Persian peace proposal sent to Antioch was dismissed out of hand.[135] Another speech of Libanius, prompted by Julian's initial successes on the campaign, looked forward to a conclusive triumph over 'the ancestral *hybris* of the Persian', and cast the Emperor in the tradition of Alexander.[136] That was not just an orator's conceit: the image seems to have had special resonance for Julian. The *Caesars*, composed at the time the Persian expedition was being planned, not only allows Alexander a place in a competition between Roman Emperors, but makes him one of the strongest contestants by reason of his Persian conquests; conversely, it is a major charge against Constantine in the work that 'his campaigns against the barbarian covered him in ridicule, for he paid them tribute, so to speak, and gave his attention to pleasure.'[137]

This uncompromisingly traditionalist presentation of the Emperor finds a clear echo in the testimonies, epigraphic and literary, to Julian's public piety. An inscription from Jordan sets the tone with its stress on the venerable link between the well-being of the Empire and the keeping of the 'peace of the gods', and on Julian's role as High Priest of the State: 'To the Liberator of the Roman World, Restorer of the Temples, Destroyer of the Barbarians ... Our Lord Julian, Perpetual Augustus ... Pontifex Maximus ...'[138] It is

especially apt if it is dated to May 363, in which case it will allude – in the event, unhappily – to the Persian campaign. Certainly, the impression it conveys accords with reports in Ammianus and Libanius of Julian's acts of public devotion in the build-up to the campaign and in the course of it. Both of them note a detour made *en route* to Antioch to worship at Cybele's famous temple at Pessinus,[139] and later, at Callinicum in Mesopotamia, Julian was scrupulous in observing her Roman festival of 27 March.[140] Again, they both recount a sacrifice to the Antiochene Zeus Casius on his festal day: both imply that his cult had solar connotations – there was a sacrifice at sunrise, and probably another at high noon.[141] There was another sacrifice to Zeus at Beroea, on the march from Antioch.[142] The importance Julian attached to these devotions can be gleaned from a passage in the *Against the Galilaeans*, itself composed at Antioch: in the time of Numa, 'mighty Zeus gave a warrant that he would always hold his shield before our city [Rome].'[143]

So too, worship of Apollo was actively promoted. In *To King Helios*, Julian identified Helios with Palatine Apollo, guardian of the Augustan order.[144] Around the same time, he took steps to restore major Apolline centres at Daphne and at Didyma;[145] in the case of Didyma, he says himself that he acts in his capacity as Pontifex Maximus and Prophet of Didyma.[146] We hear too of a mission to the Delphic oracle undertaken by Oribasius on Julian's orders.[147]

At Antioch itself, we know from Ammianus, Julian's appetite for sacrifice did not win him popularity. But special factors were at play there: the sight of soldiers gorged on sacrificial meats was not likely to please the inhabitants of a largely Christian city in the grip of a corn shortage.[148] In any case, our immediate interest lies not with the practical consequences of his actions, but rather with the impulse behind them. The impression he wished to create can be guessed at from the tone of speeches composed by Libanius at the time. One – delivered on 1 January 363 – declares that Julian has made a bulwark for the Empire by winning back the favour of the gods after a period of neglect.[149] The Persians, indeed, are already as good as defeated: 'The many sacrifices have destroyed the enemy.'[150] Another speech, intended to repair the breach that had arisen between the Antiochenes and their Emperor, recalls the many shrines at Antioch at which Julian has worshipped. The city 'has given many gods to be your allies. You have sacrificed to them, you have soldiered with them: Hermes, Pan, Demeter, Ares, Calliope [the patroness of Antioch], Apollo, the Zeus of the Mountain, the Zeus of the City.'[151]

In short, the testimonies to Julian's public piety at this time reveal a basic concern to propitiate well-established gods of the Roman State, and some sensitivity (the problems at Antioch notwithstanding) to local pagan allegiances. Gods long viewed as special protectors of Rome are particularly prominent: Zeus/Jupiter, Apollo, Cybele. Mithras, by contrast – even if one focuses on Julian's promotion of paganism within the legions, at first sight a setting more promising than most for Mithraic proselytism – is notable only for his absence from the pertinent evidence, literary and epigraphic.

This brute fact must count heavily against any notion that Julian attempted to elevate Mithraism in the public sphere, whether as an instrument of ideology or simply as the act of an enthusiastic devotee. It constitutes an argument from silence, certainly; but in this case, the silence of Julian and his contemporaries is precisely the issue.

There is a further point. It arises from Julian's ideal of a philosophic ruler, of the applicability of philosophy to the sphere of public action. I have discussed that issue in Chapter Two, and need not rehearse its details now. I simply recall the emphasis Julian put on the virtues of *philanthrôpia* and *civilitas*, and the practical forms they took in an Emperor's behaviour: mildness, the observance of due processes of law, generosity in public expenditure, affability towards subjects, an impatience with pomp and flattery. That ideal was no new thing; it was very familiar to readers of Dio Chrysostom two centuries before Julian ruled.[152] Julian's self-promotion in such terms – the fact is amply attested – has prompted talk of his 'reactionary' or 'democratic' views on kingship.[153] That is misleading, if it is to imply that those views seemed bizarre and outdated to contemporaries, but certainly they harked back to an imperial style associated with the High Empire, with Antoninus and with Julian's exemplar Marcus. The point lies in the contrast between this style and the elevation of the Emperor's person and power which characterized the public image of a Diocletian. Cumont's general claim was that Mithraism was promoted because the emphasis that its doctrines put on the 'military virtues' supported 'autocratic pretensions'; but even if that were granted in the case of a militarist disciplinarian such as Diocletian, the authoritarian note would hardly suit the imperial ethos of the *civilis princeps* which Julian very evidently wished to foster. In that case, we will doubt all the more if Julian could ever have used Mithraism to serve his political aims.

The conclusion to draw is plain. The notion that Julian promoted Mithraism as a feature of his imperial policy may be discarded: it

finds no support in the relevant evidence, and it rests on a broader claim about the cult's political significance which seems markedly inappropriate in Julian's own case, and likely enough wrong in the round.

There is no mistaking the contrast presented by the Metroac cult on this score. The evidence shows that Julian was quite prepared to take practical steps to publicize his imperial favour for a cult in which he had a personal interest as an initiate. In addition to the sacrifices to Cybele attested by Libanius and Ammianus, we can point to two letters he wrote at Antioch which reveal a personal interest in the fortunes of the cult at its ancestral centre at Pessinus. In one, he extravagantly praises a priestess of Demeter for her constancy to the gods throughout the reign of Constantius: to reward her exemplary piety, he appoints her priestess at Pessinus.[154] The second is still more telling. Writing to the High Priest of Galatia, Julian complains that 'Hellenism' does not yet prosper to his satisfaction. By way of remedy, he urges, the practice of *philanthrôpia* by pagans, priestly and lay, must be protected – to fail in that is virtually impiety, and government officials must be seen to visit the priests in their temples.[155] These were instructions designed to increase the general awareness of the ancestral and integral place of the cults in civic life, and it seems that in making them Julian had the Metroac cult squarely in mind. At the close of the letter, he turned to a particular case:

> I am prepared to assist the people of Pessinus provided that they supplicate the Mother of the Gods; if they neglect her, they will suffer my wrath. . . . Persuade them, then, if they seek my patronage, that the whole community must be supplicants of the Mother.'

This down-to-earth and rather menacing admonition discloses Julian's strong feelings in the matter. The ideological basis of his attitude is evident from the start and end of *To the Mother of the Gods*. That hymn, which presents itself as the Emperor's celebration *in absentia* of the Roman festival of the Great Mother, opens with a strong affirmation of Cybele's role as ancestral protector of the state, recounting the celebrated transfer of her cult statue from Pessinus to Rome at a critical point in the war against Hannibal.[156] The same theme recurs in the prayer to the Mother that closes the work: 'Grant to the community of the Roman people that they cleanse themselves of the stain of godlessness, and grant them good fortune, by which they may guide their Empire for many thousands of years.'[157]

In that prayer, Julian coupled his appeal on the Empire's behalf with a more personal request, begging to be made perfect in theurgy. It would be wrong, though, to think that the secure place he evidently gave Cybele in his pagan revival was merely the consequence of his private devotion to her. Whatever the force of personal sentiment, there were other good reasons to support her cult: it was well suited to serve his political purposes on several counts. To outline these advantages is implicitly to reiterate Mithraism's failings as an instrument of imperial politics.

I remarked in Chapter Five that the provision Metroac religion made for private mysteries did not markedly restrict its social appeal; of those who attended its festivals, the majority were not initiates. Nor was it the preserve of a single sex: women participated freely at festivals and *taurobolia* and served as priestesses.[158] In these respects, it did not much differ from Mystery religions in general, except for Mithraism; but the unusual breadth of Cybele's appeal is witnessed by the geographic spread of the cult. Here the contrast with Mithraism is significant. Outside Italy, Mithras had flourished principally in the military frontier provinces.[159] Cybele made some headway there, though her appeal to soldiers was never comparable. But Mithras failed to put down roots in huge tracts of the Empire where Cybele prospered. In Asia Minor, for instance, the worship of the Mother in one local guise or another had long been almost ubiquitous. In the West, Cybele had taken firm hold in the provinces of Gaul and Africa – above all in the ports and cities along the major road routes linking them to Italy – and, of course, in Italy itself. In this setting, the cult came to hold a potent attraction for provincial and municipal worthies – a feature witnessed alike by dedications and by the fact that Cybele's was the only 'oriental' cult for which municipalities constructed temples.[160]

The popularity of the cult at this level was surely due in part to its perceived standing at Rome itself. The Palatine cult could boast long-established official status as part of the *sacra publica*, and – from its earliest days – a famous association with the well-being of the city and its Empire. Worship of the Mother could serve to assert a community's sense of Roman identity and its loyalty to the Roman order. Rome was certainly regarded as the centre of the cult: that much is clear from inscriptions which show the active part played by the *quindecimviri* in the 'transference' of the *taurobolium* to Lyon in 161 and in the appointment of local priests at Cumae (251) and Baiae (289).[161]

Given this history of wide geographic spread and appeal to civic sentiment, and the signs of centralized control, it is tempting to suggest that the potential utility of the cult was not lost on an Emperor whose policy of pagan restoration was coupled with the promotion of the civic ideal of philanthropy and the restitution of a measure of financial and administrative autonomy to the cities of the Empire. More than that, imperial support of the cult had attractive Antonine precedents, in the wake of which the *taurobolium*, assimilated into Metroac practice in the second century, came to have political significance as a favoured medium of sacrifices *pro salute imperatoris*.[162] The custom was still current in the time of Diocletian and Maximian, who are honoured in just this fashion in a taurobolic inscription from Africa.[163]

This is the last *taurobolium* we know to have been performed *pro salute imperatoris*, but the Tetrarchic period is also notable for several *taurobolia* celebrated at Rome itself – the first attested for the capital, as it happens – by senators at pains to record their status as augurs or *quindecimviri*.[164] Of those rites, one at least took place at a sanctuary on the Vatican, and throughout the fourth century *taurobolia* performed in that locality continued to hold appeal for a traditionalist circle. The depth of feeling involved is hinted at by an inscription found there which speaks of the *taurobolium* as 'restoring the light after twenty-eight years of darkness'. The phrase may denote the end of the rule of the sons of Constantine (in which case it neatly witnesses a revival of the rite in Julian's reign), or else – perhaps as likely – the end of an enforced closure of the sanctuary during the construction of St Peter's.[165] In either case, it marks the persisting appeal of Cybele around the mid-century after prolonged difficulties connected with the imperial promotion of the Church.

To appreciate it fully, we should read it in the light of a celebrated series of rather later dedications from the same sanctuary. They run through the 370s and 380s, recording the *taurobolia* of a number of aristocratic devotees, culminating in those of a former Urban Prefect and the last known augur in 390.[166] The rites they commemorate were not public, but they show the proud adherence of prominent figures to pagan tradition around the time that Symmachus and Praetextatus led their attempt to preserve its place in the public ceremonies of the city: Praetextatus, formerly Julian's governor of Achaea, is himself attested at Rome as a *tauroboliatus*.[167] Further, those who celebrated these Metroac rites evidently saw them as peculiarly expressive of a broader pagan sensibility: several took the

opportunity to recall in the dedications not only their official posts as augurs and *quindecimviri*, but also their priesthoods of a number of other cults besides Cybele's. In this manner, some are revealed as Mithraists, and there is no reason to doubt that in these circles Mithraism too provided a focus for pagan sentiment.[168] Half a dozen Roman inscriptions of the years 357–9, 362 and 376 show Senatorial Fathers officiating at Mithraic initiations.[169] They are unusual among Mithraic testimonies in that, like the taurobolic dedications at issue, they date the rites involved precisely – a feature that may well mark the self-consciousness of the devotees in the face of Christianization.[170] The point to note here, however, is that it was under the aegis of Cybele and her *taurobolia* that those who were impelled to declare their status as augurs and *quindecimviri* or their other cultic allegiances saw fit to do so.[171]

These *taurobolia* were performed by a close-knit clique of aristocrats at Rome in the decades following Julian's death, and nostalgia will have counted for something: the last pagan Emperor's known regard for Cybele cannot but have had a considerable appeal for this circle. The real question lies with the social and political significance of the Metroac practices of a group of this kind. The *taurobolia* at issue have figured prominently in a modern account of 'the pagan revival in the West' in the late fourth century, but that was to claim far too much for them – and for the wider notion itself.[172] They record the private devotions of a circle increasingly hard-pressed to resist the inroads of the Church; their concentration on the Vatican sanctuary arguably reflects the sad fortunes of the state cult and its festival in the wake of Gratian's withdrawal of funds for the maintenance of public cults;[173] the multiple priesthoods of the dedicants may witness their piety, but they hint too at a scarcity of persons willing to serve as cultic officials. Certainly, we cannot infer that pagan resistance in those years was inspired more by the oriental cults than by the religion of the Roman state, or that pagans at the time classified one another in those terms.[174] Still, that is not the whole story: the devotion of Praetextatus and his friends to Cybele was not merely the nostalgia of the politically quiescent, and we need not think it was quite devoid of political significance in their eyes. Praetextatus himself, after all, had been governor of Achaea in Julian's reign; still in post after Julian's death, he had stoutly and successfully resisted an attempt by Valentinian to outlaw the observance of the Mysteries there.[175] More strikingly, there is the prominent place of Cybele in the pagan restoration attempted at Rome under

Eugenius by Nihomachus Flavianus, the Praetorian Prefect of Italy in 393–4, an associate of Symmachus and probably himself a *tauroboliatus*: in 394, the March festival of Cybele and Attis that Julian had observed from a distance in 362 and 363 was celebrated in the city with some pomp; so too, in April, were the Mother's Megalensian games.[176]

These were ceremonies belonging to the state cult on the Palatine rather than to the Vatican sanctuary, but there is reason to doubt if the public and the private were rigidly divorced in the minds of the devotees in question. Besides, the Vatican sanctuary had a public dimension as early as 160, by which time it was viewed as a focus of the provincial cult of the Mother administered by the *quindecimviri*;[177] and while the formal relationship between it and the Mother's Palatine cult is not entirely clear, there is evidence to suggest a link existed: the timetabling of the March festival of the Palatine Mother and the *taurobolia* on the Vatican was complementary.[178] And if a recent reading of the numismatic evidence is accepted, the public profile of the Phrygianum on the Vatican will be put beyond doubt. It was long since observed that the Great Mother figures on a number of the commemorative medallions – the contorniates – belonging to the late fourth century.[179] On three such, she is seated at the entrance to a distinctive temple, and surrounded by the legend *Matri Deum Salutari*. A tentative case has lately been made for the identification of the temple in question with the Phrygianum.[180] If that is right, the sanctuary can hardly be denied some public significance; and even if the identification is rejected, the fact of Cybele's appearance on the medallions would still be suggestive. It was the habit once to view the Roman contorniates as pagan propagandist items distributed among the populace of the city on public occasions from the mid-fourth century onwards. As a general interpretation, that is no longer accepted;[181] but we can still grant them some force on this score, and the case of the contorniates distributed when Nihomachus Flavianus was Prefect could seem rather special. Cybele's presence on them would support the suggestion that the importance her cult had in the setting of his short-lived pagan reaction at Rome in the 390s was more than marginal. Exactly when they were struck cannot be known for certain,[182] but the precise date is not the issue; the important point is that in Julian's day, and for some years afterwards, the Metroac cult at Rome had a public profile which a pagan activist might think to exploit.

We know of Nihomachus Flavianus' celebration of the Metroac

festivals from a Christian source – which prompts a final observation. The ferocity with which Christian polemicists attacked a given cult might seem to tell something about its power to appeal to pagan contemporaries,[183] and in the fourth century their attacks are directed with particular violence against the Metroac cult. As well as the *Poem against the Pagans*, with its garish account of the celebration of the March festival in 394, we can point to the poem *To a Senator who has Turned away from the Christian Religion to the Service of Idols*, in which the addressee is castigated for returning to the worship of Cybele and Isis.[184] One thinks too of the treatment of Cybele and Attis at the hands of Firmicus in a tract of the 340s which closed with a demand for a general persecution of pagans.[185] And there are also Christian responses of another colour to consider. At Rome in 389, four years before Flavianus' pagan 'revival', a powerful noblewoman – Serena, the wife of Stilicho – entered the Palatine temple of the Mother, stripped the cult image of its necklace and hung it on herself.[186] The victim, one suspects, was shrewdly selected: Serena's display of Christian zeal was calculated to give the greatest possible offence to Roman pagans. And there is an intriguing detail to the story. Serena was not the only lady at the temple that day: Rome's last Vestal Virgin, we are told, witnessed the insult to Cybele and voiced her outrage. The ancestral cult of Vesta had been deprived of state funding seven years earlier and was now in rapid decline; the priestess of Rome's Eternal Flame now looked to the Mother of the Gods for refuge.

In the New Rome in the East, meanwhile, not all the Emperor's subjects were observing the decrees that outlawed sacrifice.[187] The names of the gods they honoured are not disclosed, but we know the name of one who had been the city's special friend since its earliest days. When the mythical founder Byzas chose his site on the Hellespont, his first act was to build a house for the goddess Rhea. She became the protecting deity of Byzantium; her temple, the *Tycheion*, was the city's Luck, and even when Constantine founded his Christian capital there, she did not go away. In what had been until that time the main square of the city, Constantine built two adjacent temples; one housed a statue of the Fortune of Rome, one a statue of the goddess. Rhea had another name: the Mother of the Gods.[188]

Theurgic Neoplatonism and Mithraism are dense and controversial subjects, and their bearing on Julian's involvement with Mystery

cults is often problematic; it has made for a long account. I now briefly summarize my main conclusions, and suggest what they imply.

The places of Mithras and Cybele in Julian's thinking and actions reflect the fact that their cults differed notably in their organization and manner of appeal. We need not question the strength of his personal devotion on either score: the Mithraic initiation that some find doubtful is well supported by the weight of circumstantial evidence. On the other hand, the significance of his Mithraism has been greatly overestimated. For a number of reasons, philosophic and political, Julian was disposed to follow a dynastic precedent and to lay special stress on the divinity of the Sun and his own devotion to it. The effect of Mithraism proper on his philosophic outlook was marginal, however. Arguably, that was because Mithraic doctrine, while naturally of interest to a Neoplatonist who was also an initiate of the cult, was resistant to systematic Platonist interpretation. In any case, the hymn to Helios is a text that is firmly rooted in Iamblichan theurgy, not in values or doctrines peculiarly distinctive of Mithraism. Nor is there any good evidence that Julian in his public actions was intending to promote specifically Mithraic cult worship or teachings. That omission seems all the more telling for his personal allegiance: it hints at an awareness that Mithraism was ill suited to serve his public programme of pagan restoration. In short, Julian's Mithraism belonged squarely with the private man. In the nature of the question, the deep impulses behind it are elusive. If need be, Julian could no doubt rationalize his faith, in a fashion, in Neoplatonist terms. But there are hints that it spoke loudest to another part of his mind, less speculative than energetic, and that his Mithraism went hand in hand with another initiation, into the society of soldiers.

By comparison, too little tends to be made of his Metroac interests. They first developed, likely enough, in the wake of his theurgic conversion: certainly, he later interpreted the mythology and ritual of the cult to illustrate theurgic principles. But their particular significance lies in the fact that in this case there was a political dimension too. Julian's personal tastes for 'oriental' religions and theurgy were undeniable, but his plans for a pagan restoration were less outlandish than might be supposed on the strength of them. A century earlier, the entirely unphilosophic Emperor Decius had been honoured as *Restitutor Sacrorum*, 'Restorer of the Cults':[189] so now, I have hinted, Julian's own devotion in its public face had deep roots in long-established Graeco-Roman practice. In Cybele, for all her

Phrygian pedigree, he found a goddess firmly placed in that tradition, both in local cult and in the Palatine Great Mother with her offshoots in the Western provinces and her hallowed link with Pessinus. He found too a cult which for a century and a half before Constantine had been associated through its ritual with the well-being of the Emperors and the Empire. On these counts, Cybele was a valuable friend for an Emperor who hoped to see a pagan restoration, and the place she found alongside the Apollos of Didyma and Daphne and the Zeuses of the Capitol and Mount Casius in Julian's public piety suggests that he was by no means blind to the fact. Through her worship, so he thought, the Empire could be cleansed of 'the stain of atheism' (*Or.* 5.180b). By that he meant the Christians. In my final chapter, I turn to Julian's 'apostasy', and to the activist pagan politics in which it was to culminate.

7

THE APOSTATE AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS

Julian has been remembered above all else as 'the Apostate' – the descriptive title was already familiar by the early fifth century.[1] He provides the best-known instance from antiquity of a conversion (I use the term loosely for now) away from Christianity. His defection has been much discussed, and not only for its intrinsic interest: the impulses behind it cannot but have had a bearing on the critical arguments that Julian later levelled against Christian teachings in his *Against the Galilaeans* and on the public action he directed as Emperor against the Church and its activities. But if that much is true in a general way, it is a highly unspecific truth that leaves a lot unclear. Quite what do we mean when we say that Julian converted? And how are we to envisage the interrelationships of the conversion, the anti-Christian critique and the political measures?

I will begin by discussing the conversion (pp. 180–9). The problem, it will be evident, arises partly from the state of the evidence. Any account of Julian's conversion must begin from what he has to tell. What he said directly amounts to very little, though: a few remarks made in passing in works that were written ten years after the episode to which they relate. We need to distinguish carefully between what they reveal about his attitude to Christians as Emperor, and what they reveal retrospectively about the conversion, in which connection what he says is likely to be in some degree partial, or self-justificatory, or distorted by a Neoplatonist's hindsight.[2] Simply in terms of the evidence, then – to say nothing of the complexity of 'conversion' as an intellectual concept[3] – the psychological origins and course of Julian's conversion are highly problematic. On one view, indeed, they are a puzzle with no historical answer, and better left aside.[4] My own view is less radical: it is futile, I believe, to try to reconstruct the psychological process at play in any detail; but I will

suggest that we can still read back with profit to aspects of it from Julian's retrospective testimony.

An account of the critical arguments (pp. 189–207) and the political measures (pp. 207–16) that Julian later directed against Christians at least avoids the problem posed by retrospective testimony. But even here, when we ask how the intellectual critique and the public actions are related, we have to allow for the possibility that what Julian said or did at a given time can mislead us about his basic attitude and intentions. At one level, this bears on a central question about his consistency of political purpose in the reign. On one view, Julian's experiences at Antioch led him to take a markedly less tolerant approach to Christians than the one he had envisaged earlier in his reign; on another, 'he never contemplated any other solution than total elimination [and] his view was utterly intolerant from the start.'[5] At another level, the problem bears on Julian's own justification of his attitude and actions. A rescript of 362 forbade Christians to teach classical literature on the ground that one cannot in good faith expound the works of pagan authors if one denies the existence of the gods who were honoured in those works.[6] Later, in the *Against the Galilaeans*, he set out to prove that Christianity was a 'falsehood contrived by evil'.[7] Several of his arguments there find parallels in the work of earlier critics of the Christian religion. But do these facts imply that Julian's attitude to Christians was firmly rooted in an intellectual conviction, or merely that he felt the need to justify a hostility which stemmed from feelings far less easily rationalized? In the end, there is no avoiding a hard question: What was it at root that he so disliked about the Christians and their religion, and was his complaint one that many other pagans shared?

I will keep this basic issue in mind in my discussion, but with an awareness that in this matter there is a point beyond which nothing useful can be said. I deal first with more tractable questions: to begin, the setting of Julian's conversion as the evidence discloses it; then the arguments Julian uses to criticize Christianity, their intellectual level and their bearing on the policies he devised to damage it.

JULIAN'S CONVERSION

What is implied when we speak of a religious 'conversion'? In a classic study of conversion in antiquity, A.D. Nock started with the premise that a central feature of the phenomenon was its intensity in the eyes of the person who experienced it. It implied not merely a

process by which certain beliefs were replaced by others; it involved a new and exclusive type of adherence, 'body and soul', to the new beliefs, and a sharp sense of the error and repugnance of one's former ways.[8] Nock himself accepted that this was to define conversion in Judaeo-Christian terms: indeed, it was a large part of his argument that conversion in this sense was not typically a significant feature in ancient paganism except in a special context: conversion to philosophy. Given Julian's Neoplatonist affiliations, one might easily be led to explain his case in that fashion. Nock did not do that, however. He found in Julian an exceptional case of pagan religious conversion – an exception, though, which could be largely explained by appeal to his 'passionate nature', and in the light of an upbringing which had produced a man 'saturated with Christian thought'.[9] The conversion Nock ascribed to Julian, that is to say, assumed in the background a personal commitment to Christianity strong enough for Julian to react against: his conversion followed a Christian pattern, but ran in the reverse direction.

Nock's overall approach to Graeco-Roman religion has been censured as 'crypto-Christianizing', and his account of antique conversion has not escaped criticism. On one view, the assumption that intensely-felt reorientations and repudiations were typically at play in antique conversions is idealizing and unhistorical: it focuses on special cases and pays no heed to many others – after Constantine, probably the great majority – where the transition was very likely easily made and entailed no crisis of personal identity.[10] That complaint is perhaps misdirected: Nock himself plainly intended to define 'conversion' in very strong terms.[11] It can serve to remind us that Julian's conversion may be atypical in a sense that Nock did not choose to discuss, but it is irrelevant to the particular case: the vehemence of Julian's devotion to paganism and rejection of Christianity is not in question.

A more specific objection is more pertinent. It is always a risk in analysis of an individual's conversion that the distinction drawn between 'before' and 'after' may be drawn too strongly, and Nock has been suspected on this score of having exaggerated Julian's attachment to Christianity as a youth: it is argued that he was never a convinced Christian, and cannot have experienced a religious conversion of the sort that Nock proposed. On this view, the distinction Nock drew between religious and philosophic conversion is dissolved in Julian's case: indeed, there was no conversion at all, as Nock defined the term. Rather, Julian will be supposed to

have became a fervent pagan and a fervent Neoplatonist by a single, gradual process:[12] his Neoplatonist studies and the theurgic initiation to which they led will only mark a turning-point in Julian's life in the qualified sense that he found in them formal and devotional articulations of intuitions he had experienced and reflected upon increasingly in adolescence.

Each of these accounts is necessarily speculative, of course, but the disagreement between them hangs on a basic issue: was Julian ever a convinced Christian? To test them, I turn to what Julian himself has to tell.

Late in 362, Julian dispatched a letter to the Alexandrians in response to their request that Bishop Athanasius, banished from the city by Julian earlier in the year, should be allowed to return to his see.[13] The Emperor's reply made his displeasure very plain, and offered some pointed advice:

> You have the audacity not to worship any of the gods, and think that another, whom neither you nor your fathers have ever seen, should rule as God the Word. . . . But [I tell you that] he whom all men worship, and by worshipping prosper, is . . . great Helios, the living image of the father's *nous*, ensouled, intelligent, the cause of good. Heed my advice, and guide yourselves a little towards the truth: for you shall not err from the right path if you heed one who walked on that other path [of yours] until his twentieth year, but who is now in his twelfth year of walking this [right] path I speak of in the company of the gods.[14]

This passage is the sole explicit mention of Julian's conversion to be found in his writings. It is only a passing remark in a public letter, and has nothing to say about the mental process at play in the conversion. None the less, two indisputable points emerge. First, the shift in religious allegiance alluded to is clearly represented by Julian himself as a radical turnabout: he declares, in effect, that until a given point in time he was a Christian, and that afterwards he was a pagan. Conceivably, the statement may need to be modified in the light of other allusions he makes to his youth: but the letter, at least, gives no hint that his Christianity had been only nominal. Second, he dates the turnabout precisely to the period 350/1,[15] the time when he was studying successively at Nicomedia, at Pergamum (where his first serious study of Neoplatonism began) and at Ephesus (where Maximus initiated him as a theurgist).

The emphasis this passage puts on a given time and place corresponds well with remarks made by Libanius in a speech composed in 362 at the Emperor's request. Like Julian's, then, his testimony is retrospective. But Libanius had been living at Nicomedia at the time of Julian's stay there in 349, and what he has to tell about the period is of some interest. It turned out, he says, that Julian's sojourn at Nicomedia was 'a source of the greatest blessings for himself and the Empire':

> For there was hidden in that place a spark (*spinthêr*) of prophecy that had barely escaped the hands of the impious. As a result, Sire, you were soothed by the prophecies as you first began to seek out hidden lore, and you held in check your excessive hatred (*sphodron misos*) of the gods. And upon your arrival in Ionia you encountered a wise man (*sophos*), you heard of those who fashioned and maintain the universe, you gazed upon the beauty of philosophy and tasted its sweetest springs. Then you quickly threw aside your error, released yourself from darkness and grasped truth in place of ignorance, reality in place of falsehood, our old gods in place of that recent one and his wicked rites.[16]

Like Julian, Libanius here assigns the crucial events to 350/1, the period of Neoplatonist study at Pergamum and Ephesus, suggesting in addition a particular background to it: Julian was propelled towards Pergamum by a 'spark of prophecy' at Nicomedia. The phrase may allude obliquely to a theurgic circle in the city, or more simply to an oracular prediction that Julian's fortunes would prosper with the help of the gods.[17] Either way, Libanius plainly implies that when Julian came to Nicomedia, he was more than a nominal Christian: until that time, he says, he showed 'excessive hatred' to the gods. If we credit that, it will count against the modern reading of Julian's conversion as in reality a process gradually evolving in his six-year exile at Macellum as an adolescent – an exile which must certainly be dated 342 to 348, no later.[18] So might an item in another contemporary witness: at Macellum, Gregory Nazianzen tells us, Julian and his half-brother Gallus competed to build a memorial to a local martyr, Mamas.[19] And there is a testimony from the Pergamene stable itself: Eunapius, whose teacher Chrysanthius had also taught Julian, would have us believe that Julian's study of Scripture in his teens was prodigiously deep.[20]

It would not do to press these items hard. All of them are

retrospective, Libanius' florid rhetoric is designed to flatter, and Eunapius' story sounds exaggerated and has a twist: Julian's knowledge of Scripture supposedly confounded his Christian tutors. There is a twist in Gregory too: Julian lost his contest with Gallus because God read his heart and saw the mark of Cain. Still, Libanius and Gregory at least tell stories which rest on specific details, and their general convergence with the apparent sense of Julian's own words in the Alexandrian letter is suggestive. Taken together, they certainly outweigh a single and highly generalized remark in Ammianus. He speaks of Julian as 'having been more inclined to the worship of the gods from early childhood',[21] but very little can be made of that: it is a remark made casually to preface an account of Julian's first public sacrifices at Constantinople, and no specific item is offered in support.

The contemporary testimonies, then, do nothing to diminish the force of what Julian said in his public letter to the Alexandrians. Nor, at first sight, do two less direct allusions which he makes in a more reflective context. At the start of the hymn to Helios, Julian recalls a time in his youth when he knew nothing of 'the science of astrology', then adds this: 'But why do I say that, when I should have greater things to tell if I were to speak of my opinions about the gods in those days? But let that darkness be buried in oblivion.'[22] The same metaphor occurs in the hymn to the Mother: she is thanked 'for not overlooking me when I walked, so to speak, in darkness'.[23] It has been observed, though, that in this case Julian goes on to construe the darkness in Neoplatonic terms as 'vain elements in the irrational motions of the soul', and that the allusion in the hymn to Helios follows closely on a passage usually taken to show that Julian was prone to pantheist experiences in his childhood: he speaks of a sort of trance which overcame him when he gazed at the Sun or the night sky.[24] On one view,[25] Julian's talk of having been 'in darkness' refers not to his having been a convinced Christian as a youth, but to his earlier ignorance of a specific and cardinal doctrine of Platonist theology – the divinity of the cosmos – and the childish interpretation which he entertained of his early pantheist visions as a result. The suggestion is far from convincing. Even if we agreed to read the remarks in the hymns in this sense, they are clearly retrospective and have nothing to tell about the way the youthful Julian interpreted any early religious experiences he may have had. But in any case, nothing forbids us to read 'vain elements in the irrational motions of the soul' as a Neoplatonist's description of Christian 'soul-error';

and the image of Julian's earlier self walking 'in darkness' accords perfectly smoothly with his talk in the letter to the Alexandrians of the false 'path' he had trodden at one time.

A final item from Julian's writings is conceivably relevant: the Helios myth at the close of *Against Heraclius*. I have remarked in another context[26] that if the myth indeed recalls an actual vision or psychic crisis, the event is implicitly located by the dramatic setting of the piece around the time of Julian's theurgic initiation. The myth was written long after that, of course, and will itself give a retrospective account, but specific details in it deserve attention. In castigating the sons of Constantine as Christians, Julian adds that 'their relatives, having had no better education, also shared their folly and ignorance' (*Or.* 7.228b). Perturbed at this state of affairs, Zeus is urged to take care that 'this wicked zeal for impiety should not overcome all men'. He orders Helios to

> care especially for your child [Julian] and cure him of this sickness. For you see how he is infected, as it were, with smoke and filth and darkness, and there is a risk that the fire you sowed in him will be extinguished.
>
> (229bd)

Helios recognizes that 'a small spark (*spinthêr*) of himself was still preserved in him', and cares for him. And when Julian is approaching manhood, 'having been so dismayed by the extent of the misfortunes of his kinsmen as almost to hurl himself into Tartarus', he is diverted from that purpose by 'a dream or kind of trance' sent by kindly Helios and Athene. In consequence, we are led to suppose, he seeks initiation (229d–231c). There are clear correspondences here with the details of what Libanius says about the conversion. It is unremarkable that both describe Christianity as darkness and ignorance, but it is suggestive that they both conjoin this with talk of a scarcely surviving 'spark', be it of Helios or of 'prophecy': the myth's details seem to imply that, in recollection, Julian represented his conversion as the culmination of a spiritual crisis which followed a Christian period.

In sum, it is safe to say that both in overt statement and in more oblique allusions Julian indeed represented his rejection of Christianity as bound up with a conversion – a process located in a specified period of time and (so the Helios myth hints) involving an emotional crisis finally resolved by an initiation. But that is not an end to the matter. While there is no good evidence that his account of the

conversion is intentionally misleading – rather, we have seen, it gains some support from contemporary testimonies – it was offered ten years after the event, and may mislead on other counts. It may be excessively self-dramatizing, or distorted by Neoplatonist habits of thought, or by its omission of other factors to which we may attach more weight than Julian did. If we are to judge Nock properly in his central claim that Julian's conversion was essentially devotional rather than philosophic, we must first consider these possibilities.

On the first count – self-dramatization – we need to allow for a cultural factor which I have discussed more fully earlier,[27] and which probably predisposed Julian to speak starkly in terms of conversion. In popular tradition, figures such as Socrates and Diogenes were men whose lives had changed radically at a particular time: both, the story went, had turned to philosophy in response to Delphic oracles. This may put the 'spark of prophecy' to which Libanius attributed Julian's awakening to the gods in a new light. Certainly, literary play on the theme can be discerned in Dio Chrysostom's claim to have been prompted by an oracle to turn from rhetoric to the philosophic life, and to have spent years wandering as a Cynic in consequence. That 'conversion', we saw, is highly suspect: Dio had studied philosophy long before its alleged occurrence, and his later career suggests no great disdain for rhetoric and the prestige it conferred. A good case has been made for treating his claims as an instrument of self-dramatization by which he set himself in a distinguished philosophic company to add to the authority of his utterances.[28] Julian was familiar with some of Dio's writings: it is particularly to the point here that the Helios myth itself looks to owe a literary debt to a speech of Dio's in several of its details.[29] The most that can be concluded on that basis, however, is that his retrospective account of the conversion is likely to be rather too neatly drawn round a familiar cultural or literary pattern. It does not follow that he manipulated his experience in so conscious a fashion as Dio probably had; nor, of course, need any literary debt he may owe imply that he had not in fact been a sincerely professed Christian at one time.

At first sight, there is more to be said for the possibility that significant distortion occurs through Neoplatonist hindsight, that Julian put excessive emphasis on the period 350/1 as the time of his first serious study of philosophy. But this argument is double-edged. The special colour Julian's Neoplatonism took owed much to a human exemplar – 'one who surpasses all men in my time', the theurgist Maximus. 'He taught me', says Julian, 'to regard the gods

as guides to all that is fair.'[30] And there is independent evidence to suggest that the impact of Maximus and his miracles on the young Julian really did come as a revelation. After a lecture at which Maximus' activities were critically reported, Julian's response had been abrupt: 'Goodbye to you, and keep your books: you have shown me the man I was looking for.'[31] If this report is accurate – and it probably derives from one who had instructed Julian at Pergamum[32] – it is a telling glimpse into his state of mind at the time. It was just such evidence that Nock had in mind in his treatment of the conversion as less a search for the cool truths of philosophy than for an anchor for intensely-felt religious needs. But whether or not that distinction holds, Neoplatonist hindsight cannot easily be thought to make Julian exaggerate the impact of events in his twentieth year. One could argue, indeed, that it was likelier to make him minimize it. I have touched earlier on the ambiguity in Julian's allusions to pantheistic trances in childhood and to a 'spark of fire' sown in him by Helios at a time of darkness in his soul. They testify to his conviction that he had always been in the special care of the gods: in retrospect the Neoplatonist may have come to feel that the core of his paganism must have somehow been innate.

Finally, can we point to other factors whose relevance to the issue Julian either chose to ignore or was imperfectly aware of? The suggestive fact here is that in his writings his hatred of Christianity is manifestly linked to his hatred of members of the Second Flavian dynasty. This much is clear from the *Caesars*, where Constantine and his sons find refuge with Jesus, protector of 'seducers, murderers and impious wretches',[33] and from a propagandist letter of 361 which levels bitter complaints at Constantius for a father and eight relatives murdered – a charge obliquely repeated in the Helios myth – and for six years' exile at Macellum.[34] It is suggestive, too, that Julian's guardian during that internment was a fanatical Arian, George of Cappadocia – in Julian's later judgement, 'an enemy of the gods', and a man whose lynching late in 361 by an Alexandrian mob, so a letter of Julian intimated, was richly deserved.[35] In the face of all that, it seems absurd to deny that unusual psychological factors were at play in Julian's rejection of Christianity. But they need only imply that the conversion, when it came, will have been all the more decisive for the fact that it gave Julian extra reason to hate persons whose actions and whose power over him he resented in any case. It does not follow that in secret he was already moving steadily towards a rejection of Christianity itself in his days at Macellum.

In the nature of the question at issue, there is little profit to be had in pressing psychological hypotheses further: unless there is some means to assess their relevance to Julian's own case, they do nothing to illuminate it. Besides, philosophic analysis on the topic teaches us that the search for preconditions of any given conversion-experience is potentially endless.[36] To ascribe a conversion to Julian is necessarily simplifying: what matters is whether the simplification is controlled and reasonable. There is enough evidence to suggest that he had been a Christian in his precocious youth. Perhaps there is a sense in which the seeds of his drift away from that state went back to adolescence,[37] but nothing Julian says implies any conscious break at so early a stage. It is doubtful, too, whether Constantius would have given Julian the freedom of movement he granted him in 349 if he had entertained any serious doubts on that score.[38] Julian's own remarks and allusions speak of his interests in paganism and philosophy as quickening decisively and in concert at Nicomedia and in the year or so following his stay there. That version of events accords well with what we know from other sources about the initiation, and the length of time it suggests is not implausibly short: in my view, it is reasonable to accept its essentials, and to attribute to Julian a conversion in a significantly stronger sense than some modern accounts have been willing to allow.

On this argument, much of Nock's reconstruction of the case will be granted. But there is a significant proviso. It has to do with Nock's inclination to deny that Julian's motivation was philosophic in any important degree, and that in this respect his pagan conversion is untypical. The contrast Nock drew was for the most part with cases which did not involve conversion from Christianity. The sort of case he had in mind was a conversion such as Dio claimed to have undergone, a search for philosophic truth.[39] Now clearly in the case of a pagan conversion away from Christianity the psychological implications are different: the Christian insistence on the recognition that salvation arises through divine grace and on the need for contrition for past sins has introduced a new factor. But while Julian seems to hint in the Helios myth that his conversion involved an emotional crisis, what he says about his Christian past hardly implies extreme embarrassment at it. To say that he was 'saturated' with Christian thought in his youth is one thing; it is something else to suggest that he could never really cast off the devotional habits of mind and theological presuppositions imparted by a Christian education, and that his conversion is at root a semipathological

variant on a Christian conversion. The argument that his case is untypical in this stronger sense can very easily become circular. For one thing, it looks rather too readily for support to his 'fanatical' or 'passionate' nature: that is a psychological judgement we should treat with caution. For another, it is a brute fact that the ancient testimonies say almost nothing in any detail about other 'intellectual' conversions away from Christianity. No doubt this reflects a bias in the Christian transmission of sources, but it means that if Julian's case is unusual, it is partly so in the unilluminating sense that the state of the evidence gives us little to compare with it.[40]

Given the lack of cases for comparison, Nock's characterization of Julian's conversion as religious rather than philosophic, even if we accepted the general distinction on which it rests, would not suffice to show that the conversion was markedly unusual in a pagan context. But in any case, the distinction itself is suspect in so far as it rests implicitly on a more general value-judgement about the nature of Iamblichus' Neoplatonism. To E.R. Dodds, his *On the Mysteries* seemed a 'manifesto of irrationalism', but modern philosophic study has made us warier of characterizing his philosophic system in such terms; in particular, R.T. Wallis has drawn attention to the manner in which 'miraculous' interventions – and these have a bearing on conversion – might be accounted for in Iamblichan theory without recourse to a Christianizing notion of divine grace.[41] Lately, too, an effort has been made to show how enduring Neoplatonist modes of thought could be, even with Julian long gone and the Empire irreversibly Christianized: it is claimed that Synesius of Cyrene, conventionally regarded as a Neoplatonist convert to Christianity, would retain a Neoplatonist viewpoint from first to last, assenting only to such Christian doctrines as were consistent with it.[42]

But here the terms of debate become too general to tell anything decisive about Julian's own case. Argument about his unstated or unconscious motives is bound to be inconclusive; further speculation on that score, if it has a place, can be left aside until we have appraised the grounds that Julian himself gives for his dislike of Christians.

THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN CRITIQUE: *AGAINST THE GALILAEANS*

Behind the debate about Julian's conversion there lies a deeper issue. Whatever Christianity may have meant to him in his youth, his later

hostility towards it is patent, both from specific policies which he directed against Christians and from the critique of their beliefs and practices which he offered in his writings. It is plain too, in a general sense, that the practical measures and the ideological criticisms were connected: Julian himself, in his rescript on Christian teachers, justified the most striking of those measures in ideological terms. What is less clear is the real force of the relationship involved. To what degree do the arguments offered by Julian reveal the core of his complaint? Was it at root the intellectual conviction of a Neoplatonist Emperor that prompted him to act against Christians, or was it rather that he felt compelled to offer an intellectual pretext for actions which really stemmed from feelings unamenable to argument?

For the moment, I restrict myself to the explicitly stated grounds on which he professed to find Christianity false or otherwise objectionable. A number of questions arise. On what basic premises do the arguments that he uses rest? What do they owe to conventional polemic, what to a personal viewpoint? Are there hints that some of the objections he voiced were especially deeply felt? Discussion of the bearing of the critique on the practical measures can follow later.

Writing from Antioch to a heretical bishop, Julian let it be known that if the gods and Fortune allowed, he intended to write a treatise against 'the new-fangled Galilaean God' and 'the degenerate error of ignorant fisherman-theologians'.[43] From Libanius we learn that the work in question – the *Against the Galilaeans* – was written during the Antiochene winter nights of 362/3.[44] As Julian wrote it, the work is lost: it is a plausible conjecture that it will have been condemned either by a Theodosian law of 448 or by Justinian in 529. That any of it survives at all is due almost solely to its being quoted at length in an exhaustive refutation undertaken by Cyril of Alexandria in the 430s. Cyril's refutation itself is lost in part, or else was never completed, but from what survives we can safely infer that *Against the Galilaeans* originally comprised three books, and that the surviving portions come mainly from the first.[45] For the most part, they deal with Old Testament doctrines, but a clear knowledge of the Gospels and of Paul is evident too, and gives some credence to Libanius' summary description of the treatise as 'a long and strongly argued polemic' against 'the books that make the Palestinian god or son of god'.[46] Julian's own stated aim was 'to show all men that the Galilaean fabrication is a human fiction contrived by evil',[47] and we

need not doubt that he wrote out of deep feeling to an earnest purpose. The work was composed in the midst of preparations for a major military campaign and efforts to remedy an economic crisis at Antioch, and to judge from Libanius and Cyril it was the longest of all Julian's treatises, and by his standards unusually long in the making: by contrast, the invectives against Cynics had both been dashed off, on Julian's account, in a day or two at Constantinople.[48] These facts, and the resolutely plain style of the writing – here too, the contrast with the invectives is revealing – mark more than Julian's energy: if he had been merely wishing for intellectual diversion in his leisure hours, there were more congenial things to read and write.

High claims have sometimes been made for the quality of the work. Libanius praised it as superior to the critique of Porphyry,[49] and Cyril would maintain that it was the most important pagan polemic of its kind, and widely reckoned irrefutable.[50] Both had their axes to grind, but their verdicts have been echoed in a strand of modern scholarship: *Against the Galilaeans* has been judged to present a case against the Christians as compelling as Porphyry's, and a well-articulated Neoplatonist theory of the universality of Roman rule.[51] Its fragmentary state suggests that any judgement had better be qualified, but to my mind, appraisals of *Against the Galilaeans* should rather dwell on its prolixity, its repetitions, and the writer's failure to separate the major and the minor in his criticisms:[52] the work is remarkable not so much for any great intellectual deftness as for a feature which is plainly to be linked to Julian's own Christian upbringing – the prominent role assigned in it to Judaism as a third term in the argument.[53] Still, the Libanian comparison at least shows that from the first *Against the Galilaeans* was seen to follow in the Platonist tradition of Celsus and Porphyry. Whether Julian had Porphyry's *Against the Christians* or Celsus' *True Word* directly to hand as he wrote is uncertain – the one firm clue to his sources is his order that the library of George of Cappadocia should be brought to Antioch[54] – but a broader debt is not in doubt. Many of Julian's arguments are anticipated in the earlier writers. Like the arguments in the anti-Cynic polemics discussed earlier in this book, they reveal his readiness to repeat standard criticisms. On the other hand, the standard criticisms he makes may turn out to be deeply felt.

Enough survives of *Against the Galilaeans* to disclose the main lines of its arguments, and a modern reading has reconstructed them lucidly.[55] At the start, Julian makes it clear that his objection is both

intellectual and ethical: Christianity is a 'man-made falsehood contrived by evil'. The vituperative tone is unsurprising, but a detail is instructive. Julian imagines himself in a 'court of law': he will 'deal with all the "dogmas", as they call them', and his opponents must respond to his points before they bring counter-charges (*CG* 41e). If not entirely playful, the pose is still revealing: the writer's ostensible concern is to present a comprehensive and watertight case, and the core of his complaint may perhaps become submerged under the weight of detail. He goes on to propose a three-part procedure: first, an account of the human conception of divinity in general; then a comparison of the Greek and Jewish conceptions of it; last, an inquiry into why Christians, while they prefer the Judaic conception, have chosen to abandon even it in pursuit of a way all their own (42e–43a). Broadly speaking, this pattern is adhered to in the fragments as Neumann arranged them, and the basic argument is easily summarized: Graeco-Roman notions of divinity are superior to their Judaic counterparts, and whatever merit the Jewish doctrines and customs have has been discarded by the Christians, whose belief in the divinity of Jesus has caused them to reject what is good in both the Greek and Jewish traditions.

I pass to the detail. The point of the opening stage of the argument is to discredit the notion of revelation. All men, we read, Greeks and Jews alike, have a natural awareness of the divine even without being taught anything about it, and locate it in the heavens (52bc). The implicit criticism is that innate knowledge of this kind makes unnecessary a revelation of the sort that the Christians claim for Christ. Probably, it is hinted too that the notion is positively impious, in so far as it implies mutability rather than a god 'stationed beyond all change' (69cd). All this is utterly derivative. The natural knowledge of god is a commonplace of 'eclecticism', his immutability was standard Platonic dogma, and both notions had already been used by Celsus in a polemic against the Christians.[56] The real interest of the claim has been held to be that it misrepresents the view of Julian's opponents (Christians too made play with a similar idea of innate knowledge) and that it is in some degree inconsistent with Julian's own position, on the assumption that theurgy also entails a notion of revelation.[57] On that basis it has been suggested that the bitterness of Julian's attack, and his undoubted willingness to traduce the views of Christian apologists, derives from a feeling, more or less clearly sensed, that his Neoplatonism had more in common with what he opposed than he cared to admit.[58]

If that is true, it will clearly give an important insight into the deep motives behind *Against the Galilaeans*. It is a possibility to consider cautiously, however. Inconsistency of this sort may certainly be revealing of Julian's deeper grounds of complaint: I shall consider a striking instance later. But in this case, it is not beyond question either that Julian is open to the charge, or that it implies any awareness of being uncomfortably close to Christian belief. Theurgic and Christian notions of revelation differed markedly in two respects: in theurgy, revelation was justified by a 'philosophic' principle of correspondence, not in terms of redemptive supernatural grace;[59] and relatedly, theurgy assumed epiphanies of unambiguously intermediary deities and *daimones*, not a once-and-for-all incarnation of God.[60] In this there is a first hint to be had of something to which I shall return: the possibility that Julian's complaint, notwithstanding his adherence as a Neoplatonist to the One, is bound up at a deep level with a polytheist sensibility.

The second stage of the argument – the comparison of Greek and Jewish doctrine – serves two functions. It is designed to show, on the one hand, that the Jewish conception of divinity is vastly inferior to the Greek; but on the other, that Jewish doctrines have some truth (96c) and at least have the virtue of being ancient (141c). The fact that Julian stops short of outright condemnation of Judaism has undeniable interest in view of his reliably attested intention to rebuild the Temple of Jerusalem and so make it possible for Jews to sacrifice once more;[61] all the more important, then, to emphasize that his treatment of it in the context of the argument of *Against the Galilaeans* is predominantly hostile. In attacking Old Testament doctrines about the nature of God and his purposes in creating the world, he attacks notions to which Christians and Jews alike adhere: he speaks automatically of such doctrines as 'yours', Christian (115d), and judges it detestable that Christians have 'abandoned the ever-living gods for the corpse of the Jew' (194d). In the terms of the argument, at least, the implicit qualification in Julian's criticisms of Judaism is introduced mainly to provide another stick with which to beat the Christians: it prepares the ground for the judgement that 'if you at least held to Jewish teachings, you would not fare entirely badly, though worse than you did before, when you were with us, the Greeks' (201a).

The Judaeo-Christian idea of God is compared unfavourably with the Greek conception on several grounds. The myth of Adam and Eve shows that the Mosaic God is jealous and envious; perversely,

He seeks to deny man knowledge (89a; 94a). Perversely too, He resents worship being offered to any other god and demands exclusive worship (152cd). Further, He acts irrationally and out of pique, lacking any sense of mildness (*praotês*); He can contemplate destroying a thousand good men in response to the failings of one bad one.[62] In the philosophic terms in which the case is formulated, the contrast here is plainly with the Platonic teaching that God is free from passion and by his rational providence makes it possible for humans to become similar to him (171c). It was easy, too, to justify polytheist practice in Platonist terms: Celsus had already argued that a passionless and self-sufficient god could hardly resent cult worship of others.[63] Julian has recourse to this argument, and adds two others: to assume that God forbids the worship of any but Himself is to show that He is unable to prevent it – for other gods are patently worshipped, whatever God decrees – and that is an impiety; on the same assumption, the Christians' own worship of Christ, indeed, would count as blasphemy (155de).

The intellectual force of these arguments is for our purposes by the by: our interest lies with the strength in Julian's own eyes of arguments of this sort. The issue is difficult. Plainly, he will present his case in Platonist terms: but is his complaint essentially philosophic, or is it more the outraged response of one for whom cult worship of the gods – emphatically in the plural – was a deeply-felt need in its own right? I wish to suggest the latter.

We can point first in this connection to the strength of Julian's language. At some points, philosophic niceties are set aside. 'Why [he asks the Christians] are you so ungrateful to our gods as to desert them for the Jews?' (209d). The only thing they share with the Jews is 'a new-fangled doctrine (*kainotomia*) of the Hebrews ... a blasphemy of the Gods whom we honour' (238d): he means precisely the demand for exclusive worship. He is even prepared to undermine his own opening arguments against Jewish doctrine: citing the tag from Exodus, 'Thou shalt not revile the gods', he is quick to draw the point that the early Jews were themselves polytheists, and that 'the shamelessness and rashness of those who came afterwards wished to root out all reverence from the mass of the people, and reckoned that blasphemy and neglect of worship (*to mê therapeuein*) went hand in hand' (238c). This is vilification before it is argument: it puts us in mind of remarks in Julian's letters which tell of a man with a gut-feeling for the ancestral gods and their worship – one who will characterize Christianity in sum as an absurd 'fear of the gods'

(*deisidaimonia*) or roundly declare that 'I shun innovation (*kainotomia*) in all things, but most of all as regards the gods.'[64]

Details of language and incongruities of argument in *Against the Galilaeans* do not suffice to make a case, of course: they may owe too much to the conventions of polemic to bear any great weight. More revealing is the pervasive concern to defend polytheism which lies beneath the treatment in *Against the Galilaeans* of three key issues on which Greeks and Jews are divided.

The first bears on Jewish and Greek conceptions of the creation of the world. Julian cites at length and contrasts the accounts of the event given in Genesis and in the *Timaeus*.[65] What he says implicitly refutes the Numenian description of Plato as no more than an 'Atticizing Moses'; rather, he is far superior. Genesis is read to imply that the Mosaic God is a creator only in the sense that He disposes matter: fire, the darkness and the deep were already in existence (49d). The burden of Julian's argument, however, rests on the manner in which the Mosaic God acts. The failure of Genesis to explain the creation, origin or function of angels is contrasted with the famous passage of the *Timaeus* in which the Demiurge delegates the creation of the world to celestial gods whom he had already brought into being for that purpose (49d; 58bd). Julian's central assumption here is that a divine ordering of the world, and the participation of divinity in it, necessarily entail the existence of intermediaries. Celsus had argued in a similar way, asserting the impropriety of a god who 'works with his hands' and 'participates in being';[66] what is particularly revealing in Julian's account is the emphasis it puts on the creation and role of divine intermediaries. It becomes a principal point of contrast. The Demiurge had spoken of 'gods of gods': 'Of course!' exclaims Julian: 'He says "gods" when he addresses invisible beings, and "of gods" when he means (as is evident) the visible gods' (65c).

The second issue similarly assumes the need for a multiplicity of gods. It bears on the ambiguity inherent in the Mosaic notion that God is both supreme and yet particular to a Chosen People – as Julian puts it, a 'sectional' god (*merikon*: 146c) who 'takes thought for and cares for [Israel] alone' (99e). Is it reasonable, it is asked, to think that the supreme god would look on idly for thousands of years while men worshipped idols in their ignorance, and yet do nothing to remedy the situation except in a single part of Palestine? Was it right to overlook the Greeks? (106d). That was a standard pagan argument,[67] but *Against the Galilaeans* gives it a further twist: it is held

to prove that 'the god of the Hebrews is not the lord of all; his kingdom has limits, and he must be deemed only one in the company of the other gods' (100c).

This argument leads Julian to the third issue in question. It takes its starting point from the observable diversity of human nations and cultures. Celts and Germans, Greeks and Romans, Egyptians and Syrians, Persians and Parthians – all the different nations of the earth have formulated different laws in accordance with their natural dispositions (116a; 131b; 138b). How has this come about? The Judaic account of the Tower of Babel is dismissed as absurd (134d); 'rather, has not God given us gods and kindly guardians (*prostatas*) . . . and lawgivers by no means inferior to Moses? (141cd). For each nation there is a presiding god, and to help him there are angels and *daimones* and heroes, and he has established the differences in laws and characters in harmony with a divine command (143b). Here Julian draws an analogy with viceroys who administer their separate provinces in the interest of their king (148b). Implicit in this is a theological justification of Empire – a point picked up in the later remark that 'the gods gave sovereign power to Rome, permitting the Jews to be free for a short time only' (209d). But beside this there is another note to discern. The concept of the gods as constant helpers in human society is not merely a philosophic abstraction, and it is not to be lightly explained as a monist's cool justification of the brute fact of polytheist belief. Close study of the words *boêthos* ('helper') and *prostatês* ('supporter', 'guardian') in pagan devotional texts and dedicatory inscriptions marks the concept out as lying squarely in the mainstream of pagan cult practice, and at the heart of pagan sensibilities.[68] Just so, in Julian's view, the gods gave blessings, physical and spiritual (138c). Highest among the latter, they gave philosophy, and science, and 'the sacred arts by which we may obtain the aid (*boêtheia*) that is fitting to our needs' (178c; 198bc). What great gift of such a kind, he goes on to ask, can the Hebrews boast of as given them by their God? (201e). The question scores a point in a debate, but it is not just a debating-point in the writer's mind.

I turn now to the third stage in the overall argument of *Against the Galilaeans*, in which criticism of Old Testament doctrine gave way to direct criticism of Christian belief and practice. Here too, I think it can be shown that a strong concern with pagan cultic practice and a belief that its well-being is bound up with its diversity lie at the heart of what Julian says.

From a remark made at 261e, it is clear that the bulk of Julian's

criticism on this score came in the lost part of *Against the Galilaeans*, but enough is said in what survives to let us sense the main direction of the argument. Three essential charges can be discerned, each of which had been anticipated to some degree in earlier anti-Christian polemic. The first we could call cultural in a general sense: Christians have rejected all that is good in the traditions of Greeks and Jews alike, and speak out of deep ignorance. The second is doctrinal: their central claim, that Christ is God, is a fraud. The last is ethical: their religious practices are repulsive and impious.

In the formal exposition, and arguably in a deeper sense, the second and third charges derive from the first. The starting point of the general attack is the assumption that to stay true to ancestral teachings and practices is a virtue in itself, to innovate radically from them a ground for censure. This is of course the same line of attack Julian had used against 'false' Cynics. As I noted earlier in that connection, it is a stance commonly found in polemic, and not only in pagan polemic. One of Eusebius' arguments, in response to Sossianus Hierocles' claim that Apollonius of Tyana was superior to Christ as a wonder-worker, had been that Apollonius had not kept faith with the true Pythagorean heritage;[69] and in doctrinal disputes within the Christian ranks, novelty was often enough heresy. For the pagans, Celsus had already drawn the obvious connection with the argument from the diversity of national custom:

> The practices performed by each nation are right when they are done in the way that pleases the overseers [that is, the relevant gods]; and it is impious to abandon customs which have existed in each locality from the beginning.[70]

This is Julian's argument too. 'You have taken up blasphemy of the gods we honour: the reverence of each and every higher nature, which goes with our worship and our love of our ancestral traditions – these you have cast aside' (238d). It is not the mere occurrence of this argument that is telling, but the emphasis it is given. Not only are statements to the same effect made repeatedly in *Against the Galilaeans*; the same conviction can be found in a context not directly polemical, in the 'encyclical' letters which advise pagan priests on the proper management of their offices. I have quoted already from one such letter, recording Julian's professed dislike of innovation, particularly in matters of religion.[71] In another, he stresses the need for cult worship as follows:

> Let men worship the gods as if they see them actually present (*parontas*): for our fathers established images and altars and the maintenance of undying fire, and everything of the sort, and symbols of the presence of the gods . . . so that through them we may worship the gods.[72]

It is apt, too, to recall here the letter in which Julian alluded to his own awakening to paganism: in it, the Alexandrians are upbraided for neglecting their patrons Serapis and Isis, the Olympians and Helios: 'You have the audacity not to adhere any of these gods, and to think that one whom neither you nor your fathers have ever seen, Jesus, should rule as God the Word.'[73]

When Julian calls the Christians deserters, he has their neglect of custom of these kinds at least as much in mind as the precepts of philosophy. In his view, this jettisoning of cult is well-nigh incomprehensible. Insofar as he attempts to explain the motivation behind it, he falls back on a standard taunt of polemicists and attributes it to sheer ignorance. In Chapter Three, I discussed a passage in the *Against Heraclius* in which Julian had likened Christians in passing to ignorant (*apaideutoi*) Cynics.[74] *Against the Galilaeans* expands that notion in a much more earnest setting. Christianity appeals to the part of the soul that loves fables and is childish and mindless (*anoêtos*) (39b); men brought up on the Bible have the minds of base and thoughtless slaves (230a). By contrast, a man who has received a true education (*paideia*) becomes, as it were, a gift of the gods to mankind (229a): indeed – and here it is tempting to think that Julian has his personal experience strongly in mind – 'any one with an ounce of innate virtue' who has been granted such an education 'has apostasized from your [Christian] godlessness in all haste' (229d).

The blanket charge of ignorance was conventional, but Julian's insistent recourse to it is instructive. It touches on a central and very telling ambiguity in his critique. A plain reading of his argument might imply the view that the best remedy against the impiety of Christians will be to educate them. Julian would indeed have assented to that, but with the crucial proviso that it is a requirement of true education that one is taught in a particular manner. What he says about education as a cure for Christian folly needs to be read alongside an immediately preceding remark in *Against the Galilaeans*: 'If your own Scriptures are sufficient for you, why do you nibble at the learning of the Greeks?' (229c). The comment hints at

the writer's outrage at the uses to which Christians have put the cultural heritage of the Greeks – an outrage plain in remarks that Julian makes elsewhere. Two of his unplaced fragments set out the issue succinctly:

> [Let us ensure] that they [the Christians] may not, by sharpening their tongues, prepare themselves to take on the Greeks in debate . . . for as the proverb has it, we are struck by our own arrows. For they arm themselves from our own writings to do battle with us.[75]

It is well enough known that Julian did not confine himself to mere debate in this matter. An edict of 17 June 362 had ruled that would-be teachers must be authorized to teach by civic councils,[76] and a rescript soon followed to make it clear that Christian professors were to be disqualified *in toto* by this law. The rescript gives a fuller expression to Julian's grievance and an ideological explanation of his action. Proper education (*paideia orthê*) entails not merely expertise in language and letters, but a 'healthy disposition';[77] a man who thinks one thing and teaches another fails to educate his pupils. There is passing allusion to philosophers in this connection, but once again the main focus of Julian's attention lies with the gods and their cult worship.

> Was it not the gods who revealed all their learning to Homer and Hesiod? . . . It is absurd that men who expound the works of such writers should dishonour the gods whom those same writers honoured. . . . Until now there were many excuses for not attending the temples. . . . But since the gods have granted us freedom, it is absurd that men should teach what they hold to be false. If they believe that those whose works they interpret were wise, let them be the first to compete with them in piety towards the gods. If they do not . . . let them take themselves to the churches of the Galilaeans and teach Matthew and Luke.[78]

A significant rider – we will return to it – was added to this judgement: it permitted youths of Christian parents to continue to attend the schools if they wished: 'For it is not reasonable to shut out boys who are still too ignorant to know which way to turn. . . . It is proper to cure them, even against their will, as one cures the insane.'[79]

It may be that an argument of this general kind was further

amplified in the lost part of *Against the Galilaeans*; certainly, in view of the emphasis placed on it in Julian's explanation of his edict, there is no doubting its importance in his eyes. At the same time, it raises a general doubt about the intellectual pitch of his critique. Julian's professed intention notwithstanding, one is tempted to wonder if his principal aim in writing *Against the Galilaeans* was ever to produce a refutation of Christianity that was intellectually compelling to any real degree. He perfectly well knew that Christians were not all uncultured ignoramuses; his own education under the careful direction of Arian churchmen can hardly have left him entirely unaware of the sophisticated apologetic of an Origen or a Eusebius, and as Emperor he maintained polite relations with Christian men of culture like Prohaeresius and Basil, both of whom he had known in student days at Athens.[80] Yet as far as *Against the Galilaeans* is concerned, the works of a Clement or an Origen might just as well never have been written: Christians are presented as by definition ignorant. That is only a pose in the debater's 'court of law'. At root, what it expressed was not a judgement about the mental capacity of his opponents, but a revulsion at their efforts to assimilate the literary and philosophic heritage of the Greeks without accepting the religious values voiced in it. To Julian's mind, that seemed wreckage, not assimilation. And acceptance of those values was not for him just a process of thought. It demanded practice on the familiar principle of *do ut des*: 'We must maintain such rituals of the temples (*ta en tois hierois*) as ancestral custom prescribes, and we must perform neither more nor less than that to appease the gods the better.'[81] On this point Julian's stance was basic and closed to argument: 'Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.'

In parallel with their desertion of Greek *paideia*, the Christians are charged with 'not abiding even by the traditions of the Hebrews' (238a). The writer's immediate purpose in driving this wedge between Christian and Jew is to facilitate the criticism of Christian belief and ritual practice; their incompatibility with Judaic teaching and custom is the most prominent charge to be levelled at the Christians in the surviving part of *Against the Galilaeans*. But we need to remember here that this follows from the method of exposition Julian adopted and can give a misleading impression of the deep grounds of complaint: for the purposes of argument, the writer will be prone to exaggerate the extent of his real agreement with Judaic doctrines. The key to Julian's ambivalence towards Jewish religion, one suspects, will be found in two particulars: first, his awareness that at one time

the Jews had practised sacrifice according to the law of Scripture at the Temple in Jerusalem (229bc; 305b); second, his claim that the Jews – and here they are at one with Christians – made a basic mistake in reckoning the God of Moses the Lord of All Things: rather, he is a sectional god, ethnic and localized and assuredly one among many (100c). I have suggested earlier that Julian's insistence on this point marks out the universalist claim made for the Judaeo-Christian God as peculiarly offensive to his religious sensibilities, his feeling that it is proper that different nations have different gods.[82] His specific criticisms of Christian belief and practice need to be read with a steady eye to his deep conviction on this point: if the manner of exposition leads him to speak rather more generously at certain moments of the Mosaic God, we must interpret what is said extremely cautiously.

The critique of Christian doctrine does not ignore the central issue: the belief that Christ is God. Here, Julian has three main lines of attack. The first is that the belief deserts the fundamental claim of Moses' God: 'There is no other God but Me' (262b). The talk of a Messiah in the prophets, whatever it may mean, certainly cannot refer to Jesus (253c; 261e; 262d). In this connection, Julian can report the Mosaic claim that there is only one God, and that He alone is to be worshipped, without explicit criticism (253b; 262ab). But however we interpret Julian's public dealings with the Jews – an issue I leave aside for now – his forbearance in the text need not be supposed to arise from a conviction that Moses' God over All (*epi pasin*) should be construed as intimately akin to his own noetic Helios, Father of All. The best evidence for such a claim comes not in *Against the Galilaeans* but in a letter which grants that the God of the Jews 'is most powerful and most good and governs (*epitropeuei*) the world of the senses and is worshipped, as I know well, by us under different names'.[83]

True, this implies a god who is more than sectional, but he is not transcendent: he is firmly restricted to the material world, and he is assimilated to Helios in a correspondingly limited aspect. And from what follows in the letter it is evident that the assimilation is very loosely made, and very far from monotheistic in impulse: 'In one thing they err, however: while they honour their own god greatly, they do not conciliate the other gods in their barbarian conceit.'[84] More centrally, as I have argued earlier, the claim that Julian's devotion to Helios marks him out as in his essence a Neoplatonist monist is a serious distortion in itself: it ignores the casualness of his

'identifications' of one god with another, and it quite fails to do justice to the strength of his devotion to conventional cult.

The brute fact of that devotion should make us similarly hesitant in our appraisal of a related charge made in *Against the Galilaeans*. At 201e we read that if Christians had kept faith with Judaism they would not have fared entirely ill: 'for you would be worshipping one God instead of many, [and instead of] a man, or rather many wretched men.' At first sight, this might seem to hint at a monotheist tendency in the writer. It will not do, however, to put any weight on the passage. First, there is an ambiguity in the sentence. The 'many' whom Christians are said to worship are not really gods at all, but 'wretched men'. Julian means the martyrs. The passage offers not a contrast between monotheist and polytheist belief, but rather a variant on the basic charge that Christians have not stayed true to the Mosaic demand that one God alone must be worshipped. For the sake of his argument, Julian chooses to take a generous view of Judaic theology: the Jews at least have a glimmering of the existence of the High God, the noetic Father. But for Julian, belief in the High God is quite compatible with the idea that many gods exist and must be worshipped. His true sympathies in the matter are abundantly clear from an argument of *Against the Galilaeans* which only survives in summary form in Cyril and is often overlooked. Greeks and Jews, it asserts, concur except on one count – the existence of many gods. Christians err in both directions: they deny that there are many gods, but at the same time they profess that God is not one but three.[85] A patent implication of this charge is that for a Greek, three gods will not be nearly enough.

The second argument against the divinity of Jesus proceeds to criticism of the New Testament itself. For a start, it is internally inconsistent: only in John, not in the synoptic Gospels or in Paul, is Jesus called 'God' (327a): and even John is self-contradictory in claiming that 'no man hath seen God at any time' (333cd). Then again, the miracles ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels do not prove the claim: if they had been remotely compelling, the Jews would have worshipped him *en masse* (213b). In fact, we are told, Jesus accomplished nothing except to cure a handful of cripples and to exorcise demons in a couple of up-country villages (191c). Here, and in his insistence that Jesus was a comparative newcomer, 'known for a mere three hundred years' (191e), Julian shows himself concerned to treat Christ as he had treated the Mosaic God, restricting the benefits he gave – and these were insignificant – to a specific ethnic setting,

geographically and historically localized. An analogous way of thinking can be found in Julian's habitual use of the term 'Galilaeans' to denote his opponents – a quirk perhaps picked up from Epictetus, and one by which he evidently irritated Christians at the time:[86] it sneers at them as mere backwoodsmen who choose to honour a minor wonder-worker from an insignificant locality.

Against the small blessings worked by Jesus, Julian sets the great and manifest *beneficia* of Zeus, Hermes and Asclepius. Zeus is the ancestral and constant helper of the great city of Rome and her Empire (193c–194c), and gave to the Greeks the 'sacred arts [of divination] by which we may obtain the help appropriate to our needs' (198d). As Trismegistus, Hermes had manifested himself on earth not once but three times (176ab). Asclepius – the son of Zeus revealed on earth through the power of 'generative' Helios – descended as a man, then multiplied himself 'and by his visitations stretched out his saving right hand over the whole earth. . . . He is present everywhere, on land and sea . . . he raises up souls that are wretched and bodies that are sick' (200ab); 'his oracles are everywhere, and he allows us a share in them always: when I have been sick, he has often cured me thus by prescribing remedies' (235c). This intrusion of the explicitly personal into the argument is rare, and it is telling: we think of Marcus' thanks to the gods for their helpful remedies conveyed in dreams.[87]

The claim that Jesus' miracles and *beneficia* were inferior was a standard jibe of pagan polemic,[88] but it is hard to avoid the suspicion that for Julian it counted for a lot. The emphasis he lays on the point suggests that his deep complaint is simply not reducible to impersonal philosophic argument. Its roots lie in a convinced belief in the impact of the gods on the here and now. Of course, the gods must be assumed to have a care for the posthumous fate of men as well: they 'hold out great hopes for us after death, and we must believe them utterly'.[89] But it is significant that no argument in *Against the Galilaeans* as we have it touches on the Christian conception of resurrection and the life in the world hereafter. Rather, the weight of the argument lies between the notion that the gods in their diversity are ever-present helpers, and the notion that the revelation of Christ in a specific time and place put a historical seal on God's relations with men which rendered further demonstration of that kind unnecessary. In this sense, Julian's religion stood independent of history. His basic assumption is well illustrated by the argument

he used to rebuke the Christians of Alexandria. Having spoken of several famous episodes in the city's past, he went on to say this:

> Such, to put it in a word, are the blessings bestowed by the Olympian gods on your city in particular. I pass in silence over many others: they would be too long in the telling. But what of the blessings that are granted by the manifest gods (*epiphanôn theôn*) to all in common each and every day, not merely to a few persons or a single race or city, but to the whole world at once? How can you fail to recognize these?[90]

Julian's deep conviction on this score provides the true key to his final line of attack on Christians, his criticism of their immorality. Ostensibly, the charge is still apostasy from Judaism. Christians fail to practise circumcision (354a) and they do not observe the Jewish dietary taboos (314de). Above all, however, they disregard the Mosaic demand for sacrifice (229bc; 305b). Their failure to sacrifice had long been a central complaint of pagans, and Julian reiterates it with vehemence: the inexhaustible blessings of the gods need to be acknowledged by public worship: 'it is our duty to adore not only the images of the gods but also their temples and sacred precincts and altars.'[91]

The demand that sacred places be revered bears on a last charge. *Against the Galilaeans* speaks with disgust of the veneration by Christians of the tombs and relics of the martyred saints.

> You keep adding more corpses to the corpse of the past [Jesus]. You have filled the whole earth with tombs and sepulchres . . . and yet Jesus himself said that tombs were full of pollution (*akatharsia*). How is it, then, that you invoke God at them? (335bd)

In this practice Julian saw only 'the work of sorcery and foulness' (340a). The accusation of magic was a common one, but Julian's polemic seems to have been the first to level a charge against the cult of saints. It responds to a developing practice among Christians, and behind it there is a compelling feeling which transcends all philosophic argument. To a pagan, the ascription of holiness to the graves and remains of the human dead involved a monstrous ritual pollution: 'On this point, the rise of Christianity in the pagan world was met with deep religious anger.'[92] By replacing the divine helpers of the sublunar regions with privileged dead persons, the cult of saints merely compounded the 'atheism' of Christians.

The strength of Julian's abhorrence of pollution through the dead is evident both from the funeral decree of February 363 – a 'confirmation by law of an ancient custom' by which daytime funerals were forbidden[93] – and from particular actions he took in 362. His brother Gallus, as Caesar, had had the bones of the Antiochene martyr Babylas transferred from the city to a new sepulchre built adjacent to the temple of Apollo at Daphne, and columns from the temple had apparently been used in the construction of the Christian monument. *En route* to Antioch, Julian gave orders that the columns be restored to the temple;[94] having arrived, he was dismayed to find that Apollo's oracle was still silent. The cause was plain to him: in October, he had the remains of Babylas removed, and the sanctuary at Daphne purified.[95] The episode is further evidence that the palpable well-being of pagan cult ritual was central to Julian's hostility to Christian belief and practice – and it is not to be reckoned an eccentric act of a theurgist obsessed with purificatory rites: in various cities,[96] pagans quickly followed Julian's lead, dealing similarly – and less gently – with the tombs of local martyrs.

As we have it in the standard modern edition of its fragments, *Against the Galilaeans* gives out in the midst of criticism of Christian indolence in the matter of sacrifice and divination.[97] That is chance, but it is an apt chance. If my account holds good, the driving force behind *Against the Galilaeans* will be found in a keen defence of ancestral cultic practice focused upon sacrifice by one to whom it seemed, in all its diversity, the very cement of a civilized world. This verdict gains support not only from the emphasis Julian places on the point, but also from the brute fact that so much of what he says belongs to the stuff of popular pagan polemic. That *Against the Galilaeans* shows a familiarity with biblical texts, that it sets Platonic doctrine in opposition to the Judaic conception of God – these are undeniable facts, and it is proper to note them. But they can easily give an exaggerated impression of the intellectual level of the work. In large measure, the citations from the Bible simply witness the Christian education Julian had had as a youth. Against them, we need to set the telling fact that the Arian colour of that upbringing seems to have left no discernible trace in any of his writings.[98] Where the writer cites the Scriptures in *Against the Galilaeans*, he takes the posture of a well-informed outsider. Our interest here is with the impulses that underlie the work, not with the intellectual validity of its arguments: it is plain, though, that many of the arguments rely

heavily on a doggedly literalist reading of biblical passages, and do not begin to answer the counter-arguments of an Origen. Rather, Julian merely denies Christians the right to put such arguments: they appeal to allegorical interpretation, and that (it is implied) is the preserve of men of true *paideia* (94a); by definition, this quality is just what Julian's Christians lack. No educated opponent would allow the justice of that, and in this sense *Against the Galilaeans* disdains to engage in serious argument by a debater's trick. But it was a trick that went deep. It is often suggested that, in their basic suppositions, pagans and Christians had far more in common than the conventions of ancient polemic lead us to suppose. For Julian, at least, that does not look to be true. The gulf between them was to his eyes massive, and not to be bridged.

Nor am I inclined to find in *Against the Galilaeans* any well-articulated Neoplatonist theory of the universality of Roman rule.[99] The account of the world's creation in the *Timaeus* and the Platonic conception of the divine as eternal, self-sufficient, and free from change and passion were the common stuff of pagan theological discourse.[100] It would be astonishing if a professed Neoplatonist had no recourse to them in a critique of Christianity. But that does not mark *Against the Galilaeans* out as above all else a philosophic critique rooted in the contrast between Platonist reason and Christian faith. In tone at least, it has been observed, *Against the Galilaeans* stands closer to Celsus' *True Word* than to Porphyry.[101] If that contrast cannot be pressed too hard, it is only because of the very restricted number of fragments that can confidently be said to survive from Porphyry's *Against the Christians*.[102] Certainly, there is nothing in Julian or Celsus that can compare with Porphyry's painstaking and coolly expressed critique of biblical texts on philological and historical grounds.

The tone of what survives of Porphyry's work may deceive, of course: for one thing, some would argue that his critique was written around the time of the Diocletianic persecution, perhaps even at imperial request;[103] for another, there are hints elsewhere in Porphyry's works that he too regarded Christians as 'deserters of tradition'[104] and that he did not entirely neglect the defence of traditional worship.[105] The brute fact remains, though, that the defence of polytheist practice to be found in Celsus and Julian finds no close parallel in what survives of Porphyry's work. Porphyry, indeed, while rejecting the notion that the Christian religion constituted a 'universal way of salvation', was prepared (at least at one

stage in his career) to speak of Christ himself as a 'pious, just and wise man who has access to the heavens', akin to a Greek hero and worthy to be praised as such.[106] There is emphatically nothing of the sort to be found in Julian, and the contrasting tone of *Against the Galilaeans* remains significant: in this text, the style is the man. It is telling, too, that the defence of polytheist cult in Julian is notably energetic and forthright even in comparison with that of Celsus, which is often judged lukewarm and rather uneasy.[107]

It was only the ostensible purpose of *Against the Galilaeans* to prove 'in a court of law' that the 'so-called dogmas' of the Christians were false (41e). The true impulse behind the work was more basic: it was written out of deep hatred for Christian thought and practice, and the social effects they had had throughout the Empire. To Julian, these were most palpable in the indifference of Christians to the cult worship of the ancestral gods, and in their assumption that they could participate in the Greek republic of letters and yet deny what he saw as its religious core:[108] a multiplicity of gods manifesting themselves in helpful epiphanies in return for the honours paid to them by mortals. A modern writer has borrowed a lucid metaphor from Julian's own lips to capture the horror he felt: 'He saw, with a clarity bred of hatred, one blatant feature of his age – Christianity rising like a damp-stain on the wall of his beloved Hellenic culture.'[109] Julian was not so self-deceiving as to think that the damp-stain could be checked by one more polemic against Christians. But he could do more than that: the gods had made him Emperor.[110] Reflection on the public measures directed by the Emperor against his Christian subjects will lend further support to my argument.

THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN POLITICS OF JULIAN

The criticisms made of Christians in the *Against the Galilaeans*, and the tone in which they are made, owe an evident debt to conventions of polemic. That does not mean they did not go deep. But polemic deals in extremes; it is impatient of distinctions between the wholly and the partly bad in what it attacks. To appraise Julian's criticisms properly, we need to measure what he said about Christianity against what he did about it. The debate on this score has tended to centre on two related issues: Did the underlying motivation behind his policy towards Christians change significantly in the course of his reign? And do the measures taken in the later part of it amount to persecution?

The notion that the policy underwent a significant shift assumes that when Julian first became Emperor he supposed that it would be possible to restore the fortunes of paganism in the cities of the Empire without recourse to actively repressive measures against the Christians. That was the view of Bidez. In support, he pointed first to edicts issued by Julian very shortly after his arrival at Constantinople in December 361, or perhaps even earlier.[111] They declared religious toleration throughout the Empire, and an amnesty for all Christians exiled by the former regime. On this view, Julian started out in the belief that, provided the cults were free to compete with Christianity without hindrance, a pagan restoration would follow, and continued to work on that basis for several months. For Bidez, the education law of 17 June 362 marked a fundamental shift from that assumption:[112] Julian now acted on the basis that the disseminators of a Christianized Hellenism were working serious harm and must be checked, that Christian youth was sick and could only be cured by true *paideia*.[113] His later experiences at Antioch, the argument runs – not least the destruction by fire of the temple at Daphne – gave his dislike of Christians an increasingly sharp edge:[114] there were churches summarily shut, their property confiscated;[115] soldiers bribed to sacrifice, sometimes even compelled on pain of death;[116] Christians excluded from public office,[117] forbidden even to bury their dead by day;[118] orders that they should be henceforth called 'Galilaeans';[119] anti-Christian pogroms left unpunished.[120] In short, Julian's policy became more and more repressive and pettily vindictive, and seemed to imply that outright persecution was not far off by the time he set out against Persia in spring 363.

For the moment, I set aside the matter of Julian's credentials as a 'persecutor', and focus on the larger argument that his policy involved a turn-about from a tolerant stance to a conviction that Christianity must be actively repressed. This widely accepted interpretation of the policy was crisply rejected by Bowersock: in his view, Julian's view of Christians was utterly intolerant from the first and he never contemplated any other solution to the problem they posed than their total elimination.[121] That claim is very strong and needs to be qualified, but in my view Bowersock was right to reject the basic notion of a slide from toleration to persecution in the reign: as a general interpretation, it is highly misleading.

In the first place, there is an elementary distinction to be made between ends and means. Even if we suppose that Julian did not intend at first to pursue the Christians actively, that does not mean

that his underlying purpose was to change in any way. At the heart of *Against the Galilaeans* there lay a compelling sense that Christianity was damaging the fabric of civilized life. Julian did not arrive at that conviction at Antioch, however. It is plain to see in two works composed in close proximity[122] in the early spring of 363. The Helios myth in the *Against Heraclius* casts Constantine and his sons as the sowers of monstrous discord: 'there was a general slaughter . . . and everything was thrown into confusion. The sons demolished the ancestral temples which their father had dishonoured . . . and the laws of the gods and men alike were profaned.'[123] The Fates foretold that if nothing were done, 'this wicked zeal for impious deeds will prevail universally.'[124] The criticism elsewhere in the same work of men who 'subvert the common customs' we have discussed much earlier. Ostensibly, it was a description of Heraclius and his friends, but I have argued that they hardly merited the title and that Julian was well aware of the fact. For the sake of an argument and a vivid image, Julian had likened the Cynics to subversive 'pirates': his audience, I suggested, will have known how to take that remark, but to help them he went on to deride Heraclius as 'very like a monk': the men who 'subvert[ed] the common customs' for real were not the hairy Cynics who hung about the imperial court but the Christians in the cities of the Empire.[125] The prayer which closed the hymn to the Mother pointed the same way: 'Grant all men knowledge of the gods, and grant to the community of the Roman people that they may cleanse themselves of the stain of godlessness.'[126]

That prayer and the warning of the Fates in the Helios myth give reason to suspect that Julian intended from an early point to take steps to render Christianity impotent as a social and political force. That need not entail a general persecution. 'I swear by the gods', a letter runs, 'that I do not wish Galilaeans either put to death or unjustly beaten'.[127] But the sentence that follows reveals the author's principal assumption: 'None the less, I insist that those who revere the gods should be given absolute preference to them; for by their folly almost everything has been destroyed.' In any case, persecution had not succeeded in the past: the Tetrarchic persecution sixty years before had for the most part failed to excite the mass of pagans in the cities, and the opportunity it had given the Church to add to the roll of glorious martyrs was arguably better avoided.

The possibility may be allowed that Julian came to feel in the course of 362 that an initial 'tolerant' stance had proved inadequate for his needs and that a change of tack was needed. But it is not

necessary to think as much. There is a political factor to consider. In his early days as Emperor, he had to proceed with caution. Above all, he needed to win and retain the loyalty of the Constantinian legions and the generals who commanded them. There is no cause to think that either the generals or the rank and file will have been much upset by the mere fact of Julian's paganism,[128] but the commanders in question had been active supporters of Constantius.[129] Julian's ground for manœuvre was accordingly restricted: he could not safely launch an immediate frontal attack on the memory of his hateful uncle and the Christian system that he had worked to promote.

Julian's hatred of Constantius is a fact that must be kept firmly in mind if we are to catch the mood of his policy in the early months of 362. The Christianity he set himself against was not an abstraction. It was intimately linked in his mind to members of his own family, to 'a bad dream of two generations of impious rule by a Christian dynasty': barely fifty years had passed since Constantine had converted, less than forty since he had eliminated his pagan colleague Licinius – and the most vehement anti-pagan measures undertaken by the dynasty were still more recent, post-dating Constantius' elimination of the usurper Magnentius (350–3); in Julian's mind, the problem was perhaps reducible to manageable proportions, and he need not be supposed to have been trying anything so desperate as to 'put the clock back' to the age of Marcus Aurelius.[130] And in some ways at least, he approached the task shrewdly. Men who came to the purple were expected to act according to a pattern: one purpose of the edicts proclaiming religious toleration and an amnesty for Christians who had fallen foul of Constantius was to give a symbolic show of *civilitas* and *praotês* at the start of the reign. That Julian's first step towards a restoration of paganism was taken in this fashion tells a good deal about his political nous. It does little, however, to show that he was really willing to let the Christians alone at the start. If Ammianus is believed, the amnesty for Christian exiles was proposed with an ulterior purpose: to foment discord between Christian sects, above all between the Arians and the supporters of the Nicene creed.[131]

Bidez allowed that Julian's motives here were less than pure, but he minimized the import of Ammianus' comment. He looked for support to the honorific inscriptions set up by cities far and wide throughout the Empire – 'même dans les cités les plus christianisées'.[132] It will hardly surprise that the new Emperor was formally congratulated by Christian as well as pagan communities: to do that

much was only politic. But Bidez gave less weight than was due to the striking titles of Julian in some of the pagan inscriptions he adduced. 'To the Restorer of the Cults'; 'To the Lord Julian, Born for the Good of the State . . . on Account of the Wiping Away of the Ills of the Former Time'; 'Restorer of Liberty and the Roman Religion'.[133] A hundred years before, the persecutor Decius had been hailed as 'Restorer of the Cults'; now, Julian was 'Restorer of the Temples'.[134] Titles of this sort respond to more than a mere declaration of religious toleration ensuring that paganism should no longer be hamstrung in competing for men's sympathies. They anticipate, or recognize, a concrete plan to weigh the balance decisively in its favour.

The most effective way for Julian to further his cause was to do all he could to ensure that the worship of the gods was firmly linked to the material prosperity of the Empire in the minds of his subjects. That, above all, was what Constantine had done for the Church. Behind the success of his reforms had stood the brute force of money.[135] Vast sums were spent on the building of basilicas, and there were grand endowments of land to the Church. That land, moreover, was to be exempt from tax. Clerics were excused the burden of costly public offices, even personally subsidized. There were food allowances for Christian widows and nuns. To pay for it all, Constantine looked to a source of funds accumulated over centuries: the huge treasure house of precious metals lying to hand in the ancestral temples. Pagans, it has been nicely said, had financed their own destruction.[136] Julian's most pressing task in this connection was to do the same in reverse, to restore the temples as the perceived focus of public *beneficia* at the expense of the Church.[137]

A clear step in this direction came as early as 4 February 362. An edict decreed that temples of the gods that had been put to improper use should be rededicated, and that those which had been destroyed by the Christians should be rebuilt at the Church's expense.[138] Owners of land which had formerly belonged to the temples were to give it back, and a special tax was levied on those who had used the fabric of sacred buildings in the construction of new ones. The importance Julian attached to the issue is clear from a further edict of 29 June: the rebuilding of temples was to take priority over all other building projects in the provinces.[139] In parallel, in March, the clergy's tax exemptions were revoked, and their judicial power and exemption from service as decurions withdrawn.[140]

Whatever practical difficulties, confusions and objections the edict

of 4 February raised in its local application – and the sources show that these were considerable –, it is very revealing of Julian's basic intentions. If the restoration programme and the withdrawal of the clergy's privileges need to be seen in the light of his general aim to increase the sources of revenue available to the cities, they also highlight the integral part he envisaged for cult in civic life. I have discussed earlier the importance he attached to the virtue of *philanthrôpia*, and the strong appeal such a stance could hold for the upper classes in the East. In political terms it demanded a respect for the legal processes and privileges of the cities, and generous public spending; and it linked these with a traditional cultural ideal – in short, with *paideia*.[141] In this connection, cult piety could certainly find a place. Temples had been a medium of pagan euergetism and munificence, 'a common resort for people in need,'[142] and a centre for banquet and spectacle. Julian repaired the finances of the cults with this in mind. The priests of the cults 'must exercise *philanthrôpia* before all else, for from it come many other blessings, the greatest of all the goodwill of the gods.'[143] In making that demand, Julian had a keen eye to the popularity the Church had won through the charitable provision which bishops had been able to make for local communities in the wake of Constantine's reforms. 'The impious Galilaeans discerned that the poor were neglected by the priests and applied themselves to *philanthrôpia*, and the result is that they have led many into atheism.'[144] To counter which, priests were to establish hostels and were allocated corn and wine to be distributed to the needy: this too was 'reverence to the gods'.[145] Needless to say, the Church's grain allowance was to be revoked.[146]

Philanthrôpia was a virtue central to Julian's imperial vision, and closely bound up with his ideal of *paideia*. In his view, the Christians had seized upon it in one of its aspects and used it to their own ends; and in that respect their practice of it found a parallel in his eyes in the use they made of Greek education. By a notorious edict of 17 June 362, Christian teachers in the schools were forbidden to teach literature, rhetoric or philosophy. The measure was distasteful even to Ammianus,[147] and its promulgation was the point at which Bidez discerned a major change in the thinking behind the policy. For him, it began a 'bloodless persecution' and a move towards a principle of pagan theocratic rule.[148] On a similar assumption, it has been held to mark Julian's coming more heavily under the influence of his theurgic mentors.[149] On either judgement, the implication is that the measure was quirky, that it is to be explained as the act of a ruler

whose personal enthusiasm for culture or theurgic theory was coming to infect his political judgement in ways which were likely to put him increasingly at odds with the social and political realities of the time: as if Julian had begun to sense that, despite all his efforts, the pagan restoration was badly faltering, and now reacted in frustration with an ill-directed measure whose autocratic overtones were quite incompatible with the ideals of *philanthrôpia* and *civilitas* that he had lauded earlier in the reign.

Another view can be offered, however. The edict unquestionably marks a significant development in Julian's policy, but not necessarily any deep shift in intention. If we attach due weight to the financial measures directed against the Christians earlier in the year, it will not indicate the point at which Julian first turned to active pursuit. Attention has focused on the measure most of all because of the explicitly ideological terms in which Julian justified it; but there is a sense in which that may mislead. The edict as issued on 17 June says nothing about the gods or the classical authors and the need to respect them: it states briefly that those who teach should be of good character and proven competence, that with this in mind their appointments should be confirmed by civic decrees in the cities and that the decrees should be referred to the Emperor for approval.[150] A great deal is left unsaid, and we can assume that requests were sent to Julian for guidance on points of practical application. The document in which he expands on the ideological basis of the edict[151] looks to be a rescript written in reply to one such request and given general circulation: in a formal sense, the statement was elicited. The rescript is undeniably striking for the stress it puts on ideological statement, but the ideological content of other Julianic edicts is no less significant for the fact that it is not spelt out: measures directed in the same month of June to strengthen the finances and councils of the cities were equally 'ideological' in their implicit appeal to the virtue of *philanthrôpia*: the difference is one of emphasis.

Nor is it clear that Julian's close concern with the running of the schools discloses a man whose political priorities had been rendered markedly eccentric by the company of theurgists: the historians of late antiquity who now study its 'rhetoric of Empire' as a pointer to a 'discourse' in a 'web of power' will take another view.[152] Hand-outs to the needy notwithstanding, the principal aim of the philanthropic measures which Julian demanded was to ensure that the activities of the dominant classes of the cities should be intimately linked with the bedrock of pagan cult, and should be clearly seen to be so linked.

The education edict was exclusively concerned with the same classes and looked to the same end. It hardly touched the mass of Christians; it furthered Julian's plan to reverse the progress of Christianity as a social and cultural force in the upper levels of society.[153] It was well directed to a sensitive point, and precisely for that reason it bulked large in the complaints of educated Christians.

To understand the full intention behind it, we need to dwell on the close of the rescript, where it is made clear that Christian students are free to attend the schools if they please: they are sick rather than wicked.[154] Bidez regarded this as an empty gesture, assuming that compromise on the question would not be tolerated by the Christian community at large. On that reading, the aim of the edict was to cut off Christians from education *tout court*. But on one view,[155] Julian may not have intended that. A man without the benefit of the *enkyklios paideia* would find himself virtually debarred from a public career in his city, and generally diminished in status in a milieu in which the claims of *paideia* clearly continued to count.[156] Well-to-do Christians faced a stark choice: to put their sons at a severe social disadvantage in their prospects, or to let them be taught by pagans. Julian's own experience, it may be guessed, will have given him no small faith in the transforming power of such an education. Whether he misjudged the numbers of Christian students who would be willing, or allowed, to attend the schools is another matter.

Despite the provision it made on this score, the edict can plainly count as an emblem of a 'totalizing discourse'; for Ammianus at least, and perhaps for many cultured pagans, the remedy it proposed was much too drastic. Julian can hardly have failed to see that it would lead to bitter controversy. But that just serves to show how convinced he was that Christianity must be rooted out from the upper levels of society, and how far he was prepared to go to secure that result. A long-sighted view was needed: in Julian's view *paideia* without the gods was nothing and worse than nothing, and professors who did not sacrifice were no true professors.

The measures taken against Christians in the months following the education edict need to be judged in the light of Julian's stay at Antioch. He arrived there in July 362 prepared 'to make the city greater and more powerful';[157] when he left it in March 363, he declared he would transfer his headquarters to Tarsus, and appointed as its governor a man whom he knew to be vicious.[158] Several factors contributed to the change of mood, but not least was the fact that the city was predominantly Christian. Julian became markedly

unpopular there, and came to look on the place as a city of ingrates.[159] It is reasonable to think that this will have made him impatient for clear signs that elsewhere the pagan revival was faring better, and there are hints in his Antiochene letters of unease on that score: 'Hellenism does not yet prosper as I intend.' He demanded more strenuous efforts from those he relied upon to promote it,[160] and his dealings with Christians took on a harsher note. Whole cities were penalized for their Christian affiliations. Palestinian Constantia was stripped of its civic status and merged with pagan Gaza.[161] When the Caesareans destroyed the last functioning temple in their city, there was not only a fine, but civic demotion, with higher taxes to boot.[162] A letter to the Edessenes gave a menacing slant to a cherished concept: in response to internal bickering between Christian sects, Julian confiscated the entire wealth of the community – it was easier for the poor, he said, to enter the kingdom of heaven – and warned them to desist from riot 'lest you provoke my *philanthropia* against yourselves and pay the price for upset of the common good by being sentenced to the sword and exile and fire'.[163] More disturbing still, he seemed to condone violent pagan riots at Emesa and elsewhere.[164] In the last months of his reign, there were apparently laws barring Christians from certain public and military posts, and a declaration that much more was to come on his return from Persia.[165]

A change in mood is obvious. But how deep a change in policy and intention need it imply? It deserves to be said that the actions taken against Caesarea and Edessa were responses to particular events that had come to Julian's notice; and that in the case of Constantia, he merely revoked a privileged status granted by the hated Constantine.[166] It is perhaps too easy to proceed to a generalizing explanation on the strength of Julian's exasperation with the Antiochenes. As early as 1 August 362, he was prepared to connive against a bishop in at least one city;[167] as early as January 362, he had all but condoned the murder of George of Cappadocia.[168] Financial measures were being directed against the Christian authorities from the start of the year. As the year proceeded, the policy was intensified; in cases where notable resistance by a Christian community came to Julian's attention, particular actions were taken in response. From the beginning, though, he envisaged the eradication of Christianity as a social force in the Empire, and worked steadily to that end.

Specific measures taken by Julian are not the whole story, however. The leading pagans in a number of cities were quick to sense the Emperor's hardening mood and took advantage of the situation.

Gaza, for instance, apparently petitioned Julian to condemn the celebrated monk Hilarion as an outlaw.[169] The initiative behind the pagan riots that occurred there – and likewise, the initiative behind such episodes of mob-violence as the murders of Bishop Mark at Arethusa and of the holy virgins at Heliopolis[170] – came from the local pagans, not from the imperial authorities.[171] Against this background, Julian's status as a persecutor is reduced to a question of definition. If persecution is to entail the authorization of mob violence, then Julian will be found 'not guilty': he was a cultured man with a genuine regard for civic order, and he had no wish to shed the blood of Roman citizens. But that leaves a lot unsaid. Julian sought the obliteration of Christianity as a social and cultural force, not the physical destruction of Christians. If he eschewed violent measures of repression, it was partly because he thought that there were other means to hand, more likely to be effective in the longer run. That left room enough for vindictiveness; on the terms the Apostate set, the fight against the Church was a fight to the finish.

Specific measures against Christians were one side of a larger design. 'Restorer of the Cults', the dedication is likely to have read:[172] the one implied the other. And if the long-term fight was to win men's minds, the weapon was very concrete. 'Prayers divorced from sacrifice,' wrote Julian's friend Salutius, 'are only words; prayers with sacrifices are animated words.'[173] My account of Julian's anti-Christian politics conforms with my reading of his anti-Christian critique: its core lay in the restoration of the temples and of public worship at them as the inescapable corner-stones of civic life. In the streets of the cities there were to be many gods. On New Year's Day in 363, to celebrate the start of Julian's fourth consulship, Libanius delivered a public speech commissioned by the Emperor. 'The gods,' he said, 'were bound to be your friends, Sire, for you have neglected none of their altars on your journey here. . . . This is the bulwark you have made for the Roman Empire.' A later speech picks up the theme:

> This city . . . has given many gods to be your allies. You have sacrificed and made invocation to them, you have soldiered with them: Hermes, Pan, Demeter, Ares, Calliope [Patroness of Antioch], Apollo, the Zeus of the Mountain and the Zeus in the city in whose presence you entered into your consulship . . .[174]

No adequate account of Julian's stay at Antioch can ignore his high-profile worship at local shrines or his determination to repair major temples and oracular centres throughout the East. That is the setting

against which we must place the Emperor's abortive plan to restore the Temple at Jerusalem. Three centuries earlier a catastrophe had razed the Temple to the ground, but the Jews of the Roman State had once offered sacrifices to an ancestral God on High, and prayers for the safety of the Roman Emperor. Julian planned to repair the Temple and make it possible for the Jews to honour their god with sacrifice again. If that dismayed the Christians and falsified a cherished prophecy of the Gospels, so much the better in Julian's eyes. Constantine had built the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to proclaim Jerusalem a Christian city, the centre of Christian pilgrimage: now the Jews would worship in Jerusalem once more. In policy, as in debate, they could serve as a weapon against the enemy.[175]

It is reasonable to think that the polemical tone of *Against the Galilaeans* is all the sharper for its having been composed in a city which had showed itself indifferent to Julian's vision of cult. That does not entitle us to view it as the pathological product of a deeply alienated and isolated man.[176] In its central complaints against Christians – their refusal to worship the ancestral gods, their perversion of social values and their travesty of true *paideia* – it expresses in specious argument the convictions on which Julian proceeded from his first days as Emperor. It expresses also the strength of the polytheist sensibilities of the private man; and whatever that may tell or fail to tell about Julian's 'conversion' in his twentieth year, it certainly tells a lot about the religion of Julian ten years on. A recent study of his *Against the Galilaeans* closed with a statement of 'the differences between Christian and Hellenic wisdom': the Julianic godhead, it concluded, was 'a quasi-impersonal source of reality, too far removed to be concerned with human beings'; by contrast the God of his opponents was 'personal, immanent, and actively engaged in human affairs'.[177] About Julian, at least, that judgement is utterly wrong. On the second count, too, it claims a lot: in fourth-century Egypt, at any rate, the monks told a different story. A pagan priest was interested to ask one Abba Olympius if he still received visions from his God since taking to the cells. 'No', he was told. 'What?' said the priest: 'When we sacrifice to our god, he hides nothing from us, but discloses all his Mysteries.'[178] Julian would have assuredly applauded that. His world was full of ever-present helpers, 'manifest gods',[179] and they lived in the cities' temples as much as in the caverns of the theurgists. They had been neglected, and Augustan verse had warned long ago that neglect

had its consequences. 'Guiltless you may be, O Roman, yet still shall you expiate your fathers' crimes until you have rebuilt the ruined shrines and temples of the gods.' Julian looked on Constantius' reign as proof enough of that. Temples had closed and oracles had failed: to restore them was his duty to the Empire and the gods. For himself, an oracle promised that a chariot would bear him to Olympus and 'the halls of heavenly light',[180] and the private man could look to a gentler mood in the poet: 'Bits of me, many bits, will dodge all funeral . . .'

ENVOI

The care of the temples of the gods was never Julian's sole concern as Emperor. His reputation had been founded on military success, and when he went to Antioch in the summer of 362 he went to prepare for a war against the Persians. In the event, the expedition which left Antioch the following March turned out to be a débâcle. On 26 June 363 Julian was fatally wounded in a mêlée, and died during the night. His body was embalmed and borne back to Roman territory for burial at Tarsus, close by the grave of Maximin Daia.[1] There his Christian successor Jovian honoured him with a fine tomb on which was inscribed (so Zosimus tells) a soldierly epitaph that echoed Homer:

> Julian lies here, back from fast-flowing Tigris:
> At once a noble king and a strong spearman.[2]

Others remembered him from different perspectives. Within a few years of his death, idealizing memoirs by Libanius were circulating in pagan cliques.[3] They dwelt on his love and promotion of learning and literature, the restoration of the temples of the cities.[4] In some of those temples, there is reason to think, the dead Emperor was prayed to as a god for favour and protection.[5] For their part, the Neoplatonists long cherished the memory of one whose soul had attained 'his father's halls of heavenly light';[6] in the late fifth century, the head of the Alexandrian school would recall his opinion on a knotty problem in logic,[7] and readers of Marinus' *Life of Proclus* would learn that the philosopher had died 'in the 124th year after the rule of Julian'.[8] Nor were Christians disposed to forget. The invectives composed *Against Julian* by Gregory Nazianzen (probably within a year of Julian's death)[9] enjoyed wide currency and formed the basis of colourful popular legends which told of a tyrant who

ordered the slaughter of Christians *en masse*, a black magician who drew embryos from the womb in occult rites.[10]

In modern scholarship, too, assessments of Julian and his reign remain at odds. His latest biographers are agreed in ascribing to him a totalitarian political programme which came to nothing and made of him, in his last months, a deeply alienated figure; but they differ sharply in their judgements of the ideological basis of the policy and in their views of the man himself. One offers us the 'Puritanical Pagan' who tried to found a pagan Church – an ascetic revolutionary at odds not only with Christians but with the majority of his pagan subjects too, a bigot whose Neoplatonist interests are informative of little but the eccentric emotional development of an *enfant nerveux*.[11] Another presents those same interests as an important key to the understanding of Julian's public policy. He is credited with a systematic theory of *paideia*, a dogmatic syncretism by which Neoplatonic and Mithraic doctrines were linked and given political expression in a theocratic ideology of kingship – an ideology by which Julian sought to impose a pagan monotheism as the religion of the Empire.[12] On a warier variant of that view, it is better not to talk of 'monotheism' in Julian's case, but rather of a 'universalism' rooted in a henotheist and Mithraicizing theology which stressed the link between the earthly and the heavenly monarchies.[13] On this view, the failure of Julian's cultural programme was uniquely harmful to the pagan cause, because his universalized theory of paganism at last presented the Christians with just the thing they had lacked till then – an all-embracing version of paganism on which they could focus their attack.

Many, too, have seen the key to Julian's paganism in the very religion he set himself against:

> Pénétré d'influences chrétiennes malgré son idolâtrie, [il] ressemble à un Augustin platonisant au moins autant qu'aux représentants de la philosophie archaïsante dont il se croyait un disciple . . . l'âme inquiéte et tourmentée de Julien est à beaucoup d'égards animée par l'esprit des temps nouveaux.[14]

The very intolerance that he showed towards the Christians has been taken to mark his inability to cut free from the habits of mind forged by a Christian education.[15]

These are views I do not share. To my mind, characterizations of Julian as an innovative Neoplatonist ideologue or as a bigot hostile to forms of pagan practice and thinking other than his own are the

two sides of a false coin. Philosophy had a central place in Julian's *paideia*, certainly, but it did not constitute the whole: rhetoric too was crucial in his education, and always remained integral to his conception of culture and to his cultural practice. In this connection, the influence of the 'divine' Iamblichus may be judged peripheral: even his devoted admirers readily granted that his works were devoid of literary merit.[16] And even where Julian's philosophy is the issue, it is possible to make too much of the debt. Iamblichus was prized above all for his theurgic writings on the divine hierarchy and the *Chaldaean Oracles*; and while Julian's deep attraction to theurgy is not in any doubt, he conceived of it as only a part of philosophy. In the round, the philosophic ideal to which he subscribed was shared by many cultured pagans in his day: we have met the Plutarchs and Scylaciuses who wrote their poems to Zeus and Pan, and who in their turn were graciously praised for their *sophia* and *beneficia* as governors in the poems which like-minded men in the cities of the East composed to honour them.[17]

The concept of *civilitas* was central to Julian's philosophic ideal, and it is given much less than its due if we ascribe to him a cosmocratic theory of kingship more evocative of Byzantium than of imperial Rome. There is a distinction, subtle but essential, to be drawn in this connection, and a modern study of the ceremonial modes of fourth-century *accessio* has drawn it lucidly. Julian certainly believed that the will of the gods had made him Emperor, but he differed markedly from his immediate predecessors and successors in regarding himself as the bearer of divine inspiration not *qua* Emperor, but in his own person: against the precepts of a Eusebius or a Themistius, he considered that 'the Emperor's nature was not related specifically to the nature of the gods'; an Emperor could indeed be divinely inspired, but in his view 'this was as true of any human being.'[18]

So too, it seems to me, the religion of Julian is not finally to be explained in terms of his philosophy. That his philosophic interests were deeply felt is not in question, and in this case they strike us all the more forcefully for the fact that they belonged to a Roman Emperor. It was a rare conjunction, and it evoked a beguiling Platonic ideal: the image of Julian as a philosopher-king was to engage historians from Ammianus onwards. For the author of a 'philosophic history' the notion had a special edge, and when Gibbon wrote on Julian he gave close attention to the justice of the Emperor's reputation on this score. Gibbon's verdict, though, was studiedly

ambiguous, and when he wished to convey the heart of the man he looked elsewhere: 'A devout and sincere attachment for the gods of Athens and Rome constituted the ruling passion of Julian.'[19] In my view, that judgement deserves to stand. As an Iamblichan Neoplatonist, Julian could subscribe to the doctrine of a transcendental First Principle as the sole true source of the real, 'known to the blessed theurgists' alone; but alongside his philosophic monism we find in his writings the traces of an irreducibly polytheist sensibility, with firm roots in ancestral patterns of pagan belief that were far from moribund.[20] The key fact of Julian's devotional life is his assumption that a multiplicity of gods was constantly being manifested in the world of men, and that they must be honoured and rendered propitious by acts of cult performed in accordance with established custom. In his case, it is true, we must allow for a special factor: a pagan who had converted away from a Christian upbringing was no doubt likely to stay inclined to systematized expressions of belief. None the less, the assumptions Julian made about the gods and the forms of worship due to them were not the assumptions of one irreversibly permeated, despite his best endeavours, by a Christian education: rather, they mark the gulf which came to separate the mature Julian from the faith into which he had been born. Nor did they make for an innovatory attempt to transform the paganism of his subjects into a 'monotheistic universal faith'. Julian's promotion of paganism was first and foremost what the inscriptions declared: a restoration of the temples and cults of the ancestral gods whose worship his predecessors had sought to check by edict and law.[21] And this in turn implies that the ascription to him of a totalitarian religious ideology is subject to a major proviso. His anti-Christian programme was indeed an attempt to consign Christianity to cultural oblivion: but he was not out to impose a uniform pattern on pagan thought and practice; 'He did not feast some [gods] and ignore others,' recalled Libanius, 'but made libation to all the gods whom the poets have passed down, ancestral parents and their offspring, gods and goddesses, ruling and ruled . . . worshipping the different gods at different times'.[22]

Julian's intolerance of Christianity stemmed from a sense of outrage at those who denied the existence of the many gods and did their best to obliterate the worship of them. His determination to strip the Christian movement of the power and influence it had gained in the wake of Constantine's conversion led him to discriminate actively, in some fields anyway, against those who pro-

fessed the faith. The education edict evoked a protest even from an Ammianus, and we may suppose that many other pagans may have shared his reservations. Conceivably, Ammianus' complaint was emblematic of a deeper disquiet at the degree to which religion had impinged on Julian's public policy, a sense that the rift between pagan and Christian had been exacerbated unnecessarily.[23] But if the complaint went deep, it bore upon an aspect of Julian's religious programme, not the whole of it. It need not imply any lack of sympathy with his basic wish to restore the cults to their places of honour, and it gives no cause to suppose that the attempted restoration was a freakish episode which 'perplexed rather than inspired the majority of surviving pagans'.[24]

Whether or not the attempt had any real chance of making a lasting political impact is quite another matter, and it is not the subject of this book. In the logic of counterfactuals and the state of the evidence, the question can yield no certain answer. We are presented with the brute facts that the early fourth century saw the coming to power of a Roman Emperor determined to promote the Christian and to harm the pagan cause, and that a century later the number of those who professed Christianity had grown remarkably – from five to thirty million, on a recent guess.[25] On one celebrated view, 'Constantine's revolution was perhaps the most audacious act ever committed by an autocrat in disregard and defiance of the vast majority of his subjects.'[26] There is a sense in which that statement is deeply misleading, but it can still serve to warn us against any easy assumption that 'paganism' was already doomed by the time Julian reigned. If we cannot quantify the relative importance of the factors that led to its demise, there is no ignoring the fact that thirty years after Julian's death, one of them consisted in the coercion of pagans by force, the smashing of temples and their altars and statues, and on occasion the torture and killing of those who held fast to them.[27] It may be inferred, at least, from the content and tone of numerous inscriptions set up in Julian's honour – and from the outbursts of pagan violence in several cities in his reign – that his pagan activism struck a deep chord in the minds of some of his subjects. The times were not gentle.

Sixty years earlier, Apollo had spoken through his oracle at Didyma to demand a general persecution of the Christians who hindered his prophecies: in the aftermath, his shrine and his priests had suffered for it.[28] With the coming to power of Julian, he could look for better things. The Emperor became his *prophêtês*,[29] and the

Milesians were pleased to declare on a dedication in his honour that they tended the Apollo of Didyma.[30] At Delphi, too, it is possible, someone who loved the god was willing to let the Emperor know his need:

> Go tell the king: Apollo's lovely hall
> Is fallen to the ground. No longer has the god
> His house, his bay-leaf oracle, his singing stream.
> The waters that spoke are stilled.

There is no knowing whether the author of those lines wrote in hope or resignation,[31] but the poem bears eloquent witness to the bond that linked the Muses and pagan piety, and to the depth of feeling that the mixture could inspire. It spoke of things that Julian held dear and resolved to preserve.

NOTES

1 INTRODUCTION: THE EMPEROR AND THE WRITER

1 The summary account of J.'s career in pp. 1–9 supplies an outline biographical setting for events and episodes which I discuss further in later chapters as they come to bear on my arguments. It aims to be uncontroversial in its presentation of facts and sparing in its interpretations: detailed annotation would be superfluous, and the notes I attach to this section are merely bibliographical; they signal significant items which for the most part post-date the modern biographies in English by Bowersock and Browning, whose books can be readily consulted for amplification on particulars of the political and military career and for disputed details in the chronology.

2 Recent opinion on the importance for the Christianization of the Empire (and even the historicity) of the 'conversion' of 312 is sharply divided. Its centrality is stressed by, e.g., R. MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1984), 32–3, 50, 102; R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth, 1986) 609ff; for the minimalist view, see, e.g., T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 21, 53f, 146, 191, and 'Christians and pagans in the reign of Constantius', in *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XXXIV, L'Église et l'Empire au IVe siècle* (Geneva, 1989) 301–43; T.G. Elliot, 'Constantine's conversion: do we really need it?', *Phoenix* 41 (1987) 420–38, 'Constantine's explanation of his career', *Byzantion* 62 (1992) 212–34.

3 On Constantine's late dynastic arrangements, Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, 251–2. For recent discussion of the murders of 337, see M. di Maio and W.H. Arnold, *'Per vim, per caedem, per bellum*: a study of murder and ecclesiastical politics in the year AD 337', *Byzantion* 62 (1992) 158–91.

4 A.-J. Festugière, 'Julien à Macellum', *JRS* 47 (1957) 53–8 is often viewed as questionably 'psychologizing' but retains value as a sensitive speculation on the adolescent's mentality.

5 Opinion has differed both as to the year the exile ended and (because the exact year of J.'s birth is not quite certain) as to his exact age at the

time: for the chronology I presuppose, see my Ch. 7 at nn. 15 and 18, below.

6 N. Aujolat, 'Eusébie, Hélène et Julien', *Byzantion* 53 (1983) 78–103 (Part I), 421–52 (Part II) speculates on the Empress's role in connection with the choice of her sister-in-law as wife for J., and on her subsequent attitude to Helena.

7 For recent views, see, e.g., J. Szidat, *Historischer Kommentar zu Ammianus Marcellinus XX–XXI*, Teil I (Wiesbaden, 1977) on *RG* 20.4.12ff and 8.7ff; F. Paschoud, ed. and comm., *Zosime: Histoire Nouvelle*, vol II[1] (Paris, 1979) 83ff, on Zos. 3.9; S. Lieu, ed., *The Emperor Julian: Panegyric and Polemic* (Liverpool, 1986) 9ff; J. Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus* (London, 1989) 94ff.

8 J.F. Drinkwater, 'The "pagan underground", Constantius' "secret service" and the survival and usurpation of Julian the Apostate', in C. Deroux, ed., *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*, III (Brussels, 1983) 348–87, wary of the view that J. in the 350s had been protected and cultivated by a network of politically focused pagan dissidents.

9 P. Chuvin, *A Chronicle of the Last Pagans* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990) 30–72 gives a summary account of the anti-pagan legislation of the 4th cent. On one controversial view, Constantine himself had issued a general ban on sacrifice in the 320s: see Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, 210–12, 246–8.

10 See now esp. T.D. Barnes, *Athanasius and Constantius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993) 109–20, 144–51.

11 P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity* (Madison, 1992) 3–34 gives a carefully nuanced overview.

12 F. Millar, 'Empire and city, Augustus to Julian: obligations, excuses and status', *JRS* 73 (1983) 76–96, at 95, with E. Pack, *Städte und Steuern in der Politik Julians* (Brussels, 1986) ch. II *passim*.

13 For representation and discussion of the ideology of early Christianity as an emergent 'discourse of power', see Av. Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire* (Berkeley, 1991), with G.W. Bowersock, 'From Emperor to bishop: the self-conscious transformation of political power in the fourth century AD', *Class. Phil.* 81 (1986) 298–307.

14 Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*, contains at chs VI–VIII an important recent discussion of central questions about the career of J. and is now fundamental on his representation in Ammianus; see also J. Fontaine, 'Le Julien d'Ammien', in R. Braun and J. Richer, eds, *L'Empereur Julien: de l'histoire à la légende* (Paris, 1978) 31ff.

15 Ammianus' Antiochene background has recently been doubted, however: see the reviews of Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus* by G.W. Bowersock, *JRS* 80 (1990) 244–50 at 247f, T.D. Barnes, *CP* 88 (1993) 55–70 at 57ff.

16 F. Blanchetière, 'Julien philhelléne, philosemite, antichrétien', *Journ. Jewish Studies* 33 (1980) 61–81; F. Millar, 'Jews of the Graeco-Roman diaspora between paganism and Christianity AD 312–438', in S Lieu, J. North and T. Rajak, eds, *Jews Among Pagans and Christians* (London, 1992), at 106–8.

17 *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xxiii (vol. ii, p. 476 ed. Bury).

On Gibbon's assessment of J. in this connection, see G.W. Bowersock, 'Gibbon and Julian', in P. Durcey, ed., *Gibbon et Rome à la lumière de l'historiographie moderne* (Geneva, 1977) 191–217, at pp. 192–8.

18 On Gregory as a witness, J. Bernardi, 'Les Invectives contre Julien de Grégoire de Nazianze', in Braun and Richer, eds, *L'Empereur Julien*, 89ff; J. Bernardi, ed., *Grégoire de Nazianze, Discours 4 et 5* (Paris, 1983) Introduction.

19 J. Bouffartigue, *L' Empereur Julien et la culture de son temps* (Paris, 1992) is an important study on a large scale of the cultural contexts and implications of J.'s writings. For the interpretation of the *Misopogon*, see esp. M. Gleason, 'Festive satire: Julian's *Misopogon* and the New Year at Antioch', *JRS* 76 (1986) 106–19.

20 For recent views of the campaign, see Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*, ch. VIII *passim* (now fundamental), with F. Paschoud's commentary on Zosimus, Book iii, *Zosime: Histoire Nouvelle II*[1] (Paris, 1979); also Lieu, ed., *The Emperor Julian*, 91ff; R. Blockley, *East Roman Foreign Policy* (=ARCA 30) (Leeds, 1992) 22ff.

21 G. Scheda, 'Die Todesstunde Kaiser Julians', *Historia* 15 (1966) 380–4 [= R.Klein, ed., *Julian Apostata* (Darmstadt, 1978) 381–6]; Fontaine, 'Le Julien d'Ammien'.

22 Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, 73–5 argues that the *Orat. ad Sanctorum Coetum* appended in Eusebius' *V. Const.* is authentic at base, and discerns in it hints of some philosophic training (though granting that the speech may have been composed with aid): for further refinements, Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, 627ff.

23 Lib. *Or.* 18.175–6, 178. Amm. Marc. 16.5.4–6; 25.4.5.

24 On the form and purpose of the 'diary', R. Rutherford, *The* Meditations *of Marcus Aurelius* (Oxford, 1989) ch. 1; on the correspondence, I quote E. Champlin, *Fronto and Antonine Rome* (Cambridge, Mass, 1980) 2, 121ff.

25 On the assumption of authenticity, see above, n. 22.

26 G.W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (London, 1978) 101–4.

27 *Ep.* 25 (4 Bidez).

28 *Ep.* 69 (201 Bidez); I accept its authenticity (q.v. Loeb edn, vol. iii, p. xlviii).

29 *Ep.* 42 (81 Bidez).

30 *Ep.* 58 (98 Bidez) 400b–401a.

31 *Ep.* 49 (109 Bidez).

32 *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 268a–270d. Cf. appeals to Athens' past as a spur to civic confidence in the 3rd cent.; F. Millar, 'P. Herennius Dexippus: the Greek world and the third-century invasions', *JRS* 59 (1969) 12–29, esp. 27ff.

33 Men. Rhet. 353–4ff (praise of origin of cities); 359.16ff (accomplishments).

34 *Ep.* 47 (111 Bidez) 43a–434a.

35 *Misopogon*, 347a–349a (the tag is Homeric: *Il.* xxiv.261).

36 *Misopogon*, 358a–359a.

37 *Ep.* 29 (80 Bidez).

38 Contemporaries: Amm. Marc. 16.5.4; 25.4.15. Lib. *Or.* 15.2. Christians: *Artemii Passio*, 69 (*PG* 96.1318a); Socr. *HE* 3.21. The Alexander comparison was a predictable rhetorical ploy (Eusebius, *V. Const.* 1.7ff

gives an apt parallel); too much has been read into Lib. *Or.* 17.17. On a contorniate portrait head of Julian modelled after Alexander, A. Alföldi, 'Some portraits of Julian Apostata', *AJA* 66 (1962) 403–5.

39 P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism* (Oxford, 1981) 192–3, 224, on the basis of N. Baynes, *Byzantine Studies* (London, 1955) 346–7.

40 T.D. Barnes, 'Constantine and the Christians of Persia', *JRS* 75 (1985) 135, on the *Itinerary of Alexander*, datable to *c.* 340, and usually assigned to a senator (*PLRE* i, s.v. Polemius 3; 'probably identical' with a cos. of 358). Further discussion in L. Cracco Ruggini, 'Sulla christianizzazione della cultura pagana: il mito greco e latino di Alessandro dall'età antonina al medio evo', *Athenaeum* 43 (1965) 3–80 (esp. 3–21), on 4th-cent. pagan and Christian views of Alexander. Julian's motive in moving to Antioch is implicit in Amm. Marc. 22.7.8; 9.2.

41 On the possible aims (at the least, to force Persian adherence to the treaty of 299: but n.b. Lib. *Ep.* 1402, implying J. hoped to make Hormisdas king of Persia) and intended length of the campaign see R. Ridley, 'Notes on Julian's Persian Campaign', *Historia* 22 (1973) 317–30; Blockley, *East Roman Foreign Policy*, 22–6.

42 *Ep. ad Them.* 253b; 257b; 264d.

43 The modern consensus has been to date the *Ep. ad Them.* to late 361, after Constantius' death: but T.D. Barnes and J. Vander Spoel, 'Julian and Themistius', *GRBS* 22 (1981) 187–9 date the bulk of the letter to 356, conjecturing that the last two paragraphs were added after the acclamation at Paris, and I am inclined to accept their argument: see Ch. 2, at pp. 27ff. N.b. also the variant in S. Bradbury, 'The date of Julian's *Letter to Themistius*', *GRBS* 28 (1987) 235–51, dating the whole to 355/6.

44 *Caes.* 325b; cf. 331c. On the work's date, B. Baldwin, 'The *Caesares* of Julian', *Klio* 60 (1978) 449–66 offers 362/3; Dec. 362 (the time of the Saturnalia) seems most plausible.

45 *Ep.* 50 (82 Bidez) 446.

46 *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez) sets Herodotus and Thucydides alongside Homer, Hesiod and Demosthenes as pinnacles of Greek literature: but n.b. the qualification at n. 57 below.

47 Handbooks: *Ep.* 29 (80 Bidez); *Or.* 3.123d. J.'s debt to Plutarch, acknowledged at *Misopogon*, 358d, is well shown in Baldwin, 'The *Caesares* of Julian', and in G.W. Bowersock, 'Emperor Julian on his predecessors', *YCIS* 27 (1982) 159–72; Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien* 285ff, 419 (indirect knowledge *via* Damophilus?).

48 Caesar: Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 36. Relations with Victor: H. Bird, *Sextus Aurelius Victor* (Liverpool, 1984) 10–12. J.'s knowledge of Latin has been much discussed. Amm. Marc. 16.5.7 attributes *latine . . . disserendi sufficiens sermo*, and J. must be assumed to have been fluent in speech: for one thing, it was necessary to communicate effectively with troops in situations such as Amm. Marc. 17.9.3 recounts. He surely read official documents too: Latin was still the language of official communication in the East (W. Liebeschuetz, *Antioch: City and Administration in the Later Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1972) 246–7, 251–2): though n.b. the suggestively bilingual edict recorded at *Cod.*

Theod. XI.39.5 (=*ELF* 70), where the preamble in Latin is followed by J.'s Greek. But Ammianus' phraseology refers most naturally to speech and need not imply that J. read Latin habitually. The issue turns mainly on his inclination to read Latin literature (not – despite the conventionalized disavowal at *Or.* 2.78a – his capacity to do so). Lib. *Or.* 18.21 and Eutrop. 10.16.3 may suggest that he was so inclined; if so, there is little sign of it in his writings. E. Thompson, 'The Emperor Julian's knowledge of Latin', *CR* 58 (1944) 49–51 suspects no reading of 'literature composed by a Roman'; C. Lacombrade, 'Julien et la tradition romaine', *Pallas* 9 (1960) 155–64 disagrees, but wide reading in Latin is impossible to establish: see Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 408ff. Even if J. was less dismissive of Latin than Libanius (Liebeschuetz, *Antioch*, 11), allowance must be made for 5th-cent. translations into Greek (E. Fischer, *YClS* 27 (1982) 173ff). In the matter of historical sources, he clearly turned most readily to Greek authors (Baldwin, 'The *Caesares* of Julian'); J. Gilliam, 'Titus in Julian's *Caesares*', *AJP* 88(1967) 203–8 finds a (disputable) Suetonian echo at *Caes.* 311a.

49 *Or.* 3.124bc; which is to allow historical judgement a political value. W. Kaegi, 'Emperor Julian's assessment of the significance and function of History', *Proc. Am. Phil. Soc.* 108 (1964) 29–38, makes the point that J. was under no illusion that it was possible simply to replicate times past; cf. P. Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity* (London, 1971) 92, denying that J. sought to 'put the clock back to the days of Marcus'.

50 *Ep.* 14 (31 Bidez).

51 Thus Bowersock, 'Emperor Julian on his predecessors', 159ff., Baldwin, '*Caesares* of Julian', 449ff.: R. Pack, *TAPA* 77(1946) 151ff. discerned a 'serious theological base' to the work, with the divinities ordered according to Iamblichan doctrine.

52 *Caes.* 312a: 313a.

53 *Caes.* 309b; 311c; 313b; 330c. J. was surely aware of Gallienus' support for Plotinus: q.v. Porph. *V. Plot.* 12, discussed by J. Rist, *Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1967) 12–14.

54 Bowersock, 'Emperor Julian on his predecessors', 159.

55 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 300c–301c.

56 Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, chs II–VII, separates and analyses the 'bibliothèques idéales et réelles', discussing Aristotle at 65ff, 197ff, 422; his ch. VIII gives quantitative tables of the frequential order of citation of authors and texts which can now replace those of W. Schwartz in 'Julienstudien', *Philologus* 51 (1892) 632ff.

57 'Canonical' list: *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez); cf. Lib. *Ep.* 1036. For the possible discrepancies, see Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*,130ff, 244ff, 281ff, 420ff.

58 Archilochus: *Or.* 7.207b; 227a (n.b. criticism of his undignified style at *Ep.* 29 (80 Bidez)). Aristophanes: *Or.* 8.243c; *Ep. ad Them.* 260c; *Caes.* 310b; *Misopogon*, 350d. Eupolis: *Or.* 7.204a. Tales: *Misopogon*, 358c.

59 P. Easterling and E. Kenney, eds, *Cambridge History of Classical Literature* (Cambridge, 1985) vol. i, p. 683; T. Szepessy, 'Le siège de Nisibis et la chronologie d'Héliodore', *A. Ant. Hung.* 2 (1976) 24–76.

60 *Caes.* 318d. On the broader formal debt, R. Helm, *Lukian und Menipp* (Leipzig, 1906) 73–5; M. Courtney, 'Parody', *Philologus* 106 (1962) 88; Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 294ff.

61 Gleason, 'Festive satire' *JRS* 76 (1986), 106–9: excellent on the generic and public contexts: Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 13, 103–4 finds 'unsettling laughter'.

62 *Caes.* 312d.

63 *Misopogon* 339cd.

64 *Ibid.*, 349cd.

65 *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 275b; cf. *Or.* 7.233d (divine help conditional on J.'s philanthropy).

66 Decius: *AE* (1973), 235 (Restitutor Sacr[o]rum). Tetrarchs: n.b. esp. Maximin's repair of temples (Eusebius, *De mart. pal.* 9.2).

67 Pliny, *Ep.* 10.96.5, with G.E.M. de Ste. Croix's fundamental 'Why were the Early Christians Persecuted?' *Past & Present* 26 (1963) 6–38 [= M.I. Finley, ed., *Studies in Ancient Society* (London, 1974) 210–49 (cf. 256–62)]; for the *libelli* procedure under Decius in the 3rd cent., see D.S. Potter, *Prophecy and History in the Crisis of the Roman Empire: A Historical Commentary on the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle* (Oxford, 1990) 42–3 and commentary on line 87; on the Tetrarchs, Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, 22ff (n.b. esp. Eusebius, *De mart. Pal.* 4,8).

68 *Or.* 7.235ad.

69 *Ibid.*, 234c; *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.*, 284d; cf. Amm. Marc. 20.5.10: none of which is incompatible with J.'s complicity in the acclamation at Paris, where the detail of the invitation of the officers to dine (Amm. Marc. 20.4.13) is most suggestive. As to whether J. coolly planned rebellion, or acted in (understandable) fear of Constantius' motives, see R. Browning on J. Szidat, *Historischer Kommentar zu Ammianus Marcellinus XX–XXI*, Teil I (Wiesbaden, 1977), in *CR* 29 (1979) 237–9. For well-stated doubts about the notion of a pagan movement in the 350s working on J.'s behalf, Drinkwater, '"Pagan Underground"', 348ff.

70 *Or.* 5.161b.

71 Combining *AE* (1983) 895 (Thessalonica); *ILS* 751b (Iasus).

72 Lib. *Or.* 18.157.

73 *Ep. ad. Them.* 254b. Cf. *Or.* 7.235c; *Misopogon*, 359a (ironic).

74 Principally, Iamblichus: *Or.* 4.146a; 157d.

75 On the emergence of *civilitas* as an ethical term applied to an Emperor's personality, A. Wallace-Hadrill, '*Civilis princeps*: Between Citizen and King', *JRS* 72 (1982) 32–48.

76 Amm. Marc. 16.5.6; 25.4.1.

77 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez), 294d; *Or.* 6.183a.

78 R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972) 120–3. Plotinus' lukewarm attitude to cult was clearly thought unusual: Porph. *V. Plot.* 10.

79 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 293.

80 A.D. Nock, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, 2 vols, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972) vol. i, 456; R. Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus: Recherches sur l'hellénisation philosophique de Mithra* (Leiden, 1975) [= *EPROER* 47] surveys the Platonizing commentators for distortions. R. Beck, 'Mithraism since Franz Cumont', *ANRW* II.17.4, 2002–115 is an

important survey of the recent scholarship.

81 J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930) 266ff, citing W. Koch, *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 6 (1927) 123ff; 7 (1928) 49ff, 511ff, 1363ff.

82 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 181.

83 Amm. Marc. 25.4.1.

84 *Ibid.*, 25.4.20; 22.10.7.

85 *Ibid.*, 25.4.17; on the (shifting?) connotations of the *superstitio/religio* contrast, see R. Gordon in M. Beard and J. North, eds, *Pagan Priests* (London, 1990) 237ff, 253.

86 Amm. Marc. 23.5.10–14; 25.2.7: well discussed in Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*, 126–9, 176–9.

87 Theurgic doctrine dismissed conventional techniques of divination: *OC* 107. Ammianus' attitude: Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*, 128–9.

88 Lib. *Or.* 18.155f; Amm. Marc. 22.7.3.

89 Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*, 468–70; E.D. Hunt, 'Christians and Christianity in Ammianus Marcellinus', *CQ* 35 (1985) 198–200.

90 Bidez, *Vie*, 272.

91 Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, xi, 1 n. 1, 119.

92 For arguments against the view of T.D. Barnes, *Sources of the Historia Augusta* (Brussels, 1978) 117–23 (largely accepted in Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*, 161ff), that Ammianus used Eunapius as a source, see F. Paschoud in *Bonn.-Historia-Augusta-Colloquium* 1978/9 (Bonn, 1980) 159ff; 1982/3 (Bonn, 1985) 284ff, developing his earlier treatment in *Zosime*, vol. II[1] (Paris, 1979) xii–xix. The notion that Ammianus had access to the memoir of Oribasius is not implausible, but that need not entail that it was a shaping influence on his presentation of J. (nor even, perhaps, on Eunapius': q.v. R. Blockley, *Fragmentary Classicizing Historians of the Late Roman Empire* (Liverpool, 1981), vol. i, pp. 23ff). Even supposing that Ammianus used Oribasian/Eunapian material extensively, he should be credited with critical appraisal of it: see R. Tomlin, *Phoenix* 34 (1980) 266–70, esp. on Ammianus' account of the acclamation. See also L. Cracco Ruggini, 'The Ecclesiastical Histories and the pagan historiography: providence and miracles', *Athenaeum* 55 (1977) 107–26, esp. 122, suggesting that Eunapius traced J.'s failure to his decision to enter political life – of which view there is no sign in Ammianus.

93 Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*, 435–51, esp. 435, 445–51.

94 Amm. Marc. 21.1.7ff; Matthews, *Roman Empire of Ammianus*', 428–35.

95 G. Fowden, *From Commonwealth to Empire* (Princeton, 1993) 52–60; for a different emphasis, cf. A. Momigliano, 'Disadvantages of monotheism for a universal state', *Class. Phil.* 81 (1986) 1ff, repr. as ch. 9 in *On Pagans, Jews and Christians* (Middletown, Conn., 1987) 142–58; J. North, 'The development of religious pluralism', in Lieu, North and Rajak, eds, *Jews Among Pagans and Christians*, 174–93.

96 See n. 43 above.

97 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, v.

2 JULIAN'S EDUCATION AND PHILOSOPHIC IDEAL

1 *Ep.* 1 (13 Bidez); in context, J.'s reference to 'true philosophers' marks his adherence to the Pergamene Neoplatonic group of which Priscus was a member.
2 Lib. *Or.* 12.55; *ILS* 751b; (Iasus).
3 Marinus, *Vita Procli*, 36.
4 On the form of Eunapius' history (called by Photius 'a kind of panegyric on Julian') see A.B. Breebart, 'Eunapius of Sardis and the writing of history', *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979) 360–75; K.S. Sacks, 'The Meaning of Eunapius' History', *History and Theory* 25 (1986) 52–67.
5 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez), 301a–b; cf. *Ep.* 36, 423a.
6 *Ep.* 53 (97 Bidez); cf. *Or.* 7.236ab.
7 H.-I. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris, 1938) 171.
8 P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism* (Oxford, 1981) 13–52, in my view underplays the importance of J.'s formal rhetorical studies: see esp. the judgement at 28 that 'the shallowness of the discipline that [the rhetor Hecebolius] taught must have failed to appeal to Julian.'
9 Amm. Marc. 22.9.4.
10 *Misopogon*, 352ab.
11 See below at n. 18.
12 *Misopogon*, 351b–352c; the tag is Homeric, *Od.* 6.162.
13 *Or.* 6.235a: whether J. refers to Maximus of Ephesus or to Mardonius is disputed. For the considerations that favour Mardonius, see Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 23 n. 40; J. Bouffartigue, *L' Empereur Julien et la culture de son temps* (Paris, 1992) 20.
14 R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian* (Berkeley, 1986) 134–9.
15 *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 271b–d.
16 See H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (London 1956) 305–6; Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 40 (school attendance in addition to private tuition?).
17 *Epp.* 23; 38 (107; 106 Bidez).
18 Eunap. *VS* 473/428W: J.'s familiarity with the Scriptural texts (notably the Pentateuch and Matthew) is stressed in Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 156–70 from a count of verbal allusions in his writings (largely, though, in one work, the *CG*).
19 *Or.* 7.215cd.
20 I.e. the so-called *progymnasmata*: for whose place in secondary education, Marrou, *History of Education*, 172–5.
21 Lib. *Orr.* 15.27; 18.12.
22 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 28–9.
23 The authenticity of *Ep.* 63 (194 Bidez) is denied by Bidez and Cumont for its florid style and inconsequential content, but perhaps too confidently: that J. might write in such terms to a rhetor whose pupil he had been is not impossible.
24 *Ep. ad Them.* 257d; cf.258ad, quoting Plat. *Leg.* 713c–714a.
25 *Ep. ad Them.* 254c.

26 *Ibid.*, 263c.
27 *Ibid.*, 261ac; 262ac.
28 *Ibid.*, 265b–266b.
29 J. Bidez, *La Tradition manuscrite de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1929), App. 1; J. Geffcken, *The Last Days of Greco-Roman Paganism*, trans. S. MacCormack (Amsterdam, 1978) 201 n. 21.
30 L. Daly, 'Themistius' plea for religious tolerance', *GRBS* 12 (1971) 65–81, and *art. cit.* at n. 32 below; G. Downey, 'Education and public problems as seen by Themistius', *TAPA* 87 (1955) 291–308; 'Themistius and the defence of Hellenism', *HThR* 50 (1957) 259–74.
31 Them. *Or.* 5.63bc; 69b.
32 L. Daly, '"In a borderland": Themistius' ambivalence towards Julian', *ByzZ* 73 (1980) 1–11, reviving a notion rejected by Bidez (*La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930) 388 n. 10) and G. Dagron, 'L'Empire romain d'Orient au IVème siècle et les traditions politiques de l'hellénisme: le témoignage de Thémistios', *Travaux et Mémoires* 3 (1968) 230–5. The notion arises from Them. *Or.* 34.14 (composed 384), in which he speaks of having refused the Prefecture offered him by an earlier, unnamed, Emperor. Dagron, 'L'Empire romain d'Orient', 213–17, argues for an identification with Constantius II. L. Daly, 'Themistius' refusal of a magistracy', *Byzantion* 53 (1983) 164–217, insists on Julian as referent; but even if Constantius is rejected, there is another candidate (*pace* Daly, 'Themistius' refusal of a magistracy', 194–8) in Valens.
33 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 56, 91–3, 128. I find no trace of sarcasm in the letter; and no personal snub. Less personalized accounts of the ideological dispute in its broader implications are offered by Dagron, 'L'Empire romain d'Orient', 62–5; F. Dvornik, 'The Emperor Julian's "reactionary" ideas on kingship', *Late Classical and Medieval Studies in hon. A.M. Friend, Jr.* (Princeton, 1955) 71ff (with the criticisms made by O. Murray, *JThS* 19 (1978) 677). It is to be stressed that J.'s rejection of the doctrine of a specific relation between the nature of the gods and the nature of the Emperor does not imply that an Emperor cannot be divinely inspired: here S. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, 1981) 192–6 is excellent.
34 For the earlier date, see T.D. Barnes and J. Vander Spoel 'Julian and Themistius', *GRBS* 22 (1981) 187–9, and the variant of S. Bradbury, 'The date of Julian's *Letter to Themistius*', *GRBS* 28 (1987) 235–51.
35 *Ep. ad Them.* 262d.
36 *Ibid.*, 259c–260b (events of the early and mid-350s vividly in mind?); 259c, an allusive reference to Gallus perhaps because he is not yet restored from *damnatio memoriae* (contrast *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 271a). On the change of tone at the close, n.b. 267a (J. is *protetagmenos* among philosophers). Barnes and Vander Spoel (*art. cit.*, n. 34 above) see significance in the talk, in the singular, of 'God' in the closing paragraph (266d–7b): certainly, this presents a contrast with the polytheist expressions in *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 284b, composed late 361, but arguably reflects only the 'philosophic' mode of discourse.
37 *Ep. ad Them.* 259d.

38 See above, n. 32.
39 The (lost) speech is mentioned in Lib. *Ep.* 1430 and was perhaps composed to mark J.'s fourth consulship. On the possibility that other works addressed to J. by Themistius have also perished, Dagron, 'L'Empire romain d'Orient', 218–28 (sceptical).
40 Geffcken, *Last Days*, 181–2. In his own day, Themistius was severely criticized by some pagans for accepting the Prefecture at Theodosius' invitation, and wrote *Orr.* 31 and 34 in response: n.b. the mocking poem in *Anth. Pal.* xi.292.
41 MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony*, 196–8, 268–75.
42 *Ep. ad Them.* 259bc.
43 Lib. *Or.* 13.11.
44 J. Moles, 'The career and conversion of Dio Chrysostom', *JHS* 98 (1978) 79–100; P. Frederiksen, 'Paul and Augustine: conversion narratives, orthodox traditions and the retrospective self', *JThS* 37 (1986) 3–34.
45 *Ep.* 8 (26 Bidez) 415cd: written in 361, the letter gives Maximus the news that J. has begun to worship the gods openly.
46 *Or.* 7.235c; *Ep.* 12 (190 Bidez) to Maximus implies frequent correspondence, if genuine.
47 Amm. Marc. 22.9.4; Lib. *Or.* 18.18.
48 Bidez, *Vie*, 90 citing Lib. *Or.* 18.19ff, doubted in Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 45. On J.'s knowledge of Latin, see above, Ch. 1, n. 48.
49 K. Clinton, *Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Philadelphia, 1974) 65. Not that the basic phenomenon was peculiar to late antiquity: Plutarch was a long-serving priest of Apollo at Delphi (C.P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford, 1971) 33). On Marcus Aurelius' initiation, see n. 141, below.
50 Iamblichus II: Lib. *Ep.* 801 records his initiation. A. Cameron, 'Iamblichus at Athens', *Athenaeum* 45 (1967) 142–53 argues ingeniously that he was the grandson of Sopater, pupil of Iamblichus I, rather than of his famous namesake, and laid the way for the 5th-cent. Neoplatonist school at Athens.
51 Maximus had advised J. to go to see Nestorius: Eunap. *VS* 475/437W. On the hierophant (Nestorius?), Clinton, *Sacred Officials*, 43: *PLRE* i., s.v. Nestor, 2.
52 *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez); cf. *Ep. ad Them.* 260d.
53 Eunap. *VS* 481/460W.
54 Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 19, 29–30, 118–19.
55 *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez).
56 *Ep.* 26 (26 Bidez), to Basil. (*Ep.* 81 (205 Bidez) is spurious.) P. Gallay, *Vie de Grégoire Naziance* (Paris, 1943) 36 estimates Gregory's arrival at Athens as *c.* 350; he was already there when Basil came, and stayed longer: Greg. Naz. *Or.* 43.16 and 24 (*PG* 36). On Gregory's studies at Athens, R. Ruether, *Gregory of Nazianzus* (Oxford, 1969) 18–28 (suggesting a stay of as long as 10 years). On the chronology of Basil's stay (350/1 to 355/6?), P.J. Fedwick in *Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic* I, Introduction (Toronto, 1981), pp. 3–20, at p.6.
57 See Ruether, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 25. Gregory, recalling his student

days at Athens, described the city as 'excessively given over to idolatry . . . but we, our minds fortified against this, suffered no injury' (*Or.* 43.21, in *PG* 36). On the question of Neoplatonic influence on Basil, see now the negative judgement of J. Rist, 'Basil and Neoplatonism', in P.J. Fedwick, ed., *Basil of Caesarea* vol. i, pp. 180–220, minimizing Basil's knowledge of Plotinus and arguing against significant influence at Athens. For a hint that Basil was familiar with Iamblichus' *V. Pythagorica*, N.G. Wilson, *Saint Basil on the Value of Greek Literature* (London, 1975) 59.

58 Greg. Naz. *Or.* 43.21: see also his *Or.* 5.23, ed. J. Bernardi, (Paris, 1983), claiming J.'s motive in settling at Athens was to consult on his destiny with a clandestine pagan clique.

59 *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 274d; cf. *Misopogon*, 351a, Greg. Naz. *Or.* 43.20.

60 For the date of Eunapius' arrival at Athens, R. Goulet, *JHS* 100 (1980) 60, redating from 362 to 364. On Chrysanthius as Eunapius' tutor, Eunap. *VS* 500/538W. He was perhaps named after the Sardian festival *Chrysanthinê* (P. Fraser, *JHS* 101 (1981) 134), and is a likely source of Eunapius' knowledge of the details of J.'s conversion in 351 (Eunap. *VS* 474/430W).

61 *Or.* 3.119c: J. speaks of philosophers at Argos, Sicyon and Athens. A Neoplatonist is independently attested at Sicyon in 359 (Lib. *Ep.* 86).

62 Him. *Or.* 48 (Colonna), 23–4. See Proclus, *Theol. Plat.*, ed. Saffrey and Westerink, vol. i, pp. xxxix–xli.

63 J. Lynch, *Aristotle's School* (Berkeley, 1972) 164ff; J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen, 1978) 364–73 (Stoics and Epicureans); 306–315, 344–56 (Academy); 98–120 (denying that Antiochus' breakaway Academy survived as an institution into the imperial period); J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) 232f.

64 Glucker, *Antiochus*, 148 makes the distinction in discussing Marcus' chairs and their fate (*ibid*, 146–158).

65 Glucker, *Antiochus*, 150–8. N.b. also a Platonist *diadochos* attested at Didyma, *Inschr. Didym. II*, ed. Rehm, no. 150. The epitaph of P. Aelius Cyrillus (S. Mitchell in *Anatolian Studies* 27 (1977) 81, inscr. 12; n.b. comments of L. Robert, *Bulletin Epigraphique*, no. 487 in *REG* 91 (1978) 484) has particular interest: the brothers of one Cyrillus (an Ancyran) '*ekomisan auton apo tês Alexandreias kai tên larnaka apethonto kataxiothentes diadochês*'. If, as Robert argues, this refers to the headship of a philosophic school rather than to inheritance of the property of the deceased, it appears that either the title of *diadochus* is loosely applied as an honorific term, or else that there was shared headship at the school; cf. Glucker, *Antiochus*, 155.

66 3rd cent.: Theodotus and Eubulus (Porph. *V. Plot.* 20).

67 Proclus, *Theol. Plat.*, ed. Saffrey and Westerink, vol. i, p. xlvii: Theodorus was a pupil of Iamblichus (Eunap. *VS* 458/364W). For his thought, R. T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, (London, 1972) 95.

68 Eunap. *VS* 483/469W. (The 5th-cent. Neoplatonists at Athens seem to have taught in a private house: Lynch, *Aristotle's Schools*, 188.) It must be admitted that we have no ancient testimony of a school founded or run by Priscus – not even a private one; J.'s disavowal in *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez) that he was, strictly speaking, a pupil of Priscus could be interpreted to

imply that no such school existed. We know from Eunapius that Priscus had left Pergamum for Greece by 351 (Eunap. *VS* 474/430W); on his later residence teaching activities there, n.b. Saffrey and Westernik, *op. cit.* (n. 67), p. xlii.

69 *Ep.* 2 (Bidez).

70 *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 275ab.

71 *Ep.* 3 (8 Bidez) 441bc.

72 Library: *Or.* 3.123d–124d. Winter leisure: *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez).

73 Priscus: *Epp.* 1 and 2 (13 and 12 Bidez). Nestorius (the Hierophant): Eunap. *VS* 476/439–40W. Maximus was invited (*Ep.* 8 (26 Bidez) 415d), but evidently remained at Ephesus.

74 Oribasius is the unnamed doctor referred to at *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 277c, and the addressee of *Ep.* 4 (14 Bidez). On his intellectual accomplishments, Eunap. *VS* 498/532W, and on his importance as a source for Eunapius' history, F. Paschoud,, *op. cit.* above at ch. 1 n. 92. The interest J. evinces in medicine (*Ep.* 17 (58 Bidez), to Zeno) was no doubt stimulated by Oribasius.

75 A.D. Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge, 1926) ci n. 14. *PLRE* I identifies the author with (Flavius) Sallustius (5), cos. 363; but n.b. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate,* App. 3. For Salutius' public career, *ILS* 1255.

76 *Or.* 8.241c. See also below, n. 134. Lib. *Or.* 12.43, it is true, refers to Salutius as Phoenix (alluding to the adviser of Achilles). But this is a flattering literary conceit which cannot be pressed; *Or.* 12 was delivered on the occasion of J.'s consulship of 363 and Salutius (=Sallustius, author of *DM*), as Praetorian Prefect of the East, was very likely in the audience.

77 *Or.* 8.243c.

78 *Or.* 8.241c, 243c.

79 *Or.* 8.245b; cf. 241cd.

80 *Or.* 8.247b–248b (put by J. into Pericles' mouth); 249a–250c.

81 *Or.* 8.252ab; a standard combination.

82 The justification of myth and the story of Attis given at *DM* iii–iv are taken from J.; for the parallels and direction of influence, Nock, *Sallustius,* xliv–xlv, xlix, li–liii, xcvii. If Sallustius was the dedicatee of *Or.* 4 (hymn to Helios), he would seem not to have read Iamblichus' *On the Gods* at the time of the hymn's composition (implied at *Or.* 4.157c); the *DM* was perhaps written after Sallustius had taken J.'s advice and read it (for possible influence, Nock, *Sallustius,* n. 12). On their respective views of *daimones,* see J. Puiggali, 'La démonologie de l'Empereur Julien en elle-même et dans ses rapports avec celle de Salloustios', *Les Études Classiques* 50 (1982) 293–314, demonstrating greater divergence than Rochefort (*REG 7* (1957) xiii–xv) supposed: J. assumes irrational and bad *daimones* (*Ep.* 50 (82 Bidez) 445b; *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 288b), following Iamblichus, *De myst.* 178.4–5; 293.11–12; contrast Sallustius' assumption that all *daimones* derive from the Good (*DM* xii.3; xiii.4).

83 Marrou, *History of Education,* 211; Nock, *Sallustius,* xvii–xxvii.

84 Bouffartique, *L'Empereur Julien,* 171ff (reading of Plato); 197ff, 421f (indirect study of Aristotle); 329f (doxographies); 551ff (Stoics).

85 J.'s stay with Maximus: *Or.* 7.235c. Porphyry studied with Plotinus from 260 until 268 (*V. Plot.* 4; 11). Gregory Thaumaturgus: J. Quasten, *Patrology: the Anti-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus* (Utrecht/Antwerp, 1962), 123. Plotinus' studies: Porph. *V. Plot.* 3.

86 See above at n. 56.

87 Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 138, 421ff.

88 See above at n. 83. For a Christian expression of the view that philosophy necessarily involves the study of rhetoric, Lactantius, *D.I.* iii.25.

89 *Ep.* 3 (8 Bidez).

90 *Or.* 7.235c; Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 44f, 608–14.

91 On J.'s criticism of rhetoric, *ibid.*, 625–9 (in my view exaggerating its depth).

92 (Libanius) *Ep.* 53; (Eustathius) *Ep.* 43; (Prohaeresius) *Ep.* 14.

93 Lib. *Or.* 12.56.

94 *Or.* 4.146a.

95 *Or.* 7.225d; cf. *Or.* 6.183a. The metaphor is Platonic. For discussion of its origin and philosophic development, H. Merki, 'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΩΙ (Freiburg, 1952).

96 *Or.* 6.183a; 188b; *Or.* 7.211b. For the Neoplatonic usage of the phrase, P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même* (Paris, 1974) vol. i, pp. 83–95.

97 Porph. *De abstin.* 4.6–8; n.b. the remarks of A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris, 1944), vol. i, pp. 27ff; Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 633–6.

98 See above, nn. 95, 96: *archêgos tês philosophias*: *Or.* 6.188a.

99 *Or.* 6.183a.

100 *Ep.* 50 (82 Bidez) 445a.

101 Nock, *Sallustius*, xxx–xxxii. N.b. *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez) 424a, in which J. speaks of Christianity as a disease which can be cured by education in philosophy and literature.

102 See above, p. 30.

103 Lactant, *D.I.* 4.3 attacks the notion that pagan philosophy constitutes true wisdom (*sapientia*), on the ground that it is contaminated by false religion; contrariwise, paganism cannot be the true religion because the means by which it tries to justify itself – philosophy – is not true wisdom.

104 It is hard to think that the Helios myth at *Or.* 7.227c–234c is other than earnestly meant; for further discussion, 233 Ch. 5 at pp. 132–4 and Ch.7 at p. 185.

105 *Or.* 5.161b.

106 *Or.* 7.222c; 217cd, with Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 616ff.

107 *Or.* 5.173a, on 'things unknown to the herd, but know to the blessed theurgists'.

108 *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez) where *homônymos* surely refers to a namesake of J., and most naturally, given the Iamblichan context, to the author(s) of the *Chaldaean Oracles* (the date of the letter makes Iamblichus II a most unlikely referent: Camerson, 'Iamblichus at Athens'). The letter is from Gaul (*c.* 358?): J. says nothing to prove that he has studied the text closely up to this time.

109 *Ep.* 16 (30 Bidez): in Loeb, vol. iii, p. 40.

110 *CG* 235b.
111 Cf. *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez) 422a, on *orthê paideia.*
112 *Ep.* 4 (14 Bidez) 385b.
113 Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 99–100.
114 Eunap. *VS* 500/540W: Chrysanthius' early studies under Aedesius were in 'the doctrines (*logoi*) of Plato and Aristotle'.
115 Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 139–44, for Aristotelian studies at Alexandria; with I. During, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957) 116–19, 162–3, 444–56, on late ancient lives of Aristotle from Alexandria. By the time of the Arab invasion of Alexandria, two Neoplatonic works had found their way into the *Corpus Aristotelicum*; F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabicus* (Leiden, 1968) 56–7, 72–4. In the 5th-cent. Athenian school, study of Aristotle, then of Plato, preceded study of theurgic texts ('the theologians'); Marinus, *V. Procli* chs 13, 26. (The account the Byzantine historian and scholar Psellus gives of his studies at *Chronographia* 6.38–40 seems to be modelled on this procedure.)
116 Priscus: *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez). The text is corrupt. Wright reads it to refer to 'six books on Platonic logic' by '*Tyrios Maximos*'; Bidez in his *apparatus criticus* (*Lettres*, Budé, vol. i.2, p. 19) objects that no work on logic is otherwise attributed to Maximus of Tyre, and proposes a reference rather to 'a book on logic' by *Tyrios ?Malchos?* – i.e. to Porphyry. The context would suggest that Aristotelian logic was at issue: Libanius praises Priscus' knowledge of Aristotle (*Ep.* 947). For Maximus' commentary, Simplicius, *In Cat.* 1.14–16; another, by Dexippus, a follower of Iamblichus, survives: Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 95–6.
117 See preceding note: assuming *Tyrios ?Malchos?* = Porphyry.
118 *Ep.* 4 (14 Bidez) 385d.
119 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez), 300d–301d.
120 Nock, *Sallustius*, xxxvii–xxxix; Marrou, *History of Education*, 208.
121 A.-J. Festugière, *Épicure et ses dieux* (Paris, 1946) 77–8; L. Robert, *Hellenica* 11–12 (1960) 484–6.
122 A mosaic depicting Socrates and six other sages at Apamea (later 4th cent.) may conceivably mark the building that housed the Neoplatonic school there. J. and J.-Ch. Balty, 'Julien et Apamée: aspects de la restauration de l'hellénisme et de la politique antichrétienne des empereurs', *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 1 (1974) 267–304, conjecture that the features of the idealized Socrates were perhaps intentionally reminiscent of Julian; there may also be an implicit challenge to Christian iconography (G.M.A. Hanfmann, 'Socrates and Christ', *HSCP* (1951) 205–33). For another 4th-cent. mosaic portraying Socrates (with Diogenes) at Cologne, M.N. Tod, 'Sidelights on Greek philosophers', *JHS* 77 (1957) 132–41; cf. R.R.R. Smith, 'Late Roman philosopher portraits from Aphrodisias' *JRS* 80 (1990) 127–55 on the late antique (5th. cent.?) Neoplatonist school building, decorated with portrait sculptures of Socrates, Aristotle and Pythagoras, recently discovered at Aphrodisias.
123 On the 'idolatry of holiness' in humans, G.W. Bowersock, *Hellenism*

in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, 1990) 17. For comparable instances, see J. Nollé, *ZPE* 41(1981) 197, 206 (an inscription making the Platonic philosopher Ofellius Laetus a reincarnation of Plato); and the inscription honouring Apollonius of Tyana (text and comment in N.J. Richardson and P. Burton, *GRBS* 22 (1981) 283–5, with details of earlier publications) – a clear example of idealization in religious terms of a contemporary (or near-contemporary: that Apollonius was still alive at the time of composition is disputed).

124 *Orr.* 6.188b (*theios*); 7.222b (*daimonios*); *fr.* 4 Wright (hierophant); *Orr.* 4.446b, 7.217b (Plato's equal).

125 *Theios* is used by Proclus, Syrianus, Simplicius, even by the Christian Philoponus, as an epithet of Iamblichus; Cameron, 'Iamblichus at Athens', 142f, remarking on the commonness of the usage.

126 *Or.* 4.157c; *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez).

127 Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 99–100, 118–20, 123–31.

128 *Or.* 7.217d, with its talk of the One, has a Plotinian flavour; G. Rochefort, in his Budé edn, dubiously adduces as a parallel Plot. *Enn.* 5.3.12, ll. 48–9. Cf. Nock, *Sallustius*, p.c, n. 12, and pp. xcvi–xcvii, arguing that 'in all probability Sallustius made no direct use of either Plotinus or Porphyry'; J. Rist, in P.J. Fedwick, ed., *Basil of Caesarea*, vol. i, 165–70, on the slight influence of Plotinus and Porphyry in late 3rd cent. Alexandria, may help to explain the subsequent influence in the Greek East of Iamblichus.

129 Lib. *Or.* 18.178: J.'s use of Porphyry implicit (cf. A. Meredith, 'Porphyry and Julian against the Christians', *ANRW* II.23.2, 1140–47. *Or.* 6.191c may refer, among other works, to the *De abstinentia*.

130 A. Wallace-Hadrill, 'The Emperor and his virtues', *Historia* 30 (1981) 298–323 on 'philosophic' virtues on imperial coinage; 'If one can speak of influence, it is not of official propaganda on the public at large, but of the educated élite upon the imperial machine.' Cf. Men. Rhet. 373.5ff; philosophic virtues as subject for praise in *basilikos logos*.

131 Arist. *E.N.* 1155a4.

132 *Or.* 8.245a; cf. Arist *E.N.*1159b31.

133 *Or.* 8.245b; 241c–d; 242c.

134 *E.N.* 1164b2–6: Aristotle says that one's friendship with one's philosophy teacher cannot be *epirrhopos* because one owes what cannot be repaid. In this context, n.b. that J. had stressed that his friendship with Salutius *was epirrhopos*, see above, p.33.

135 *Ep.* 30 (40 Bidez).

136 Arist. *E.N.* 1156a6–b32.

137 See above, p. 33.

138 *Epp.* 26 and 15 (32 and 46 Bidez).

139 *Epp.* 52 and 53 (96 and 97 Bidez); cf. *Epp.* 1 (13 Bidez) to Priscus and 44 (35 Bidez) to Eustathius.

140 *Ep.* 30 (40 Bidez).

141 *Ep.* 53 (97 Bidez); cf. Marcus to Fronto, II.3: the parallel is noted in the Loeb, vol. iii, p. 185 n. 2. Letters of Marcus (some spurious?) were certainly in circulation; Philostratus was familiar with them (*Dial.* ii. 258 Kayser) and quotes what purports to be a private letter to Herodes

Atticus (Eunap. *VS* 562) which mentions Marcus' own initiation at Eleusis (cf. Philostratus, *Vit. Sophist.* 588).

142 E.g. Lacombrade, 'L'Empereur Julien, émule de Marc-Aurèle', *Pallas* 14 (1967) 9–22, thinks that the ambivalence of J.'s ref. to Marcus in *Ep. ad Them.* 253a (J. doubts if he can emulate Marcus) may be due to the fact that to a Mithraist Marcus' Stoicism is too chilly a prospect to match. He concludes – very questionably – that J.'s attachment to Marcus is essentially nostalgic and an escape from the realities of his day.

143 R. Rutherford, *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius* (Oxford, 1989) 10, doubts if Julian knew the work: but see following note for another view. A.S.L. Farquharson, ed., *Meditations* (Oxford, 1944), vol. i, pp. xiv–xvi, speculates that J. may have instinctively avoided verbal echoes because of the very different literary tone of Marcus' work.

144 The *parangelmata* referred to by Themistius *Or.* 6.81c are clearly the *Meditations*. The speech in question, the *Philadelphus*, is dated to 364. If it is allowed that Themistius knew the work when he wrote the text that elicited J.'s *Ep. ad Them.*, it is natural to suppose that reference will have been made to it in the course of his advice to Julian on the theory of kingship: and if J. knew of the work's existence he would surely, given his regard for Marcus, have made an effort to obtain it. For another argument, see below at n. 146.

145 *Med.* 1.16; cf. 6.30.2.

146 Stobaeus, *Anth.* iv.223.7: the parallel is noted by Bidez, *Vie,* 390 n. 3. If the attribution by Stobaeus is correct, it follows that (i) the *Meditations* had some circulation by the early 4th cent., and (ii) they were of some interest to Iamblichus (hence, one might think, to his followers).

147 Amm. Marc. 25.4.8 on J.'s mildness (*genuina lenitudine*); cf. J.'s praise of the *praos* at *Ep.* 30 (40 Bidez). Amm. Marc. 25.4.4–7, on J.'s love of philosophy, affability and personal temperance. Two points of contrast with Marcus' picture of Antoninus deserve to be noted in Ammianus' muted criticisms of J. in his obituary: the Antoninus of the *Meditations* avoided 'superstitious fear of divine powers' and did not court popularity: J. was *superstitiosus magis quam sacrorum observator* (25.4.17) and *vulgi plausibus laetus* (25.4.18).

148 Mercy (*clementia, praotês*); Amm. Marc. 25.4.9. Generosity; *ibid.*, 25.4.15. (Both virtues are constituents of *philanthrôpia*; q.v. above, pp.43–4ff.) *Civilitas*: *ibid.*, 25.4.7. As to public generosity, n.b. Marcus' stress on Antoninus' *moderatio* in public expenditure – a feature Ammianus' *elogium* chooses not to emphasize in this connection.

149 E.g. *Or.* 6.76cd; see G. Downey, 'Philanthropia in religion and statecraft in the 4th century', *Historia* 4 (1955) 199–208. Libanius, *Or.* 15.25–8, construes J.'s *philanthrôpia* as the care shown for the Greeks by a Greek who esteems learning.

150 But n.b. that the same letter contains the warning (425a) that if the Edessenes do not stop rioting, Julian's *philanthrôpia* will punish them in the interest of *ta koina*.

151 Eusebius, *HE* 7.32.6; on the connotations, Glucker, *Antiochus*, 50–1.

152 Eusebius, *HE* 7.32.6ff.

153 See pp. 44–5 and nn.

154 E.g. Constantine's reading in the *Orat. ad Sanct.* 19–21; see also D. Comparetti, *Virgil in the Middle Ages* (London, 1908) 96ff.

155 *Ep.* 29 (80 Bidez) p. 100 Loeb, to Count Julian; *Ep.* 7 (10 Bidez), to Alypius; *Ep.* 16 (30 Bidez), p. 36 Loeb.

156 Mamert. 9.1–4, trans. with notes in S. Lieu, ed., *The Emperor Julian: Panegyric and Polemic* (Liverpool, 1986). C. Lepelley, *Cités de l'Afrique romaine au bas-empire* I (Paris, 1979) 98–101, surveying another region of the Empire, dwells revealingly on an upsurge in public building in the last years of Constantius' reign given further impetus by J.'s financial measures.

157 Amm. Marc. 25.4.15. Cf. *Ep.* 27 (73 Bidez), granting partial exemption from taxes to the Thracians; also *Ep.* 31 (75b Bidez), a decree excusing doctors from senatorial duties.

158 Amm. Marc. 15.1.3. On Ammianus' contrast between Julian and Constantius, J. Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus Marcellinus* (London, 1989) 235–9; R.C. Blockley, *Ammianus Marcellinus: a Study of his Historiography and Political Thought* (Brussels, 1975) 66ff.

159 Fourth-cent. examples: Eustathius, Neoplatonist and correspondent of Julian – q.v. *Epp.* 43; 44; 83 (34; 35; 36 Bidez) – was a kinsman of Aedesius (Eunap. *VS* 465/392W); he married a female philosopher from Ephesus (Eunap. *VS* 466/398W). Chrysanthius named his son after his master Aedesius (Eunap. *VS* 504/556–8W); cf. the conjecture of Cameron, 'Iamblichus at Athens', that Iamblichus II was not the famous Iamblichus' grandson, but was named after him by his father Himerius, a pupil of Iamblichus I together with his brother and his own father, Sopater I. At Athens: Himerius the son-in-law of Nicagoras; Nestorius, (?grand?)father of Plutarch. For the 5th cent., a clear example is the case of Horapollon (*PLRE* ii, s.v. Horapollon 2): an Alexandrian philosopher, son of a learned father, brother of the philosopher Heraiscus with whom he shared a house and whose daughter he married; a teacher of Isidorus. (On kinship bonds between the Athenian and Alexandrian schools, Wallis, *Neoplatonism*,141.)

160 *Misopogon*, 349bc; cf. Libanius' remarks cited above, n. 149.

161 Him. *Or.* 4.9, in honour of Cervonius: L. Robert, *Hellenica* 4 (1948) 25; cf. Julian's praise of Sal(l)u(s)tius (supra, p. 33). N.b. also Men. Rhet. 371.23ff on the *basilikos logos*; if the addressee excels in literature or philosophy, he should be praised on these counts; cf. J.'s praise of Constantius as a rhetor (*Or.* 2.76b–78d) and as a respecter of law (*Or.* 1.45d; cf. *Or.* 2.88d–91d).

162 Amm. Marc. 22.7.6.

163 L. Robert, 'Epigrammes du Bas-Empire', *Hellenica* 4 (1948) 35–114, at 24.

164 *Ibid.*, 61.

165 *Ibid.*, 65.

166 L. Robert, *Laodicée de Lycos: Inscriptions* (Paris, 1969) 339–51, esp. the

comments at 340f: *teuxen eparchos eôn/cheiri sophêi hode ergon holois duo kai deka mêsin/oudena lupesas.*

The fact that the word *philosophos* is itself rare in these sorts of epigrams is simply due to its inadmissibility in elegiac and hexameter verse; see Tod, 'Sidelights on Greek philosophers', 141.

167 Lib. *Ep.* 1230.

168 Eunap. *VS.* 490/498W; 491/508W.

169 Eunap. *VS.*491/500Wff; 492/508W.

170 Eunap. *VS.* 491/500W.

171 Him. *Or.* 5.8 (39 Colonna), dated 362, on Musonius: *sophistôn thronos ton tôn hyparchôn kekosmêke . . .*; see Robert, *Hellenica* 4 (1948) 46.

172 *Ibid.*, 56, noting that the poem reveals Plutarch's familiarity with the opening of Plato's *Laws*. The fact that Plutarch turned so readily to poetry after visiting a sacred place may offer some support for the view that the famous verses on the oracle at Delphi preserved in Cedrenus (see p. 224) are quite likely to be the work of a pagan rather than the Christian forgery that some suppose: H. Parke, 'Castalia', *BCH* 102 (1978) 199–219 argues against the view that the oracle derives from Daphne at Antioch rather than from Delphi, and suggests that Oribasius composed it for Julian in the course of his mission to Delphi (q.v. Philostorgius, *HE* 7.15). See also T.E. Gregory, 'Julian and the last oracle at Delphi', *GRBS* 24 (1983) 355–66.

173 Eunap. *VS* 492/502W; on Eunapius' pagan usage of the term *Hellên* in this passage, Bowersock, *Hellenism in Late Antiquity*, 10.

174 See above, n. 166.

175 Eunap. *VS* 492/508W.

176 On the continuing centralizing tendencies under Constantius II, see C. Vogler, *Constance II et l'administration impériale* (Strasbourg, 1979), ch. IV *passim* and pp. 281–7. For Julian's attempt to revive the cities, and his very limited room to manœuvre, see F. Millar, 'Empire and City, Augustus to Julian: Obligations, Excuses and Status', *JRS* 73 (1983) 76ff, 95–6, and the major study of E. Pack, *Städte und Steuern in der Politik Julians* (Brussels, 1986) ch. II *passim*, esp. sections 1 (c) and 2.

177 P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity* (Madison, 1992) 25, with important discussion at chs 1 and 2 *passim*, esp. 7–13, 18–47; with A.H.M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1964), vol. i, 448–60; ii, 737ff (taxes).

178 A.F. Norman, *CR* 31 (1981) 190. For J.'s stress on justice and piety as cardinal features of Attic virtue, see *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 268a–270a; *Misopogon* 348c.

179 In Lib. *Or.* 11, *Sophrosynê* is notable for its absence; in the matter of public expenditure, the more lavish the better (ch. 134); the freedom Libanius extols seems extreme – he praises the demos for its philanthropy in pleading for the lives of strangers whom the governor had condemned to death, but their action could as easily be termed riotous (155). The city is said to surpass all others in *sophia* (193), its Senate is a *choros sophistôn* (139), but the stress lies most on its material prosperity.

180 The description of the sacred site at Daphne (236ff), Norman notes, is

'suited to men of little faith', aesthetic and hedonist in its emphasis on springs, baths, gardens and banquets.

181 Libanius in the *Epitaphios* defends J.'s heavy expenditure on sacrifices at Antioch, which was notably unpopular with the inhabitants: 'such expenditure is more worthwhile than any made on the theatre, races or wild beast shows' (ch. 170); J.'s austerity, which had made him a figure of fun in the city, is praised (171; 174–5). For an account of Libanius's techniques in the speech, see G. Benedetti, 'Giuliano in Antiochia nell'*Orazione XVIII* di Libanio', *Athenaeuum* 58 (1981) 166–79.

182 Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, xi, 118–19.

183 For J.'s letter to Eustathius, see above at n. 159; on his family connections, the activities of his wife and the embassy to Shapur II, Eunap. *VS* 465–9/392–410W. For discussion of the public and involvements and progressive 'social marginalization' of lamblichans in the 4th cent., G. Fowden, 'Pagan holy man in late antique society', *JHS* 102 (1982) 33–59, esp. 57–9; for reservations, Brown, *Power and Persuasion*, 61–70.

184 On Iamblichus II, see above, no. 50. Epigram cited in Cameron, 'Iamblichus at Athens', 143: *kai sophièi kosmêthen Iamblichos houtos Athênas/[kai krana]êi krateron tei[chos epêi]re polei.* Other philosophers prominent in public life are noticed in Tod, 'Sidelights on Greek philosophers', 140.

185 *Ep.* 16 (30 Bidez).

3 PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICE: THE INVECTIVES AGAINST CYNICS

1 *Ep.* 29 (80 Bidez), p. 96 Loeb.

2 J. Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien et la culture de son temps* (Paris, 1992) 413ff provides comprehensive tables of the authors Julian quotes, refers to by name or indisputably echoes.

3 *Ibid.*, 416.

4 Lib. *Or.* 18.157, alluding to the *Against Heraclius* and *To the Mother of the Gods*: the hymn was composed at the time of the March festival of Cybele (*Or.* 5.161c).

5 Delivery before an audience is implied by *Or.* 7.205b and 235a.

6 *Or.* 7.234cd; 204–205b.

7 *Or.* 6181a gives midsummer (probably shortly before J.'s departure from Constantinople in 362) as the time of composition: 6.203c asserts composition over two days.

8 *Or.* 6.181d–182b.

9 P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism* (Oxford, 1981) 128; 138.

10 *Ibid.*, 138.

11 *Ibid.*, 125–6, 130–1, 137.

12 *Ibid.*, 121, 128, 132, 137.

13 Diog. Laert. 6.80 lists writing attributed to Diogenes, but shows also that their authenticity was in doubt as early as the 2nd cent. BC. At *Or.* 6.186c, J. rejects as forgeries tragedies alledgedly from

Diogenes' hand. Diog. Laert. 6103 reports the tendency to view Cynicism as a way of life (*enstasis biou*).

14 *Ep.* 9 (26 Bidez) 414d uses the conventional imagery. Other examples in Leonidas of Tarentum (*Anth. Palat.* 6.298), Epictetus (*Diss.* 3.22.10), Lucian (*Fugitivi* 14; *Anth. Palat.* 11.410), Gregory Nazianzen (*De Vita Sua*, *PG* 37.1081).

15 Diog. Laert. 6.103 reflects on the dispute and challenges Hippobotus' denial that Cynicism was a *hairesis*; Diog. Laert. 1.20 and Sextus Empiricus 1.16 show that the debate could be philosophically delicate. On the etymology, M. Simon, 'From Greek *hairesis* to Christian heresy', in W. Schoedel and R. Wilken, eds, *Early Christian Literature and Classical Intellectual Tradition: Essays in honour of R. M. Grant* (Paris, 1979) 101–16, esp. 110–11 (non-pejorative use).

16 Of the authors of the *Diadochai*, Sotion of Alexandria was apparently the first to establish the conventional succession, in the early 2nd cent. BC: see Dicks in *Diogenes Laertius* (Loeb), vol i, p. xxiv. The Stoic interest in the *diadochê* (D. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th century* AD (London, 1937; repr. Hildesheim 1967) 3–4) no doubt contributed to the hostility of Epicureans to Cynics: Philodemus, *On the Stoics* (*Pap. Hell.* 339, col. viii. 5–7) attacks 'accursed men who choose to live the life of dogs'; for an earlier attack on an Epicurean-turned-Cynic, see W. Cronert, 'Kolotes und Menedemos', *Studien zur Paläographie und Papyrologie*, vol. 6 (Leipzig, 1906; repr. Amsterdam, 1965). Epicurus himself was said (Diog. Laert. 10.8) to have called Cynics 'enemies of Hellas' (and thus becomes an improbable anticipator of Julian).

17 Themistius, *Orationes* (Teubner), ed. A. Norman and G. Downey, vol. iii, *Peri Aretes* S. 21 (preserved in Syriac).

18 *Or.* 6.188b ('headmen'); 7.209a (Socratic Antisthenes); 6.202d (Diogenes/Crates/Zeno); cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22, 63–4, with Billerbeck, *EVK* ad loc. and at pp. 6–8 (idealized model).

19 J.cites the proverbial injunction at *Orr.* 6.188b and 7.211b, interpreting it as a command to seek knowledge. The story is found in Diog. Laert. 6.20.

20 Cynic arguments proposing the abolition of coinage, temples, courts, gymnasia and the family survived even in Zeno's *Politeia*, to the discomfiture of later Stoics: Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 98–9; Cronert, 'Kolotes und Menedemos', 55 (*Pap. Herc.* 339 col. xv); H. Baldry, *JHS* 79 (1959) 3–15.

21 'Short cut' (*syntomos hodos*): Diog. Laert. 6.104. Menippus' attack: Diog. Laert. 6.101.

22 *Ibid.*, 7.129 (Chrysippus' praise of *enkyklia mathêmata*).

23 Radical ethics: A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London, 1974) 109–11. On the diatribe, A. Oltramare, *Origines de la diatribe romaine* (Geneva, 1926) 12ff; A.D Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge, 1926) xxvff. On the *chreia*, A. Fischer, 'Studies in Cynicism in the ancient Near East: transformation of a *chreia*', in J. Neusner, ed., *Religions in Antiquity: Essays* (Leiden, 1968) 372–4; R. Hock and E. O'Neil, *The Chreia in Ancient rhetoric, I: The Progymnasmata* (Atlanta, 1986) 3–47 (discussion) and 224 (Aphthonius' definition: 'A chreia is a concise reminiscence aptly attributed to some character: since

it is useful, it is called "chreia"'). For reservations on the status of the diatribe as a distinct genre, J.F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes* (Stockholm, 1976) Appendix 1; cf. W. Watt and P. Cachia, *A History of Islamic Spain* (Edinburgh, 1965) 124, on the *maqama*, a comparable literary form progressing from moralizing anecdotal form in which a virtuous Bedouin harangues luxurious nobles to a polished literary diversion mocking the critic as a self-interested charlatan.

24 R. Hercher, ed., *Epistolographi Graeci* (Paris, 1873) collects the letters; W. Capelle, *De cynicorum epistulis* (Göttingen, 1896) dates those of Diogenes and Crates to the 1st cent. AD. On the pseudepigraphical form generally, see A. Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature* (London, 1966) 868; on the *Epp. Heracliti* specifically, see H. Attridge, *First Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclius* (Missoula, 1976) intro., esp. 5–6.

25 Epictetus, *Diss.*, 3. 22, 23–4, 80–2, 89, with Billerbeck, *EVK* ad loc., and at pp. 4–6 (diatribe influence). For the domestication of Cynicism in cultured discourse, see M. Griffin, 'Le mouvement cynique et les romains: attraction et répulsion', in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé and R. Goulet, eds, *Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements* (Paris, 1993) 241–58.

26 Lucian, *Alex. Pseudom.* 5–6.

27 J. Moles, 'The Career and conversion of Dio Chrysostom', *JHS* 98 (1978) 79–100, argues persuasively that the conversion was a fiction devised by Dio after his exile for rhetorical and self-seeking purposes. On a less sceptical view, the picture derives less from Dio's own mouth than from an interpretation of his career by Synesius: C.P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) 136.

28 *Ibid.*, 174 n. 13 (other *personae* of Dio included Socrates, Odysseus, Epaminondas and Aristotle).

29 Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.23.17–19. On the social milieu of his school, see P. Brunt, 'From Epictetus to Arrian', *Athenaeum* 55 (1977) 19–48.

30 Aug. *C. Acad.* 3.19.42.

31 The appeal of Athens and Alexandria to Cynics in imperial times is well attested. Athens: Lucian, *Demonax*, *passim*; Aulus Gellius, *NA* 9.2, 12.11; *IG* ii. 5184 (a Cynic meeting-place on the north slope of the Acropolis in the 2nd cent.). Alexandria: Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.9; Damascius, *V. Isid.*, ed. Zintzen, *frr.* 138, 147, attesting at Alexandria *c.* 470 the last-named Cynic of antiquity, one Sallustius (q.v. Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 207–8; *PLRE* vol. ii, s.v. Sallustius 7). The appeal of Constantinople in the 4th cent. is implied by J. at *Or.* 7.224d, where a number of individual Cynic contemporaries are named; to whom add one Cleomenes, attested there in the mid-350s by Lib. *Epp.* 399; 432.

32 M.N.Tod, 'Sidelights on Greek philosophers', *JHS* 77 (1957) 135, 137 records visits to the Cataracts by Ouranios (*CIG* 4807h); by the Epicurean Serenos (*CIG* 4841c); by Lampon (*CIG* 4785) and Philastrios (*CIG* 4817); and by the Eleusinian *dadouchos* Nicagoras (*OGIS* 721).

33 Published in F. Preisigke, *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden* (Strasbourg, 1916) 5730. Nock, *Sallustius*, xxix surmises a school exercise.

34 *IG* xiv.2567, briefly described in Tod, 'Sidelights on Greek philosophers', 132.

35 On the traditional relations of Plato and Diogenes, see Diog. Laert. 6.24–6, 53–4 (Plato calling Diogenes 'a Socrates gone mad').

36 On stock forms of characterization in these terms, C. Robinson, *Lucian* (London, 1979) 18–20; on 'atheism' as a polemical charge, A.-J. Festugière, *Épicure et ses dieux* (Paris, 1946) 77–8, 91. A.B. Drachman, *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity* (London, 1922) stresses the rarity of formal atheism in antiquity: the philosophic debate typically presupposes that belief in the existence of the gods is innate in man, and focuses on the Epicurean claim that they play no part in human affairs (e.g., Cicero, *De nat. deorum*, 1.2).

37 Lucian, *De morte Pereg.* 21: to Lucian, Peregrinus was a charlatan (ch. 13); but he was spoken of with respect as a philosopher by Aulus Gellius, *NA* 12.11. A Neopythagorean connection with his choice of suicide by fire is suggested by R. Pack, 'Volatilization of Peregrinus', *AJP* 67 (1946) 334–45: Lucian himself (ch. 36) says that Peregrinus appealed to *daimones* as he leapt into the fire, and his associates and the inhabitants of his home town (Parium) certainly imagined that he had been divinized: *De morte Peregr.* 40; Athenagoras, *Apol.* 26. In Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 46 (ed. Dindorf, ii, 394f), the primary subject of criticism is surely Cynics rather than Christians: P. de Labriolle, *La Réaction païenne, Étude sur la polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe siècle* (Paris, 1934) 81ff.

38 Plutarch, *De superstitione* 1; Lucian, *Alex. Pseudom.* 25; H.K Usener, *Epicurea* (Stuttgart, 1966: photographic reprint of 1st edn, Leipzig, 1887) lxxiff.

39 L. Robert, *Hellenica* 11–12 (1960) 485–6: a funerary inscription from Miletus, 1st cent. or later.

40 Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 46 (ed. Dindorf, vol. ii, p. 402); Greg. Naz. *Or.* 25 (*PG* 36.200), commending the addressee for refraining from shamelessness in his practice of *parrhêsia*.

41 Lucian, *De morte Peregr.* 19.

42 Aulus Gellius, *NA* 9.2.4–5; 9; 11. On Gellius' own interest and limited competence in philosophy, L. Holford-Strevens in *RAC* vol. ix, s.v. Gellius; and on his fondness for the diatribe form, E. Marache, 'Aulus Gellius et la diatribe', *Pallas* (1953) 84–95.

43 Max. Tyr. *Or.* 36 (ed. Hobein, 420); Apuleius, *Florida*, 14; 22.

44 Lucian, *Vitarum auctio* 11.

45 *Ibid.*

46 Lucian, *Fugitivi* 12; 16.

47 Lucian, *Piscator* 23–8.

48 B. Baldwin, 'Lucian as a social satirist', *CQ* 11(1961)199–208 presents Lucian – in my view, implausibly – as a radical political observer sympathetic to 'radical Cynicism'.

49 Dio Cass. 63.13. 1.

50 On Plotinus' response to Sceptical epistemology and theology, R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972) 26.

51 Seneca, *De Beneficiis* 2.17.2; *Ep.* 5.1; Epictetus, *Diss.* 3. 22.10–12.

52 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 137–8.

53 Eupolis, *fr.* 4.

54 Octopus story in Lucian, *Vitarum auctio* 10; Diog. Laert. 6.76. In

Epicurean terminology, the term *kenodoxia* connoted liability to vain opinion contrary to nature: Epicur. *Sent.* 30; Philodemus, *Pap. Herc.*[2] iii, 121; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 989c (other examples and cognates in H.K. Usener, *Glossarium Epicureum* (Rome, 1977) 379 ff). Philosophic opponents turned the charge against Epicureans themselves, implying perverse conceitedness (L. Robert, *Hellenica* 11–12 (1960) 485–6, on the Platonist inscription quoted above at p. 59); cf. Epictet. *Diss.* 3.24.43, on 'false' Stoics. Applied to Christians, the term could refer to their stubbornness in refusing to sacrifice: *Acta Pionii*, 17 (p. 158 Musurillo). In Christian usage, it could denote heresy (Epiphan. *Adv. Haer.* 75.1; Basil, *Ep.* 226.3) or a general mental quality inimical to virtue (Clement, *Paed.* 2.1; Greg. Naz. *Or.* 2.51).

55 Eusebius, *C. Hieroclem*, 61.

56 *Or.* 6.183a.

57 The idea that knowledge of God was innate in man derived from the supposition that the hand of a divinity was manifest in the ordering of the universe and was widely accepted, e.g., Cicero, *De nat. deorum* 1.2; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 12.27; Origen, *C. Celsum* 8.38.

58 *Or.* 6.185ac; 188c.

59 Plat. *Theaetetus* 176ab; cf. *Rep.* 10.613a. On the subsequent philosophic development of the theme, see H. Merki, **'ΟΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΩΙ** (Freiburg, 1952).

60 Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 12.59.

61 The *Enneads* open with the quote from *Theaetetus*, 176ab. Iamblichus, *Protrepticus*, ed. Pistelli, 2.14, declares that 'knowledge of the gods is virtue and wisdom and perfect happiness and makes us like the gods.' E.R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (Cambridge, 1965) 75 n. 3, notes omission of *kata dunaton* as a Neoplatonist tendency: n.b. that J. retains it at 6.183a, 184a.

62 The origin of the phrase was much debated in antiquity: it was attributed variously to Apollo, his priestess, the Seven Sages, Homer. On this and its subsequent philosophic usage, P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même* (Paris, 1974) vol. i, *passim*, esp. pp. 83–95.

63 See, for instance, the pseudo-Julianic letter to Iamblichus (Loeb Julian, vol. iii, p. 236 (= *Ep.* 186 Bidez) 420a): 'I ought to have heeded the Delphic injunction "Know Thyself" and should not have presumed to impose on the ears of one so great as yourself.'

64 Dio Chrys. *Or* 10.22.

65 See above at nn. 34, 35.

66 *Letter to a Priest* (*Ep.* 89b Bidez) 301cd.

67 Epigram: L. Robert, *Hellenica* 11–12 (1960) 484–6. Themistius warns against Epicureanism in *Peri aretês* S.19 (Them. *Orationes*, ed. Norman and Downey, vol. iii).

68 Lucian, *Alex. Pseudom.* 25.

69 Plut. *Contra Colotem* 17; 20. Plutarch apparently also wrote a treatise devoted to discussion of the 'Know Thyself' theme: the *Catalogue of Lamprias*, no. 177, ascribes to him a piece 'On self-knowledge, and whether the soul is immortal': Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même*, i, 43.

70 H.I. Marrou, **ΜΟΥΣΙΚΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ**, *étude sur les scènes de la vie*

intellectuelle figurants sur les monuments funéraires romains (Paris, 1938) 231–57.

71 G.W. Bowersock, 'Plutarch and the Sublime Hymn of Ofellius Laetus', *GRBS* 23 (1982) 275–9; cf. *BE* (1981) 481. Theurgic tradition was to press the image of the Master's contact with the soul of a latter-day disciple a stage further: for Plato as the spectral author of the Chaldaean Oracles, see Ch. 4, pp. 93–4.

72 Marrou, ΜΟΥΣΙΚΟΣ 'ΑΝΗΡ, 241.

73 *Ibid.*, 240.

74 See above at n. 33.

75 Stobaeus, *Anth.* ii.31; 75; 87; 92.

76 W. Amelung, 'Notes on representations of Socrates and of Diogenes', *AJA* 31 (1927) 294–6; Marrou, ΜΟΥΣΙΚΟΣ 'ΑΝΗΡ, 167–8.

77 *Ibid.*, 144–5.

78 Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 4 (Attridge, *First Century Cynicism and Epistles of Heraclitus*, p. 60, lines 12, 20).

79 Diog. Laert. 6.80.

80 *Ibid.*, 6.20.

81 *Ibid.*, 6.103; see above, n. 15.

82 *Ep.* 50 (82 Bidez) 444bc (ignorance and self-conceit of Nilus) – a letter heavy with proverbial tags and Platonic and Homeric allusions. On Nilus, *PLRE*, i, s.v. Nilus 2. From 445ab, it seems that he had been recommended to Julian by the elder Symmachus.

83 Plat. *Gorgias* 463ac.

84 Crates on Pera: Diog. Laert. 6.85. For the rejection of meat in Teles, see *Teles the Cynic Teacher: Texts and Translations*, Graeco-Roman Religion Series, 3 (Missoula, 1977) 113ff.

85 Plut. *Mor.* 131df; Max. Tyr. *Or.* 21.5; Philostratus, *V. Apollonii*, 1.26.

86 Diog. Laert. 8.13 on Pythagoras; cf. A. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (Assen, 1962) 96ff.

87 Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28, cited in J. Bernays, *Lukian und die Kyniker* (Berlin, 1879) 105. Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22.86–9 with Billerbeck, *EVK* ad loc.

88 Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22.98. Lucian: *Anth. Palat.* 11.410; *Fugitivi* 14.

89 *Or.* 6.203b; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 6.12.

90 See above, p. 55.

91 *Or.* 7.225d–226c.

92 *Suda* has Oenomaus as a contemporary of Porphyry, but this date probably rests on a misunderstanding of Eusebius, *PE* 209a: in favour of a 2nd-cent. date, Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 184 n.3.

93 Eusebius, *PE* 209b–234c, 225b–261c preserves fragments: collected, with discussion, in P. Vallette, *De Oenomao Cynico* (Paris, 1908).

94 Eusebius, *PE* 211c–213b; 222d–223c; 226ac.

95 *Ibid.*, 211c; 224d.

96 The ferocity of Oenomaus' attack on Apollo seems to derive from his personal experience. He tells (*PE* 214a–215b) how he had consulted the Apolline oracle at Claros in the hope of finding a philosophic mentor, only to obtain a trite response.

97 Dio Chrys. *Or.* 10.24–8 questions whether men can understand the utterances of Apollo and argues that they are better dispensed with than misinterpreted. But he adds that, in themselves, Apollo's orders are never

ignoble (27), and affirms the primacy of the injunction 'Know Thyself' (28).

98 Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 4 (as above, n. 78).

99 Porph. *V. Plot.* 10.

100 Universe as a temple: Plut. *De tranquillitate animi* 20; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 90.281. Plut. *De superstitione* 167d unfavourably contrasts worshippers of images with philosophers who contemplate the order of the universe. On the general notion, Attridge, *First Century Cynicism and the Epistles of Heraclitus*, 13–23, 59–61; J. Geffcken, 'Der Bilderstreit des Heidnischen Altertums', *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 19 (1918/19) 286ff, citing Lucian, *Gallus* 24 (nuts and bolts behind the gleaming façade of a statue of a god).

101 *Or.* 7.209b.

102 *Ibid.*, 238b.

103 On the possible Neopythagorean influence, see above at n. 39. If the Cronius to whom Lucian addresses the *De morte Peregrini* is to be identified with the Neopythagorean of the same name (see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) 379–89) it may be suspected that Lucian was well aware of the Neopythagorean connection himself.

104 J. possibly first met Oenomaus' work in the pages of Eusebius during his youthful studies at Macellum, at which time he had access to the extensive library of George of Cappadocia: *Epp.* 23 and 38 (107 and 106 Bidez). J. refers to a work of Eusebius – probably *Praeparatio Evangelica* – at *CG* 222a.

105 Eusebius, *PE* 255c; 258a.

106 *Or.* 7.238a.

107 Diog. Laert. 6.45; 60; 78.

108 *Ep.* 8 (26 Bidez) 414d.

109 *Misopogon*, 338b–339c. Independent testimony on J.'s physical appearance confirms that he was stockily built and hirsute (Amm. Marc. 25.4.22); but it should be recognized that the self-depiction in the *Misopogon* is in part a literary posture. On the self-conscious use of the images of the Cynic familiar from the diatribe in the *Misopogon*, see J. Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes* (Heidelberg, 1909) 139–46.

110 Ps.-Lucian, *Cynic* 14, 17. N.b. also that the speaker, in giving reasons for dressing as a Cynic, claims that the style allows him to avoid the company of *apaideutoi* (ch. 19).

111 *Or.* 6.200b (Plutarch); *Or.* 7.212c (Dio).

112 On Sopater's anthology, H. Chadwick in *RAC*, s.v. *Florilegium*. It is not extant, but Photius, *Biblioteca* 161 gives an extensive account of its contents, in all probability quoting Sopater's own words (see 'Les Belles Lettres' edition, vol. ii, p. 125 n. 3). J. can hardly have been unaware of the work: in *Ep.* 58 (93 Bidez) 401b he speaks with great respect of Sopater, and of his friendship with a relative and namesake of the anthologist.

113 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 128.

114 *Or.* 7.205ab.

115 *Or.* 6.181d.

116 *Ibid.*, 182b.

117 *Or.* 7.224d–225a.

118 *Ibid.*, 223d.

119 P. Brunt, 'Stoics and the Principate', *PBSR* (1975) 7–35, esp. 27ff, is sceptical. Broader discussion in R. MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966) ch. 2 *passim*, esp. pp. 50–63.

120 M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 2nd edn, rev. P.M. Fraser (Oxford, 1957) 115–17, citing Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.9–10.

121 Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History*, 117; 587 n. 19.

122 Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32 was delivered at Alexandria in the wake of a riot and urged support for the Emperor (for the date – probably Vespasianic rather than Trajanic – see Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, 134; Moles, 'Career and Conversion', 84 n.48). Dio speaks (chs 9–10) of 'street-corner' Cynics who 'do the worst possible harm', but he does not himself accuse them of preaching treason; rather he specifies the harm they do as their encouragement of the foolish to mock philosophers. Also suspect is the claim of Rostovtzeff (see preceding note) that a Cynic anti-monarchic ideology strongly influenced the presentation of Claudius and Isidorus in the *Acta Isidori* (discussed in H. Musurillo, ed., *Acts of the Pagan Martyrs* (Oxford, 1954) 118–24, Appendix 5). Isidorus is a prominent gymnasiarch and belongs to a very different social milieu from that of the Cynics Dio criticizes. His *parrhêsia* is nationalist and aristocratic. Even if the fragment published as *Acta Diogenis* is to be classed with the Martyr Acts (which is debatable) it allows no general inference (Musurillo, *Acts*, 145). Although some of the *Acta* display traits from martyr literature, these are not specifically Cynic (MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order*, 314, nn. 38–9). Papyrus finds in any case suggest literary embellishment may be over-readily attributed in the case of the earlier *Acta* (A. Bowman, 'Papyri and Roman history', *JRS* 66 (1976) 154). N.b. also Rostovtzeff's failure to explain why the riots, if anti-monarchic Cynicism lay behind them, should have focused so often on Jews.

123 B. Baldwin, 'Lucian as a social satirist', *CQ* 11 (1961) 199–208, suggests Cynic involvement in provincial revolts under Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, but none is mentioned in the sources cited. Philostratus, *Vit Sophist.* 526, attests a Cynic in a bread riot at Athens – but notes that he *saved* an official from the mob. Lucian's claim (*De morte Peregr.* 19) that Peregrinus fomented revolt in Greece seems a baseless innuendo.

124 Diog. Laert. 6.72. R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Uppsala, 1948) 139–42 took this passage to indicate an idealist politics: but *nomos* and *politeia* were in Cynic eyes not *kata physin* and thus not desiderata: see Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 36; M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge, 1991) 144f. See also following note.

125 *Or.* 7.238bc. J. Moles, 'Le Cosmopolitisme cynique', in M.-O. Goulet-Cozé and R. Goulet, eds, *Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements: actes du colloque internationale de CNRS (Paris, 22–25 juillet 1991)* (Paris, 1993) 259–80, argues for a more positive and socially engaged ideological content underlying the model of the Cynic as *kosmopolitês* than

is usually granted, citing J. at *Or.* 6.201c as emblematic of a tension between early Cynic individualist and philanthropic aims (p. 280): but whatever Diogenes' view may have been, an individualist disengagement from social and political life looks to have become central and predominant in the later image of the Cynic.

126 Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22. 77–85.

127 *Ibid.*, 3.22.30 (Agamemnon); 49 (Cynic as King).

128 *Ibid.*, 3.22.23 (sent by Zeus). See Höistad, *Cynic Hero*, 181–222 (tyrant/king contrast); and esp. 205ff (Alexander/Diogenes exchange in Dio Chrys. *Or.* 4). On Stoic attitudes to Alexander, P. Brunt, 'From Epictetus to Arrian', *Athenaeum* 55 (1977) 19–44; Moles, 'Cosmopolitisme cynique', 275ff.

129 *Or.* 7.210c.

130 R. Browning, *The Emperor Julian* (London, 1976) 141 judges the Cynics of J.'s day 'politically and socially ineffectual . . . in a sense a safety-valve for intellectual discontent'.

131 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 128ff; G.W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (London, 1978) 81–2.

132 Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 46, ed. Dindorf, 394ff, cited with comment in de Labriolle, *Réaction païenne*, 81–7. The speech is datable to the earlier 160s. Aelius, it must be said, does not name the 'men in Palestine' as Christians, but they are on balance more likely denoted than Jews: cf. the reference to the obstinacy (*parataxis*) of Christians in Marcus, *Medit.* 9.3 (probably not interpolated, *pace* P. Brunt in C. Deroux, ed., *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History, I* (Brussels, 1979) 483ff.).

133 Lucian, *Alex. Pseudom.* 25.

134 *Or.* 7.224bc.

135 *Or.* 7.223c; cf. Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22.57, with Billerbeck, *EVK* ad loc..

136 *Ibid.*, 223d; cf. Lucian, *Vitarum auctio*, 11.

137 *Ibid.*; cf. Lucian, *De morte Peregr.* 19; *Fugitivi* 14; Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22.9–10.

138 *Or.* 7. 224a.

139 *Ibid.*, 224d.

140 *Cod. Theod.* 12.1.63 (Valens); 16.3.1 (Theodosius, 390, ordering monks to return to the desert; repealed 392). Strains in the relationship between Theodosius and Ambrose may have led to the legislation of 390: J. Geffcken, *The Last Days of Greco-Roman Paganism*, trans. S. MacCormack (Amsterdam, 1978) 170ff. For contemporary attitudes to monks, Geffcken, *Last Days*, 212 n.84; P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity* (Madison, 1992) 71ff, 107ff.

141 *Or.* 7.224c.

142 *Or.* 6.183b; *CG* 52b.

143 *Ibid.*, 43a.

144 Epictetus, *Diss.* 3.22.80. Celsus ap. Origen, *C. Celsum* 7.44; 5.25; 8.47.

145 *Or.* 7.235bc.

146 *CG* 229d.

147 *Or.* 7.206d; 208b; 226d; *CG* 39b.

148 *Ibid.*, 194d: ever-living gods abandoned 'for the corpse of the Jew'; cf. 201e, 355b.

149 *Or.* 6.192d. Julian had a fondness for the phrase from Genesis, 'even as the green herb', quoting it twice in *CG* (238d; 314c).

150 Eunapius, *fr.* 34,3 Blockley (31 Müller); Amm. Marc. 23.3.2; 26.62–3 (Procopius' claim to be J.'s chosen successor).

151 Greg. Naz. *Or.* 25 (*PG* 35.1200ab): q.v. R. Ruether, *Gregory of Nazianzus, Rhetor and Philosopher* (Oxford, 1969) 109ff. On the suppression of Maximus' name in the MS title, *In laudem Heronis philosophi*, see Jerome's explanation in *PG* 35.1194–5 (Maximus had been insulted by Gregory in subsequent works). Gregory's *Carmen de vita sua* (*PG* 37.1029ff) 11, 954–5, confirms that he had written a panegyric of Maximus.

152 *PG* 35.1200a.

153 *Ibid.*, 1216c; 1221a: *Hellênon deisidaimonia* (the same term that J. applied slightingly to Christians).

154 Jerome, *De vir. illustr.* 127.

155 P. Gallay, *Vie de St. Grégoire de Nazianze* (Paris, 1943), 160ff; G. Dagron, *Naissance d'une capitale: Constantinople et ses institutions de 330 à 451* (Paris, 1974) 450ff.

156 *PG* 37.1081ff, 11.751–2, 11.974–5. Gregorian references to Maximus are itemized in M.M. Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie zu den Schriften Gregors von Nazianz* (Bonn, 1960) 119–21.

157 Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 1.1.5.

158 Tertullian, *De pallio*, ed. Marra (1937) 64–5 (= chs 4, 5). Cf. Greg. Naz. *Ep.* 98.

159 Tertullian, *De pallio* 74 (= ch. 6). The date and nature of the *De pallio* have been widely debated. For discussion, J.C. Fredouille, *Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique* (Paris, 1972) 443–78. Despite the exordium of the piece, it is not in any simple sense an apology to justify the writer's wearing of the *pallium*. Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes*, 56ff, read it as a *jeu d'esprit* evocative of the diatribe; T.D. Barnes, *Tertullian* (Oxford, 1971) 228–9, compares it with Apuleius' *Florida* in its mannered style and erudition.

160 A. Bretz, 'Studien zu Asterius', in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, edd. Harnack and Schmidt (1914), vol. 40, pp. 46–55.

161 Gregory of Nyssa's *V. Greg. Thaumaturgi* and Lucian's *Demonax* are compared in specific details by Nock, *Sallustius*, xxx–xxxii. The influence of the diatribe is perhaps discernible too in Gregory the Wonder-worker's own paraphrase of *Ecclesiastes* (*PG* 10.987–1018): at 1001 and 1004 he seems (unlike the version of the Septuagint) to treat poverty as the concomitant of wisdom.

162 Discussed in de Labriolle, *Réaction païenne*, 100–7.

163 Lucian, *De morte Peregr.* 16. For discussion of apparent 'similarities' between Christian and Cynic teachings on a broader front, with speculation on possible direction of influence, see F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins* (Edinburgh, 1992) chs 7–8: in my view exaggerating the significance of the parallels.

164 De Labriolle, *Réaction païenne*, 63–4, on Justin, *II Apol.* 3, 11.

165 See the hostile Cynic of *Acta Apollonii*, 33 (H. Musurillo, ed., *Acts of the Christian Martyrs* (Oxford, 1972)).

166 *Or.* 7.227b–234c.
167 *Ibid.*, 234d; 208d.
168 One such (likelier Mardonius than Maximus) is explicitly mentioned as among the audience of *Or.* 7 (235a).

4 THE *CHALDAEAN ORACLES* AND NEOPLATONIST THEURGY

1 Eunap. *VS* 475/434W; *Or.* 7.235c. Cf. Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.55.
2 *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez), taking *homônymos* to refer to a Julian (see Ch. 2, n. 108).
3 *Or.* 5.180b; *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 292ab.
4 Amm. Marc. 23.5.10–14; 25.2.7–8; for discussion, J. Matthews, *The Roman Empire of Ammianus* (London, 1989) 126–9, 176–9.
5 *Or.* 4.157cd.
6 Marinus, *V. Procli* 26.
7 H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*, 2nd edn, ed. M. Tardieu (Paris, 1978) 3 n. 5.
8 On Psellus' variant, P. Hadot, in Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, *Complement 10*, p. 704.
9 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 443–4.
10 E.R. Dodds, 'Theurgy', a classic short account (repr. 'Theurgy and its relation to Neoplatonism', from *JRS* 37 (1947) 55–69 as Appendix 2) in his *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951) 284.
11 On the roles of the *prophêtês* and thespode, H. Parke, *Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor* (London, 1985) 219–23; R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth, 1986) 172ff.
12 Dio Cass. 71.8 gives the miracle to one Arnuphis. For recent discussion, G. Fowden, 'Pagan versions of the rain miracle', *Historia* 36 (1987) 83–95.
13 *SHA*, *Heliogabalus* 9.1; cf. Claudian, *De VI cos. Hon.* 348.
14 Soz. 1.18.7.
15 Iamblichus' commentary ran to at least 28 books: Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 68.
16 The *Suda* attributes to Porphyry a work *eis ta Ioulianou Chaldaiou* which may have been a commentary on the *OC*. Whether the title was Porphyry's is debatable: see P. Hadot in Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 713.
17 Thus H. Saffrey, 'Les Néoplatoniciens et les *Oracles Chaldaïques*', in *Recherches sur le néoplatonisme après Plotin* (Paris, 1990) 209–25, at 218ff.
18 On their fabulously antique dates, A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégista* (Paris, 1944), vol. i, 22: Zoroaster was put 6,000 years before Plato, the scribes of Hermes 49,000 before Alexander.
19 Plut. *Mor.* 398e; 566e.
20 L. Robert, *A Travers l'Asie mineure* (Paris, 1980) 393ff.
21 *PGM* iii.187ff (Apollo/Helios); iv.475ff (angel of Helios). On indications of date, A.D. Nock, 'Greek magical papyri', in *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972), vol. i, 176–84.

22 On Claros and Didyma in this period, Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, 171ff, Parke, *Oracles of Apollo*, esp. 74ff, 146f, 162ff. A number of 'theological oracles' (nos. 1, 7, 8 and 9 in G. Wolff, *Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda* (Berlin, 1856; repr. Hildesheim, 1962) 231ff) have been proved to be genuine responses: L. Robert, 'Trois oracles de la Théosophie et un prophète d'Apollon', *CRAI* (1968) 568–99 (Didyma); 'Un oracle gravé à Oinoanda', *CRAI* (1971) 597–619. On the close resemblance of one of these to the form and teaching of the *OC*, see above, pp. 97–8.

23 Nock, 'Oracles Théologiques', *Essays*, 165.

24 Festugière, *Révélation*, iii, 52–9.

25 E.R. Dodds, 'New Light on the "Chaldaean Oracles"', *HThR* 54 (1961) 271 [= Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles, Complement* 9, pp. 693–701]. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) 363–4.

26 *Ibid.*, 362.

27 R.L. Gordon, 'Date and significance of *CIMRM* 593', *Journ. Mithr. Stud.* 2 (1977) 163–4, discussing the source of Statius, *Theb.* 1.719. For a different emphasis, see D.S. Potter, rev. of R. Majercik, *Chaldaean Oracles*, *JRS* 81 (1991) 225, proposing a 3rd-cent. composition date with which I disagree.

28 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 398.

29 Thus J. Geffcken, *The Last Days of Greco-Roman Paganism*, trans. S. MacCormack (Amsterdam, 1978) 112 n. 94.

30 Proclus (*In Tim.* 3.124.32) knew a commentary purportedly by one of the Juliani.

31 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 4, 428; cf. J. Bidez, *La Vie de L'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930) 75.

32 Proclus, *In Tim.* 3.63.24.

33 A. Sheppard, 'Proclus' attitude to theurgy', *CQ* 32 (1982) 212–24; J. Rist, *Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1967) 244–5.

34 E.R. Dodds, 'New Light', 265–7.

35 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 19 n. 46. Clarian origin: Robert, 'Un oracle gravé à Oinoanda'; with discussion in Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, 168–77; D.S. Potter, *Prophecy and History in the Crisis of the Roman Empire: A Historical Commentary on the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle*, (Oxford, 1990) 351–5 (= Appendix 1).

36 I translate from the text given in G. Wolff, *Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis*, 231–4, reading *deiseie* and *daiein* at lines 11–12 for the MSS *daiseie* and *daiên*, and emending line 15 to read *ounoma mê chôrôn, polyônomos* (see Robert, 'Un oracle gravé à Oinoanda').

37 Text and discussion in Robert, 'Un oracle gravé à Oinoanda'.

38 *Ibid.*, 614; Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, 176–7; for doubts, see Parke, *Oracles of Apollo*, 165–8 and G. Fowden, review of Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, *JRS* 78 (1988) 173–82, at 178–9.

39 Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, 168–200.

40 Robert, 'Trois oracles', 568ff.

41 *OC* 7, so interpreted by Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 393. Another reading would deny the identity of Father and First Intellect: *Oracles chaldaïques*, ed. E. des Places (Paris, 1971) 125 (n. on *OC* 7).

42 *OC* 4.

43 *OC* 3. Female: Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 393.
44 Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 395.
45 *OC* 3.
46 *OC* 8.
47 *OC* 34, 35: Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 118–19.
48 *OC* 6, 50, 54; with Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 83ff, 142; Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 394.
49 *OC* 51.
50 Dodds, 'New Light', 268. For an attempt to order the entities concerned, Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 120–2, 126–42, 157–64.
51 *OC* 27: 'In every *kosmos*, there shines out a triad which a monad rules.'
52 *OC* 1.
53 *OC* 3.
54 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 178ff.
55 *OC* 104.
56 *OC* 103.
57 *OC* 115; 102; 112.
58 Bidez, *Vie*, 369 n. 8.
59 Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 291ff. On the refinements in later Neoplatonists, Sheppard, 'Proclus' attitude to theurgy', 212–24. J.-F. Festugière, 'Contemplation philosophique et art théurgique chez Proclus', in *Études de philosophie grec* (Paris, 1971) 585–96.
60 *OC* 108.
61 Psellus, *Ep.* 187 (cited in Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 292).
62 Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 293.
63 See above, n. 1.
64 Eunap. *VS* 474–5/432–4W: Eusebius of Mendes critical of Maximus.
65 Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, ch. 4 *passim*, esp. 102–4, 141–4 on the enquiry made at Didyma by a priestess of Demeter (Rehm, *Didyma* II (Berlin, 1958) 496). For an attempt to explain a theurgic epiphany (*OC* 46.5) in the light of iconographic parallels in contemporary pagan practice at large, see S. Johnston, 'Riders in the sky: cavalier gods and theurgic salvation in the second century A.D.', *Class. Phil.* 87 (1992) 303–21.
66 L. Robert, *Documents de L'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1966) 916; Parke, *Oracles*, 157–8.
67 Olympiodorus *fr.* 27 Blockley (1,27 Müller): discussed in B. Croke, 'Evidence for the Hun invasion of Thrace', *GRBS* 18 (1977) 358; K. Holum, *Theodosian Empresses* (Berkeley, 1982) 118–19.
68 *PGM* 7.540ff; Porph. ap. Firmicus Maternus, *De errore*, 14.
69 Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 295, with n. 105.
70 Eunap. *VS* 473/424W.
71 Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 291; a view refined by P. Hadot in Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 717–19.
72 Iambl. *De myst.* 179.8.
73 *OC* 120; 129. On the purification, Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 178, 228ff. On the soul's *ochêma*, E.R. Dodds, ed., Proclus, *Elements of Theology* (Oxford, 1933) 313–21; A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition* (The Hague, 1974) 152–8.

74 *OC* 110.
75 *OC* 111.
76 *OC* 97; 153.
77 *Or.* 5.172d; n.b. 172a (*anagôgoi aktinai* of the sun).
78 Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 285–6. Claims that the *Enneads* do echo the *OC* are countered by Hadot (Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 710).
79 On the challenge to the chronology proposed by J. Bidez, *La Vie de Porphyre* (Ghent, 1913), see Hadot, *REAug.* 6 (1960) 205ff; R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972) 99 n. 1.
80 See Hadot in Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 713–14.
81 Porph. *Ep. ad Aneb.* 1.2a-3c.
82 Porph. ap. Aug. *CD* 10.9; 10; 26.
83 *Ibid.*, 10.9; 27.
84 On Porphyry's wish for a 'universal way of salvation', see J.J. O'Meara, *The Young Augustine* (London, 1954) 143ff; the notion is queried in P. Hadot, 'Citations de Porphyre', *REAug* 6 (1960) 205ff, and granted only restricted scope in G. Fowden, *From Commonwealth to Empire* (Princeton, 1993) 39.
85 Iambl. *De myst.* 7.2–11.
86 *Ibid.*, 96.13–97.8.
87 *Ibid.*, 69.9–10.
88 Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 121 emphasizes Iamblichus' distinction between primary and auxiliary causes. The *OC* themselves stressed that one cannot attempt to conceive the Intelligible with 'vehemence' (*sphodrotês*): *OC* 1. 5. On the conception of theurgy as essentially responsive, Hadot, in Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 719; G. Shaw, 'Theurgy: rituals of unification in the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus', *Traditio* 41 (1985) 1–28.
89 L. Rosan, *The Philosophy of Proclus* (New York, 1949) 213ff.
90 Smith, *Porphyry's Place*, 90ff, distinguishing sensible effects obtained through *sympatheia* and higher effects dependent on *philia*. For refinement, see Sheppard, 'Proclus' attitude to theurgy', esp. 218–22. P. Athanassiadi, 'Dreams, theurgy and freelance divination: the testimony of Iamblichus', *JRS* 83 (1993) 115–30 also insists that Iamblichan theurgy is not primarily *technique*.
91 *OC* 107 is dismissive of conventional methods of divination (including astrology, augury and haruspicy): for interpretation of the ground of objection, Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 255–7.
92 *De myst.* 161.10–167.9; 287.16–290.4: discussion in Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 122.
93 Dodds, *Greeks and the Irrational*, 287. Contrast the account of Neoplatonist theurgy in J. Trouillard, *La Mystagogie de Proclus* (Paris, 1982) 33–51, 249–52, arguing that theurgy was conceived of as complementing, not replacing, abstract contemplation. See also the comments on 'la théurgie comme pénétration d'élements extra-rationnels dans la philosophie grecque tardive', in H.D. Saffrey, *Recherches sur le néoplatonisme après Plotin* (Paris, 1990) 33–49, esp. 48–9.
94 Iambl. *De myst.* 7.2–6.
95 Porph. ap. Aug. *CD* 10.9; following Plot. *Enn.* 4.8.8.
96 Discussion in Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 110–18.

97 Thus Proclus, *ET* 211, after Iamblichus (see Dodds' comment in his edn (Oxford, 1933) 309; J. Dillon, *Iamblichi in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden, 1973) fr. 6). On Iamblichus' criticism of Plotinian metaphysics, Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 118–20; on his doctrine of the soul, Festugière, *Révélation*, vol. ii, 184 (translating Iamblichus' fragmentary *De anima*).

98 *De myst.* 8.3–6.

99 *Ibid.*, 41.5–11.

100 *Ibid.*, 272.8–10. On Abiding/Procession/Reversion, Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 132.

101 *Ibid.*, 124ff.

102 *Ibid.*, 130.

103 Dillon, *Iamblichi in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta*, 23–4 dates these provisionally to c. 305–25, and takes this period to be the acme of Chaldaean influence on Iamblichus.

104 *Ibid.*

105 T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) 22.

106 T.D. Barnes, 'A correspondent of Iamblichus', *GRBS* 19 (1978) 99–106; *Constantine and Eusebius*, 68, re-dating the pseudo-Julianic letters to Iamblichus (*Epp.* 74–9 in Loeb Julian) to 313/4 and the years following. N.b. also Bidez, 'Le Philosophe Jamblique et son école' *REG* 32 (1919) 35; D.J. O'Meara, 'Aspects of political philosophy in Iamblichus', in H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clarke, eds, *The Divine Iamblichus: Philosopher and Man of Gods* (London, 1953) 65–73; M.J. Edwards, 'Two images of Pythagoras: Iamblichus and Porphyry', *ibid.*, 159–72 at 168f (anti-Christian allusions in *De Myst.* and *Vit. Pythag.*).

107 Eunap. *VS* 462/380W.

108 *Ibid.*, 463/384W. The accuser was the Prefect Ablabius: Eunapius gives the motive as jealousy of Sopater's influence, but conceivably the latter was using theurgy to a 'subversive' end. On the failure of late Neoplatonists to intervene in politics effectively, G. Fowden, 'Pagan holy man in late antique Society', *JHS* 102 (1982) 33–59.

109 Eunap. *VS* 461/378W.

110 *Ibid.*, 480/434W; Amm. Marc. 29.1.42.

111 *Ep.* 89 Bidez = *Ep.* 20 and *Letter to a Priest* in Wright, who doubts if the texts should be treated as a single letter (Loeb, vol. ii, p. lxi).

112 *Ep.* 20 (89a Bidez) 453a.

113 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 300d–303b; 305ad.

114 Bidez, *Vie*, 399 n. 21.

115 *Ibid.*, 267; 271–2.

116 G.W. Bowersock, *Hellenism in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1990) 12.

117 P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism* (Oxford, 1981) 181, 188.

118 Lactant. *De mort. pers.* 36.3, Eusebius, *HE* 9.5: discussion in R.M. Grant, 'The Religion of Maximin Daia', in J. Neusner, ed., *Christianity, Judaism, and other Greco-Roman Cults: Studies for J. Morton Smith* (Leiden, 1975) 144–5, 157–60.

119 *Ep.* 22 (84a Bidez) 429d–431b; *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 290d, 305ad. On the development of the Christian charitable ethos, E. Patlagean, *Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance 4e–7e*

siècles (Paris, 1977) 181–96, esp. 177–8 (views of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa). On the pagan tradition of poor-relief via temples, R. MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1984) 143 n. 9.

120 S. Mitchell, 'Maximin and the Christians', *JRS* 78 (1988) 121–4.

121 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 294c, 293b.

122 *ELF* 136b.

123 Bidez, *Lettres* (Budé Julian, vol. 1.ii) 130–2.

124 Demosth. *Or.* 43.62 cites the law; for discussion, R. Parker, *Miasma* (Oxford, 1983) 34ff. In Plato: *Leges*, 960a; Nock, *Essays*, 528–30, suggests a Greek (but not a specifically Neoplatonist) context.

125 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 302d.

126 Eunap. *VS* 475/434W.

127 Eunap. *fr.* 28 Blockley (26 Müller): on the oracular imagery, S. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, 1981) 136–8. Unless judged posthumous, this will be viewed as the oracle alluded to by J. on his death-bed (Amm. Marc. 25.3.19). Ammianus' account of the philosophic death-bed scene of J. is idealizing and indebted to an obvious literary model, but is not an evident fiction: G. Scheda, 'Die Todesstunde Kaiser Julians', *Historia* 15 (1966) 380–4 is in my view too sceptical.

5 THE MYSTERIES I: JULIAN AS INITIATE

1 Lib. *Or.* 24.36.

2 *Caes.* 336c; *Or.* 5.159a.

3 *Or.* 7.217d–218a; *Or.* 5.173ad. On J.'s contacts with the hierophant Nestorius, Eunap. *VS* 475–6/436–8W.

4 G. Thomas, 'Cybele and Attis', *ANRW* II.17.3, 1500–35 surveys recent scholarship. J. knew well (*Or.* 5.159c–161a) the story of the cult's introduction at Rome in 205 BC at the instigation of the *Xviri*: the subsequent process of 'Romanization' is succinctly outlined in A.D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford, 1933) 68–71. For the reform of the cult by which the *XVviri* took responsibility for its ceremonies and priesthoods, see still H. Graillot, *Le Culte de Cybèle* (Paris, 1912) 136–8, 142–4.

5 Development of *taurobolium* as civic ceremony: Graillot, *Culte de Cybèle*, 150–3, 159–60; R. Duthoy, *The Taurobolium: Its Evolution and Terminology* (Leiden, 1969) 68, 78–80, listing attested *taurobolia pro salute imperii/imperatoris* or similar (the last attested is Diocletianic: *ILS* 4142).

6 A.D. Nock, 'The Genius of Mithraism', *JRS* 27(1937) 108–13 [=*Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (Oxford, 1972) 452–8].

7 *TMMM*, vol i, 338–50. On the general notion, see A. von Harnack, *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, 2nd edn, trans. J. Moffat (London, 1908) vol. ii, pp. 317–21.

8 *TMMM*, i, 281.

9 J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930) 219–24, 346–7; P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism* (Oxford, 1981) 88, 114, 160.

10 G. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (London: 1978) xi.

11 R. Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus: Recherches sur l'hellénisation philosophique de Mithra* (Leiden, 1975) 105–28.

12 Non-specialists in the field owe a substantial debt to the fine survey of R. Beck, 'Mithraism since Franz Cumont', *ANRW* II.17.4. 2002–115; see too his important review article in *Phoenix* 41 (1987) 296–316 of R. Merkelbach's ambitious but problematic *Mithras* (Königstein, 1984). The quality of some recent contributions is outstanding: I note Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus* and *Mithra et le Mithriacisme* (Paris, 1981; rev. edn 1993, with additional material); R. Beck, *Planetary Gods and Planetary Orders in the Mysteries of Mithras* (Leiden, 1988); and the articles of R.L. Gordon in J. Hinnells, ed., *Mithraic Studies* I–II (Manchester, 1975) 215–47, *Religion* 2 (1972) 93–121, and *Journ. Mithr. Stud.* 1–3 (1976–80). U. Bianchi, ed., *Mysteria Mithrae* (Leiden, 1979) includes helpful papers on Roman Mithraism.

13 *Or.* 5.161b.

14 R.L. Gordon, 'Franz Cumont and the doctrines of Mithraism', in Hinnells, ed., *Mithraic Studies*, 215–47, strongly challenges the procedural methods and some of the major conclusions of Cumont in his influential *TMMM*. N.b. also R. MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1981)122ff on Cumont's account of the appeal of the cult; R. Turcan, 'Salut Mithriaque et la sotériologie néoplatonicienne,' in U. Bianchi and M. Vermaseren, eds, *La soteria dei culti orientali nell' impero romano* (Leiden, 1982) 173ff on his use of the term 'salvation'; M. Simon, 'Mithra et les Empereurs', in Bianchi, ed., *Mysteria Mithrae*, 411–25 on his view of the place of Mithras in imperial ideology.

15 Gordon, 'Franz Cumont', argues that Mithraism in the West had probably been radically transformed in doctrine and ritual. As for the Metroac cult, Cumont himself assumed important developments in the course of Romanization (F. Cumont, *Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, 4th edn (Paris, 1929) 43). Metroac *taurobolia* seem to start in the 2nd cent. (Duthoy, *Taurobolium*, 116–17), the Metroac cult worship of Attis later still (*ibid.*, 65). At Rome, the organization of the priesthood and March festival was basically Claudian, but some of the rites are later developments: M. Vermaseren, *Cybele and Attis: The Myth and the Cult*, trans. A. Lemmers (London, 1977) 112–24. At Pessinus itself, the priesthood underwent imperial reform (*ibid.*, 98).

16 Cumont, *Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain* 17–43 is the classic statement on these lines.

17 I quote from W. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987) 11. See generally the classic discussions of A.D. Nock: 'Early gentile Christianity' (*Essays*, 63–8); 'Conversion and adolescence (*ibid.*, 475–80); 'Hellenistic Mysteries' (*ibid.*, 797); and for his treatment of Julian as an exceptional case, *Conversion*, 156–60, 185.

18 *Or.* 7.233d.

19 Nock, 'The Genius of Mithraism' (*Essays*, 455); 'Cremation and burial', *ibid.*, 298.

20 The structural peculiarity of Mithraic initiation is well emphasized by

Gordon, 'Mithraism and Roman society', *Religion* 2 (1972) 96–7.

21 On the senses of the term *sôtêria*, see Nock, 'Early gentile Christianity' (*Essays*, 78–84); Turcan, 'Salut Mithriaque', 173ff. Cf. also Bianchi's prolegomena to *Mysteria Mithrae*, 4–5; G. Sfameni Gasparro, *Soteriology and Mystic Aspects in the Cult of Cybele and Attis* (Leiden, 1985) 84ff.

22 Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults*, 12–29; J. North, 'Development of religious pluralism', in J. Lieu, J. North and T. Rajak, eds, *Jews Among Pagans and Christians* (London, 1992) 183f.

23 Private Mysteries: Nock, *Conversion*, 116ff. Public Mysteries: Nock, 'Studies in the Graeco-Roman beliefs of the Empire', *Essays*, 33–48, at 33 (n.b. *Mystis* as the divine personification of Side). Prusias: *OGIS* 528. Artemis Ephesia: *Forsch. in Ephesos* 3 (1923) 144. Aion and Kore: Nock, 'The Vision of Mandaulis Aion', *Essays*, 388–92.

24 MacMullen, *Paganism*, 20–4.

25 *Or.* 7.218a.

26 Scope of secrecy: MacMullen, *Paganism*, 23; Nock, *Conversion*, 214–15.

27 Nock, *Conversion*, 12.

28 Gordon, 'Mithraism', 98–9.

29 Cult as 'replication' of social values: *ibid.*, 103–13 (senatorial Fathers 110–11). Cf. MacMullen, *Paganism*, 124, stressing the more palpable social attractions of feasts etc.

30 Firmicus, *De errore*, 2–5. Cf. an earlier critical allusion in Celsus ap. Origen, *C. Celsum*, i.9, associating Metroac and Mithraic worship on grounds of their 'irrationalism'.

31 Firmicus, *De errore*, ed. R. Turcan (Paris, 1982), intro., pp. 14, 54, and chs 6, 15, 17–18, 20, 24.

32 *Or.* 5.161c alludes to a Porphyrian treatise which is arguably not to be identified with the *De antro nymph.*; Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 106.

33 *ILS* 1259. Comparable cases in H. Bloch, 'A new document of the last pagan revival in the West, 393–394 AD', *HThR* (1945) 199–244 with discussion in J. Matthews, 'Symmachus and the oriental cults', *JRS* 63 (1973) 182–6.

34 Porph. *De antro* 2, 6, 21, 34.

35 R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian* (Berkeley, 1986) 134ff.

36 R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972) 123–4, 134–7 (citing the Proclan description of Iamblichus' exegesis as 'epoptic' (all-comprehending)).

37 *Or.* 4.157cd; cf. 146a; 150d; 157bc, where most infer references to the *On the Gods*; see below at Ch. 6 n. 23.

38 For a different and more generous emphasis, see G. Fowden, *The Egyptian Hermes* (Cambridge, 1986) 131–41; on the connotations of the Egyptian pseudonym, H.D. Saffrey, 'Abamon, pseudonym de Jamblique', in *Recherches sur le néoplatonisme après Plotin* (Paris, 1990) 95–107.

39 Iambl. *De myst.* 247, 17.

40 Plat. *Sympos.* 210; Nock, *Essays*, 800f; cf. 467–8.

41 J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) 300, 398, on the embellished metaphor in Theon of Smyrna and Albinus, esp. the analogy between *enkyklios paideia* and *ta proteleia*; cf. J. at *Or.* 7.235ad.

42 *Or.* 4.146a; *Or.* 7.235c, taking *philosophôi telesanti* to refer to Mardonius rather than Maximus (see Ch. 2 at n.13).
43 Arist. *Protrepticus*, *fr.* 15 (with W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford, 1943) 159–60); cf. Plut. *fr.* 178 (Sandbach), where death is a *pathos* of the soul like the *pathos* of men engaged in *teletais megalais*.
44 Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 106: though the allusion may refer to a Porphyrian work other than the *De antro*.
45 *Or.* 7.215c–216c.
46 *Ibid.*, 237a (cf. Iambl. *V. Pythag.* 13–14, 16).
47 *Ibid.*, 237d (the reference is likelier to be to the school of Iamblichus than to Aristotle's Lyceum).
48 Eunap. *VS* 475/434W.
49 *Ibid.*, 458–9/364–70W.
50 *Ibid.*, 475/432–4W; cf. Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.55.
51 Bidez, *Vie*, 20, 346.
52 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 38, 88.
53 Lib. *Or.* 18.178–9. On the date of the *Caesars*, Lacombrade, intro. to the Budé Julian, vol. ii.2. 3–30; B. Baldwin, 'The *Caesares* of Julian', *Klio* 60 (1978) 449–66.
54 *Caes.* 307a.
55 *Ibid.*, 336a.
56 *Ibid.*, 335a.
57 See pp. 128–9, 166.
58 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 197. The claim rests on (i) the identification of Cronos with Chronos made in Sallustius, *DM* 4; (ii) the suggestion that the description at *Caes.* 307cd of Cronos as taking his seat on a bed of ebony alludes to the astrological association of the colour black with the planet Saturn (black standing for infinite time, according to an ancient manual of astrology). But the identification with Chronos, even if Julian had it in mind, was a commonplace (A.D. Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge, 1926) xlvi n. 38), and neither ebony nor the blackness of Saturn are otherwise securely attested as Mithraic symbols.
59 Supposing that Cumont was right to identify the Mithraic Time-god with the Leontocephaline figure in Mithraic statuary (against which, see Gordon in *Mith. Stud.*, 221–4), J. – if he intended to equate this god with his Cronos in the *Caesars* – could have readily done so by alluding to one of its numerous and striking symbolic attributes: lion's head, wings, serpent, keys or sceptre. He makes no such allusion, and nothing else in the symbolism associated with the gods of the *Caesars* suggests Mithraic influence. Cronos, Zeus and Rhea as they appear in the *Caesars* are in fact better interpreted as figures corresponding to the deities of the same name in Iamblichus' noetic triad; and Iamblichus had derived this triad not from Mithraism, but from the Orphic poems and the *Chaldaean Oracles*: see *OC* 56, with Proclus, *In Tim.* i. 46–7; *In Crat.* 148; Damascius, *De principiis*, i. 146 [= Budé, ed. Westerink, (1989) vol. ii, p. 92]; and Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 132–3, 137.
60 Aesch. *Persae*, 12; 1 Corinthians 7.19.

61 *Phaedo*, 67c; *Rep.* 6.496e. On the Eleusinian usage, F. Van Menxel, ELPIS, *espoir, espérence* (Paris, 1983) 120–3; n.b. also 134–5 (Pindar, *Isthm.* 8.15: first use?).
62 *Or.* 5.180c (Cybele); 7.233d (Helios); *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 298d (gods); *Ep.* 20 (89a Bidez) 452c (priest).
63 Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 128.
64 *Ep.* 21 (60 Bidez); Bidez, *Vie*, 234.
65 Julianic coins feature Isis and Serapis: L. Budde, *Archaeol. Anzeiger* (1972), 4, 633–5. J.'s puzzling Bull coinage probably does not show Apis, and certainly not Mithras: F. Gilliard, *JRS* 54 (1964) 138ff; Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 104; J. Kent, *Rom. Imp. Coinage* VIII (London, 1981) 46–7. On the interpretation of coins as a vehicle of imperial religious propaganda, S. Price, review of R. Fears, *Princeps A Diis Electus*, in *CR* 29 (1979) 277–8, citing Euseb. *V. Const.* 15.1; A. Wallace-Hadrill, 'Image and authority', *JRS* 76 (1986) 66–85.
66 Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 125–6.
67 *Or.* 4.153d.
68 *Ibid.* 154d–155a.
69 *Ibid.*, 156b.
70 *SHA*, *Aurel.* 25, 5–6 is the only evidence that Aurelian sacrificed to Elagabalus after his victory over Zenobia at Emesa: which leaves the episode very much open to question. For sceptical discussions, see H. Seyrig, 'Le culte du soleil en Syrie à l'époque romaine', *Syria* 48 (1971) 337–73, esp. 361, 365–6; F. Millar, *The Roman Near East, 31* BC–AD 337 (London, 1993) 172–3, 522, with 300–9 (the complex background to the Emesan Sun-god).
71 Bidez, *Vie*, 219–20.
72 Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.55.
73 *TMMM*, i, 345–6.
74 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 38; *JThS* 28 (1977) 360 n. 3 wished to retrieve Cumont's reading of the passage by appeal to an apparent reference earlier in Gregory's speech (*Or.* 4.52) to a *taurobolium* performed by J. But (i) the two passages need not refer to the same event; (ii) (crucial) the ceremony of the *taurobolium* belonged to the Metroac Mysteries and was never a typical feature of Mithraic worship; see Beck, 'Mithraism since Franz Cumont', denying that the *taurobolium* was ever part of Mithraic liturgy; Cosi, 'Il Mitreo nell Therme di Caracalla', in Bianchi, ed., *Mysteria Mithrae*, 933–42, denying an allegedly taurobolic pit in the Baths of Caracalla any taurobolic function (Ostia, contrary to earlier claims, has *not* yielded evidence of Mithraic *taurobolia*: S. Laeuchli, *Mithraism in Ostia* (1967) 54–6).
75 *Or.* 4.130bc.
76 Lib. *Or.* 18.127.
77 Himerius, *Or.* 7 (XLI Colonna), MS title.
78 Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 113; cf. Nock, 'Hellenistic Mysteries' (*Essays*, 796–801, 813–25); and n.b. Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.103.20 (Bernardi), using *mystêria* loosely of pagan cult practice.
79 Him. *Or.* 7 (XLI Colonna), 8–9; Turcan took *Hêliôi Mithrâi* (ch. 1) as a literary apposition.

80 Solar worship of Second Flavians and Tetrarchs: J. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion* (Oxford, 1979) 281–5; MacMullen, *Paganism*, 84–6, 186–7. On the identification and association of the Sun with other gods, see Ch. 6 at pp. 158–9, 165.
81 Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 111–12; *Or.* 7.227c–234a.
82 *Or.* 7.229cd; 230c–231c; 231d; 232c–234c.
83 *Ibid.*, 226c–227b.
84 *Ibid.*, 230a; 231d.
85 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 39.
86 *Or.* 7.231d; 233d.
87 *Ibid.*, 232d–233b.
88 *Ibid.*, 233cd.
89 *Ibid.*, 234a.
90 *Ibid.*, 231c: at 234a, Athena gives an aegis and helmet.
91 E.g. Seneca, *Ep. Mor.* 53, 56; Epictetus, *Diss.* 2.22.15.
92 Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.49.
93 *Ibid.*, 64–72.
94 *Men. Rhet.*, 390.7–10 .
95 *Ep. ad SPQ. Ath.* 275a.
96 Eunap. *VS* 475/436W. Eunapius may exaggerate out of personal esteem for the hierophant, by whom he himself had been initiated, and he does not name the man: for his identity, *PLRE* i. s.v. Nestorius 2.
97 Gordon, 'Mithraism', 108–10.
98 J. at Cologne: Amm. Marc. 16.3.1–2; his victory at Strasbourg, *ibid.*, 16.12.1ff; wintering at Vienne, *ibid.*, 16.2.1. On the *mithraea* at Lyon and Vienne, with other examples, R. Turcan, *Les Religions de l'Asie dans la vallée du Rhône* (Leiden, 1972) [=*EPROER* 30], 3–4, 44–7. The issue is complicated by the disruption of religious activity at many centres attributable to 3rd-cent. military conditions in the Rhineland, to Constantinian legislation banning 'magic' and to local Christian attacks (Turcan, *Mithra et le Mithriacisme*, 115–19); the Strasbourg *mithraeum*, e.g., apparently ceased to function as early as c. 260 (*ibid.*, 118).
99 Turcan, *Mithra et le Mithriacisme*, 28, 36 (map). Nock, *CAH*[1] XII, 418, 430–1.
100 *CIMRM* II 2348.
101 *CIMRM* II 2349 (accepting Cumont's judgement).
102 No weight can be placed on the curious story in Eunap. *VS* 475–6/436–8W of the Mithraic Father who became hierophant at Eleusis in the late 4th cent. The whole point of the story is that this was an unwelcome aberration: see Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults*, 51–2.
103 The hymn was composed (see *Or.* 5.161c; 178d) to celebrate the March festival of Cybele and Attis of 362 (so not at Pessinus in summer 362, as supposed in the Loeb, vol. i, 441).
104 *Or.* 5. 158d; 172d; 179d–180c.
105 Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.52, without indication of date. Athanassiadi-Fowden (*Julian and Hellenism*, 43–4) conjectures the early 350s in a Phrygian setting, Bidez (*Vie*, 219–20) 361/2 at Constantinople: another possibility (see p. 137) is not excluded.

106 Nock, *CAH*[1] XII, 422–5 still serves for summary; Graillot, *Culte de Cybèle* remains the fullest account.
107 Turcan, *Religions de l'Asie dans la vallée du Rhône*, 48–102, esp. 68–74, 80–98.
108 Vermaseren, *Cybele and Attis*, 32ff: cf. J.'s ref. to the Metroon at Athens at *Or.* 5.159b.
109 The cult had acquired mysteries by the early 3rd cent.: MacMullen, *Paganism*, 196 n. 54.
110 Eunap. *VS* 475/434W, on Maximus' theurgy at a 'Hecatesion'.
111 MacMullen, *Paganism*, 90, 189 nn. 56–7.
112 *OC* 30: *mêtra synechousa ta panta.*
113 *Or.* 5.180b.

6 THE MYSTERIES II: DOCTRINE IN THE HYMNS AND THE PIETY OF PUBLIC CULT

1 J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930) 222.
2 P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism* (Oxford, 1981) 148, 160.
3 The hymn was composed fast (*Or.* 4.158bc) to commemorate the festival of *Sol Invictus* of December 362 (*ibid.*, 131d, 156bc).
4 *TMMM*, i, 293ff.
5 A.D. Nock, 'The Genius of Mithraism', *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972) 452–8.
6 S. Wikander, *Études sur les mystères de Mithra* (Lund, 1951) 19–26, 29ff.
7 R. Gordon, 'Franz Cumont and the doctrines of Mithraism', *Mith. Stud.* 215–48.
8 Eubulus ap. Porph. *De antro*, 6, taken by Cumont (*TMMM* i, 305) to refer to Mithras' creation of natural life through the performance of the tauroctony at the behest of a higher divinity.
9 See esp. R.L. Gordon, 'Mithraism and Roman society', *Religion* 2 (1972) 92–121.
10 Nock, *Essays*, 457.
11 Gordon, 'Reality, evocation and boundary in the Mysteries of Mithras', *Journ. Mithr. Stud.* 3 (1980) 19–99; R. Beck, *Planetary Gods and Planetary Orders in the Mysteries of Mithras* (Leiden, 1988).
12 R. Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus: Recherches sur l'hellénisation philosophique de Mithra* (Leiden, 1975) 130–2.
13 R. Merkelbach, *Mithras* (Königstein, 1984) chs 8, 9.
14 This approach differs sharply from the method proposed in P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'A contribution to Mithraic theology: the Emperor Julian's *Hymn to King Helios*', *JThS* 28 (1977) 360–71, which is based (p. 363) on the premises that (i) any doctrines found in the hymn which are not demonstrably derived from Iamblichan Platonism are likely to be Mithraic, (ii) no Platonic dogma mentioned in the hymn will be irreconcilable with Mithraic doctrine: in my view, neither premise is safe.
15 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *ibid.*; *Julian and Hellenism*, 147–53, 160.
16 *Or.* 4.150d, 157cd.
17 Nock, 'The Genius of Mithraism', *Essays*, 456.

18 *TMMM*, i, 28.
19 Nock, *Essays*, 456.
20 I accept, with adjustments, the basic structural analysis of the hymn presented in G. Mau, *Die Religionsphilosophie Kaiser Julians* (Leipzig/Berlin, 1907) 1ff: Mau's general treatment of Neoplatonic issues is inevitably outdated, but his learned account of the hymn is an admirable pioneering demonstration of the crucial influence of Iamblichus on the hymn in many of its specifics.
21 *Or.* 4.131d (date and occasion); 132b (the programme).
22 R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972) 118–34 is an account of the main tenets.
23 Or works (Julian is unspecific). The obvious source is the (lost) commentary on the *Chaldaean Oracles*, 'the magnum opus of Iamblichus' "Chaldaean" period' (J. Dillon, ed., *Iamblichi in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden, 1973) 24). That Julian knew this work is clear from *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez), written in Gaul. On the strength of Sallustius, *DM* 6 *et al.* (q.v. A.D. Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge, 1926) xcvi) it is usually assumed that the lost *On the Gods* was also used. Dillon, *Iamblichi in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum*, 23, provisionally dates this work to c. 305–25, late in Iamblichus' career and at the peak of 'Chaldaean' influence (Nock, *Sallustius*, xcvi n. 1, implied an earlier date), and discerns its doctrinal influence in Iamblichus' treatment of the Olympians in his commentary on the *Timaeus*; J. may perhaps be indebted to this text also.
24 *Or.* 4.158bc.
25 Men. Rhet. 336.25–337.34 (Russell and Wilson). The term denotes not a specific genre so much as a mode of description in literature; it encompasses Empedocles, and the *Timaeus*.
26 *Ibid.*, 369.18–371.17; 372.14–377.9; 377.10–30. For enhanced emphasis on representation and praise of gods as virtuous kings as a general tendency in the paganism of the Roman imperial period, see P. Veyne, 'Une évolution du paganisme gréco-romain: injustice et piété des dieux, leurs ordres ou "oracles"...', *Latomus* 45 (1986) 258–83.
27 Men. Rhet. 372.25.
28 Cf. *OC* 22: 'The Father's will nodded and everything was already divided.'
29 *Or.* 4.132c–133c.
30 P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'A contribution to Mithraic theology: the Emperor Julian's Hymn to King Helios', *JThS* (1977) 364; cf. 362.
31 Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 124.
32 Plat. *Ep.* ii.312a: see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) 367, citing the passage in its Numenian connection; cf. *ibid.*, 347: a Neopythagorean work?
33 *Or.* 4.132c.
34 Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'Contribution to Mithraic theology', 367.
35 Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 133.
36 *Ibid.*, 132–3; H. Chadwick, *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge, 1965) 194 n. 4; Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 27; Plut. *Mor.* 389a, 996a.

37 *Or.* 4.144d; 133b (son of Good); 135c; 137d; 140ab; 143d–144c (demiurge and sustainer).
38 Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 366–71. Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 79ff.
39 Eubulus ap. Porph. *De antro* 6.
40 J. never cites Numenius. Conceivably, there is indirect influence though Porphyrian or Iamblichan knowledge of the *On the Good*. Despite *Or.* 5.161d, Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 106, allows that J. perhaps knew Porphyry's *De antro*.
41 Plat. *Rep.* 6.508b (*ton tou agathou ekgonon*); *Or.* 4. 133b (*tês ideas t[ou] agathou . . . ekgonos*).
42 *Or.* 4.133ab; cf. *Rep.* 6.508.
43 Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 215–16, on Plutarch's *De facie lunae* (*Mor.* 956bc); in speaking of his 'Eclecticism' I merely use for convenience a conventional tag whose potentially misleading connotations I recognize: see Dillon's remarks in J. Dillon and A. Long, eds, *The Question of Eclecticism* (Berkeley, 1988).
44 Cumont, *TMMM*, i, 303–4; Gordon, in *Mith. Stud.*, 228–33.
45 A. Pannekoek, *History of Astronomy* (London, 1961) 133–45.
46 R. Beck, *Planetary Gods and Planetary Orders in the Mysteries of Mithras* (Leiden, 1988) 4–7: T. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* (Oxford, 1913) 106–7.
47 Plat. *Rep.* 616e puts the Sun second in the order. The reconciliation was probably effected as early as the 4th. cent. BC: Pannekoek, *History of Astronomy*, 117–18. For Iamblichus' view, see Dillon, *Iamblichi in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta*, at *In Tim.* fr. 20.
48 A momentary slip at *Or.* 4.135c discloses the priorities neatly: J. speaks of Helios as 'established as king among the noeric gods from his middle position among the planets', but on the strict terms of his argument, this conclusion does not follow: the Helios who rules as 'midmost of the planets' is the hylic, not the noeric, Helios; J. has conflated hypostases.
49 *TMMM*, i, 303; against which, Gordon, *Mith. Stud.*, 229–31, proposing that the planetary order on which the Mithraic grades were based was adapted from the usual order found in Greek horoscopes. Beck, *Planetary Gods*, 1–7 conjectures that Mithraic doctrine consciously adapted the Chaldaean order in a way that *deprived* the Sun of its centrality. If he is right, this is decisive against Mithraic influence on *Or.* 4 in the connection at issue here.
50 Plut. *De Is. et Osir.* 46–7.
51 Gordon, *Mith. Stud.*, 226–7.
52 *Or.* 4.152b.
53 Porph. *De antro* 24–5.
54 R. Turcan, 'Salut Mithriaque et sotériologie néoplatonicienne' in U. Bianchi and M. Vermaseren, eds, *La Soteria dei culti orientali nell' impero romano* (Leiden, 1982) 173–84; 'Le sacrifice Mithriaque', in *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XXVII* (Geneva, 1981); summary in *Mithra et le mithriacisme* (Paris, 1981) ch. VI *passim*: a deeply controversial view (see R. Beck, 'Mithraism since Cumont' *ANRW* II.17.4, 2078ff).

55 Commentary: *Ep.* 2 (12 Bidez). For verbal echoes, see pp. 154, 162.
56 Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 384ff ('Platonic underworld'), noting the Numenian correspondences and divergences; M. Tardieu, 'La Gnose Valentinienne et les *Oracles chaldaïques*', in B. Layton, ed., *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism I: The School of Valentinus* (Leiden, 1980) 194–237, esp. 209ff (the Stoics' 'three fires'). No scholarship on the *Oracles* conjectures any specific doctrinal debt to Mithraism: E. des Places, *Études Platoniciennes* (Leiden, 1981) 368 allows a possibility that *heptaktis* ('seven-rayed') at *OC* 194 may borrow from Mithraic imagery, but even that is unnecessary: it is the obvious image to be adopted in any poetic account of a system in which the planetary gods emanate from a noetic Sun; cf. *OC* 200 with des Places' commentary ad loc. (p. 149). See also at n. 62 below.
57 H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*, 2nd edn, ed. M. Tardieu (Paris, 1978) 137–8.
58 *Ibid.*, 142 nn. 283, 287; cf. 152 n. 317.
59 *Ibid.*, 77; 99; *OC* 49.5 – but dissenting from the view of Lewy (*Chaldaean Oracles*, 158) that Aion is the Supreme God of the *OC* (q.v. Dodds, 'New Light on the Chaldaean Oracles', *HThR* 54 (1961) 226). On the place and role of Aion in the *OC*, R. Majercik, ed. and trans. *Chaldaean Oracles* (Leiden, 1989) 14–16, 162.
60 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 139–44.
61 *Ibid.*, 140; 142; 124. (Proclus, *In Tim.* iii, 132.28.)
62 *OC* 194; J. *Or.* 5.172d: the Mysteries referred to are indisputably those of Neoplatonist theurgy, and the epithet *heptaktis* (see also above at n. 56) has no necessary Mithraic connotation (n.b. that in Mithraic statuary *Sol* is by no means always seven-rayed: see, e.g., *CIMRM*, figs 106, 123, 179): see Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 186 n. 38, 199 n. 97, citing Proclus' attribution of the titles *anagogeus* and *heptaktis* to 'the *theologoi*'. Iamblichan theory took clear account of the Chaldaean *heptaktis* by substituting a noeric hebdomad for one of the three transcendental enneads in the noeric *kosmos*: see H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, eds, Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne*, i, lxvi; Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 133–4.
63 *OC* 49, 73; see Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 139–40.
64 *Ibid.*, 151–5.
65 Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'Contribution to Mithraic theology', 365–6.
66 Corresponding to Proclus (*In Tim.* iii.143), where Aion is associated with the *Dynamis* and assigned to the level of the second Intelligible triad. Beck, *Planetary Orders*, 3 n. 3 tentatively suggests the notion may draw (though not exclusively) on a variant Mithraic doctrine: he admits that there is no evidence for such a doctrine, and its incompatibility with the doctrine for which evidence does exist.
67 Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'Contribution to Mithraic theology', 366; cf. *Or.* 4.136a.
68 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, ch. III, esp. 201–3.
69 *OC* 120; Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 178; 183 n. 27 (Julianic echo).
70 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 186–7.
71 Cumont, *TMMM*, i, 109, 301; Gordon, *Mith. Stud.*, 216.

72 Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'Contribution to Mithraic theology', 369.
73 *Or.* 5.173a.
74 *OC* 24; Lewy, *Chaldaean Oralces*, 108.
75 *Ibid.*, 96–7, 355–8.
76 *Or.* 4.146c; cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 123–4, on a prose work allegedly written by Julian the Chaldaean on the creation of the heavens.
77 Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'Contribution to Mithraic theology', 369.
78 *TMMM*, i, 300–1.
79 Philo, *De decalogo*, 12–54 (Cohen-Wendland).
80 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 123 n. 220.
81 Athanassiadi-Fowden, 'Contribution to Mithraic theology', 370. Against Cumont: Gordon, in *Mith. Stud.*, 220.
82 F. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937) 178–81 (on *Tim.* 49a–50a); 188–91 (on 51be).
83 Plat. *Tim.* 73b–76e.
84 *Ibid.* 41ad. Cf. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 139–41. Thus, at *Rep.* 509b, the Sun, offspring of the Good, is the cause of life, growth and nourishment in the visible world.
85 *OC* 67; Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 117–19.
86 *Ibid.*, 349; *OC* 40 and 80.
87 Sallustius, *DM* 6; Nock, *Sallustius*, xcvi n. 2; Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 349 n. 141.
88 Iambl. *De myst.* 71.4–5.
89 *Or.* 4.134a, 150bd, 154b.
90 *Ibid.*, 155b; see above at Ch. 5, pp. 127–9.
91 W. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion* (Oxford, 1979) 283.
92 G. Wolff, ed., *Porphyrii de phil. ex oraculis haurienda* (Berlin, 1850) 234: for full translation and comment see above, Ch. 4 at pp. 97–9 with nn. 35–8 ad loc.
93 *Or.* 4.153d, 155a.
94 *Or.* 5.161b.
95 *Ibid.*, 159a. For a modern account, M. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion II*, 2nd edn (Munich, 1961) 640–57.
96 *Ibid.*, 166bd, 167cd, 168a.
97 G. Thomas, 'Cybele and Attis', *ANRW* II.17.3, 1518ff.
98 *Or.* 5.175c (fruits); 176bc (fish); 175b (aim of purification).
99 Beck, *Planetary Orders*, 60 n. 151; against which, Turcan, *Mithras Platonicus*, 119–20.
100 I quote Beck, *Planetary Orders*, 60 n. 151; cf. R. Gordon, 'Reality, evocation and boundary in the Mysteries of Mithras', *Journ. Mithr. Stud.* 3 (1980) 32ff, with Aelian, *De nat. anim.* 12.7, Plut. *Mor.* 670c.
101 See Nock, *Sallustius*, lii, with n. 61, discussing differences of emphasis between *Or.* 5 and Sallustius' treatment of the Attis myth in *DM* 4.
102 On the Chaldaean Hecate as a transcendental principle identified with noetic *Dynamis* and on its relation with the Paternal *Nous*, Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 394–5. Julian's Cybele is *pêgê tôn noerôn theôn* (166a; 170d); the Chaldaean Rhea (= Hecate) is *noerôn makarôn pêgê* (*OC* 56), *pêgê tôn pêgôn* (*OC* 30).

103 *Or.* 5.170d; 179cd; cf. *OC* 158.
104 *Or.* 5.172a, 172d; cf. *OC* 190, 194.
105 *Or.* 5.178d; *OC* 129.
106 *Or.* 5.180b.
107 For Turcan's views, see above, n. 54; on astrology as central, Beck, *Planetary Orders*, and his comments in 'Mithraism since Franz Cumont', 2081, 2096ff.
108 I particularize from Nock, *Essays*, 456.
109 *TMMM*, i, 281–2.
110 *Ibid.*, 284–9. For an important modern discussion of the theme and the Near Eastern background, see P. Brunt, discussion-review of R. Fears, *Princeps a Diis Electus*, *JRS* 69 (1979) 168–75; F. Miller, *The Roman Near East, 31* BC–AD 337 (London, 1993) 142, 186–7.
111 *TMMM*, i. 290–2.
112 See above, pp. 139–42.
113 *ILS* gives only two such: 4198 (Gordian); 4234 (Caracalla).
114 D.W. MacDowell, 'Sol Invictus and Mithra: some evidence from the mint at Rome', in U. Bianchi, ed., *Mysteria Mithrae*, 557–69, rightly observes (p. 568) that coins featuring *Sol Invictus* might well be interpreted by Mithraists in the light of their own cultic allegiance. But his attendant implication that Emperors may themselves have intended these coin-issues as covert Mithraic 'propaganda' is highly suspect, both in itself (see my comments on Aurelian's *Sol Invictus* and Mithraism, pp. 128–9, 166) and in the role and purpose it ascribes (p. 557) to the Emperors themselves in connection with the choice and design of imagery on the coinage: for the parameters of the discussion, see A. Wallace-Hadrill, 'Image and authority in the coinage of Augustus', *JRS* 76 (1986) 66–85, esp. 67ff, 84f; C. Howgego, 'Why did ancient states strike coins?', *Numismatic Chronicle* (1990) 1–26.
115 *ILS* 4270; Nock, *CAH*[1] XII, 430.
116 *ILS* 659: on the immediate political context, T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) 30–2.
117 M. Simon, 'Mithra et les empereurs', in U. Bianchi, ed., *Mysteria Mithrae* (Leiden, 1979) 414ff.
118 *Ep.* 21 (60 Bidez) 738d.
119 See the rightly sceptical accounts of R. MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1981) 83–94 and of H. Seyrig, 'Le Culte du soleil en Syrie à l'époque romaine', *Syria* 48 (1971) 337–73 and Millar, *Roman Near East*, 186–7.
120 MacMullen, *Paganism*, 85–6, 94, 102–5, is sceptical here also, stressing the limited efficiency of imperial patronage of cults. But to promote a given cult can imply something less than an attempt to impose *uniformity* in cult worship.
121 Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change*, 82–5. It was this temple of Apollo which was destroyed by fire in March 363 (Amm. Marc. 23.3.3). For honours paid to *Sol* by Augustus, G. Halsberghe, *The Cult of Sol Invictus* (Leiden, 1972) 29–31; on the Caesarian background, S. Weinstock, *Divus Julius* (Oxford, 1971) 381–4.
122 See above at Ch. 5, p. 129 with n. 70.

123 On the site of the temple, see S. B. Platner and T. Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (London, 1929) 324f.

124 Well observed in R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth, 1986) 593.

125 On the solar imagery of the Tetrarchs and Second Flavians, see above at Ch. 5, n. 80. N.b. that Aurelian's college of *Pontifices Solis* was still in existence in 384: *ILS* 1259.

126 Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change*, 281, 285–9.

127 *Or.* 4.131d; 156bc; 157ab.

128 *Ibid.*, 155b.

129 See the characterization of Nock in *Essays*, 452–8.

130 For a (possible) exception to the exclusion of females, G. Mussies, 'Cascelia's Prayer', in Bianchi, ed., *Mysteria Mithrae*, 156–7.

131 Turcan, *Mithra et le Mithriacisme*, 104ff, presents Mithraic sacrifice as an enactment of the tauroctony, performed not as an offering to the god but directly in the interest of men and the other created beings in their struggle against the enemies of light; on Mithraic priesthood, R. Gordon, 'Religion in the Roman Empire: the civic compromise and its limits', in M. Beard and J. North, eds, *Pagan Priests: Religion and Power in the Ancient World* (London, 1990) 235–55, at 250ff.

132 M. Simon, 'Mithra et les empereurs', 422–5.

133 The increasing preoccupation of the Emperors with Persia in the 3rd cent. and the far-reaching political and cultural consequences for their subjects in the Eastern territories is a leading theme throughout in Millar, *Roman Near East*: see, e.g., 142ff, 156ff, 175, 205ff, 219ff.

134 *Mos. et Rom. Leg. Collatio* XV.3.4.; cf. Euseb. *HE.* 7. 31; and compare the tone of legislation against magic discussed in H. Chadwick, *Priscillian of Avila* (Oxford, 1976) 53ff, 140. On the edict as 'a symptom of the increasingly rigid barrier of the governing class between "Rome" and "Persia"', P. Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of St Augustine* (London, 1972) 106ff; and on the cultural setting of Manichaeism (not in fact Persian, rather Aramaic), Millar, *Roman Near East*, 499–503.

135 Amm. Marc. 23.5.19–21; Lib. *Or.* 18.164. Cf J. *Ep.* 57 (202 Bidez), probably an early forgery: 'the Persian madness'.

136 Lib. *Or.* 15.16; cf. 1 (Alexander); 25 (Hellenes as opponents of proud, bestial, murderous, merciless barbarians).

137 *Caes.* 316bd; 323d–325a (Alexander); 329a (Constantine).

138 *AE* (1969/70) 631 (discussion of date in J. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (London, 1978) App. II); cf. *ILS* 751, the Pergamene *piissimo imperatori . . . victoriosissimo Augusto.*

139 Amm. Marc. 22.9.5–8. Lib. *Or.* 12.87. Cf. Iamblichus' celebration (in private) of the heliacal rising of Sirius: Eunap. *VS* 458/366W.

140 Amm. Marc. 23.3.7.

141 *Ibid.*, 22.14.4; Lib. *Or.* 18.172.

142 *Ep.* 58 (98 Bidez) 399d.

143 *CG* 193c–194d. Cf. *Misopogon*, 357c, 361d. On the eagle in J.'s coinage, Gilliard, 'Notes on the coinage of Julian the Apostate', *JRS* 54 (1964) 138ff.

144 *Or.* 4.153d.

145 Amm. Marc. 22.12.8ff (Daphne); Soz. 5.20.7 (Didyma).
146 *Ep.* 18 (88 Bidez) 4516; in which connection n.b. *SIG* ii.[3], 906a, honouring Julian from 'the metropolis of Miletus which tends the Didyman Apollo'; see H. Parke, *The Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor* (London, 1985) 110–11.
147 Philostorgius 7.15, much discussed in connection with the poem *Eipate tôi basilei*, to be linked to Delphi rather than Antiochene Daphne: see H. Parke,'Castalia', *BCH* 102 (1978) 199–219; for this poem and its setting, see p. 224, with n. 31 ad loc. for bibliography.
148 Amm. Marc. 22.12.6–7; 14.3. On the corn shortage of 362/3 and the predominance of Christians in the city by this time, J. Liebeschuetz, *Antioch: City and Administration in the Later Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1972) 128–32, 224–5.
149 Lib. *Or.* 12.87–91: a speech commissioned by J. for delivery in his presence on his entry upon his fourth consulship, 1 Jan. 363.
150 *Ibid.*, 79.
151 *Ibid.*
152 Dio Chrys. *Or.* 2.74, 77.
153 F. Dvornik, 'The Emperor Julian's "Reactionary" Views on Kingship', in *Studies in hon. A.M. Friend* (Princeton, 1955) 71–81; with the comments of O. Murray, *JThS* 19 (1968) 677.
154 *Ep.* 42 (81 Bidez) 388c–389a.
155 *Ep.* 22 (84a Bidez) 429c; 430d–431c.
156 *Or.* 5.159c, 161a.
157 *Ibid.*, 180b.
158 Female tauroboliates: *ILS* 1260, 4155–7. Roman priestess of Magna Mater: *ILS* 4161.
159 A.D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford, 1933) 132–3; *CAH*[1] XII, 431, on basis of treatment of epigraphic evidence in J. Toutain, *Les Cultes païens*, vol. ii. MacMullen, *Paganism*, 116–19 properly emphasizes distortions implicit in the epigraphic evidence; but his suggestions that Mithraism cannot be said to have peculiar appeal for soldiers, or to have excluded women (pp. 202 n. 23, 203 n. 24) do not convince: accuracy on the relative proportion of soldiers to other Mithraists may be impossible, but it surely remains significant that 38 per cent of the Mithraic dedicators whose status is known were soldiers: see R. Gordon, 'Mithraism and Roman society', *Religion* 2 (1972) 103.
160 Nock, *Conversion*, 131–3; *CAH*[1] XII 423–5; J.-J. Hatt, 'Divinités orientales et dieux gaulois', in *Paganisme, Judaisme, Christianisme. Mélanges offerts à Marcel Simon* (Paris, 1978) 277–86. For the prominence of Roman citizens among Metroac devotees in the Balkans, as against devotees of other 'oriental' cults, MacMullen, *Paganism*, 200 n. 13.
161 *ILS* 4131 (Lyon); 4174 (Cumae); 4175 (Baiae).
162 See Ch. 5 at nn. 4 and 5.
163 *ILS* 4142; cf. 4103, a sacrifice *pro salute . . . Augg. et Caess.* by a senator at Tomi.
164 *ILS* 4143–5.

165 *CCCA* III.239; Greek inscription discussed in Rose, *JHS* 43 (1923) 194ff, 45 (1925) 180ff; M. Guarducci, 'L'interruzione dei culti nel' Phrygianum,' in Bianchi and Vermaseren, eds, *La Soteria dei culti orientali*, 109–21.

166 *ILS* 4147–54; cf. 1259, 1260, 1264: with additional persons in Bloch, *HThR* 38 (1945) 199–244.

167 *ILS* 1259.

168 H. Bloch, 'The pagan revival in the West at the end of the fourth century', in A. Momigliano, *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century* (Oxford, 1963) 203, note 9 of 19 *tauroboliati* as Mithraists; of these, three (including Praetextatus) were also *Pontifices Solis*. Two other *Pontifices Solis* are not attested as Mithraists: but n.b. J. Matthews, 'Symmachus and the oriental cults', *JRS* 63 (1973) 194 on the problems in interpretation of the epigraphic testimonies.

169 *ILS* 4267–8, recording a series of initiations performed by Nonius Victor Olympius and his son, both Fathers.

170 Thus Nock, 'Early gentile Christianity and its Hellenistic background,' *Essays*, 102 n. 233.

171 Though one cannot properly compare the Mithraic dedications in *ILS* 4267–8, since they record persons officiating at, rather than receiving, initiations: Matthews, 'Symmachus', 183.

172 Bloch, in Momigliano, ed., *Conflict*, 192–218; Matthews, 'Symmachus', 175–95 questions the contrast drawn between oriental cults and state cults. For a sceptical view (which I share) of the wider notion of a later 4th cent. 'pagan revival' in the West, A. Cameron, 'Paganism and Literature in late 4th cent. Rome', in *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XXIII* (Geneva, 1977) 1–40.

173 On Gratian's measures, see J. Matthews, *Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court* A.D. 364–425 (Oxford, 1975) 204. The effect on the Palatine cult of Magna Mater is unclear: the law of 415 (*Cod. Theod.* XVI.10.20.2) depriving the *dendrophoroi* of their property seems to imply that it had continued till then to receive some state funds.

174 Matthews, 'Symmachus', 194–5.

175 Zosimus 4.3.2–3.

176 Matthews, *Western Aristocracies*, 240–3. The notion that Flavianus was a *tauroboliatus* derives from the *Carmen contra paganos*, but it is plausible.

177 *ILS* 4131; cf. MacMullen, *Paganism*, 104, noting Lyon and other attested recipients of the cult as colonies.

178 H. Graillot, *Le Culte de Cybèle* (Paris, 1912) 168, on the development of *taurobolia* held after public festivals. The addition of *Initium Caiani* in the *Calendar of Philocalus* – on which see now M.R. Salzman, *On Roman Time* (Berkeley, 1990) – implies a connection in ritual by this period: Nock, *Conversion*, 68, with n. at 284.

179 On the Metroac contorniates, R. Turcan, *Numismatique romaine du culte métroaque* (Leiden, 1983) 51–64.

180 *Ibid.*, 56–7.

181 *Ibid.*, 59–60, 65. For minimalist interpretation, see Salzman, *On Roman Time*, 193–231, 234–5.
182 Alföldi argued that they were struck in the 350s by the Praef. Urbis Vitrasius Orfitus (see Bloch, in Momigliano, ed., *Conflict*, 202 n. 2) around the time Constantius visited Rome. The same Orfitus made a dedication to Julian *Nobilissimo ac fortissimo Caes.* (*CIL* VI.1168).
183 N.b. the qualification in Matthews, 'Symmachus', 195.
184 *Carmen contra paganos* in Riese, *Anth. Lat.*, I.4, 20–5; *Carmen ad senatorem* (a work of uncertain date; likely enough connected with Flavianus' restoration) in Ps.-Cyprian, *CSEL* 3.3 302ff. For other 4th-cent. Christian attacks on Metroac worship, see Prudentius, *Peristephanon*, X.1013ff and the *Ambrosiaster* (Ps.-Augustine, *CSEL* 50). For helpful selections in translation from these texts, see B. Croke and J. Harries, *Religious Conflict in Fourth Century Rome* (Sydney, 1982) 74ff, documents 50, 51, 54 and 56.
185 Firmicus, *De errore*, 3.1–4; 18.1; 27.1; plea for persecution, 29; cf. 16.4.
186 Zosimus 5.38.3. The date of the episode is problematic: for the best argument, see F. Paschoud, ed., *Zosime*, vol. III.i, the note at pp. 263–6.
187 K. Harl, 'Sacrifice and pagan belief in 5th and 6th century Byzantium', *Past and Present*, 128 (1990) 7–27.
188 On Byzas and Rhea, G. Dagron, *Constantinople imaginaire* (Paris, 1984) 68; for Rhea as patron deity and Constantine's temples in the *Tetrastôon*, see Zosimus 2.31.2–3 with G. Dagron, *Naissance d'une capitale: Constantinople et ses institutions de 330 à 451* (Paris, 1974) 368, 373.
189 *AE* (1973) 235 (a title of a kind formerly supposed unique to Julian and the 4th cent.: see also Ch. 7 at n. 134.

7 THE APOSTATE AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS

1 Aug. *CD* 5.21.
2 On the general issue, see P. Frederiksen, 'Paul and Augustine: conversion narratives, orthodox traditions and the retrospective self', *JThS* 37 (1986) 1–34, esp. 20–6, 33–4, with P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (London, 1967) 113.
3 See, e.g., S. Katz, 'Language, epistemology and mysticism', in S. Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (London, 1978) 22–74.
4 R. MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1984) 71.
5 I quote G. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (London, 1978) 84–5; contrast J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930) 291ff, R. Browning, *The Emperor Julian* (London, 1976) 182–5.
6 *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez) 423a.
7 *CG* 39a.
8 A.D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford, 1933) 14; 185, 218–19.
9 *Ibid.*, 157–8, 185; cf. his remarks in 'Conversion and adolescence', *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972), 476.
10 MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 4, with J. North, *JRS* 66 (1976) 239–40.

11 The complaint: Macmullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 57, where the strength Nock intended the term to bear is surely the issue: it is an argument about terms. Cf. J. North 'Development of religious pluralism', in J. Lieu, J. North and T. Rajak, eds, *Jews among Pagans and Christians* (London, 1992) 175f.
12 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 27.
13 T.D. Barnes, *Athanasius and Constantius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993) 155–8 for discussion of context.
14 *Ep.* 47 (111 Bidez) 434cd.
15 With Baynes, 'The early life of Julian the Apostate', *JHS* 45 (1925) 252 and Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 22, I date J.'s birth to 331, making his '20th year' 350/1. For a different view (birth in 332) see F. Gilliard, 'The birth-date of Julian the Apostate', *California Stud. in Class. Antiquity* 4 (1971)147; *PLRE* i, 477.
16 Lib. *Or.* 13.11–12.
17 Nock, *Conversion*, 157 conjectured an oracle touching on the devotion of the Second Flavians to the Sun, Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 31 a theurgist cell.
18 The once-conventional view that the exile ran from 344/5 to 350/1 cannot stand: see A.F. Norman, *Libanius*, Loeb, vol. i (1969) ix, n. a. We know from Libanius himself that J.'s stay at Nicomedia coincided with his own, and that Libanius left the city to reside at the capital in 349: to allow for J.'s presence and indirect contact with Libanius (Lib. *Or.* 18.13) at Nicomedia that year, his six-year exile must be dated to 342–8.
19 Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.23–6.
20 Eunap. *VS* 473/428W.
21 Amm. Marc. 22.5.1.
22 *Or.* 4.131a.
23 *Or.* 5.174c
24 *Or.* 4.130cd.
25 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 22–3, 25.
26 See above, Ch. 5, p. 133.
27 See above, Ch. 3, pp. 55ff.
28 J. Moles, 'Career and conversion of Dio Chrysostom', *JHS* 98 (1978) 79–100, is radically sceptical; C.P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) 44–52 is readier to treat the story of Dio's conversion as a later invention of Synesius, but assumes that philosophic study had preceded it (against which, J. Kindstrand, 'The date of Dio of Prusa's Alexandrian oration', *Historia* 27 (1978) 378–83.
29 J. cites Dio by name at *Or.* 7.212b, alluding to Dio, *Or.* 4.12f. R. Asmus, *Julian und Dio Chrysostomus* (Berlin, 1895) first noted parallels; L. François, 'Julien et Dion Chrysostome', *REG* 28 (1915) 417–39 developed the case for a literary debt on J.'s part to Dio's *Kingship Orations*. See now J. Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien et la culture de son temps* (Paris, 1992) 293; A. Marcone, 'Un panegirico rovesciato: pluralità di modelli e contaminazione letteraria nel "*Misopogon*" giulianeo', *REAug.* 30 (1984) 226–39, proposing a debt to Dio, *Or.* 32.
30 *Or.* 7.235b: for Maximus as the referent, see Ch. 2, n. 108 above.

31 Eunap. VS. 475/434W.
32 Chrysanthius, the teacher and long-time friend of Eunapius: see Eunap. VS 500/538W.
33 *Caes.* 336ab.
34 *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 270cd; 271bc; cf. *Or.* 7.228bc, 230a. On the murder of Julian's relatives in 337, see most recently M. di Maio and W.H. Arnold, 'Murder and ecclesiastical politics', *Byzantion* 62 (1992) 158ff.
35 *Ep.* 21 (60 Bidez) 379c. On George's career and death, Amm. Marc. 22.11.5f. Whether he was killed by pagans or by Athanasian Christians is debated: Barnes, *Athanasius and Constantius*, 155.
36 S. Katz, ed., *Mysticism*, above, n. 3.
37 A possibility granted by Nock, 'Conversion and adolescence', *Essays*, 476; but in the context of a paper which played down the role of adolescent anxieties as a factor in antique conversion in general.
38 A concern felt by Constantius on this score has been suspected on the strength of the fact that at Nicomedia Julian was forbidden to attend the lectures of the pagan Libanius (Lib. *Or.* 18.13–15): but Libanius says plainly that it was Hecebolius, a sophist with whom he had a long feud, who made Julian swear to keep away, and the likelihood is that the motivation behind the ban was professional jealousy. The notion that Libanius' paganism was the issue derives from a Christian reading of the Libanian passage by Socrates Scholasticus (*HE* 3.1).
39 Nock, *Conversion*, ch. X, esp. pp. 173–4, 185.
40 On intellectual apostasy, G. Bardy, *La Conversion au christianisme durant les premiers siècles* (Paris, 1947) 329–39. The only figures we can adduce with relevance are (i) the Cynic Peregrinus (P. de Labriolle, *La Réaction païenne: Étude sur la polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe siècle* (Paris, 1934) 110–17); (ii) Ammonius Saccas, said by Porph. ap. Euseb. *HE* 6.19.7 to have abandoned Christianity 'when he began to think philosophically' (see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977) 380–2); and (iii) the unnamed senator reviled for 'having turned from the Christian religion to be the slave of idols' by the author of the *Carmen contra paganos*. In none of these cases is there reliable evidence for the motivation. Socrates Scholasticus, *HE* 3.23.37 made Porphyry an apostate and drew the parallel with Julian, but the claim is highly suspect: as de Labriolle (*Réaction païenne*, 231) notes, Augustine never hints that Porphyry had been a Christian in youth. For evidence of other mid- to late 4th-cent. 'converts' to paganism, MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 144 n. 28.
41 R.T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London 1972) 104–8; see also J. Rist, *Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1967) 231ff. 'Irrationalist manifesto': E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951) 287.
42 J. Bregman, *Synesius of Cyrene: Philosopher-Bishop* (Berkeley, 1982), respects Nock's basic distinction (36–7) and makes Synesius a 'philosophic' convert; but n.b. 10–12, 179–83, arguing that on central points at issue – the Trinity, baptism, theory of Soul – Synesius as a bishop remained significantly indebted to the *Chaldaean Oracles*.
43 *Ep.* 55(90 Bidez).

44 Lib. *Or.* 18.178–9.

45 *CG*, Loeb, vol. iii, following Neumann, ed., *Juliani Imperatoris librorum contra Christianos quae supersunt* (Leipzig, 1880) ch. III, rearranges the fragments in a rough coherent order which I have accepted in its basics: the recent edition of E. Masaracchia, *Giuliano Imperatore Contro i Galilei* (Rome/Athens, 1991), returns to a fragmentary presentation. A few (short) fragments from the *CG* have lately been discerned in a slightly earlier Christian source: A. Guida, 'Frammenti inediti del *Contro i Galilei* e della replica di Theodoro di Mopsuesta', *Prometheus* 9 (1983) 139–63. It is assumed that Cyril's refutation was planned in 30 books, 10 to answer each of Julian's 3, but almost nothing survives of books 20–30 and the work was possibly never finished: de Labriolle, *Réaction païenne*, 396–7; W. J. Malley, *Hellenism and Christianity* (Rome, 1978) 239–40, 244 n. 33; J. Quasten, *Patrologia* III (Utrecht/Antwerp, 1963) 129 (sceptical on the 30-book plan).

46 Lib. *Or.* 18.178.

47 *CG* 39a.

48 *Or.* 6.203c; Lib. *Or.* 18.157.

49 Lib. *Or.* 18.178.

50 Cyril Alex., *Contra Julianum* (*PG* 76) 508ab; 508c12–508d1.

51 R. Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them* (New Haven, 1984), 197; Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 169.

52 Thus Browning, *Emperor Julian*, 175.

53 See F. Millar, 'Jews of the Graeco-Roman diaspora between paganism and Christianity, AD 312–438', in S. Lieu, J. North and T. Rajak, eds, *Jews Among Pagans and Christians* (London, 1992) 106–8.

54 *Epp.* 23 (107 Bidez), 38 (106 Bidez): the collection included works of pagan philosophy and 'many books on the teachings of the Galilaeans', possibly Origen's and Eusebius' refutations of Celsus and Porphyry among them. On the question of direct reading of Porphyry and/or Celsus by J., see Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien*, 379ff and Appendix III.

55 A. Meredith, 'Porphyry and Julian against the Christians', *ANRW* II. 23.2 1138–47.

56 *emphytos/koina ennoia*; Dio. Chrys. *Or.*12.27; A.D. Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge, 1926) xli; Iambl. *De myst.* i.3. In polemic, Celsus ap. Origen, *C. Celsum*, iv.14; vii.44; viii.38 (Origen granting the point).

57 Meredith, 'Porphyry and Julian against the Christians', 1141, citing Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.102; Celsus ap. Origen, *C. Celsum*, viii. 38 *et al.*

58 Meredith, 'Porphyry and Julian against the Christians', 1141.

59 Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 105–7; but n.b. also 121–2 (ambivalence of Iamblichus' *De myst.*); q.v. A. Smith, 'Iamblichus' views on the relationship of philosophy to religion in *De Mysteriis*', in H. Blumenthal and E. Clarke, eds, *The Divine Iamblichus: Philosopher and Man of Gods* (London, 1993) 74–86, esp. 79ff.

60 Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 104, 107, 120–1. On theurgy as a 'routinization of grace', see G. Shaw, 'The geometry of grace', in Blumenthal and Clark, eds, *The Divine Iamblichus*, 116–37, at 120–5. On the Neoplatonists' basic acceptance of philosophic knowledge of divinity as ultimately

limited, n.b. esp. A.C. Lloyd, *The Anatomy of Neoplatonism* (Oxford, 1990), at 126–7: 'The personal experience is needed to complement the non-empirical philosophical system ... but the content of personal experience cannot be derived from the Neoplatonists' philosophical system. It is an unpredictable gift from their gods.'

61 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 295c; *Ep.* 51 (204 Bidez) 398; Amm. Marc. 23.1.2–3. On the chronology of the episode, Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 120–2; S. Brock, 'The rebuilding of the Temple under Julian: a new source', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 108 (1976) 103–7 and *BSOAS* (1977) 267ff; F. Blanchetière, 'Julien philhelléne, philosémite, antichrétien', *Journ. Jewish Studies* 33 (1980) 62ff; and on the import of *CG* 305d–306a, Millar, 'Jews of the Graeco-Roman diaspora'. See also pp. 216f with n. 175.

62 *CG* 168b; 160e-161c; 106de.

63 Celsus ap. Origen, *C. Celsum*, viii.21: good discussion on the issue of antique religious tolerance and intolerance, pagan and Christian, in A.H. Armstrong '"The Way and the Ways": religious tolerance and intolerance in the 4th century AD', *Vigiliae Christinae* 38 (1984) 1–17.

64 *Epp.* 39 (54 Bidez) (*deisidaimonia*), 20 (81a Bidez) 453b (*kainotomia*): cf. Plotinus *Enn.* II.9.6.11, using *kainotomein* to refer to Gnostic doctrine, and polemical use of the term in Christian discourse, e.g. Basil, *Ep.* 175 (i.112 Courtonne); Clement, *Strom.* 7.17.

65 *CG* 96ce; 49a-66a.

66 Cels. ap Origen, *C. Celsum*, vi.61; 64.

67 *Ibid.*, iv.7; vi.78. Porphyry, *Against the Christians*, fr. 81 (von Harnack); Porph. ap. Aug. *CD* 10.32.5–11 (failure of Christianity to provide a 'universal way of salvation'): see Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 92, 10, 316, and for a cautious view of the scope of the notion in Porphyry, G. Fowden, *From Commonwealth to Empire* (Princeton, 1993), 39.

68 L. Robert, *Hellenica* 6 (1948) 108–11 citing *boêthos* of Artemis Anaitis (120 AD); *parastatês kai boêthos* of Zeus Sabazius in a letter of Attalus III, and of Zeus Megistos (AD 114); *hêlie boêtheson* in a graffito in the temple of Memnon at Abydos. See also Marcus, *Medit.* 9.27: 'The gods ... lend aid (*boêthousi*) through dreams and prophecies'; and more generally 1.17 (Marcus' view of the gods as constant benefactors throughout his life).

69 Euseb. *Contra Hieroclem*, 11 (appended in the Loeb edn of Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, vol. ii, pp. 512ff.). On Sossianus Hierocles, *praefectus Aegypti* in 307, *PLRE* i, s.v. Hierocles 4.

70 Celsus ap. Origen *C. Celsum*, v.25.

71 *Ep.* 20 (81a Bidez) 453b.

72 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 302bc.

73 *Ep.* 47 (111 Bidez) 432d; 434bd.

74 *Or.* 7.224bc; cf. *Or.*6.193d. See above at Ch. 3, pp. 83–5.

75 Socrates Scholasticus 3.12.7, cited in *ELF* under *Ep.* 62(d); frr. 6 and 7 in Loeb, vol. iii, 229.

76 *ELF* 62(b) (= *Cod. Theod.* 13.3.5).

77 *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez) 422a.

78 *Ibid.*, 423ad (abbreviated).
79 *Ibid.*, 424a.
80 Eusebius and George as directors of J.'s studies: Amm. Marc. 22.9.4; *Epp.* 23; 38 (107, 106 Bidez). Prohaeresius: *Ep.* 14 (31 Bidez). Basil: *Ep.* 26 (32 Bidez).
81 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 302bc.
82 For a very different emphasis, cf. Fowden, *From Commonwealth to Empire*, 52ff.
83 *Ep.* 20 (89a Bidez) 433d–454a; cf. *CG* 354b. (*Ep.* 51 (204 Bidez) 'to the *koinon* of the Jews' cannot be accepted as authentic.)
84 *CG* 454ab.
85 Cyril Alex. *C. Julianum* (*PG* 76) 984a12–b4; noted in Malley, *Hellenism and Christianity*, 347.
86 Epictetus, *Diss.* 4.7.6. (the quirk is noted by Greg. Naz. in *Or.* 4.) For a suggestion that J. seeks to transform religious into ethnic opposition, see S. Scicolone, 'L'accezioni dell'appellativo *Galilei* in Giuliano', *Aevum* 56 (1982) 71.
87 Marcus, *Medit.* 1.17.
88 For unfavourable comparisons making Jesus an inferior or fraudulent sorcerer, see Lactantius, *DI* 5.3 (Hierocles' charge) and Celsus ap. Origen, *C. Celsum* ii.49.
89 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 298d.
90 *Ep.* 47 (111 Bidez) 434b.
91 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 296b.
92 P. Brown, *The Cult of Saints* (Chicago, 1981) 4–6, citing Artemidorus *Oneirocrit.* 1.51.
93 *Ep.* 56 (136b Bidez): the ancient custom promoted was apparently Athenian in origin, and had not been enforced in the Roman law code (Nock, 'Tomb violations and pontifical law', *Essays*, ii, 528–30). See above, Ch. 4 at pp. 111–12.
94 *Ep.* 29 (80 Bidez), p. 98 in Loeb; cf. Zonaras 13.12, for the restoration of columns at the Asclepeium at Aegae.
95 Amm. Marc. 22.12.8.
96 *Misopog.* 361a; 357c (Emesa).
97 *CG* 351d; 358de.
98 Well noted by A.-J. Festugière, *Antioche païenne et chrétienne* (Paris, 1959) 70.
99 Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 169.
100 For the development of a Stoicizing 'religion of the universe' on the basis of the account given in the *Timaeus* of the creator of the world, see above all A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, vol.ii (Paris, 1949), 'Le Dieu Cosmique', 194. On the pervasive influence of the account on later Platonists, popularizing and scholastic, Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, e.g. 157–9 (Philo), 206–8 (Plutarch), 285–7 (Albinus), 315–7 (Apuleius). The *Timaeus* of course remained a central text for Plotinus and in the school curriculum devised by Iamblichus: see Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 19.
101 Meredith, 'Porphyry and Julian against the Christians', 1147.

102 T.D. Barnes, 'Porphyry, Against the Christians: date and the attribution of fragments', *JThS* 24 (1973) 424–42 grants the authenticity of only 46 of the 97 fragments offered by Harnack.

103 Barnes, *ibid.*, urges the late date against c. 270 (proposed by Harnack on the basis of Euseb. *HE* vi.19.2): but see the well-argued defence of the earlier date in B. Croke, 'Era of Porphyry's anti-Christian polemic', *Journ. Relig. Hist.* 13 (1984) 1–15. H. Chadwick, *Sentences of Sextus*, Texts and Studies, 5 (Cambridge, 1959), 66 suggests composition by imperial request on basis of Porphyry's journey 'for the need of the Greeks' (Porph. *Ad Marcellam* 4).

104 Meredith, 'Porphyry and Julian against the Christians', 1129, citing Porph. *Ad Marcellam* 18.

105 R. Wilken, *Christians as the Romans Saw Them*, 136, 148–56, 158, on the basis of a late date for the *Phil. ex Orac.*, which he characterizes as an emphatically anti-Christian work. Its date remains highly problematic, however: Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, 99 n. 1. Iamblichan Neoplatonists like Julian, of course, found philosophic justification for sacrifice: see Nock, *Sallustius*, lxxxiii–lxxxv, on *DM* 15–16.

106 Porph. ap. Euseb. *Demonst. Evang.* 3, 6.39–7.1 attributes this friendly judgement to the pagan gods: cf. Aug. *CD* 19.23 (both cited in Wolff, *Porphyrii de phil. ex oraculis* (Berlin, 1856) 180ff); see also de Labriolle, *Réaction païenne*, 231ff, esp. 236: but n.b. that such an attitude towards Christ is compatible with criticism of Christian religion for its failure to provide the 'universal way' in which Porphyry was interested (see above, n. 67).

107 On Celsus' defence of cult, H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (Oxford, 1966) 28–30; Wilken, *The Early Christians as the Romans Saw Them*, 122–5.

108 Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.103, in response to J., distinguishes two senses of 'Hellenism': (i) use of Greek language; (ii) commitment to culture and religion. For discussion, G.W. Bowersock, *Hellenism in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1990) 6–13.

109 P. Brown, *World of Late Antiquity* (London, 1971) 93, echoing *Or.* 5.180b (Christianity 'a stain of impiety', *atheotêtos kêlida*). The Latin equivalent *contagio* is used similarly of Christians in Pliny, *Ep.* 10.96.9, and Christians in turn applied it to pagans (*ILS* 705 = F. Abbot and A.C. Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton, 1926), no. 155, lines 46–7: the Hispellum edict), and also to Christian heretics and astrologers (*Cod. Theod.* 16.5.62).

110 *Or.* 7.234c; *Ep. ad SPQ Ath.* 284c; *Ep.* 8 (26 Bidez) 415cd.

111 Amm. Marc. 22.5.2; Bidez, *Vie*, 227–8.

112 Bidez, *Vie*, 263–6.

113 *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez) 424a.

114 Bidez, *Vie*, 286–9, 291–8.

115 Theodoret, *HE* 3.12.4: the church inaugurated at Antioch by Constantius.

116 Lib. *Or.* 18.168 (bribes); Amm. Marc. 22.11.2 (two soldiers executed, probably Christian: but conspiracy is probably a factor).

117 *ELF* 50: Christians excluded from the imperial Guard and governorships of provinces, according to later ecclesiastical historians. See also Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 92 with n. 38, noting a law of 17 Jan. 363 (not in *ELF*) by which Christians were arguably excluded from legal profession at Rome.

118 *Ep.* 56 (136b Bidez): not specifically directed against Christians, but prompted by a strict view of pagan purificatory ritual.

119 *ELF* 151 (= Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.76).

120 *Misopogon*, 367c (Emesa); Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.93 (Gaza).

121 Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 84–5. Bidez's account of a turnabout in basic policy is retained by Browning, *Emperor Julian*, 168–9, 180–2; R. Braun, 'Julien et le Christianisme', in R. Braun and J. Richer, eds, *L'Empereur Julien: de l'histoire à la légende* (Paris, 1978) 169–72. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism*, 128 implies a coherent policy proceeding by stages, but her account of the heart of that policy is unacceptable: it proposes that until the autumn of 362 – after the education law, that is – J. wished 'to inaugurate a reign in which gifted men of whatever creed would be honoured and respected' (p.120).

122 Lib. *Or.* 18.157.

123 *Or.* 7.228bd.

124 *Ibid.*, 230b.

125 *Ibid.*, 210c, 224b–225a: see above, Ch. 3, pp. 82–5.

126 *Or.* 5.180b.

127 *Ep.* 37 (83 Bidez).

128 On the issue of the army, predominantly pagan through the 4th cent. but largely unmoved by religious conflict, see MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 44–7, 138–9 (esp. nn. 6, 19, citing the important work of R. von Haehling, *Die Religionszugehörigkeit der hohen Amtsträger des römischen Reiches* (Bonn, 1978) 505ff).

129 Agilo and Arbitio (cos. 355): on the rationale of their appointments, see Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 67–8, with J. Kent, *Roman Imperial Coinage* VIII (London, 1981), 45–6: change of legend on J.'s coinage from VIRTUS EXERCITUS GALL to VIRTUS EXERCITUS ROMANI reflecting the need to placate the Constantian legions and their officers. N.b. also MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 47, implying that in respect to key army posts, J. realistically put expertise above religion.

130 I quote P. Brown, *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, 1982) 94–5. T.D. Barnes, 'Christians and pagans in the reign of Constantius', in *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XXXIV, L'Église et l'Empire au IVe Siècle* (Geneva, 1989) 301ff argues for strongly pro-Christian action in the appointment of high officials under Constantius, and a 'more restrictive policy' in the West in the mid-350s (p. 332).

131 Amm. Marc. 22.5.4. In this particular the policy *was* to shift in the case of Athanasius (acknowledged in Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 90–1).

132 Bidez, *Vie*, 228–9.

133 I cite titles from inscriptions from: i) Baalbek: No. 106 in J. Arce, *Estudios sobre el Emperador Fl. Cl. Iuliano* (Madrid, 1984) (cf. *ibid.*, 110) *re]creatori [sacrorum et] exstincto[ri.* After *exstinctori* Arce restores

barbarorum (cf. *AE* (1969/70) 631); Nock, *Sallustius*, ciii n. 19 thought *superstitionis*, not impossibly. (ii) Mursa, Pannonia: *ILS* 946: *bono r(ei) p(ublicae) nato d(omino) n(ostro) Fl. Cl. Iuliano [princip]um max(imo) triumf(atori) semp(er) Aug(usto) ob deleta vitia temporum preteri[torum*. (iii) Numidia: *ILS* 752: *restitutori libertatis et r(omanae) religionis*.

134 Decius: *AE* (1973) 235, *restitutor sacrorum*. Julian: *AE* (1969/70) 631, *templorum [re]stauratori*. Care is needed with the interpretation of the Decian inscription: found in a temple at Cosa in Etruria, it may have local rather than general significance (Decius' wife had Etruscan connections): R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth, 1986) 453.

135 On Constantine's spending, MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 49ff; Eusebius, *V. Const.* 3.5.8.

136 R. MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1981) 136.

137 Brown, *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity*, 97–8.

138 The decree has not survived. Texts in *ELF* 42, esp. *Hist. Acephala*, 9 (cf. Amm. Marc. 22.5.2). J.'s modern biographers give this measure less prominence than it merits: compare J. Geffcken, *The Last Days of Greco-Roman Paganism*, trans. J. MacCormack (Amsterdam, 1978) 141, 145.

139 *ELF* 149 (= *Cod. Theod.* 15.1.3).

140 *ELF* 47d (= *Cod. Theod.* 12.1.50); Ep. 41 (114 Bidez) 437a.

141 See above at Ch. 2, pp. 42ff.

142 Lib. *Or.* 2.30. For examples of cult distributions to the needy and general feasts, MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, 143 n.9; *Paganism in the Roman Empire*, 47–8, 167 n.20.

143 *Letter to a Priest* (89b Bidez) 289b.

144 *Ibid.*, 305cd. On the crucial importance of Constantine's financial support in this connection, see items above at nn. 135–7.

145 *Ep.* 22 (89a Bidez) 430b–431b. N.b. also Soz. 5.15 (J. setting up a relief system for widows).

146 Theodoret, *HE* 4.4.1.

147 Amm. Marc. 22.10.7; 25.4.20.

148 Bidez, *Vie*, 265.

149 Braun, 'Julien et le christianisme', 169.

150 *ELF* 61b = *Cod. Theod.* 13.3.5.

151 *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez).

152 The key theme in Averil Cameron's *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire* (Berkeley, 1991): see esp. 130–5.

153 Brown, *World of Late Antiquity*, 93, allowing for 'barbarian' ramification surviving among the lower classes.

154 *Ep.* 36 (61c Bidez) 424a.

155 E.g. Browning, *Emperor Julian*, 172–4.

156 P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity* (Madison, 1992), ch. 2 *passim*, an important demonstration of an important truth: see also above Ch. 2 p. 46.

157 *Misopogon*, 367d. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 95–6 sees a hint that J. had intended to make Antioch his capital.
158 Amm. Marc. 23.2.5.
159 *Misopogon*, 370c.
160 *Ep.* 22 (84 Bidez) 429c–431b: cf. *Ep.* 37 (83 Bidez).
161 *ELF* 56 (Soz. 5.3.7.) Cf. Constantine's favour for Christian Orcistus in 324/5; T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) 211, 377 n. 13, citing *MAMA* 7.305 (= Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Admin*', no. 154).
162 *ELF* 125 (Soz. 5.4.1).
163 *Ep.* 40 (115 Bidez) 425a: n.b. also *ELF* 91, refusing to protect the city of Nisibis from the Persians as long as it stayed Christian.
164 See above, n. 120.
165 *ELF* 50 (reports in ecclesiastical historians): see above at n. 117. For future plans according to Christian sources: Greg. Naz. *Or.* 5.25f; Soz. *HE* 6.2.9; Theodoret, *HE* 3.21.4.
166 Euseb. *V. Const.* 4.37.8: Constantia = Maiuma, port of pagan Gaza. A deputation from Gaza to ask J. to reverse the privilege might be conjectured.
167 *Ep.* 41 (114 Bidez) 437c–438c (to the citizens of Bostra, conniving against Bishop Titus).
168 *Ep.* 21 (60 Bidez). Whether George was in fact murdered by a pagan rather than a Christian mob is debatable, but J. surely assumed the former: E.D. Hunt, 'Christians and Christianity in Ammianus Marcellinus', *JThS* 35 (1985) 192.
169 Jerome, *Vita Hilarionis*, 33 (*PG* 23.46c): the work has fictional elements (J. Kelly, *Jerome* (London, 1975) 172–4) but the detail here rings true.
170 Gaza: *ELF* 146 (= Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.93; Soz. 5.9). Arethusa: *ELF* 42 (= Greg. Naz. *Or.* 4.90; Soz. 5.10). Heliopolis: Soz. 5.10.
171 Cf. the stress laid on local factors in an earlier period in G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, 'Why were the early Christians persecuted?', in M.I. Finley, ed., *Studies in Ancient Society* (London, 1974), 210–48, esp. 225–6 (qualified at 241–2). N.b. J.'s *Ep.* 37 (83 Bidez) to the governor of Euphrates. See also Millar, 'Jews of the Graeco-Roman diaspora', 104.
172 Text above at n. 133, item (i).
173 Sallustius, *DM* 16.
174 Lib. *Orr.* 12.87, 91; 15.79. For important discussion of the persistence of a 'Homeric' pattern of religious experience implied by these and similar passages in Libanius' speeches to Julian, see Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, 148–9.
175 On the sources and chronology of the attempt see above, n. 61. Millar, 'Jews of the Graeco-Roman diaspora,' well emphasizes (pp. 106–8) J.'s central interest in Jewish sacrifice – and that on this score 'the Judaism which most deeply attracted him was one which no longer existed.' J.'s admiration for Jewish reverence for ancestral law was real, but so was the complaint of their exclusive monotheism in the *CG*: claims to the effect that J. worked towards an active and lasting general alliance with the Jews are excessive: for a judicious treatment, see Blanchetière,

'Julien philhéllene, philosémite, antichrétien', Gospel prophecies: Matth. 24.2; Mk. 13.2; Luke 19.44; 21.6.

176 Thus Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 102.

177 Malley, *Hellenism and Christianity*, 421.

178 P. Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) 93, citing *PG* 65, *Apophthegmata Patrum*, Olympius 1, 313cd.

179 *Ep.* 47 (111 Bidez) 434b (*epiphanôn* Bidez and MSS, *emphanôn* in Loeb).

180 Eunap. *Hist. fr.* 28 Blockley (26 Müller).

ENVOI

1 Amm. Marc. 25.9.12; Philostorgus, *HE*, 8.1.

2 Amm. Marc. 25.10.5 records Jovian's adornment of the tomb. The epitaph (cited in Zos. 3.34.4) quotes *Il.* 3.179, and its authenticity is doubted by Paschoud, *Zosime* II.1, p. 234.

3 Lib. *Orr.* 17 and 18 were composed by autumn 365: on their manner of circulation, P. Petit, 'Recherches sur la publication et la diffusion des discours de Libanius', *Historia* 5 (1956) 479–509.

4 Lib. *Or.* 18.126–9; 157–61; *Or.* 17.26; 31; 34.

5 Lib. *Or.* 18.304; discussion in A.D Nock, 'Deification and Julian', *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972) 833–46; on pagan ideas of J.'s afterlife, S. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, 1981) 134–8.

6 Eunap. *Hist. fr.* 28 Blockley (26 Müller).

7 *ELF* 158 [= Ammonius, *In Analyt. Prior.* I, 1, 24b18], attesting a (lost) work of J. *On the Three Schemata* (of syllogism).

8 Marin. *V. Procli*, 36.

9 Date: J. Bernardi (ed. and trans.), Greg. Naz. *Orr.* 4 and 5 (Paris, 1983) 11–37.

10 J. Richer, 'Les Romans syriaques', in R. Braun and J. Richer, eds, *L'Empereur Julien: de l'histoire à la légende* (Paris, 1978) 253 (massacre of Edessenes ordered); 265 (sorcery).

11 G.W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (London, 1978) xi (Neoplatonism); 19 ('nervous'); 20 (J. likened to Lenin); ch. 8 *passim*.

12 P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism* (Oxford, 1981) 152–4, 160, 181, 190–1.

13 G. Fowden, *From Commonwealth to Empire* (Princeton, 1993) 5–6, 52–6.

14 J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930) 345.

15 J. O'Donnell, 'The Demise of paganism', *Traditio* 35 (1979) 52–3. Contrast A.-J. Festugière, 'Julien à Macellum', *JRS* 47 (1957) 53–8, esp. 56–7, far more cautious on the impact of J.'s Christian tutors.

16 Eunap. *VS* 458/362W.

17 See above at Ch. 2, pp. 44ff.

18 MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony*, 161–221, esp. 177–96, whose p. 196 I quote; cf. Av. Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire* (Berkeley, 1991) 130–4.

19 *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. xxiii (vol. ii, p. 432 ed. Bury).

20 Amply shown in R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth,

1986) chs 4 and 5 *passim*, esp. 148–9 (locating J. in a 'Homeric' pattern), and summary statements at pp. 163ff, 259ff; 669ff for the pace of 4th-cents., 'demise'. For a different (localizing) focus on pagan survivals in the 4th–7th cents, G. Bowersock, *Hellenism in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1990), chs iii, iv (whose judgements of J.'s own case at pp. 6 and 26 I would question, however).

21 On Constantine's moves against pagans, see, e.g., *ILS* 705, an edict of 333/5 demanding that a new shrine at Hispellum should not be 'polluted by the deceits of any contagious superstition'; the extreme view of T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) 210–12 (since amplified in 'Constantine's prohibition of pagan sacrifice', *AJP* 105 (1984) 69–72 and 'Christians and pagans in the reign of Constantius', in *Fondation Hardt Entretiens XXXIV, L'Église et L' Empire au IV^e siècle* (Geneva, 1989) 322ff) that Constantine himself issued a general law forbidding sacrifice outright remains controversial. On the forbidding of sacrifice by law in 341 (*Cod. Theod.* 16.10.20) and on Constantius' measures of the 350s, J. Geffcken, *The Last Days of Greco-Roman Paganism*, trans. S. MacCormack (Amsterdam, 1978) 121; P. Chuvin, *A Chronicle of the Last Pagans* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990) 36–40.

22 Lib. *Orr.* 17.4; 18.171.

23 E. D. Hunt, 'Christians and Christianity in Ammianus Marcellinus', *CQ* 35 (1985) 200.

24 Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, xi.

25 R. MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1984) 86. On the 'new idioms' in which paganism came to be expressed as public sacrifice declined, P. Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) 49–53.

26 J.B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire from the Death of Theodosius I to the Death of Justinian* AD 395–AD 565 (London, 1923) vol. i, p. 360.

27 G. Fowden, 'Bishops and temples in the Eastern Roman Empire AD 320–435', *JThS* 29 (1978) 53–77; MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire*, ch. 10 *passim*, esp. pp. 88–9 on the events at Gaza in the 390s in the time of Bishop Porphyry (cf. the anti-pagan 'pilgrimage of violence' of Maternus Cynegius, Praetorian Prefect in the East, 384–8: discussion in J. Matthews, *Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court* AD 364–425 (Oxford, 1975) 140ff.

28 Lactant. *De Mort. Pers.* 10.7ff; Euseb. *V. Const.* 2.50. Discussion of the event and the subsequent fortunes of the oracle under Constantine in H. Parke, *The Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor* (London, 1985) 106ff; H. Gregoire, 'Les pierres qui crient: les chrétiens et l'oracle de Didymes', *Byzantion* 14 (1939) 318–21.

29 J. declares his status as prophet in *Ep.* 18 (88 Bidez) 451b, immediately after quoting a Didyman response which attacks 'those who act in folly against the priests of the gods' (also quoted in *Letter to a Priest* 297c = 89b Bidez); Soz. 5.20 records J.'s order to destroy shrines to martyrs constructed adjacent to the sanctuary.

30 *SIG* ii^3, 906a.

31 The authorship of the famous anonymous poem preserved in Philostorgius (*HE* 7.77) and in Cedrenus (1.532; no. 627 in *The Oxford Book of Greek Verse*) has been much discussed: C.M. Bowra, *On Greek Margins* (Oxford, 1970) 233ff [= *Hermes* 87 (1959) 426–35], proposes a post-Julianic Christian author; T. Gregory, 'Julian and the last oracle at Delphi', *GRBS* 24 (1983) 355–66 grants a Julianic date and the possibility that the poem is an authentic plea for aid. According to Theodoret 3.21, J. consulted Delphi (and likewise Delos) in connection with the Persian campaign; in support, E.A. Thompson 'The Last Delphic Oracle', *CQ* 40 (1946) 35–6; T. Gregory, 'Oracle at Delos', *Classical World* 76 (1983) 290–1. See also above, p. 242, n. 172.

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WHAT DID THE 'LAST PAGAN EMPEROR' ACTUALLY BELIEVE?

Julian's brief reign (AD 361–3) saw the last attempt ever made by a Roman Emperor to counter the spread of Christianity. At a time of accelerating religious change in antique society, his repudiation of a Christian upbringing and his vigorous promotion of pagan cult across the Empire made a profound impression on contemporaries, pagan and Christian alike.

Julian's Gods examines the cultural mentality of Julian and explores its impact on his public project for a pagan restoration. In discussing the religious and intellectual allegiances at issue, it focuses especially on their expression in Julian's own writings. The surviving letters, treatises and speeches make up a substantial and varied dossier and offer rare insights into the personal attitudes and motivation of a remarkable ruler: they show the 'last pagan Emperor' as a learned man of letters, an avid student of Greek philosophy and a talented author in his own right.

This elegant and closely argued study will deepen understanding not only of Julian, but also of the cultural milieu of fourth-century Neoplatonism and its bearing on late pagan thought and practice.

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